SOVIET REACTIONARIES: HATING JEWS AND LOVING STALIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100030-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 18, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
SOVIET REACTIONARIES: HATING JEWS AND LOVING STALIN
Secret
18 March 1971
Nc. 1274/71
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WARNING
'T'his document contains inforn ation affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended,
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt l;y an unauthorized person is prohibited llv law,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
18 March 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Reactionaries: Hating Jews and Loving Stalin
Introduction
The "liberal" end of the Soviet political spec-
trum, whatever real weight it carries, has been rela-
tively visible to the West for several years. Soviet
liberals have turned to the West for inspiration and
aid, and their cause has attracted attention, often
born of hope, from many in the West. This paper por-
trays some aspects of the opposite end of the spec-
trum. Soviet reactionaries have little interest in
publicizing their views before Western audiences,
but recently they have said and written enough to
provide a rather complete model of political thought
of an extremist type against which more commonly
held opinion in the USSR can be measured. The re-
ported political ties and activities of the ultra-
conservatives, moreover, shed light on some of the
motives in the decision-making process within the
Politburo. The policies that emerge from this proc-
ess help to identify the limits imposed on the So-
viet leaders by the need for consensus in the Kremlin.
Anti-Semitism, before and after the Revolution,
has been a conservative force at three levels of na-
tional life: the popular, the political, and the
philosophical. It was endemic to the Russian masses
before the Revolution and has hardly been shed by
their descendants, the new proletariat class and
ruling elite of the Soviet Union. The Tsars pan-
dered to anti-Semitism as a convenient outlet for
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current InteZZigence and coordinated within the
Directorate of InteZZigence.
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popular frustrations; Stalin turned to it with more
frequency after he had completed his transforma-
tions of society and was intent on freezing the
mold. Anti-Semitism has also been part of the re-
curring question of the country's politicians and
intellectuals: "Whicher Russia?" Three historical
influences easily converge here: the Slavophile in-
sistence on the unique character of the Russian peo-
ple that must be preserved if Moscow is to fulfill
its destiny as a third Rome, Stalin's revival of
Great Russian nationalism and his intolerance of
foreign variations to Soviet Communist doctrine,
and the view of Jews not only as foreigners but also
as bearers of an essentially Western Weltanschaung
that threatens the foundations of Russian society.
In today's world these attitudes are sharpened by
the position of China and Israel vis-a-vis the So-
viet Union. China complements the West by offering
a more Eastern alternative to post-Stalin Communism
in the USSR, while Israel gives world Jewry a state
focus and stands as a military threat to Soviet in-
terests in the Middle East.
Study of four recent developments in Soviet
politics helps to reveal the dynamic nature of these
issues. To be examined are a set of decisions on
literary themes and political appointments taken
by the Politburo in July 1970, the activities of So-
viet Stalinists in Czechoslovakia, the views of So-
viet officials involved in Mideast affairs, and an-
other set of Politburo decisions taken in December
concerning the trial of alleged Jewish hijackers in
Leningrad. I all these cases, our information is
fragmentary and disconnected. Taken together, how-
ever, the data form a pattern that presents a com-
posite picture of reactionary opinion in the USSR
and the current extent and limits of its influence.
July Leadership Decisions
1. Several months of tension in the Kremlin
came to a climax in July 1970 as Soviet leaders
actively jockeyed for position and finally were
forced to make some difficult decisions on the fu-
ture course of party and state affairs. The issues
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revolved around the scheduling of the overdue party
congress and the shape of the new five-year plan.
Events of the period indicated that Premier Kosy-
gin's position was being eroded, and rumors pre-
dicted his retirement at the July session of the
new Supreme Soviet. At the same time, one of Ko-
sygin's first deputy premiers, Polyansky, was en-
gaged in abetting an anti-Semitic and Stalinist
push in cultural affair
Personnel matters at lower levels were up
ciston before the congress, and one of the
most startling appointments was the assignment of
Leningrad Oblast party first secretary, V. S. Tol-
stikov, as ambassador to Peking.
2. During a Central Committee plenum on 2-3
July General Secretary Brezhnev announced a five-
year agricultural program that represented a victory
for Polyansky's agricultural interests. The decision
to postpone the Party Congress was apparently made
by the Politburo between this plenum and the one on
12 July which announced that the Congress would be
held in 1971 and that Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin
would be reporters at the Congress.
3. It was also at this time
that the Politburo stepped into a controversy
over two reactionary novels by Ivan Shevtsov pub-
lished in early 1970. The novels enthusiastically
endorsed Stalin's leadership, justified the bloodshed
of collectivization and the purges, glorified the
working class while vilifying liberal intellectuals
as dup's of the West--all to the drumbeat of blatant
anti-Semitism.
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io was passed censuring e
writings o evtsov, the works of several other
authors, and an interview by Foreign Trade Minister
Patolichev that extolled Stalin too directly and
on 12 July Pravda ran a
scathing review o Shevtsov's novels aa'-mning them as
"ideologically corrupt and artistically worthless."
This has been the only direct result of the resolu-
tion, however, and neither the reactionary writers
nor Polyansky has visibly suffered from its adoption.
Sensitivity to the question of anti-Semitism was never-
theless betrayed in the elevation of a Jew with meager
party credentials to become first secretary of the
Jewish Autonomous Oblast party committee in Birobidzhan
on 24 July.
4. This appointment, related changes among pro-
vincial party leaders, and the choice of envoys to
China may also have been agreed upon by the leadership
in mid-July. News services reported on 14 July that
according to "authoritative sources" Deputy Foreign
Minister Ilichev would replace his colleague Kuznetsov
as chief negotiator at the border talks in Peking. A
Soviet journalist reported on 28 July that Tolstikov
was under consideration for the ambassadorship, and
on 5 August news services quoting "Communist sources"
reported that China had agreed to his appointment.
5. Various explanations have been advanced for
Tolstikov's banishment to Peking in spite of the
fact that it has long been eviuent that he was no
favorite with the majority of the collective leader-
ship. implied 25X1
that o s tikov s assignment was connected wi
Moscow's unhappiness over the Leningrad trials of
Jews and the attendant publicity. I Iclaimed 25X1
that the case had been stirred up by o s-icov in an
attempt to make a name for himself. The affair did
receive unusual and prompt publicity when Leningrad-
skaya Pravda, the local Leningrad newspaper, reported
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the attempted hijacking and the arrests on 16 June,
the day after the events. Not only were most of those
arrested at the airport Jews, but the incident was
used as a pretext for rounding up members of Jewish
circles in Leningrad, Riga, Kaliningrad, Kishinev,
and Odessa. Clearly, some authorities--and not only
those in Leningrad--were preparing a wide crackdown
on Jewish activists.
6. Tolstikov has displayed neo-Stalinist tend-
encies at least in the spheres of culture and law
and order. It is possible that he had been, in addi-
tion, exhibiting another quality of a neo-Stalinist--
a critical attitude toward past handling of relations
with China. His assignment may have had the double
purpose of sparing his government from his criticism
and educating him to the realities of affairs with
China. Criticism of policy toward China would have
been a particular irritant to Suslov, who had carried
the main burden of articulating the Soviet case against
China. It was Suslov who presided over the installa-
tion in Leningrad of Tolsf-".ihov's successor, second
secretary G.J. Romanov, on 16 September.
7. In retrospect, it seems likely that the
Politburo's decision to send Tolstikov abroad was
made concurrently with its censure of excessively
Stalinist themes in literature that had received en-
couragement from Polyansky. The anti-Semitism of
much of the literature censured and the arrests of
Jews in Tolstikov's bailiwick the preceding month pro-
vide a suggestive common thread.
8. It is also noteworthy that these events
coincided with the solidification of Kosygin's po-
sition in the leadership. Kosygin--a moderate in
cultural affairs, the one leader publicly identified
with the launching of the Peking border talks, and
the one Soviet leader who has addressed a Soviet
audience on the impermissibility of anti-Semitism--
had suffered a number of setbacks in the spring of
1970. These included the triumph of the agricul-
tural lobby, the decision to rework the new five-
year plan, Brezhnev's intrusion in the affairs of
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the Council of Ministers, and a rash of rumors in
Moscow and abroad that Kosygin would retire with
the convening of the newly elected Supreme Soviet.
Polyansky, as one of his two First Deputies, was
(and is) a natural contender for Kosygin's position.
In announcing the Congress and Kosygin as one of
the reporters, the Central Committee plenum on 13
July established his tenure at least until March
1971. Kosygin and his entire government were re-
elected at the Supreme Sovict on 14-15 July.
9. In sum, the evidence suggests that the
Politburo in mid-July, along with other business,
gave attention to' the growing manifestations of a
Stalinist and anti-Semitic strain in public life.
The moderates led by Suslov were able to deal a
tactical reversal to this development and its ap-
parent sponsors, including Polyansky and Tolstikov.
Kosygin, who appeared to be tottering a bit, was
able to right himself.
Soviet Reactionaries Abroad
10. Soviet reactionaries abroad, particularly
those in Czechoslovakia and the Middle East, have
been more accessible to Western observers than their
counterparts in the Soviet Union. They have kept
in. contact with Stalinist elements in Slovakia, es-
pousing a thoroughly dogmatic line and trying to
encourage anti-Semitism in order to reinforce the
contention that the "counterrevolution" of 1968 was
the work of "imperialism and international Zionism."
11. A main figure in this activity has been
Nikolay Starikov, third secretary of the Soviet Em-
bassy in Prague. On 18 November, Starikov report-
edly presented awards to seven factory workers who
had drafted a letter published in Pravda in July
1968 protesting the policy of Dubcek. Speaking
later that day to a group of about 40 ultraconserv-
ative Czechoslovak Communists, Starikov charged that
Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in 1956 was ultimately
responsible for the difficulties of Communism in
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Eastern Europe during the last 14 years. Events
since 1956 have vindicated Stalin's policy he said;
therefore, if the strength of Communism is to be re-
stored, the "poison of Khrushchevism" must be de-
stroyed at the 24th Party Congress in March and the
offending aspects of the 20th Congress repudiated.
Once this is accomplished, according to Starikov, it
will be possible to restore unity with China and
within the international Communist movement.
12. The Soviet hand in propagating anti-Semitic
themes in Czechoslovakia is also revealed in the De-
cember publication by the Slovak Pravda publishing
house in Bratislava of Beware: Zionism. The book--
written by two Soviets, Yuri Ivanov and Ye. Yevseyev,
who has been described as a "paranoic anti-Semite"---
is a vicious attack on Zionism for anti-Soviet ac-
tivity and for instigatic,i: of the Czechoslovak reforms.
13. The "new" book is actually a revised ver-
sion of Ivanov's book bearing the same title that was
first published in the USSR in March 1969 and then
reissued in May 1970 by Politizdat in a press run
of 200,000--significantly larger than the 1969 edi-
tion. The May edition, like the recent Slovak one,
was updated and included a more direct implication
of Zionism in the Czechoslovak reforms as well as in
events in Hungary in 1956 and the Polish "spring" of
1968. The publication of the book in Czechoslovakia
coincides with increasing exhortation in the Soviet
Union on the need for vigilance and anti-Zionist
propaganda. The Czechoslovaks themselves seem to
be conducting a similar, albeit less virulent, cam-
paign, probably under the influence of the Soviets.
Although no direct links between both Ivanov and
Yevseyev and any major political figure in the So-
viet Union are apparent, the highly laudatory review
which Ivanov's book received from Sovetskaya Rossiya,
which is reportedly responsive to Politburo member
Polyansky, suggests the possibility that Ivanov, like
Shevtsov, may have his support.
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The Middle East Experts: Specialists in Anti-Semitism
14. Anti-Semitic sentiments also seem to be
prevalent among Soviet officials involved in Middle
East affairs. Preoccupation with Israel apparently
leads them to magnify what they see as related dan-
gers, including the challenge of "international Zion-
ism," the supranational loyalties of Soviet Jews, and
the less than total commitment of the Russian people
to fighting Israel and foreign influences. Stalinism
flourished under a siege mentality, and the evident
insecurity felt by some officials dealing with the
Middle East makes them also susceptible to a Stalin-
ist analysis of Soviet problems.
15. It is not surprising, therefore, that such
officials have taken to the ideas of the author
Ivanov. Ivanov himself is assigned to the Israeli
desk in the Middle East Section of the Central Com-
mittee's International Department. Yevseyev, who
now works for Problems of Peace and Socialism, an
international Communist journal published in Prague,
was formerly a Soviet diplomat in Cairo (1961-64).
Prior to assuming his present position he was on
the Lebanese desk in the Middle East Division of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I
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In January 1971, the Western press
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reported the existence of the Za Rodi,nu tFcr the 25X1
Fatherland) Society, allegedly compose of xeno-
phobic, anti-Semitic St.al i.nists
25X1 In March, the press reported that a new
samiz a (Underground) journal, Veche; described as
nat'a is alisti.c, anti-Semitic and Slavophi.le (anti-
Western) was being published. The journal's stated
purpcRe is to root out. Trotskyism and cosmopolitanism
in Soviet life, Both terms have strong anti-Semitic
overtones reminiscent of the Stalin era, Although 25X1
the relationship between these anti-Semitic elements
is unclear, a striking coincidence of views is evi,- 25X1
dent. Veche, for example, contained an article by
an unnamed author who deplores the
"architectural rape" o Moscow y Jews.
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December Leadership Decisions
21. In late December, the "Jewish question"
came back to haunt the Politburo. On this occa-
sion, however, it was not the novels of an obscure
writer that resurrected the issue, but Western re-
action to the Leningrad trial of Soviet Jews, who
allegedly attempted to hijack a Soviet aircraft in
June. The Soviet response to vehement Western de-
nunciations, some of which came from important Com-
munist parties, was z; retreat from the tough posi-
tion taken by the authorities earlier.
22. Wha,ever the relationship of the arrests
to Tolstikov's change in assignment, the new ambas-
sador's departure from Leningrad had not stopped
plans for prosecution either of the alleged hijackers
or of those Jews accused more ominously of "anti-
Soviet activity." The prosecution's course did not
run smoothly. The trials reportedly were scheduled
to begin in October but were delayed until mid-Decem-
ber. The secrecy of the trial, the severity of the
verdict--including two death sentences--and under-
ground rumors that the whole affair was staged com-
bined to produce a wave of adverse publicity in the
West. The imminence of the second-level trials of
JewG arrested at the same time on charges of "anti-
So-iet activity" lent added impetus to the Western
protests against what were branded as manifestations
of anti-Semitism. The severity of the Western denun-
ciations and the criticism of the Communist parties
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in Great Britain, France and Italy were apparently
unexpected in Moscow and resulted in a rapid about
face on the Leningrad affair.
23. On 28 December, only four days after the
court handed down its verdict, it was already ru-
mored that an appeal would be heard on 30 December.
The rumor initially seemed somewhat improbable, be-
cause the normal appeal process in the Soviet Union
takes several weeks. But on 30 December the Supreme
Court did in fact hear the appeal and the following
day commuted the death sentences and reduced several
prison sentences. The sensitivity of the issue, the
speed with which the appeal was heard, and the rever-
sal of the lower court's decision suggest, that the
new Soviet attitude was the result of a Politburo
decision reached sometime between 25 and 30 December.
25. The decision to reverse the death sentences
and the subsequent delays in prosecution of the other
Leningrad Jews arrested last June were probably re-
lated to the coming Party Congress and, perhaps in
some degree, to the policy adopted on the Jarring
mission.. The agitation among foreign Communists
over the trials threatened to create unnecessary
inter-party friction while plans for the Moscow con-
clave were being made. Moreover, the emotional
storm the. trials raised in Israel and among her sym-
pathizers would probably have compounded the problems
facing the Jarring mission and would have detracted
from the "reasonable" public image the Soviets had
decided they and the Egyptians should present in
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the Middle East. These factors are in addition to
what must have been a basic desire to counteract
the domestic impact of the affair which, with its
numerous arrests in several cities, almost certainly
aroused fears in some quarters that another witch
hunt, reminiscent of the Doctors' Plot and the anti-
cosmopolitan campaign, was in the wings. Similar
considerations may have been a factor in the regime's
decision to allow several groups of the most out-
spoken Jewish activists to emigrate to Israel in the
early months of 1971.
The Weight of the Stalinists
26. The issues of Stalinism and Khrushchevism,
orthodoxy and revisionism, and accommodation with
China and/or the West define basic cleavages in So-
viet political life. Shevtsovv, Starikov 25X1
25X1 probably represent the far left of t e spectrum
of Soviet political opinion. Their views are dis-
tinguished even from most conservative political ex-
pression by both their extremism and their logical
consistency. Unity of the socialist community is
to be re-established not by China's disavowing Mao-
ism, but by the Soviet Unior.'s repudiating Khrushchev-
ism and returning to the orthodox path trod by Stalin.
Such a course would demand intense vigilance toward
the West, liquidation of Zionist elements in the So-
viet Union as the bearers of Western influences and
revisionism, and elimination of the Israeli threat
to Arab and Soviet interests in the Middle East.
27. This program is less important for the
number of people who embrace it as a whole than for
its definition of an ultimate position on one side
of political debate in the Soviet Union. Against
this model Soviet political opinion in general can
be measured and divided according to the degree of
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Starikov represent zealous advocates
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for what is probably a large conservative constitu-
ency in the Soviet Union whose members themselves,
either individually or corporately, rarely reach
such extreme or consistent views on all questions.
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must receive sanction from fairly high levels in the
party apparatus. Given the strength of conservative
impulses in. the Soviet Union, a Politburo member
like Polyansky undoubtedly finds it politic to pa-
tronize Shevtsov's efforts, and there are other in-
dications that on some issues his sympathies lie
in this direction. This does not mean, however,
that Polyansky buys Shevtsov's program wholesale or
would be eager to enact it in all respects.
28. The program, in fact, is a logical exten-
sion of the general policies of the regime since
1964. The current leadership has presided over a
steady but controlled rehabilitation of Stalin and
his hei.tage, a repudiation of Khrushchev's innova-
tions, ruthless measures to preserve uniformity and
unity in the Communist movement, and a growing com-
mitment to the Arabs in the Middle East. It has
thus fostered a climate that is not only congenial
to conservatives but also stimulates the zealots
among them to try to push these policies to their
ultimate conclusion. The fact that these extremes
have been deliberately avoided by the collective
leadership leaves it open to the charge, even from
the ambitious among its own numbers, that it is not
pursuing its policies with enough vigor and to their
logical end. It may not be unreasonable to ascribe
such views to Tolstikov, whose position ha(? long
given him claim to a seat at the summit in Moscow,
and to Polyansky, who assuredly covets the title of
his boss, Kosygin.
29. Polyansky got no more than the tip of a
finger singed in the Shevtsov affair last summer.
Since then the dogmatists have tightened their grip
on cultural policy, and reactionaries in art are
riding high. Polyansky and his agricultural inter-
ests remain the biggest winners in the allocations
sweepstakes under the new five-year plan.
30. In addition, the impending Party Congress,
with its possibilities for readjustment of the party
line and realignment of the political hierarchy, has
undoubtedly been a stimulant to the activity of the
ultra-conservatives, as well as to other political
elements. The statements by Starikov
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on the role of the 24th Congress, however, appear to
be not much more than expressions of their own fer-
vent hopes for its outcome. In reality, the conserv-
ative and moderate forces at the top seem so evenly
balanced as to make any predictions that the Congress
will veer one way or another highly suspect.
Moderates Have Final Say
31. Most telling are the decisions taken by
the Politburo in July and December when it was faced
with the escalating consequences of conservative
initiatives. On both occasions the collective sought
to rein in the extremists, and in December the leaders,
moved by a variety of personal rivalries, domestic
policy concerns, and foreign policy considerations,
in unaccustomed fashion reversed public decisions.
32. That Suslov should be a key figure on the
side of moderation is readily explained by his re-
sponsibility for ideology and the international
movement, areas where extremism threatens to wreak
havoc. It was Suslov who enunciated, at a Comintern
anniversary on 25 March 1969, the rationale for
working with Social Democracy--that is, a stance
Westward instead of Eastward--and criticized Stalin
in this regard. On such a rationale is built Mos-
cow's treating with Bonn that has been such a promi-
nent part of Soviet foreign policy during the past
year. This attitude has long been shared by Kosygir.,
33. In the past year Brezhnev's public stature
has grown, and if the trend continues, he is likely
to dominate at least the platform at the Congress.
He has appeared very comfortable with the conserva-
tive drift of policy under his regime. Nevertheless,
in policy matters he is still playing the moderator
and seems careful to apportion his support to all
factions. Two of his aides, G. E. Tsukanov and A.
Ye. Bovin, reportedly worked hard to bring Shevtsov
under censure. Having agreed to that, however,
Brezhnev is reported to have turned aside the peti-
tions for redress of a liberal playwright, Mikhail
Shatrov, who had suffered at the hands of conserva-
tives in the spring of 1970. In foreign policy,
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Brezhnev has identified himself with the Soviet -
West German treaty and portrayed it as a major ac-
complishment of the regime.
34. In short, the bust now erected above Stalin's
grave is no sure sign that the Party Congress is
about to re-install his remains in the Mausoleum.
Agitation from reactionary quarters reveals the
present conservative cast of political argument in
the Soviet Union and the strength and expectations
of one political faction as it looks forward to the
Congress. Its triumph, however, would require a
convulsion among the ruling collective. Decisions
taken by the Politburo and the policies it is pur-
suing indicate the limits placed on the Soviet lead-
ers' scope for policy initiatives. The consensus
in the Kremlin continues to be tested, but there are
no good signs that it is about to yield to reaction-
ary extremes.
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