THE PALESTINIAN ARABS: A PEOPLE IN SEARCH OF A COUNTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090052-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: November 23, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
23 November 1970
INTELLIGENCE ,MEMORANDUM
The Palestinian Arabs:' A People iri'. Search of a Country
Introduction
To a large degree, the failure to achieve a
general peace settlement. in the Middle East, sought'
now for-more than 20 years, is rooted in the unsolved
problem of the Palestinian Arabs. Like the other
people in the area at the end of World War 1, the
Palestinians believed that' they would be allowed to
determine their own future, either as part of a
greater Arab state or within the newly' created
British mandate. For its part, Great Britain, for
a variety of reasons, had made commitments to Zion-
1st leaders, proponents of a secular Jewish national-
ism, to establish a national home for Jews in Pales-
tine. Almost from the first days of its mandate in
1919, the UK was seized with the problem of control-
ling intermittent warfare between Jews and Arabs,
with each people seeking to see its conflicting as-
pirations- and demands realized.
Despairing of ever finding a solution to the
problem of maintaining peace in the mandate terri-
tory, London. in 1947 dropped the whole question in
the lap of the United Nations. Anxious to placate.
both groups, the world organization decided to divide
the mandate into two entities, Jewish Israel and-Arab
Palestine. On 14 May 1948, .with the Zionists acting
as midwife, Israel was born. Arab Palestine was not
as fortunate, however.' The armies of the surrounding
Note: 'This memorandum was produced soZ6Zy by. CIA.
It wcs prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated -with the Office of National' Estimates.
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Arab states, as self-appointed guardians, gathered
on Palestinian territory to fight against'Israel.
When the fighting finally came to an end, what had
not been conquered by Israel was under the control
of Egypt and Jordan, and the Palestinians found
themselves living as strangers in other Arab states.
Forced to sit on the sidelines during the bet-
ter part of the next 20 years, while wars supposedly
were fought in their name, some Palestinians finally
moved to control their own destinies. In the wake
of the June 1967 War, the heretofore. moribund Pales-
tinian resistance organizations--the fedayeen--began
to carry the war to the Israelis, attempting to con-
duct guerrilla warfare both within, the occupied ter-
ritories and in Israel itself.
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The Fedayeen
1. Over the past three years, some 12,000 or
more men and women--the fedayeen--have succeeded in.
becoming the most vocal spokesmen for the 'Palestin-
ians. The movement is divided between extremists--
radicals who 'seek to carry their struggle not only
against Israel but to most of the Arab world as
well--and moderates--those who would confine the
struggle to Israel. But despite 'their differences
the fedayeen are in agreement on one point. They
seek the destruction of Israel as a sectarian Jew-
ish state and the establishment of a Palestine
state within the full confines of the old British
mandate. This state, they allege, will be unitary,
democratic, and nonsectarian. For the moment, the
moderates are in the majority and are led by Fatah,
whose membership constitutes one half or more of
the entire fedayeen movement's strength.
2. Unlike the fedayeen of the 1950s and early
1960s , 25X6
the postwar fedayeen are to a
great extent drawn from among highly educated zealots
who believe their activity is the only solution to
the plight of the Palestinians. Many of them have
been eduated at the American University of Beirut
in medicine, law, and other professions. They gave
up well-paying and secure positions in order to
take up arms against Israel, and by 1969 they had
succeeded in converting the Palestine Liberation
Organization, the political organization created
by the Arab League for the Palestinians, into a
fedayeen-dominated body.
3. Their propaganda outpourings to the con-
trary, fedayeen leaders are aware that the movement
does not offer a very significant military challenge
to Israel. and that it will not be .able to do so for
the foreseeable future. They also realize, however,
that they have the capability either to involve
Lebanon and Jordan more deeply in conflict with
Israel or to pose a threat to those countries' ef-
forts to arrange a peace settlement. They further
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hope by their example to convince their fellow Pal-
estinians and Arabs to take up arms in a popular war
against Israel. They argue that they are willing Co
engage in this struggle, for decades if necessary,
until the state of Israel is finally overthrown.
4. Much of the energy of the fedayeen has been
dissipated in internecine struggles among the 30-
odd groups into which they are divided and in con-
flicts with host governments such as Jordan. In at-
tempts to prevent a recurrence of these struggles,
the fedayeen themselves have sought to impose con-
trol and coordination upon all the groups. To a
great extent, the efforts have failed because these
organizations are unwilling to curtail their free-
dom of action.
5. The serious mauling of the fedayeen in the
September-October 1970 shoot-out with the Jordanian
Government, however, convinced a number of leaders
that changes must be made. The radical Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which has
alienated many of the other organizations by its
refusal to take orders from fedayeen coordinating
bodies, is now reported to be seeking to moderate
its image and to cooperate with other groups lest
it be crushed by the Jordanian Government. 25X1
6. Both from a sense of frustration at seeing
its policies of noninvolvement in politics fail when
it was forced to bear the brunt of the Jordanian Gov-
ernment's recent attacks and from a desire to keep
the more extreme elements in its fold, Fatah has con-
tinued its drift to the left. The rhetoric of the or-
ganization and its leader, Yasir Arafat, is becoming
increasingly radical in tone and content. Whether
a new unitary radical fedayeen organization will
succeed in galvanizing the masses of Palestinians
in the great popular crusade of the fedayeen remains
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UNRWA Registered Not Registered . Total
West Bank
272,692
392,308
665,000
Gaza
311,814
48,186
360,000
Israel
340,000
340,000
East Bank
506,038
193,963
700,000
Lebanon
175,958
74,042
250,000
Syria
158,71.7
11,283
170,000
Egypt
13,000
13,000
Saudi Arabia
20,000
20,000
Kuwait
85,000
85,000
Iraq
10,000
10,000
Other Arab States
5,000
5,000
Non-Arab States
37,000
37,000
1,425,219
1,229,781
2,655,000
Age Distribution
1,608,930 60.6% of total
990,32b 37.30,10 of total
55,756 2.1 % of total
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to be seen. Even at its peak of popularity among
Palestinians just prior to US Secretary of State
Rogers' peace initiative in June 1970, the feda-
yeen movement, with all of its regulars, irregulars,
military and camp followers, did not number over
30,000. The great mass of the Palestinians, over
98 percent, have not let their sympathies lead them
into any entanglement with the movement.
The Palestinians: A Profile
7. Before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli
War of 1948, there were some 1,280,000 Christian
and Muslim Arabs living in Palestine; today their
numbers have more than doubled to 2,655,000. This
rapid increase is reflected in their age distribu-
tion, with fully 50 percent of the Palestinians being
under 20 years of age and very likely under-15 years.
8. Although Palestinians are to be found in
every state of the Middle East, they are concentrated
in four-main areas: Israel and Israeli-occupied ter-
ritory, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Israel has over
50 percent of all the Palestinians under its direct
control; some 340,000 are in its own prewar area,
360,000 are in the Gaza Strip, and 665,000 more are
in the West Bank area. Jordan, where some 700,000
Palestinians form about 54 percent of the population,
has the next largest agglomeration. Lebanon follows,
with some 250,000 people who constitute over nine
percent of the population. Syria has about 170,000
Palestinian refugees, while most of the others--ap-
proximately 170,000 people--have settled in the
Persian Gulf state:: and in the United States.
9. Because of their age distribution, over 50
percent of the refugees are dependent on some form
of assistance from the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNPWA). This assistance ranges from
no more than supplementary food in some cases to
complete housing, food, clothing, and education in
others. In the Gaza Strip, an estimated 214,000
people live in eight UNP,WA-administered camps. Even
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POPULATION OF UNRWA CAMPS
/as of July 1968)
GAZA
STRIP
AREA CAMP
Dalr at Orion Oalah 7,626 10.927
Dolah Maphozi 9,301
Khan Younis Khan Younis 20,610 20,619
Nutairat Nuwirat 18,939 31,902
Ourul) 12,963 }
Retain Rotah 46,203 40,293
Ritual Gaza Beach 33,432 33,432
Jobalia Jahallo ' 41.601 41.601
Total 190,774
Nablus Ask or 5,070
Balota 7,875
Fare 3,718
Camp No, 1 2,502 34,346
Nut Shams 3,006
Tuikarom 0,140
Jenin 6,026
Jericho. Agabat.labor 3,513
ElnSullur, 1,511 6,663
Nuwaimuh 630 )))
OCCUPIED Jerusalem Shulat 3,003
WEST Amarl 2,065
DANK Dair Ammar 1,105 13,234
Jalazono 3,382
Kalandia 2,819
Hebron Dhoishch 4,561
Aida 1.323
Befit Jibrin 617 13,254
Famvar 2,640
Arroub 4,213
Total 158,178
Jabal Hussein 31,555
Amman Now camp 40.507 72,152
Zorko 16,785
Irbodcamp 17,480 17.480
Total 106,417
Baga'a 43,260
Jerash 11.241
S,1uf 8,437
Husn 16,652
Marka 10.885
Taiblya (Zizfa) 5,203
Total 103,670
Dikwanoh 7.403
Obayeh 2,448
Amman
Irbod
t'megenry
Camps
Beirut Mar Elias 869
Mountain Bur) ol?Bamjnoh 7,169
Shalila 4,892
rain ei?rmWan 17,029
Nabatiuh 2,047.
Tyro Rashidieh 10,016
El Buss 3,911 21,086
Burjo6Shemalf 7,1F)
Tripoli Nahr el-Bared 10,075 15,521
Beddawi 6,445 }
Bega:, Wovoll 3,110 3,110
86,610
Damascus ~ Khan Esheh 5,398' 8.226
Khan Dan:un 2,828
Nonh Neirab 7,247 7,247
Emergency
Camps
SYRIA Homs,Hama HomsCity 6,090 \ 7.697
Hama 2,607
2.080 2,088
25,158
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here, those adults who are able to supplement their
subsistence allowance by working in agricultural
activities within Israel.
10. In the Jordanian West Bank area, about.
74,000 Palestinians, an estimated 15 percent of
the UNRWA-registered population, live in some 20
camps. As in the Gaza Strip, the refugees find
it necessary to have a supplementary income. At
present, he West Bankers are fortunate, as there
is little if any unemployment among them. Some
25,000 men are employed within Israel as construc-
tion, farm, and industrial laborers, both skilled
and unskilled; another 5-7,000 work in Jerusalem
in the building trades. Israel's. Ministry of Labor-
has established centers in the West Bank s() that,
those seeking employment within Israel can obtain
work permits.
11. In Jordan, an estimated 210,095 people.
reside in four regular and six. emergency UNRWA
camps. Little is known of the employment oppor-
tunities for these refugees, but job scarcity has
contributed in part to the growth of the fedayeen
movement. In :Lebanon, about 88,000 people live in
some 15 camps, while another 87,000 live in various
shantytown settlements. There are another 74,000
people who have not been granted Lebanese citizen-
ship but .who have settled in cities. The camp.
dwellers find employment in construction trades,
road building, and agriculture; the others vaork.?? in
agriculture as well as in trades and menial jobs
in urban areas. Only 20 percent of the 170,000
refugees in Syria are in the country's ten regular
and emergency UNRWA camps. Little is known of
their employment opportunities or of the status
of the other 140,000 registered refugees.
12. Some 170,000 refugees in Saudi AraLia,
the Persian Gulf and other Arab states, and coun-
tries outside the Middle East have generally been
able.to,integrate themselves into local societies.
Perhaps even more's uccessful are the additional
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35 , 000 Palestinians who have become full-fledged
Lebanese citizens. For the most part, these ex-
patriate Palestinians have developed such deep eco-
nomic roots in-.their new countries that it is ex-
tremely unlikely they would ever contemplate leaving.
However, these people do sympathize with the plight
of the less fortunate Palestinians and argue against
what they consider to be Israelis total disregard
of the rights of Palestinians. Under heavy pres-
sure--almost amounting to blackmail--they provide
the fedayeen movement with a large share of its
financial support.
The Palestinian Diaspora and Israel
13. To a? great extent, the economic status of
the various groups of Palestinians and their rela-
tive distance from Israel influence their attitude
toward Tel Aviv and the future of Palestinian-Israeli
relations. Those individuals who have become inte-
grated into local societies, for example, are anxious
to see a peaceful solution of any kind as soon as
possible so that they will not become more deeply
involved with the fedayeen movement.
14. On the other hand, the nonintegrated refu-
gees in Lebanon, both in and- outside the UNRWA camps,
are perhaps the most anti-Israeli of the people in
the Palestinian Diaspora. Bitter, frustrated, and
extremely hostile, they are encouraged by the "Suc-
cesses" of the fedayeen, who have finally succeeded
in focusing world attention upon the plight of the
Palestinians. The refugees in Lebanon are convinced
that the Palestinians now are the masters of their
own destinies rather than the pawns of-::the various
Arab powers. They will not be satisfied with such
half-way measures as the establishment of a truncated
state in the West. Bank area, but seek rather .the com-
plete destruction of Israel as it- exists today.
15. Although little is known of the attitudes
of the refugees in Jordan, it is likely that their
views parallel those of their brethren in Lebanon .
Those who. have been able to begin a new life favor
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a peaceful solution to the problem, while the in-
habitants of the UNRWA camps, having nothing to lose,,
look for the complete destruction of Israel so they
can return to their lost properties.
16. Having spent the past three years under
Israeli control and having viewed Tel Aviv's power
at first hand, the Palestinians in the occupied ter-
ritories are under no illusions regarding either the
passible overthrow of the Israeli occupation or the
destruction of Israel. This is not to suggest that
they have become resigned to a continuation of the
status quo. The majority--who, if one must pin a
label on them, are moderates--seek a Palestinian
state that would encompass both the West and East
Bank areas-of Jordan. They are willing at this
juncture to postpone any decisions as to the future
form of government, but most would accept the rule
of King Husayn, provided Palestinians were given a
greater degree of both national responsibilities
and national benefits. Their first order of busi-
ness remains, however, the withdrawal of the Israelis
from all of occupied Palestine. Although they would
be willing to allow the Israelis access to the Wailing
Wall and. to East Jerusalem in general, the West Bank-
ers demand the incorporation of East Jerusalem into
their Palestinian or Jordanian state.
Israel aid the Occupied Territories
.17. In the wake of its victory in the June 1967
War, Israel found itself with the task of governing
nearly 1.4 million Palestinians. Aware that the ris-
ing tide of Palestinianism, as articulated by the
fedayeen, might some day result in large-scale guer-
rilla warfare in the occupied territories, Israel
has sought to reach some sort of understanding with
the Palestinians concerning their future. Tel Aviv's
efforts have been hampered, however, by an awareness
that there is no realistic way of reconciling its own
desires and those of the Palestinians. With military
security an overriding concern, the Israelis are re-
luctant to allow the creation of a Palestinian entity
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that they could not control. Already faced with
hostile Arab regimes on its borders, Tel Aviv fears
`:hat the establishment of a truly independent Pal-
estinian state would only bring into being yet an-
other enemy. Israeli strategists, among.them Deputy
Premier Allon;.have therefore demanded that any such
arrangement involving the West Bank must allow for
the presence of Israeli-inhabited Nahals--fortified
settlements--to defend Israel proper.
18. Meanwhile, in order to conduct the day-to-
day administration of the occupied areas while main-
taining a low profile, Israel has worked through the
already existing Palestinian leadership establishment.
Mukhtars (village headmen), notables, lawyers, reli-,'.?
gious .f.un6tionari9sf, judggs,' former, .and..present govern-
mental officials are employed rather than imposed
Israeli administrators. Even though the Palestinians
regard these individuals for the most, part as the
corrupt,, inefficient, and repressive minions of King
Husayn's regime, the Israelis have tended to view
them as the natural leaders of the West Bank. This
in turn has diminished the acceptability of these
men, who now are tainted as quislings.
19. Other natural leaders, such as professional
men, who might be able to assume the mantle of the
present establishment, have not had an opportunity
to come forward. The fedayeen have been able to
intimidate anyone advocating a solution other than
the one they espouse. Israel's military' occupation
has likewise had a repressive influence on indigenous
leadership; those Palestinians who have spoken out
strongly,aga'ins.t Tel Aviv's policies in the occupied
areas are deported by military officials, while others,
finding their political situation intolerable, have
left of their own volition. Those who have remained,
hoping to ensure their self-preservation, have de-
cided not to commit themselves publicly.
Conclusions
20. Who speaks authoritatively for the Pales-
tinians? At present,. no one. They are a large
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amorphous mass of people,, many of whose goals and
beliefs still have not jelled. The Palestinians
at this time do not have a recognized set of leaders,
let alone one individual able to command universal
attention. The basically negative nature of "Pales -
tinianism," particularly as enunciated by the feda-
yeen, has contributed in no small measure to this
situation. To date, moreover,?the Palestinians
have largely reacted to rather than initiated events
in the area.- The fedayeen movement is a reaction
primarily to the inability of the armies of the Arab
states to challenge the Israelis and regain the lost
territories., What political'activity there has been
among West Bankers since 1967 has been in reaction
to Tel Aviv's occupation, and the only goal the
people can agree upon is the withdrawal of the Is-
raeli forces. In Lebanon,. the refugees' support of
the fedayeen is a reaction to their inability to
become a part of Lebanese society.
21. The absence of a comprehensive political
program has also affected "Palestinianism." As a
whole, even the fedayeen movement has only articu-
lated a general goal--the destruction of Israel.
Although they mouth a wide spectrum of slogans, rang-
ing from'Marxist to conservative, few fedayeen have
given serious thought to their political goals
other than the establishment of a"democratic secu-
lar state of Palestine," and even here they have
no real conception of just what such a state would
be. Other Palestinians have given even less thought
to their future. The West Bankers are obsessed with
Israel's occupation'of the area and seek only to end
it without any clear idea of what their political
future should be thereafter.
22. To date, the fedayeen have been the only
Palestinian voices heard. Not only have nonfedayeen
Palestinians been intimidated by the.fedayeen from
speaking out and making their views known, but the
news media have focused on the commandos as more
newsworthy and photogenic.. Despite such obstacles
to any significant articulation of political goals--
whether structural or ideological--there is a large
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body of educated and professionally qualified Pales-
tinians both in the Diaspora and the occupied terri-
tories who presumably could be reached over the head
of their host governments and the fedayeen.' Even if
kept from initiating or formulating a positive political
program by Israeli restrictions, by obstacles erected
by their Arab hosts, or by fedayeen terrorism, these
people are available as a sounding board for various
external proposals for a postsettlement Palestinian
nation. Over time, such soundings could evoke a
sense of political consciousness among the nonradical
Palestinians, and political leaders and groups might
eventually emerge to articulate their own political
programs.
23. In sum, the present circumstances of the
Palestinians seem only to ensure against any early
self-initiated formation of a stable Palestinian pro-
gram or of a responsible Palestinian political entity.
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