REACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA TO ALLENDE'S VICTORY IN CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090044-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: September 17, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE- OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandurr~
Reactions in Latin America to ~Qllende's Victory i~a Chile
State Dept. review
completed
.Secret
87
17 September 1970
No. 1463/70
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WARNING
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 September 1970
, INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Reactions in Latin America to Allende's Victory in Chile
Summary
There seems to be a widespread conviction in
Latin America that Salvador Allende 's 36-percent
plurality in the Chilean presidential election is
a political watershed that is likely to have impor-
tant repercussions throughout the hemisphere. Most
y~vernments have refrained from public comment, ap-
parently choosing to await the outcome of the vote
of the Chilean Congress on Allende and rtxnne r-up
Jorge Alessandri that is scheduled for 24 October.
They no doubt also want to appraise opinion at home
and to study the reactions of other Latin American
countries and of the US. Cuba is apparently the
only country that nas formally congratulated Allende,
but the text of the message has not yet been made
public and Fidel Castro has withheld comment. In
general, political reactions have fallen into three
categories. Orthodo:c Marxists and radical national-
ists are jubilant over Allende's victory. They be-
lieve that their chances for a larger political role
have been enhanced in many countries. Christian
Democratic and other left-of-center parties are dis-
appointed over the defeat of Radomiro Tomic, Chile's
Christian Democratic candidate, and are worried about
their own political fortunes. Political groups in
the center and on the right are concerned and appre-
hensive; many are hostile. In some countries these
groups probably will counsel harsher treatment of
left-wing opposition. On the extreme right, ichere
is unmitigated opposition to Allende.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was pr~:pared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates
and the Deputy Directorate for Plans.
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Initially, the Soviet px~ess has greeted Allende's
victory with enthusiasm, calling the results a "big
success for left-wing forces." The election results
are seen as having "profound, significance" as regards
bolstering the ind~:pendence from the US not only of
Chile but all Latin America. The Director of Moscow's
Latin American Institute told a US Embassy official
on 1 September that the USSR would aid an Allende
administration if the US were to pursue a policy of
"economic isolation" like that toward Cuba, Ike added
that if the US and Chile continue to have "noxmal re-
lations," he saw "little ~,rospect of sizable Soviet
aid."
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Reactions From Chile's Neighbors
1. It is .likely that the first and some of
the most important effects of Allende's election
will be felt by Chile's immediate neighbors--Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, and Peru. Since the 1830s rela-
tions between Chile and both Peru and Bolivia have
been marred by rivalry and hostility. Chile's min-
eral rich northernmost provinces were won from Bo-
livia and Peru as a result of the War of the Pacific
(1879-1883), and the paramount issue still dividing
Chile and Bolivia grows out of La Paz' unyielding
desire to regain access to the Pacific. Argentine-
Chilean relations, likewid.e, have been troubled for
decades by smoldering boundary disputes and military
rivalry and competition. All three of Chile's
neighbors, for different reasons, will be sedulous
observers of Allende and his Popular Unity coali-
tion, though to date the attitude of a ach has been
cautious.
2. A higY'_-level US observer in Lima has re-
ported that Allende 's victorl- "has been generally
well received" and should "give the Peruvian Gov-
ernment renewed determination to pursue its revolu-
tionary program." Moderate generals, however, ai?e
worried abot;t the existence of a Communist state on
Peru's southern border, especially in the light of
the long-standing military rivalries with Chile.
3. Members of the Velasco government thus far
have refrained from ublic comments on the Chilean
election
Those govern-
men~: officials who are strongly committed to the
"revolutionary" programs of the Velasco administration
and to even more rapid reforms probably think that
an Allende government will reinforce Peru's revolution.
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~L,I.~K.r,1
4. More moderate members of the Velasco govern-
ment, however, are probabl disturbed b Allende's
success.
Moderate military leaders prob-
ably believe t at a Marxist government in Chile would
make it more difficult for them to oppose the rapid
pane of reform currently espoused by their own radi-
cals, and many of the generals may fear that Chile
will become a center for subversion in Latin America.
There is probably also apprehension that the Soviets
will build up their military strength in Chile if
Allende takes office in November.
5. Despite these mixed views toward Allende,
the Peruvian Government's relations with the Popular
Unity coalition would probably be friendly, and the
two governments would be likely to find areas of com-
mon interest. For instance, although Peru has felt
that it cculd not take the initiative in restoring
relations with Cuba, it might be Buick to follow a
Chilean exchange of ambassadors with Havana.
Bolivia
6. So far, President Ovando is one of. only four
Latin American heads of state who have commented
publicly on Allende 's victory. Although he told US
Ambassador Siracusa on election eve that he favored
Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of Chile's Christian
Democratic Party, he said on 7 September in a press
conyerence that "it is possible for Bolivia to live
in friendship with a Marxist regime that doesn't use
violence to impose its goals" and expressed the belief
that the Chilean Congxess should declare Allende
wi n:~er. Asked if he thought Bolivian-Chilean relations
might improve under an Allende administration, Ovando
replied that "if Allende really wants justice not only
in his country, but in the whole world, logically he
must recognize Bolivia's right to the sea."
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7. Bolivian military leade rs, however, view an~
Allende government with considerable alarm.
The
military apparently fear that with Allende in power,
Bolivian guerrillas and urban terrorists could expect
considerable support from Chi],ean sources .
9. Reaction among other sectors in Bolivia has
been mixed. Moderate businessmen reportedly fear
that radicals will be reinforced and more audacious
and that Bolivia will lean more toward the left un-
der the influence of an Allende administration, es-
pecially because the Bolivian Government is "without
definition." They reportedly are afraid that a
"strong anti-:IS front composed of Chile, Peru, and
Bolivia could become a reality."
10. Loaders of the important Bolivian Mine Work -
ers Federation and the. Bolivian Workers..Ceritral report-
edly consider the Allende victory "a triumph of the
working class and oppressed ma:!.ses.." They believe
that Allende will develop "intEwnse" relations with
Cuba bat that he will move cahinly and gradually in
implementing domestic reforms. They do not discount
the possibility of a "right-wing" coup attempt.
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Argentina
13.. Although the government thus far has not
reacted publicly, it is deeply concerned over the
election outcome.
12. Foreign Ministry officials aze taking a
cautious approach and believe that :i~: is premature
to comment publicly on the Allende victory.
13. The US Embassy in Bue~zos Aires reports that
the Argentine military are "quite concerned--even
alarmed--by prospects of an Allende presidency, but
they are not in a state of panic." Army commander
General ~Ganusse said that the situation "is very
serious for Argentina," but did not imply an impend-
ing Argentine military mope. The Emb assy reports
that the government "apparently propose to take no
initiatives in the matter at this time." Foreign
Ministry officials reportedly believe that reaction
in Chile against any Argentine intervention would be
swift and united.
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14. Reaction by Argentine politicians 1^as thus
far been low-key . Most leaders have refrained from
public comment, but there is widespread opinion that
an Allende government would be a major and tragic
hemispheric development. Peron's representative in
Argentina, however, extolled the victory of. the
Chilean "popular movement" and identified Peron with
Allende. Argentine Communist Party leaflets have
lauded Allende and have cal.leci for unity against the
Argentine dictatorship. Although a variety of labor
leaders have expressed disappointment over the elec-
tion, even foreseeing an eventual Communist take-over
in Chile, they zre "in no sense ala7-med." There has
.been almost no discernible student reaction.
Reaction from Other South American Countries
Brazil
Foreign Ministry and high-level m~.litary
circ es ave adogted a righteous "we-told -you-so"
attitude, charging that a "socialist" government like
Frei's will "inevitably lead to a Communist regime."
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17. There are no indications that either the
Brazilian Government or the military are consiaer-
ing taking any action against Chile, but the military
apparently views increased informal cooperation with
Argentina as an inevitable out rowth of the Chilean
situation.
18. Reaction from Brazil's generally conserva-
tively oriented press has been hostile and apprehen-
sive. The independent Jornal do Brasil called the
outcome a "political earthquake, more terrible than
past earthquakes in Chile." The conservative O
Estado de Sao Paulo warned that ''it is not the first
time in contemporary history that dictatorship comes
to power taking advantage of democratic cons~l:Y.tu-
tional rights ....Adolf Hitler was an examp).e .E.si
1933." 0 Jornal blames the election result on Chile's
democratic forces, particularly the Christian Demo-
crats, who had "allowed" themselves to be seduced
by the lullaby of cooperation "with the Marxists."
O Estado de Sao Paulo saw an Allende government
following the path of Cuba, including the "solicita-
tion of Soviet alms," and O Jornal. foresaw a menace
of subversion from Chile "with its red frontiers
bordering on the Latin democracies."
Venezuela
19. President Caldera, in a press conference
on 10 September, said that much can be learned from
the Chilean elections both by those who "cel~~brate"
the results az~d by those who "lament," He added,
however, that lie believes President Frei is still
the most popular: political figure in Chile. fTis
remarks were probably intended to blunt charges in
Venezuela that Christian Democracy in Latin America
is declining. (Caldera's Christian Democratic Party
(COPET) is the only major Christian Democratic 1:arty
outside of Chile.)
20. A COPEI leader told the US Embassy in Ca-
racas that he and his associates ;were badly shaken
by Allende's victory and that the party would have
to study the implications. According to press re-
ports, he believes that the first lesson to be
learned from the Chilean election is that a united
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front of progressive parties is necessary in Vene-
zuela. Thus, in the short .run, Allende's victory
may tend to increase coopera`ion in Congress between
COPET and the progressive Accion Democratica party.
It may also enhance the possibility of broader coop-
eration among Venezuela's weak leftist forces, even
though Caldera and at least one oi:her pron.inent COPEI
leader have criticized Tomic for moving too fax? left
in his campaign in Chile.
2l. Former President Romulo Be tancourt stated
in. public that the election results i:n Chile must be
respected acid that A1lende's victory proves the
bankruptcy of the radical Marxist view that violence
is the preferred means of attaining power. He went
an to reiterate his "Betancourt Doctrine" that only
those governmAnts acquiring power legally and through
elections should be afforded diplomatic recognition
and participation in the inter-American system.
Colombia
22. Reaction in Colombia is moderate and largely
uncritical, probably bec~~use of the widespread lack of
informed opinion about. Chile and the conviction that
Chilean political developmen is affect Colombia only
peripherally. President Misael Pastrana answered a
question about the Chilean election in a press confer-~
ence on 7 September. Although he stressed his inten-
tion to refrain from commenting on internal Chilean
politics, Pastrana nevertheless again advocated con-
stitutional reforms in Colombia to provide for run-off
elections when a candidate fails to win a majority
vote.
23. Much. of the discussion in Colombia about
Allende's victory seems to center on.the prospects
for the continuance of the Andean Pact, asub-regional
association of fire South American countries that has
been a favorite Colombian project for several years.
In his press conference Pastrana was optimistic that
Allende would uphold Chile's commitments to the pact.
Former President Lleras, who with Chilean President
Frei was the principal architect of the pact, also
publicly stated his belief that the association would
~ZOt be significantly affected by Allende's victory.
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24. Colombian press comments have been gener-
ally moderate and restrained. A columnist for E1
Espectador,.: ate- prestigious Bogota daily, said that
Allende is a serious person a.nd not .a "tropical"
like Castro.
Uruguay
25. Reaction in Uruguay has been limited so far
to press and media commentaries reflecting a favorable
reception of A1lende's victory. It is unlikely that
the Pacheco government will criticize the results in
view of Uruguay, 's firm commitinen.t'~ since the first
decades of the 20th century to an advanced welfare
system and socialism. Newspapers representing various
factions of the ruling Colorado Party state optimis-
tically that Allende will bring liberal socialism to
Chile within a democratic system. The Colorado paper
E1 Diario compared Allende's brand of socialism to
Dubcek's. Another Colorado paper, La Manama, notes
that. Allende's election strengthens Moscow's position
against radical Marxists and terrorists who espouse
violent paths to power. The Catholic paper favorably
compares Allende's politics to Scandinavian socialism.
The orthodox Con;~nunist Party daily, E1 Popular, of
course, was jubilant. _
Ecuador
26. On 10 September President Velasco Ibarra
became the fo!~zrth Latin American head of state to
comment publicly on Allende's victory. Quito radio
quoted his comment that "the Chilean people expressed
their sovereign will and it must be respected by all
states, whether they like it or not." There has been
no other offiaUNC reaction from Ecuador.
Reaction From Middle America 25X1
Mexico
27. :,Mexican officials have made no public state-
ments, but all of the press has expressed satisfaction
with the peaceful course of the election. Excelsior,.
a prominent Mexico City daily, editorialized that, "the
democratic maturity of the Chilean people exercised the
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right of self-determination, and they deserve the
highest respect from all the nations of the world."
2t ~;lso cautiously pointed out that "Allende, a
democratically and freely elected president, has
assumed, above any other considerations, a commit-
ment to freedom."
28. Another Excelsior editorial commented that
"Chi.l,ean socialism has come from the ballot box, not
from an explosion of viclence, assault on palaces, or
military coups." El Dia of Mexico City said that
Allende's victory expresses the desire of the Chilean
people for deep changes in the country's basic struc-
ture."
. 29. Such comments probably accurately reflect
the mood and opinions of many Mexican officials acid
the informed public. Mexico's firm espousal of non-
intervention, its tradition of popular and nationals-.~:
istic reforms growing out of its own experiences, and
its independent foreign policy impel it toward an
uncritical judSAment on Allende.
Central America and the Caribbean
31. Reaction from most Central?American and
Caribbean states has been limited and brief.
E1 Salvador
32. In E1 Salvador, where the Christian Demo-
cratic Party (PDC) is a major political force, the
Allende victory has attracted intensive medi
public attention, however. UNCODED 25X1
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n
that any PDC election victory will result in the
country being "sold out to the Communists." A colum-
nist who is often spokesman for the Salvadoran oli-
garchy is running a series that seeks to show that
Chilean Christian Democracy was responsib 1e for
Allende's victory.
Costa Rica
33. The Costa Rican press has also devoted de-
tailed attention tc~ the Chilean elections. Althcugh
it is almost uniformly critical, it probably. h'as
not reflected the depth of antipathy that President
Figueres feels for Allende. News accounts have em-
phasized that the Chilean Congress is expected to con-
firm A1lende's plurality arch that the Chilean mili-
tary is expected t~ respect the decision. Editorial
opinion, however, reflects dismay over Al~ende's
victory. La Nacion, an influential conservative
daily, termed it a "serious threat to all other Latin
American people" and criticized Chilean democratic
elements for being "lost in indecision." The more
progressive La Republica said that Allende's victory
could be blamed on the "suicidal efforts of Chilean
democratic elements." The only approving reaction
came from the Communist Youth of Costa Rica.
Honduras, Panama
34. Statements by Radio Honduras are probably
typical of the reactions of official and ruling circles
in the remaining Central American countries. A sta-
tion editorial emphasized that it was premature for
"Communists throughout the world" to show enthusiasm
for Allende's victory, because "we are sure that the
last word. is yet to be heard." Editorials in Panama's
pragovernment newspapers indicate unease over the out-
come of the Chilean election. The blame for the
"victory of Communism" is placed, however, on the
US for "lack of sensitivity" ?to Latin .American needs.
Editorials and signed columns war
n
that the PDC is a "bridgehead to communism" a
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Dominican Republic
35. Although President Balaguer of the Dominican
Republic has declined to com^~~nt, other officials have
thus far reacted with cauti_as acceptance. Some le ad-
ers have commented on the likelihood of A1lende's elec-
tion to the presidency by Congress and say that they
expect cordial relations with his government. Former
President Juan Bosch emphasized that Allende's victory
presented problems for US policy in~Latin America and
claimed that the US could do little to avert a "Chilean
Revolution" without:risk~ing?grave consequences.
36. Informed opinion in the Dominican Republic
takes a number of different lines. Comment concen-
trates on the belief that "it can't happen he~:e"
because the military would not permit it. Moderate
leftists are somewhat concerned that the Balaguer
government could adopt a more repressive attitude
toward the left and opposition in general. At the
same time, however, the Chilean election reinforces
the vie~,~s of some of the left that change is inevitable
and highly desirable. The Dominican Republic is some-
what isolated from the .Latin American political main-
stream, and Allende's victory is not likely to have
~n immediate or profound impact on the country's
political life.
37. So far Cuban public comment has been con-
fined to a few Radio Havana broadcasts and probably
to daily newspaper coverage. The tone of these
statements is enthusiastic without being overly
boastful or confident. It appears that Castro prefers
to continue the policy he followed during the Chilean
electoral campaign of avoiding comment on Chilean
affairs as much as possible.
38. Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende have been
friends since 1959, when the Chilean senator began
his frequent and regular visits to Cuba. Castro has
praised Allende many times during the past 11 years
and will be delighted to have a friend and sympathizer
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governing an important Latin American country. The
.Cuban leader went to some lengths to aid the Allende
campaign: ~
playing to perfection
a careful public role designed to deny A1lende's op-
ponents any issue. In..anticipation of A1lende's
victory, the Cuban Communist Party recently re-es-
tablished relations with the Chilean Communist Party
in order to be on good terms with the key element of
Allende's coalition. Havana's relations with Allende's
Socialist Party are already good. Havana probably
expects to gain an increase in trade, a resumption
of diplomatic ties, and a r"ull restoration o~ normal
intercourse bet:veen the two countries.
Conclusion
39. Preliminary reaction in Latin America to
Allende's victory has gerieraly been cautious. There
is widespread acceptance of or resignation to the
possibility tha,i. Allende will be inaugurated in No-
vember, and th~ar~~ seems to be no inclination in any
country to intPr:Eere openly in Chilean affairs. Most
governments have withheld official comment, in view
of the fluida.A::l of the Chilean situation.
40. These initial responses will probably pre-
vail at least until after the Chilean Congress votes
on the candidates. If Allende is confirmed, he will
probably receive the public endorsement's of additional
governments, and, once he is inaugurated, most coun-
tries of the hemisphere will pLObably attempt to es-
tablish cordial relations with his government.
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