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July 26, 1970
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k., ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~p~1~Oved ~r?~2e~e~~ 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R0011 /090034-0 ~?ecret D?R.E~TORATE OF 11.JTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum Chile's Election--the Candidates and 'heir Programs Secret G July 1970. No. 0525j70 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 8'7 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 WARNING 'I'bis document contains information a(fectinb the national defense of the United Statca, within the meaninb of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission ar revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibitul by law. onovr i C%CLUOLD 1'IION :'.VTOYATIC UUN'Nll11AU1NO ANU UL(i1.AANIFILATION Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05/255~~1?~85T00875R001100090034-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 6 July 1970 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Chile's Election--The Candidates And Their Programs Summary Chileans will go to the polls on 4 September to elect a new president. The three candidates presently in the race are: Jorge Alessandri, an independent conservative; Salvador Allende, who is supported by the extreme left; and Radomiro Tomic, a Christian Democrat. Alessandri is stressing the benefits of his previous term as president (1958-64) and of "reform with tranquility." He gives comfort to those conservatives who dislike the direction in which Chile now is moving, but he has no consistent ideological program. Allende's program leans heavily on Marxist and Eastern European models, and he is a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro. Although he per- sonally does not believe that violent revolution is the solution to Chile's problems, many in his party do. Tomic has not moved to claim the political cen- ter; in fact, his program is in many respects identi- cal to that of Allende. He praises the record of the past six years of Christian Democratic government but, like President Frei in 1964, claims that his social and economic reforms will be instituted under a non- capitalist system. The armed forces have gone out of their way to emphasize support for Chilean democ- racy; so it seems 1?.kely that one of these three men will be inaugurated president in November, particu- larly if the two are close in voting strength. Note: TT Z~orandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Central Reference Service, the Office of National Estimates, and the Di.?ectorate fvr Plans. 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2 a 001100090034-0 Introduction 1. A crucial element in the presidential elec- tion is the constitutional provision for a congres- sional run-off if no candidate wins an absolute ma- jority of the popular vote. In such an event, con- gress, meeting in joint session, will elect the pres- ident from the top two contenders. Congress tradi- tionally has elected the candidate with the plurality, but there is no certainty that th~.s tradition mill be followed this year. 2. The Chilean armed forces remained largely apolitical from the 1930s until 1969, when low pay and lack of equipment led some officers to resort to political pressures. Last month the commander in chief of the army, General Rene Schneider, said the armed forces would support the right of the congress to elect the presidential candidate with the second largest vote. Although Schneider said he was merely emphasizing that the military would uphold the con- stitution, this statement was interpreted as support for Tomic and a blow to Alessandri, who is generally considered to be the front runner. Schneider stirred up some adverse comment within the air force and the navy for implying that he spoke for all the armed forces. 3. The campaign this year so far lacks the sharp left-rigYit polarization that existed in 1964 when Chris- ',:ian Democrat Eduardo Frei was elected presid~,it by a majority of the popular vote. The 74-year-old Ales- sandri,who was president from 1958 through 1964, has the support of the conservative Nai:ional Party and many independents. Salvador Allende, a Socialist senator and a three-time presidential loser, is supported by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Radical Party, and an assortment of other leftist groups, in- cluding the ex-Christian Democrats who left the party in 19ti9. After an unsuccessful bid for Communist sup- port, Radomiro Tomic is running with only the backing of his own Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Approved For Release 2006/05/2 : C - P85T00875R001100090034-0 i Approved For Release - 758001100090034-0 4. Jorge Alessandri is viewed by many conserva- tives a:, Chile's only hope for salvation from the leftism of Tomic and Allende. These conservatives are disillusioned by the unsettling economic and so- cial reforms of President Frei, for whom many of them voted in 1964 as the only al- ternative to Allende's radi- calism. Alessandri has en- deavored, however, to avoid becoming tarnished by associ- ation with the extreme right. He is running as an independ- ent, although he has the of- ficial support of the conserv- ative National.Party (PN),., Indeed, it was his associa- tion in the public mind with the PN that helped that party to run second in the congres- sional elections of March 1969. His campaign is being supported by various other inde endent groups This mixture is inherently unwieldy, an A essan ri s c ances have been weakened by bicker- ing among his backers. Alessandri's Background 5. Alessandri's father was President of Chile twice. In 1924 he was ousted by conservatives but the next year was recalled by a liberal junta to serve out the rest of his term. This background has given Jorge a strong sense of national pride and of personal responsibility. 6. Some of Alessandri's political appeal un- doubtedly comes from his name; his father, Arturo Alessandri, is one of the national heroes of Chile. He professes to view himself as a national leader above party politics. Although he has few close friends, he is able to establish a rapport with - -~- -- Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05 ~DP85T00875R001100090034-0 25X1 crowds, particularly the lower classes, from whom he receives much of his support. 7. Alessandri received a degree in civil en- gineering from the University of Chile in 1919. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1925. In 1927, his father's government was overthrown and the family was exiled to Argentina. Jorge served as min- ister of finance from 1947 to 1950, and in 1957 was elected to the Senate. His popular vote margin over Salvador Allende in the presidential election of~1958 was extremely slim, and during his administration in- flation continued to be a serious problem. 8. A major question iii the 1970 election is that of the 74-year-old Alessandri's health. Al- though he has seemed vigorous through much of the campaign, in a recent television program he appeared old and feeble. His hands shook, his voice quavered, and backers of Tomic and Allende were greatly en- couraged. If he can project a strong appearance through the rest of the campaign, however, he should be able to reassure the voters. Alessandri's Program 9. Unlike Tomic and Allende, Alessandri has no formal program. He is said to believe that pro- jecting his image is the important thing and that he will worry about his program after he is elected. His speeches combine praise of his former adm~.nistra- tion with promises to improve the economic situation. Alessandri has supported copper agreements drawn up last year under the Frei government and has said that if "national circumstances" and world copper prices permit, he will exercise the option to buy the remaining 49 percent of the Anaconda Company operations sometime after January 1972. Despite his commitment to private enterprise, however, Alessandri probably would not veto nat~.onalization legislation if it were passed by congress. 10. Thexe is some evidence that Alessandri is bitter toward the US, but Yie certainly would be friendlier than Allende. Some of his backers have been hurt by programs of the Alliance for Progress. Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 20 `' 758001100090034-0 AlessG:~dri has said that he was forced into brea]v- ing relations with Cuba in 1964, and he probably would not stop the small agricultural shipments to Cuba that were recently resumed. Like his opponents, Alessandri has criticized the present constitutional structure of Chile, suggesting in particular that the president be given more power over the budget. Aless andri's Campaign 11. Early in 1969 most observers concluded that Alessandri planned to run for president in 1970. It was generally believed, however, that he would delay an official announcement until a groundswell of popu- lar opinion once again "called" him to the political arena. A mutiny by an army regiment in October 1969 and pressure from his advisers caused him to advance his timing. Even before he had made his entry offi- cial, Alessandri was considered to be well ahead of any rivals. His campaign may have peaked too early, however, and his appeal may decrease as tYie election nears. 12. Alessandri appears to have little control over his own campaign. Although he stresses that he does not want to turn back the clock, some of his advisers are drawn from the-.most reactionary sectors of society. He has failed to rely on the National Party's existing organization, working instead througn the individual independent groups. An additional complicating factor is the support of old-guard Radi- cals who refuse to back their party leaders, who sup- port Allende. Alessandri's backers are already quar- reling over the division of cabinet posts and other patronage, and some of his advisers seem to believe that simply involving his name is enough to win the elections. Alessandri and the Military 13. The military's attitude toward Alessandri is somewhat ambivalent, although he claims to have close relations with armed forces leaders. High- ranking conservative officers probably believe he is the person best suited to lead the country at Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 SECRET Approved For Release - 758001100090034-0 this time: Outlook 14. At present, the crucial questions confront- ing the Alessandri campaign are the candidate's health and his backers' organization. If Ale,~sandri can .project a vigorous image throughout the rest of the campaign, he will have a good chance of being elected president. More bickering among his supporters, how- ever, could cause such chaos in his campaign that he would be unable to overcome it aimply by force of personality. Alessandri must win a plurality~in order to be elected. If he comes in second, he could not get enough congressional support to be elected. More- over, running second in the popular vote probably would be such a blow to his pride that he would not want to try to break the tradition that congress elects the person with the highest popular vote. 15. Senator Salvador Allende is running for the presidency for the fourth time. He is a member of the Socialist Party (PS) , which advocates armed revolution, and is supported by the Commu- nist Party (PCCh) , but many political moderates in Chile will vote for him because they do r_ot consider him a violence- oriented leftist--as in- deed he is not. Allende~s lengthy exposure 'to na- tional politics has gi~r~en his candidacy a bourgeois "old-shoe" cast. This familiarity is a two- edged sword, however, and in the 1970 campaign Al- lende has fought to over- come the image of a three-time loser. Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05/2~~85T00875R001100090034-0 16. At the beginning of the campaign, Allende appeared to be running a strong second to Jorge Alessandri. His unstable coalition, .l1or~Tever, failed to coalesce, and this campaign at times seemed un- directed despite the organizational strength of the Communists. By the beginning of June, many reports discounted the possibility that he could finish second. On 2 June, however, his campaign received a shot in the arm when a rally in downtown Santiago drew between 60,000 and 100,000 people. Initial assessments indicate that the rally may have stimu- lated strong popular enthusiasm for Allende in the Santiago area, cutting into Tomic and Alessandri strength. If Allende can capitalize on this new momentum, he may be able to turn the election once again into a close three-man contest. A1lende's Background 17. Allende is 61 ye~~rs old and has been ac- tive in the Socialist Party since the 1930s. Most of his early career was spent working as a lawyer, but he received a degree in medicine from the Uni- versity of Chile in 1932. In 1937 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies from Valparaiso, and he served as ministe r of public health from 1939 through 19 42 . 18. The PS has suffered innumerable schisms and reunifications, the most recent in 1967. Allende has been involved in the splits, but he has always remained prominei:~ :~n some identifiable political group. As a result of the political maneuvering of the last 35 years, he has made a number of enemies on the left. Important members of. the present So- cialist Party believe that he is too much a member of the political estab iishment to be an effective leaner of the revolution they deem n~.cessary. He was by no means pertain of the presidential nomina- tion of the Socialist Party, although the Communists had virtually promised him their backing. His Popu- lar Unity (UP) coalition. has been hammered together by the Communists and is unstable at best. Allende remains, however, the Marxist most able to run a strong campaign in a free democratic election. Approved For Release 2006/05/2 85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05/$ r ~85T00875R001100090034-0 A1lende's Program l9. ~~In December 1969, before the official des- ignation of Allende as standard-bearer for_ the UP, a Popular Unity Program was adopted by the Communists, Socialists, Radicals, and assorted leftist splinter groups. Allende ras ignored portions of the program, especially ?:hcse that m~ ght frighten or alienate Large numbers of uncommitted voters. On 2 June, how- ever, he enunciated a program of "Forty Points," which, he claims, will be enacted as soon as he takes office. His program ranges from such bread-and-butter issues as ending sales taxes and freezing montage interest rates to imposition of stiff penalties for "ecanomi c crimes." In a special jab at Alessandri, A11~nde promised that the holdings of wealthy famili.t~;;, in- cluding those of the Alessandris, would be tu:c~?ied over to the stat.P. Allende plans to nationalize basic resources now in the hands of "domestic and foreign monopoly interests"--the large copper com- panies; the iron, nitrate, iodine, and coal indus- tries; private industrial monopolies and other large companies; and enterprises that affect economic and social development, such as electric power, trans- portation, communications, petroleum and liquid gas, steel, cement, petrochemicals, cellulose, and paper. 20. A1lende's program calls for a number of re- visions in the Chilean political system. Like Tomic, he proposes the creation of a unicameral legislature. Although the program itself includes a restructuring of the judicial system, Allende has ignored this as- pect. A Soci,3lis?'t senator caused some consternation by stating that after A1lende's victory, "paredones," or execution w2:lls , would be used to eliminate the exploiting classes. P.llende has been quick to "explain" that this was only a figure of speech. 21. As expecte3, Allende has emphasized f~reign- policy issues. 23e calls for closer relations with Socialist countries, denounces the OAS as a tool of US imperialism, and says he will revise or denounce treaties that "compromise" Chilean sovereignty. His dir.?ect attacks on the US have been muted, however, pr~~bably in order to avoid the situation that 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05 I - P85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2 ~ 5R001100090034-0 occurred in 1964 when he was cast as the villain ;n a struggle between Communism and democracy. AllPnde's Campaign 22. Allende's campaign so far has bP.en an un- easy combination of Socialist rhetoric and Communist organization. Allende, who himself does not advocate violent revolution, has at times been put on the de- fensive by his extremist Socialist supporters. The Chilean Communist Party leaders, on she other hand, are strong advocates of peaceful revolution, and a strong showing by Allende is imperative if. the PCCh is to retain its attractiveness to young leftists, Therefore the Communists, despite grumbling about the lack of enthusiasm on the part of. the Socialists, are mustering all their forces behind Allende. 23. Early in May, A1lende'S campaign received a setback when it was rumored that he had suffered a heart attack. He appeared o~.i television shortly thereafter, however, and claimed that his illness was merely a severe case of the grippe and accompany- ing heart difficulties. Since then he has campaigned vigorously and has not presented tY~e image of an ill man, although he apparently does have some severe medical problems. 24, Because the Socialist Party espouses vio- lent revolution, Allende has been placed on the de- fensive on the "law-and-order" issue. Violence in the countryside over the agrarian reform program and even bank robberies have become associated in the popular mind with Allende's Socialist supporters. Alessandri in particular is hammering at this theme. The discovery last month of a guerrilla training camp in southern Chile has intensified public apprehension. Three of the six persons arrested have been identi- fied as Socialists, and Allende has already been forced to answer questions about their connection with the party Allende and members of the UP have complained bitterly. about what they refer to as a "campaign of terror" against them that seeks to emphasize leftist violence. and differences within the UP. 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05I~~DP85T00875R001100090034-0 Outlook 25. Allende's campaign got off to a good start, and he was considered py most to be running well ahead of Tomic. He entered a slump about a month ago, but his rally ~n 2 June has provided renewed momentum, and the Communists' organiza- tional ability is bo~xnd to produce results. If he should finish a strong second to Alessandri; the vote of the Christian Democrats in 'congress would. . be crucial. All the votes of the UP and a signifi- cant portion of the PDC would be enough to ensure him the presidency. If AlesSandri received much more than 40 percent of the popular vote, he probably would be elected, but if the candidates are closer, Allende will be strongly tempted to try to strike a deal those leftist Christian Democrats he might be able to woo . 26. Radomiro Tomic is the presidential candi- d~~te of the Chilean Chri:~tian Democratic Party (PDC) . Eduardo Frei, a founder cif the party, has been presi- dent of Chile since 19 64 . He cannot: succeed himself , and Tomic, who served as ambassador to the tJS from 1965 until 19 ~8, hopes to continue Christian Democra- tic control of the government. When Tomic was nominated RADOMIRO TOMIC WITH FAMILY late in 1969, he was generally considered to be running a poor third behind Alessandri and Allende. Despite his initially poor prospects, Tomic's campaign has been gathering momentum during the past months. Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05/~~CP85T00875R001100090034-0 To,;~ic's Background 27. RaZomiro Tomic, 56 years old, is a self-made man who has played an important role in the develop- ment of the Christian Democratic Party. He received a law degree in 1941 from the Catholic University in Santiago and was elected to the Chamber of Deputies the same year. He worked with Eduardo Frei to change the National Falange from the reform-oriented youth group of the Conservative Party to the Christian Demo- cratic Party, which was able to elect a president the second time it entered a candidate. 28. Some of Tomic's social and economic ideas undoubtedly are a result of the relative poverty in which he spent his youthful years. His father was an immigrant Yugoslav, which probably explains Tomic's admiration for Tito and the Yugoslav system. 29. Tomic is ambitious, and for years he has been regarded as Frei's chief competitor within the PDC and as his successor as president. Nevertheless, he had to wage a battle for the party's nomination and at one point last year withdrew his nai~le from consideration. His attempts to woo the Communist Party were probably made only part~.y because he saw an ideological affinity--he is well aware of the organizational power of the Communists. 30. One of the chief drawbacks to Tomic's cam- paign has been his own personality. Many Chileans refer to him as "Mister Blah-B1ah" because of his non-stop volubility. But non - Christian Democrats are attracted to him because of his association wiih Frei and the fact that he offers a non-Marxist aiier- native to the conservatism of Alessandri. Tomic's Program 31. In May the PDC Plenary Council, which has 128 members including the National Council, PDC mem- bers of congress, and provincial chiefs, adopted a platform for Tomic's presidential candidacy. The thrust of the program is socialist and statist, with heavy reliance on Christian Democratic "communitarian" ideas. Known as the Cartagena Document, the program Approved For Release 2006/0 - DP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05~~i~F~DP85T00875R001100090034-0 is very much in line with the philosophy Tomic has expressed privately and publicly for the past several years. It stresses "the new economy," a Tomic concept i:hat foresees the coexistence of private and of "popu- lar" enterprises, carried on by the state, sma1.1 in- dividual producers, cooperatives, and workers. 32. An important part of Tonic's program that is echoed in the Cartagena Document calls for the immediate nationalization of the large US-based cop- per companies. Although Tomic has praised Frei's "Chileanization" program, he has left no doubt that as president he would support nationalization legi~- lation. An acceptab le form of compensation probably could be worked out, however. 33. Tomic, along with Frei, Allende and Ales- sandri, has criticized the present constitutional arrangements. Like Allende, he would like to see a unicameral legislature so that legislation would not be stalemated in congress, as it has often been during President Frei's administration. Tomic has stated that "in order to get laws p" 34. Tomic has criticzed the Frei administration for not moving fast enough in certain phases of eco- nomic and social reform. Recently, however, he has changed his line. He is now emphasizing the achieve- ments of the past six years and is promising to build on this foundation to bring even greater benefits to the Chilean people. His relationship with Frei has been strained; the President has disapproved of Tomic's desire to negotiate for Communist support. Within the last two months, however, Frei has begun a concerted effort to transfer some of his popularity to Tomic. In his annual message to Congress last month, Frei indirectly endorsed Tomic's candidacy, although at the same time opposing complete nationaliz~ition of copper and PDC unity with the left. Following the speech, Tomic and Frei appeared together at a PDC celebration. Tomic apparently has given up on his attempt to gain support for his presidential candi- lacy from the Communists and other leftists, and he may try to move more closely to the center of the political spectrum in the expectation of picking up moderates from both camps. -12- I I 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 8758001100090034-0 Tomic and the Left 35. When Tomic returned from the US and began his pre-campaign, he hoped to split the Chilean Com- munist Party (PCCh) from its Socialist partners and run for president with Communist support. The PCCh itself received nearly 16 percent of the total vote in congressional elections last year. This strer~gth is firm as the party can mobilize its adherents in a relatively solid bloc behind the candidates it en- dorses. Tomic believed that he could use the Commu- nists' voting strength and organization, while main- taining his independence after the election. 36. The Communists, however, refused to go a- long with Tomic. They may have been motivated in part by a belief that he would be less malleable than Allende . In addition, they probably believed that prospects for Allende's election in 1970 were excellent, and ?trey were reluctant to pass up the opportunity. FL?rthermore, cooperating with the PDC would have laid the PCCh open even. further to attacks by extremists from the Socialist Party and the Move- ment of the Revolutionary Left on the party's "revolu- tionary zeal." 37. Tomic seems finally to have reconciled him- self to a campaign without the Communists, and indeed has begun to attack the Communist-Socialist-Radical coalition. He is now stressing the theme that when those parties last controlled the Chilean Government (1938-1948), they accomplished little. This shift probably has helped his political rapprochement wi~.,h Frei. 38. Tomic is campaigning without the Communists, but he probably is still counting on their support in Congress should he run second to Alessandri. A1?~hough in such a case some leftists might boycott the elec- tion or even vote for Alessandri--hoping, thereby, to send the country into chaos from which the left could then rescue it--Tomic is optimistic that he can strike a deal with the more pragmatic Communists. As in the case of Allende, the combined votes of the PCCh and the PDC would suffice to give him the presi- dency. If Alessandri received much more than 40 percent Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0 Approved For Release 2006/05/~~f~P85T00875R001100090034-0 of the popular vote, he probably would be elected presideizt in any event. If the three candidates are closer, however, the political logrolling in Congress is likely to be intense. ~ut1OOk 39. After a faltering start, Tomic's campaign now is swinging into high gear. It is widely ac- ~knowledged that he is running the best campaign of the three candidates. He has access to substantial government funds ar~d the support of most of the gov- ernment ap;~aratus, and is using modern campaign tech piques of radio, television, and newspaper publicity. Experienced PDC politicians who have been working in the government since 1964 now are returning to party affairs to help his campaign. For example, PDC work- ers claim to have enrolled 60,000 new voters in the countryside, using the facilities of the agrarian re- form program. 40. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Tomic could be the leader in the election, espe- cially if the health problems of Allende and Ales- sandri become more pronounced before September. If he runty a strong second, he will be under great tempta- tion to strike a des] with the Communists, hoping to ensure himself of the presidency. Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090034-0