THE 25TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100019-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 7, 1971
• Content Type: IM

 DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The 25th UN General Assembly
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7 Janua
No. 125
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WARNING
This ducumcnt contains infornwtion affecting the national
dcfcuse of the United stilt", within the meaning of 'Title
18, section: 793 and 79.1, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 January 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The 25th UN General Assembly
Introduction
This paper focuses on those developments at
the recent 25th UN General Assembly that are most
relevant to US interests. In addition to the spe-
cial commemorative session in October that attracted
some 40 heads of state, other highlights of the
meeting were the controversial resolutions on the
Middle East situation, the majority attained for
the first time by the "Albanian" resolution to
seat Peking and expel Taiwan from the UN, the res-
olution on disarmament, and the agreemen.ts''-look-
ing toward new international regulation of the
seas and their resources. An assessment of the
results of the Assembly is presented in paragraph
20.
Note: This memorandum-was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within
the Directorate of Intelligence.
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Background
1. The 25th session had been anticipated as
a major diplomatic event leading to a thorough as-
sessment of the UN's world role and the initiation
of measures to improve its effectiveness.* For a
variety of reasons, particularly the missile crisis
in the Middle East, this assessment did not mate-
rialize. Nevertheless, in the working session--
relatively quiet and unspectacular and highlighted
by the assertiveness of the less developed coun-
tries against this major powers--the General Assem-
bly took a number of steps that will have some im-
pact on how the members work and get along with
each other in the future.
The Middle East
2. Near the end of the 90-day cease-fire in-
stituted in August on the basis of the Rogers Plan,
Egypt sought debate on the Middle East in an attempt
to obtain an Assembly statement before the cease-
fire expired. Over strong US and Israeli objections,
the Assembly subsequently adopted by a 57-16 vote a
resolution that could aggravate the difficulty of
implementing the 1967 Security Council resolution,
the basis on which the search for a settlement has
so far proceeded. Although the resolution did recom-
mend to the parties concerned a three-month exten-
sion of the cease-fire, it made no reference to vio-
lations of the standstill agreement and included an
ambiguous request to the Council to consider the im-
position of economic sanctions against Israel. The
Assembly resolution was also very selective in its
references to the 1967 Council resolution, emphasiz-
ing in particular the need for Israeli withdrawal
from territories occupied in the six-day war.
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3. Early in December, the Assembly adopted
four resolutions on the Palestinian refugee situa-
tion, one of which may also complicate movement
toward negotiated settlement. Declaring that full
recognition of Palestinian "inalienable rights"
is indispensable to the establishment of peace,
the resolution advocates "self-determination" for
the Palestinians. Strenuous US and Israeli efforts
to block its passage narrowly failed.
4. As in 1969, the principal immediate cas-
ualty of the heated Middle East debates was the UN
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides
welfare services in the refugee camps of the area.
Charges that the fedayeen benefit from the camps--
and thus from UNRWA services--resulted in a tepid
response to Secretary General Thant's urgent ap-
peal for funds to alleviate UNRWA's chronic finan-
cial difficulties, made all the worse by the de-
struction resulting from the Jordanian civil war.
Pledges for 1971 amounted to about $6 million less
than the agency's budget, and 25X1
he agency may not be able to meet this
month's payroll.
Chinese Representation
5. As a result in part of Peking's more
"reasonable" diplomatic posture, including its
establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada
and Italy, support for Taiwan as the sole repre-
sentative of China at the UN eroded much more rap-
idly this year than many observers had anticipated.
For the first time, the "Albanian" resolution to
seat Peking and expel Taiwan won a plurality, 51
to 49 with 27 abstentions, but it failed adoption
because the issue was again declared an Important
Question (IQ) requiring a two-thirds vote for pas-
sage. In light of the vote on the "Albanian" res-
olution, support for the IQ ruling may wane consid-
erably now that it has been made to appear a device
to frustrate majority opinion.
6. The so-called "two Chinas" or "one China,
one Taiwan" formulas favored as a solution by many
states seem likely at this point to become the
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focus of international discussion before the 26th As-
sembly meeting opens next September, possibly within
the broader context of the concept of universality
of membership at the UN. Both Chinese regimes have
already indicated extreme hostility to any idea of
dual representation, each contending that it would
refuse to hold a seat if the other were also repre-
sented.
Arms Control
7. The 25th session was also in harmony with
the trend toward increasing preoccupation with dis-
armament--especially nuclear disarmament. Turned
aside by the Assembly in 1969, the draft treaty
cosponsored by the US and USSR to limit the use of
the seabeds for military purposes was revised to
meet most criticisms and won an overwhelming 104-2
endorsement by the Assembly. It is expected to
be opened for signature this month, and should
enter into force soon afterward. The only probable
holdouts will be France and Communist China, which
traditionally do not adhere to such disarmament
measures, and a few Latin American states that main-
tain the treaty impinges on their claims to 200-
mile territorial waters.
8. A raft of other arms control resolutions
was adopted, including eleven on a single day.
The general theme of these proposals was their
advocacy of further curbs on the arms race in the
interest of reallocating the resulting savings to
economic development and progress on social prob-
lems. In one area, chemical and biological war-
fare (CBW), there was no repetition of last year's
Assembly vote challenging the US contention that
the Geneva protocol of 1925 does not ban the use of
tear gas and herbicides in war. The 26-nation
Geneva disarmament conference is likely to focus
on CBW during its 1971 sessio:'s.
9. The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)
were accorded a generally favorable response at
the Assembly, but the superpowers did not agree on
how to react to a SALT-linked Swedish draft resolu-
tion,calling on "all" nuclear states to halt the
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testing and development of strategic weapons. The
Soviets voted for the draft--adopted in the plenary
by a 102 to 0 margin--whereas the US abstained, main-
taining that the text constituted an attempt to in-
fluence sensitive areas under bilateral negotiation.
Moscow argued that abstention would undercut the
superpowers' commitment in the Nonproliferation
Treaty to take further steps toward curbing the
arms race.
10. Soviet motives in splitting with the US
on the Swedish resolution undoubtedly were largely
tactical. Moscow had the opportunity to line up
with the nonnuclear states on an issue of consid-
erable importance to the latter, making the US ap-
pear the major obstacle to unverified moratoriums.
The USSR most likely judged that its action would
not adversely affect the prospects for SALT.
Perennial Issues
11. The Assembly again rebuffed by a wide
margin the usual Communist resolutions calling for
withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and dissolu-
tion of the UN Commission for the Unification and
Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). Although the margin
was somewhat smaller than in 1969, some observers
had expected a much larger dip in the wake of the
plurality given the "Albanian" resolution. However,
Chile, one of the seven members of UNCURK, did with-
draw from the commission during the Assembly session,
and there is concern that a similar move by Pakistan
could endanger UNCURK's existence.
12. Issues of colonialism and racial dis-
crimination consumed a considerable amount of the
Assembly's time and attention this year, as the
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UN commemorated the tenth anniversary of the Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and People. African concern in the As-
sembly was largely focused on South Africa, since
the primary Rhodesian and Portuguese territories
issues--gaps in the economic sanctions effort and
the raid on Guinea, respectively--were dealt with
in the Security Council. A bid to have the Assem-
bly decline Pretoria's membership credentials nearly
succeeded this year, and the Africans may move more
decisively in that direction at the 1971 Assembly
meeting next fall.
13. Despite vigorous efforts, the US was not
able to resolve long-standing differences with the
USSR over the control and conduct of UN peacekeep-
ing operations. The Assembly continued to mark time
on the subject, although some members now favor an
alternative, piecemeal approach that would permit
agreements on several less contentious issues re-
lating to the peacekeeping guidelines.
Other Topics
14. In its final days, the Assembly adopted
two resolutions that reflect the strong interest of
the international community in achieving accords
on a host of intertwined maritime issues. Crucial
to passage of the resolutions was the reduced sus-
picion cf major power intentions, largely a direct
result of the 1970 US proposal that national jur-
isdiction stop at a water depth of 200 meters and
that the ocean floor beyond be considered the "com-
mon heritage of mankind." A set of principles on
seabeds exploitation--along lines of the US ini-
tiative--was approved without a single dissenting
vote.
15. The second resolution calls for a Law of
the Sea conference in 1973 to deal with a broad
range of subjects, including territorial waters
claims, rights of passage through international
straits, and the establishment of international
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machinery to govern peaceful utilization of the
ocean floor. Although they share the US interest
in obtaining agreements in many of these areas,
the Soviets opposed this resolution. They view
its terms as too comprehensive, especially in look-
ing toward the creation of another international
regulatory agency.
16. In both its commemorative and regular
sessions, the Assembly adopted rather toothless
resolutions on "strengthening international secu-
rity." The texts fell far short of what the USSR
had hoped to obtain when it initiated this item as
a propaganda ploy at the 1969 Assembly session.
Strong Western opposition prevented passage of
controversial formulations on such topics as sup-
port for national liberation movements and oppo-
sition to troops on foreign soil.
17. After considerable acrimony, delegates to
the commemorative portion of the Assembly meeting
did manage to achieve agreement on guidelines for
the Second UN Development Decade (DD-II), the 1970s.
The 'less developed countries (LDCS) pushed the
DD-II concept very hard, but the final product--
hedged by both Eastern and Western statements of
interpretation and reservation--provided only amor-
phous commitments to a strategy for development
assistance. The LDCs., did not secure firm adher-
ence to a specific date for the major powers to
i'und aid programs on the basis of one percent of
their annual gross national products.
18. The rash of aerial hijacking immediately
preceding the convocation of the 25th Assembly
prompted a quick response from the UN membership.
In November, the representatives approved a resolu-
tion condemning hijackings "whatever the pretext
or motive." Galvanized by this affirmative UN
stance, a diplomatic conference at The Hague in
December completed work on a convention setting
international standards to deal with aerial pirates.
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19. A serious disappointment at the 1970 As-
sembly was the continuing inability to reach agree-
ment on the treaty that would establish rules.for-
liability in the event of accidents related to outer
space ventures. The Soviets remained intransigent
on two key issues: the form of arbitration and the
type of laws that are applicable. There is some
hope that a compromise can be effected on these
points during the coming year.
Assessment
20. Judged by the very high expectations set
for the 25th Assembly, its actions and their prob-
able impact on the future may seem only modest at
best. On the other hand, the effects--whether for
better or worse--of the controversial Middle East
resolutions an-1 the vote on the "Albanian" reso-
lution could be quite far-reaching in the years
ahead. In addition to again proving its worth as
a forum for international dialogue, the Assembly
this year moved the UN more fully into several mat-
ters of increasing importance, e.g., maritime is-
sues, aerial hijackings, and problems relating to
international development assistance.
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