CURRENT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090049-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: October 30, 1970
• Content Type: IM

 l~?
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
30 October 1970
No. 1480/70
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Wf~.RI\TI1l1G
'I'bis ~3orumcnt contains informution affecting the national
defense of the united States, within the meaning of 'I'ith~
18, sections 7J3 and ?4)4, of the US Code, us amended.
Tts tr.intilnissior~ or revclatil~n of its contents to ar rc-
teipt by un unauthorired person is prohibited by law,
OROUP 1
Y%L'LUDYD )'11CN AUTOMATIC
DCN N(111AUIN0 AND
DYr_I.ANyIYICATi[IN ~~
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C~;NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEPICY
P.i.rectorate of Intelligence
30 October 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Current Soviet Foreign Policies
Summary
Since the Soviet Government formally announced
its readiness to negotiate on strategic arms limitations
in June 1968, matters have not stood still on the
many int~~~rnational fronts where Moscow's foreigr,~ pol-
icy is engaged. Relations with China worsened rap-
idly in the next year and subsequently have leveled
off at a new low. In Europe, the Czechoslovak
crisis has come and gone, and a major thaw has oc-
curred in Soviet - West German relations, which in
turn has led to a new round of Berlin negotiations.
A stormy succession of events in the Middle East has
affected the policies of all concerned. Meanwhile So-'.
viet military programs have rolled steadily forward,
including not only continued R and D activity and
construction programs for ICBMs and ballistic mis-
sile submarines, but also the advent of Y-class
submarine patrols in the Atlantic. It may there-
fore be useful to examine the evidence that the So-
viet Union may now be embarked on a new course in
foreign policy and, in the light of that examination,
to ~~peculate upon how the USSR will approach the next
SALT round in Helsinki.
Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZz~ b~ CIA. It
raas prepared bg the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and
the Office of National L'stimates.
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1. As a general rule, major changes in Soviet
foreign policy are rare. Usually, sweeping ?altera-
tions wait upon a shift of leadership or a truly
critical external event; Stalin probably had to die
before the USSR could decide to break out into the
third world, and the Cuban missile crisis was nec-
essary to put an end to Khrushchev's policy of un-
remitting pressures. The Soviets, of course, have
a general view of their. aims and like to see them-
selves as having a consistent and well-coordinated
policy. 1n practice, however, they are inclined to
handle their policies separately, treating each on
its merits and seeking to protect and promote their
interests in each individual area. Tn the present
context, in fact, they see efforts to link separate
problems as a trap designed to maneuver the USSR
into foregoing advantageous courses of action, or
to inveigle it into pressuring friendly states like
North Vietnam and the U.AR to do so, in return for
little more than promises that their interests will
be considered in other problem areas.
2. But i# substantial over-all changes occur
only rarely in Soviet foreign policy, there are
occasions nonetheless, when one issue becomes im-
portant enough to affect significantly the USSR's
handling of other problems. In recent years China
has become such an issue. The Soviets have been
obliged to acknowledge to themselves that the Sino-
Soviet relationship is one of fundamental enmity.
The massive Soviet build-up, which: has more than
tripled Soviet troops along the frontier with China
since 1965, is one manifestation of this acknowledge-
ment. Another is the vigorous Soviet efforts to
isolate China k~oth internationally and in the Com-
munist movement. Although the Soviets probably hope
that a post-Mao leadership will temper Chinese hos-
tility, they are far from counting on this and real-
ize that a harmonious future relationship is highly
unlikely.
~ Ri
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3. There is convincing evidence that the So-
viets have felt it necessary to draw from this the
conclusion that they would be wise to compose their
relations to a certain extent with other states,
primarily the US and West Germany. The guiding
principle in this effort is the need to prevent
others from collaborating with China or from exploit-
ing the rift to Soviet disadvantage. Moscow remains
as unwilling as ever to make concessions beyond the
requirements of this principle. The China factor
probably has contributed significantly to the Soviet
decision to conduct SALT in a business-like fashion
and to the wholeheartedness with which Moscow has
taken up the opportunity offered by Brandt's elec-
tion in September 1969. It has not, however, led
the Soviets, into making substantial concessions in
either area. t?or has it forced them to. curb their
efforts to expand their influence in the Middle East
simply to secure a;1 agreement with the West. Moscow
has been working to avoid a simultane?~us heightening
of tension on both its eastern and western flanks
precisely in order to avoid being forced to make
significant concessions to either adversary. In
this context, the maturing of SALT and the advent
of the Brandt government in West: Germany came at a
propitious time.
4. The China factor may yet drive the USSR
further in these directions in the future. During
1970, however, it seems to have lost some of its
force. The Peking talks that began last October
and the vague and unformalized accommodation that
has developed along the frontier since ?ttien have
kept the border areas free of fighting. Soviet
propaganda, while not retreating on substantive mat-
ters, has avoided the high polemical pitch that
formerly ~:erved to keep the quarrel in the forefront
of international affairs. Moscow has taken other
steps, such as the return of an ambassador to Peking,
to ease tensions and to give the appearance of re-
laxation in relations with Peking.
5. More important, the USSR's fears about how other
countries might react have not been realized. The West
has not found ways to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift. China
itself suspended the Warsaw talks with the US as a result
of the Cambodian intervention. Bonn seems to have decided
SECRET
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not to jeopardize its ra rochement with Moscow b
flirtations with Pekin
A t oug Pe ing s revive ip omacy an
a tempts o reak out of its international isolation
may create new problems for Ploscow, the Soviets at the
moment are less preoccupied with the Ch:.na problem than
they were before.
6. As a result, the Soviets have conceded no more
to the West than was necessary to maintain momentum to-
ward agreements in which they have an inherent interest.
And they have perceived no special reason to practice
restraint in their strategic programs or to forsake the
pursuit of their owr; interest:, in various areas out of
any ~?eference to Western sensitivities.
The Middle East
7. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Middle East.
Tine Soviet aim in this area, simply stated, is to main-
tain and exter..d the USSR's position in the Arab states.
Soviet interest in a settlement is entirely subordinate
to this objective. In the light of Is;:aeli policy, Mos-
cow sees no point in damaging its standing with the Arabs
by pressing them to make concessions, and it has seen
considerable need to improve UAR military capabilities.
8. Confronted last January with Israeli air raids
that were hurting Nasir politically and embarrassing the
JSSR as his protector, Moscow embarked on a bold military
build-up intended, to deny Israel the freedom to strike at
targets in Egypt. During a three-month period, the Soviets
created a protective barrier of SA-3 and SA-2 missiles 25X1
around the principal Egyptian civilian and military targets,
augmenting it with so histicated radars and antiaircraf
artiller .
9. By the end of P4ay, the defenses had been ex a,nded
to cover i~iost of the Nile delta
ven a ore
e -arrange cease- ire too a ect on August, the
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Soviet air defense line had been extended to the Suez
Canal aYea and had begun to take its toll of Israeli
aircraft. As to the standstill provisions of the US
proposal, the Soviets probably reasoned that the chances
were very low that discussions would soon lead to a
settlement acceptable to their clients, and that a
stronger military position was not only an urgent present
necessity but would even, in some future round of nego-
tiatio~:is, increase those chances.
10. The US has entered into Soviet calculations
throughout this period primarily as a channel for pres-
suring the Israelis and as a military threat if uncon-
trolled escalation should get under way. On the military
front, the Soviets have advanced steadily in 1970 but
always. by stages, pausing after each small advance to
satisfy themselves concerning possibly dangerous US re-
actions before making the next move. They hope that the
US will not respond by becoming more aggressive or less
forthcoming in other, non-Mideast matters, but they are
not prepared to let this possibility restrain them from
meeting the requirements and using the opportunities that
arise on the ground there. It is almost certain that Mos-
cow did not urge the Syrians to invade Jordan and that
the Soviets did subsequently advise withdrawal, but in
neither case were they acting solely out of concern for
US attitudes; they simply judged that inter-Arab fighting
and a passible Israeli or US military move were detri-
mental to the USSR~s own interests. Particularly now,
when the USSR must devote overriding priority to securing
its position in post-Nasir Eg~,~~pt, the Soviets will be
unwilling to lean en the Arabs to bring a settlement
nearer.
Naval Deployments
11. This same unwillingness to forgo opportunities
out of regard for Western sensibilities and concerns is
evident in the increasing display the USSR is making of
its capabilities to project its military power abroad.
Over the past few years, the Soviets have undertaken a
broad range of military activities at a distance from
Soviet borders. This trend is the outcome of ling-standing
programs of military construction, primarily nava~_, that
have now begun to havF an international impact. The
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build-up of the Mediterranean Squadron, for example,
has not only forced the littoral ^tates to accord the
Soviet Union a greater weight in ;'-.heir political cal-
culations, but has probably contributed to Moscow's
confidence that it could engage in direct and large-
scale assistance to the air defense of the UAR without
running unacceptable risks. In other areas, Soviet
naval cruises and visits are meant to Underline the
USSR's status as a global power, entitled to have its
voice heeded and its influence felt in all quarters.
With additional major combat ~Tessels now under con-
struction, it is clear that the Soviet Union intends
to expand its presence even further in the years
ahead.
12. Tt was not to be expected that the USSR,
having mad~~ large investments in earlier years, now
would foxgo the payoff of using its naval, power in
these ways c+ut of concern for alarmed reactions in
the West. But the case of Cienfuegos, although it
fits into this trend, has a special further importance.
Knowing that submarine support facilities in Cuba
would touch a highly sensitive US nerve, the Soviets
approached the venture with a series of probing naval
visits before they began to install facilities for
their own use there. Now that the US has objected,
the USSR has disclaimed any intent to build a Soviet
base and has attempted to give substance to its dis-
claimer by moving its submarine support ships to an-
other Cuban port. This development coincided with a
rising level of acrimony in Soviet and US statements
about each other's motives, and it is possible that
this climate contributed to the USSR's decision. 7t
is much more likely, however, that factors specific
to the situation, and in particular the local mili-
tary superiority enjoyed by the US, determined Mos-
cow's choice.
Latin America
13. Elsewhere in Latin America, the Soviets
have moved cautiously. Presumably, they have done
so both out of .concern over the exercise of tradi~
tional prerogatives of the US in the area and out of an
awareness that previous exploits have often led more
to trauma than to triumph. They have evidently con-
cluded that a serious effort to promote radical
s~;cxET
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economic and political change throughout the area
would be premature. In recent years, Moscow appears
~to have opted for a 1ory-range policy of image build-
ing in Latin America, designed both to survive the
constantly changing alignment of political forces
there and to avoid major commitments of Soviet pres-
tige and resources.
14. This does not mean that opportunities will
be neglected or that the Soviets will be inactive.
On the contrary, Soviet overtures to the military
regimes in Peru and Bolivia provide ample proof that
Moscow will continue to work for improved relations
where it can, stretching certain political and ~,de-
ological tenets to accommodate these ends where
necessary. In any event, the Soviets do not seem
to be in any hurry as has been recently ::.liustrated
b Soviet handlin of the current situa~~ion in Chile
Evi ent y, Mos-
cow considers t at too ear y an a race of the new
government might lead to unwanted actions by either
the US or domestic political forces in Santiago.
Europe, Germany, Berlin
15. Soviet po"',cy in Europe is, from a Western
perspective, on quite a different tack. But here too
the US5R is pursuing lcng-standing national interests.
In its response to the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik
and its pressure for a European security conference,
Moscow is working toward the time-honored goals of
gaining acceptance of the postwar status quo and
reducing the American role on the continent.
16. The former goa.'.t has been largely accom-
plished by the conclusion of the Soviet - West German
bilateral treaty of 12 August 1970. The West Germans,
by th~a terms of this treaty, commi':ted themselves to
"respect" the existing borders of all European states
and to raise no territorial claims now or in the future.
In this context, the treaty specifically refers to
Poland's Oder-Neisse border and the frontier between
the Federal Republic and East Germany thus taking
into account the major postwar territorial changes in
Eastern Europe.
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17. Moscow's latter objective, that of reducing
the American role and presence on the continent, is
still far from realization. Nonetheless, the Soviets
can take a certain amount of satisfaction from the
fact that the West European perception of the USSR as
a political and military threat has been gradually
diminishing. Moreover, Moscow probably calculates
that further movement toward detente with West Germany,
parallel approaches to other West European states (such
a~ that which has already occurred with Pompidou's
France), and an eventual conference on European security
will dispel even further these concerns. As this trend
develops, the Soviets probably judge that the basis
for i:he American position in Europe will further weaken.
18. The needs of the Soviet economy, and par-
ticularly the desire to have greatex? access to Western
technology, have also figured in Mo~r~ow's political
y-astures toward Western Europe. Soviet economic planners
are evidently setting considerable store by an expansion
of trade with the West and on an infusion of Western
scientific and technical expertise. Moscow has already
moved to take advantage of the favorable political cli-
mate brought about by the treaty with Bonn and by a.ts
recent flirtation with France, approaching West German
and French firms with new offers of contracts intended
to arouse the competitive instincts of Western entre-
prene~~rs. Moscow's hopes, however, are probably un-
realistic because the barriers to increased business
deali:~gs in the past have been more economic than
political. The Soviets have need for long-term
financial credits, and potential trading partners
have been either unwilling or unable to satisfy
Sovi~?:t requests .
19. Together, these European goals are worth
a certain price. The Soviets have already paid
some of it by accepting West Germany as a respectable
state and by shelving East Germany's maximum demands
for immediate recognition by Bonn. Soviet propagan-
dists, faithfully echoed and in some cases preceded
by the East Europeans, have shifted from attacking
Bonn's "revanchist" aims to stressing the "peace-
loving" and "progressive" tendencies of the West
German rulers. Heretofore, fear of Bonn has probably
been as effective in cementing the Eastern alliance
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as fear of Moscow has been in the West, and the Soviets
are therefore giving up an effective political instru-
ment.
20. It is in Berlin at present, however, that
they are being asked to pay a real and immediate '
political price in the form of g~~arantees of civilian
access and acceptance of a legitimate West German role
in West Berlin. They probably ~,ri11 be willing to pay
some of this price, but--as evidenced by their tactics
to date--no mare than the determination of the Western
powers requires. They have insistEd, for example, on
the virtually complete dismantling of the West German
political role in the city. They are evidently making
demands of this sort in hopes that the Western powers
will give way under pressure from a West German Gov-
ernment anxious to preserve the momentum of its a~t-
politik. This is a delicate calculatic:n, how~~~~~~r,
as the Soviets try to outwait their negotiating part-
ners and to assess which side can more afford to
contemplate a setback in the process of European
detentr~ .
SALT
21. The Soviet leaders do nat easily understand
why others should take umbrage. when they find the USSR
promoting its own in~erests in all ~nese areas. Even
if they acknowledge to themselves that they may ha~.e
cut a few corners, as in the standstill violations
in the Suez Canal zone, they are stung by charges of
duplicity and resent the imputation of a sinister or
deceitful pattern to their various undertakings. Hence
their stout rejection of such charges, both out of genu-
ine indignation a?~d out of a desire to show that they
cannot be placed upon the defensive by verbal assaults.
22. In their countercharges, however, the Soviets
continue conspicuously to exclude SALT from the current
polemical exchange. It is left to low-level propagan-
dists to sustain a~z intermittent criticism of US good
faith by pointing to ongoing US weapons programs. Ac-
cusations from the other side that Soviet behavior else-
where bodes i11 for the success of SALT arP passed by
in silence. This suggESts that the Soviets wish to
approach the next round in Helsinki on its own merits
a:~d not to allow SALT to bei~ome a function of some
ot:~er problem or some larger pattern.
sr;LR~?r
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23. As to how they view its merits, there is no
evidence that the Soviets will approach the negotiations
with any greater urgency than they have aisplayed to
date. Semenov was careful to reserve the Soviet posi-
tion on all points in his final statements at Vienna,
and he prob