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December 20, 2016
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April 25, 2006
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October 30, 1970
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l~? Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R0011000~QQ49,~4 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum 30 October 1970 No. 1480/70 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Wf~.RI\TI1l1G 'I'bis ~3orumcnt contains informution affecting the national defense of the united States, within the meaning of 'I'ith~ 18, sections 7J3 and ?4)4, of the US Code, us amended. Tts tr.intilnissior~ or revclatil~n of its contents to ar rc- teipt by un unauthorired person is prohibited by law, OROUP 1 Y%L'LUDYD )'11CN AUTOMATIC DCN N(111AUIN0 AND DYr_I.ANyIYICATi[IN ~~ Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 20 8001100090049-4 C~;NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEPICY P.i.rectorate of Intelligence 30 October 1970 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Current Soviet Foreign Policies Summary Since the Soviet Government formally announced its readiness to negotiate on strategic arms limitations in June 1968, matters have not stood still on the many int~~~rnational fronts where Moscow's foreigr,~ pol- icy is engaged. Relations with China worsened rap- idly in the next year and subsequently have leveled off at a new low. In Europe, the Czechoslovak crisis has come and gone, and a major thaw has oc- curred in Soviet - West German relations, which in turn has led to a new round of Berlin negotiations. A stormy succession of events in the Middle East has affected the policies of all concerned. Meanwhile So-'. viet military programs have rolled steadily forward, including not only continued R and D activity and construction programs for ICBMs and ballistic mis- sile submarines, but also the advent of Y-class submarine patrols in the Atlantic. It may there- fore be useful to examine the evidence that the So- viet Union may now be embarked on a new course in foreign policy and, in the light of that examination, to ~~peculate upon how the USSR will approach the next SALT round in Helsinki. Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZz~ b~ CIA. It raas prepared bg the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Office of National L'stimates. Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 2006/05/ ~ - P85T00875R001100090049-4 1. As a general rule, major changes in Soviet foreign policy are rare. Usually, sweeping ?altera- tions wait upon a shift of leadership or a truly critical external event; Stalin probably had to die before the USSR could decide to break out into the third world, and the Cuban missile crisis was nec- essary to put an end to Khrushchev's policy of un- remitting pressures. The Soviets, of course, have a general view of their. aims and like to see them- selves as having a consistent and well-coordinated policy. 1n practice, however, they are inclined to handle their policies separately, treating each on its merits and seeking to protect and promote their interests in each individual area. Tn the present context, in fact, they see efforts to link separate problems as a trap designed to maneuver the USSR into foregoing advantageous courses of action, or to inveigle it into pressuring friendly states like North Vietnam and the U.AR to do so, in return for little more than promises that their interests will be considered in other problem areas. 2. But i# substantial over-all changes occur only rarely in Soviet foreign policy, there are occasions nonetheless, when one issue becomes im- portant enough to affect significantly the USSR's handling of other problems. In recent years China has become such an issue. The Soviets have been obliged to acknowledge to themselves that the Sino- Soviet relationship is one of fundamental enmity. The massive Soviet build-up, which: has more than tripled Soviet troops along the frontier with China since 1965, is one manifestation of this acknowledge- ment. Another is the vigorous Soviet efforts to isolate China k~oth internationally and in the Com- munist movement. Although the Soviets probably hope that a post-Mao leadership will temper Chinese hos- tility, they are far from counting on this and real- ize that a harmonious future relationship is highly unlikely. ~ Ri Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 2 8001100090049-4 3. There is convincing evidence that the So- viets have felt it necessary to draw from this the conclusion that they would be wise to compose their relations to a certain extent with other states, primarily the US and West Germany. The guiding principle in this effort is the need to prevent others from collaborating with China or from exploit- ing the rift to Soviet disadvantage. Moscow remains as unwilling as ever to make concessions beyond the requirements of this principle. The China factor probably has contributed significantly to the Soviet decision to conduct SALT in a business-like fashion and to the wholeheartedness with which Moscow has taken up the opportunity offered by Brandt's elec- tion in September 1969. It has not, however, led the Soviets, into making substantial concessions in either area. t?or has it forced them to. curb their efforts to expand their influence in the Middle East simply to secure a;1 agreement with the West. Moscow has been working to avoid a simultane?~us heightening of tension on both its eastern and western flanks precisely in order to avoid being forced to make significant concessions to either adversary. In this context, the maturing of SALT and the advent of the Brandt government in West: Germany came at a propitious time. 4. The China factor may yet drive the USSR further in these directions in the future. During 1970, however, it seems to have lost some of its force. The Peking talks that began last October and the vague and unformalized accommodation that has developed along the frontier since ?ttien have kept the border areas free of fighting. Soviet propaganda, while not retreating on substantive mat- ters, has avoided the high polemical pitch that formerly ~:erved to keep the quarrel in the forefront of international affairs. Moscow has taken other steps, such as the return of an ambassador to Peking, to ease tensions and to give the appearance of re- laxation in relations with Peking. 5. More important, the USSR's fears about how other countries might react have not been realized. The West has not found ways to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift. China itself suspended the Warsaw talks with the US as a result of the Cambodian intervention. Bonn seems to have decided SECRET Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 20 ~ R001100090049-4 not to jeopardize its ra rochement with Moscow b flirtations with Pekin A t oug Pe ing s revive ip omacy an a tempts o reak out of its international isolation may create new problems for Ploscow, the Soviets at the moment are less preoccupied with the problem than they were before. 6. As a result, the Soviets have conceded no more to the West than was necessary to maintain momentum to- ward agreements in which they have an inherent interest. And they have perceived no special reason to practice restraint in their strategic programs or to forsake the pursuit of their owr; interest:, in various areas out of any ~?eference to Western sensitivities. The Middle East 7. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Middle East. Tine Soviet aim in this area, simply stated, is to main- tain and exter..d the USSR's position in the Arab states. Soviet interest in a settlement is entirely subordinate to this objective. In the light of Is;:aeli policy, Mos- cow sees no point in damaging its standing with the Arabs by pressing them to make concessions, and it has seen considerable need to improve UAR military capabilities. 8. Confronted last January with Israeli air raids that were hurting Nasir politically and embarrassing the JSSR as his protector, Moscow embarked on a bold military build-up intended, to deny Israel the freedom to strike at targets in Egypt. During a three-month period, the Soviets created a protective barrier of SA-3 and SA-2 missiles 25X1 around the principal Egyptian civilian and military targets, augmenting it with so histicated radars and antiaircraf artiller . 9. By the end of P4ay, the defenses had been ex a,nded to cover i~iost of the Nile delta ven a ore e -arrange cease- ire too a ect on August, the Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 2006 - 8001100090049-4 Soviet air defense line had been extended to the Suez Canal aYea and had begun to take its toll of Israeli aircraft. As to the standstill provisions of the US proposal, the Soviets probably reasoned that the chances were very low that discussions would soon lead to a settlement acceptable to their clients, and that a stronger military position was not only an urgent present necessity but would even, in some future round of nego- tiatio~:is, increase those chances. 10. The US has entered into Soviet calculations throughout this period primarily as a channel for pres- suring the Israelis and as a military threat if uncon- trolled escalation should get under way. On the military front, the Soviets have advanced steadily in 1970 but always. by stages, pausing after each small advance to satisfy themselves concerning possibly dangerous US re- actions before making the next move. They hope that the US will not respond by becoming more aggressive or less forthcoming in other, non-Mideast matters, but they are not prepared to let this possibility restrain them from meeting the requirements and using the opportunities that arise on the ground there. It is almost certain that Mos- cow did not urge the Syrians to invade Jordan and that the Soviets did subsequently advise withdrawal, but in neither case were they acting solely out of concern for US attitudes; they simply judged that inter-Arab fighting and a passible Israeli or US military move were detri- mental to the USSR~s own interests. Particularly now, when the USSR must devote overriding priority to securing its position in post-Nasir Eg~,~~pt, the Soviets will be unwilling to lean en the Arabs to bring a settlement nearer. Naval Deployments 11. This same unwillingness to forgo opportunities out of regard for Western sensibilities and concerns is evident in the increasing display the USSR is making of its capabilities to project its military power abroad. Over the past few years, the Soviets have undertaken a broad range of military activities at a distance from Soviet borders. This trend is the outcome of ling-standing programs of military construction, primarily nava~_, that have now begun to havF an international impact. The Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 2006 01100090049-4 build-up of the Mediterranean Squadron, for example, has not only forced the littoral ^tates to accord the Soviet Union a greater weight in ;'-.heir political cal- culations, but has probably contributed to Moscow's confidence that it could engage in direct and large- scale assistance to the air defense of the UAR without running unacceptable risks. In other areas, Soviet naval cruises and visits are meant to Underline the USSR's status as a global power, entitled to have its voice heeded and its influence felt in all quarters. With additional major combat ~Tessels now under con- struction, it is clear that the Soviet Union intends to expand its presence even further in the years ahead. 12. Tt was not to be expected that the USSR, having mad~~ large investments in earlier years, now would foxgo the payoff of using its naval, power in these ways c+ut of concern for alarmed reactions in the West. But the case of Cienfuegos, although it fits into this trend, has a special further importance. Knowing that submarine support facilities in Cuba would touch a highly sensitive US nerve, the Soviets approached the venture with a series of probing naval visits before they began to install facilities for their own use there. Now that the US has objected, the USSR has disclaimed any intent to build a Soviet base and has attempted to give substance to its dis- claimer by moving its submarine support ships to an- other Cuban port. This development coincided with a rising level of acrimony in Soviet and US statements about each other's motives, and it is possible that this climate contributed to the USSR's decision. 7t is much more likely, however, that factors specific to the situation, and in particular the local mili- tary superiority enjoyed by the US, determined Mos- cow's choice. Latin America 13. Elsewhere in Latin America, the Soviets have moved cautiously. Presumably, they have done so both out of .concern over the exercise of tradi~ tional prerogatives of the US in the area and out of an awareness that previous exploits have often led more to trauma than to triumph. They have evidently con- cluded that a serious effort to promote radical s~;cxET Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 200 - 1100090049-4 economic and political change throughout the area would be premature. In recent years, Moscow appears ~to have opted for a 1ory-range policy of image build- ing in Latin America, designed both to survive the constantly changing alignment of political forces there and to avoid major commitments of Soviet pres- tige and resources. 14. This does not mean that opportunities will be neglected or that the Soviets will be inactive. On the contrary, Soviet overtures to the military regimes in Peru and Bolivia provide ample proof that Moscow will continue to work for improved relations where it can, stretching certain political and ~,de- ological tenets to accommodate these ends where necessary. In any event, the Soviets do not seem to be in any hurry as has been recently ::.liustrated b Soviet handlin of the current situa~~ion in Chile Evi ent y, Mos- cow considers t at too ear y an a race of the new government might lead to unwanted actions by either the US or domestic political forces in Santiago. Europe, Germany, Berlin 15. Soviet po"',cy in Europe is, from a Western perspective, on quite a different tack. But here too the US5R is pursuing lcng-standing national interests. In its response to the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik and its pressure for a European security conference, Moscow is working toward the time-honored goals of gaining acceptance of the postwar status quo and reducing the American role on the continent. 16. The former goa.'.t has been largely accom- plished by the conclusion of the Soviet - West German bilateral treaty of 12 August 1970. The West Germans, by th~a terms of this treaty, commi':ted themselves to "respect" the existing borders of all European states and to raise no territorial claims now or in the future. In this context, the treaty specifically refers to Poland's Oder-Neisse border and the frontier between the Federal Republic and East Germany thus taking into account the major postwar territorial changes in Eastern Europe. Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 200 17. Moscow's latter objective, that of reducing the American role and presence on the continent, is still far from realization. Nonetheless, the Soviets can take a certain amount of satisfaction from the fact that the West European perception of the USSR as a political and military threat has been gradually diminishing. Moreover, Moscow probably calculates that further movement toward detente with West Germany, parallel approaches to other West European states (such a~ that which has already occurred with Pompidou's France), and an eventual conference on European security will dispel even further these concerns. As this trend develops, the Soviets probably judge that the basis for i:he American position in Europe will further weaken. 18. The needs of the Soviet economy, and par- ticularly the desire to have greatex? access to Western technology, have also figured in Mo~r~ow's political y-astures toward Western Europe. Soviet economic planners are evidently setting considerable store by an expansion of trade with the West and on an infusion of Western scientific and technical expertise. Moscow has already moved to take advantage of the favorable political cli- mate brought about by the treaty with Bonn and by a.ts recent flirtation with France, approaching West German and French firms with new offers of contracts intended to arouse the competitive instincts of Western entre- prene~~rs. Moscow's hopes, however, are probably un- realistic because the barriers to increased business deali:~gs in the past have been more economic than political. The Soviets have need for long-term financial credits, and potential trading partners have been either unwilling or unable to satisfy Sovi~?:t requests . 19. Together, these European goals are worth a certain price. The Soviets have already paid some of it by accepting West Germany as a respectable state and by shelving East Germany's maximum demands for immediate recognition by Bonn. Soviet propagan- dists, faithfully echoed and in some cases preceded by the East Europeans, have shifted from attacking Bonn's "revanchist" aims to stressing the "peace- loving" and "progressive" tendencies of the West German rulers. Heretofore, fear of Bonn has probably been as effective in cementing the Eastern alliance Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 20 6/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00 758001100090049-4 25X1 as fear of Moscow has been in the West, and the Soviets are therefore giving up an effective political instru- ment. 20. It is in Berlin at present, however, that they are being asked to pay a real and immediate ' political price in the form of g~~arantees of civilian access and acceptance of a legitimate West German role in West Berlin. They probably ~,ri11 be willing to pay some of this price, but--as evidenced by their tactics to date--no mare than the determination of the Western powers requires. They have insistEd, for example, on the virtually complete dismantling of the West German political role in the city. They are evidently making demands of this sort in hopes that the Western powers will give way under pressure from a West German Gov- ernment anxious to preserve the momentum of its a~t- politik. This is a delicate calculatic:n, how~~~~~~r, as the Soviets try to outwait their negotiating part- ners and to assess which side can more afford to contemplate a setback in the process of European detentr~ . SALT 21. The Soviet leaders do nat easily understand why others should take umbrage. when they find the USSR promoting its own in~erests in all ~nese areas. Even if they acknowledge to themselves that they may ha~.e cut a few corners, as in the standstill violations in the Suez Canal zone, they are stung by charges of duplicity and resent the imputation of a sinister or deceitful pattern to their various undertakings. Hence their stout rejection of such charges, both out of genu- ine indignation a?~d out of a desire to show that they cannot be placed upon the defensive by verbal assaults. 22. In their countercharges, however, the Soviets continue conspicuously to exclude SALT from the current polemical exchange. It is left to low-level propagan- dists to sustain a~z intermittent criticism of US good faith by pointing to ongoing US weapons programs. Ac- cusations from the other side that Soviet behavior else- where bodes i11 for the success of SALT arP passed by in silence. This suggESts that the Soviets wish to approach the next round in Helsinki on its own merits a:~d not to allow SALT to bei~ome a function of some ot:~er problem or some larger pattern. sr;LR~?r Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4 Approved For Release 2 - 58001100090049-4 23. As to how they view its merits, there is no evidence that the Soviets will approach the negotiations with any greater urgency than they have aisplayed to date. Semenov was careful to reserve the Soviet posi- tion on all points in his final statements at Vienna, and he prob