PING PONG DIPLOMACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100050-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: April 19, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
E-
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
PING PONG DIPLOMACY
Secret
19 April 1971
No. 1682/71
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WARNING
This duv ument contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
OROUP I
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 April 1971
Ping Pong Diplomacy
1. Peking's decision to allow the members of
the US table tennis team, accompanying officials,
and newsmen to enter China is unquestionably a
breakthrough of considerable significance. In it-
self, it is a major new departure for the Communist
Chinese. But is it merely an end in itself, or do
the Chinese have other considerations in mind? If
so, how important are these additional considera-
tions? And are there wider implications for Sino-
US relations in this gesture?
Reactions in Taiwan
2. It seems reasonable to suppose that Peking
expects to kill several birds with this particular
stone. One important factor in Chinese calculations
undoubtedly is the effect the Communist initiative
is likely to have in Taipei. Although the National-
ist Chinese have reacted in relatively low kay, they
most certainly ha??e been pained by the new develop-
ment. Taipei papers are cailing Peking's gesture a
"plot" and are suggesting that Washington has been
bamboozled by clever Communist tactics. To be sure,
the Nationalists half expected that Peking would
open the door at least part way once US visa re-
strictions had been lifted, and therefore the Com-
munist move can hardly be a complete surprise to
Note: This memoranJum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinc.ted within CIA.
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them. Moreover, the fact that Americans are enter-
ing the mainland is a concomitant rather than a cause
of the strains now present in the Washington-Taipei
relationship. The tendering of the invitation, to-
gether with its immediate acceptance, is a graphic
illustration of those more fundamental strains. The
publicity attendant on the visit--much of it orches-
trated by Peking--has driven this point home to the
Nationalists and can hardly be lost on other inter-
national observers.
...and in the USSR
3. Just as in their brief resumption of the
Warsaw talks last year, the Chinese must in this in-
stance have carefully weighed the repercussions their
gesture would have in Moscow, always sensitive to
signs, however faint, of a rapprochement between Pe-
king and Washington. Soviet papers have run a brief
account of the visit directly beneath a report of
Peking's most recent "serious warning" to the US,
with the obvious intention of contrasting Chinese
words and deeds. This, of course, is a standard
propaganda ploy, though in this case the Soviets
can derive but cold satisfaction from demonstrating
that Chinese actions belie Chinese words, given the
nature of those actions. Peking both welcomes and
expects such signs of Soviet nervousness regarding
the possibility of a marked improvement in Sino-US
relations.
.and in Japan
4. Peking must view the foregoing considera-
tions as standard factors in any dealings of a polite
nature with the United States or its citizens. But
in this instance the Chinese initiative conveyed a
message to Japan as well. Although the invitation
to the American table tennis players was t'andered on
Japanese soil--and was paralleled by similar invita-
tions to the British, Canadians, and Colombians--the
Japanese themselves were snubbed. The implication
of this action, or lack of action, must be clear to
Tokyo: Japan could be left behind in a general and
mutual improvement of relations between Washington
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and Peking unless the Sato government changes its
China policy. This point ha;; no doubt been under-
lined by Japanese press reaction to the visit: each
step of the trip has been reported under banner head-
lines in virtually all papers, and the development in
general has been treated as a major new departure in
Sino-US relations.
Broader International Ripples
5. More important still, from Peking's point
of view, will be the reverberations of its move among
parties not directly involved in the transaction it-
self. In terms of general impact, the invitation to
the Americans is the clearest and most dramatic indi-
cation yet that China is now following a foreign pol-
icy of "moderation and reason." This bit of public
drama will no doubt be useful as Peking continues its
efforts to win more friends and greater influence
around the world. Moreover, the implication embedded
in the invitation--that Sine-US relations are in the
process of improvement--may help remove inhibitions
on the part of those states that are now in the course
of rethinking their China policy. All this might not
translate directly into recogn.Ltion of,Peking by ad-
ditional countries or into additional votes for seating
the Communists in the United Nations, but it will cer-
tainly have an effect on the atmosphere in which these
twin Chinese quests are conducted. In the short run
this may be the most important benefit Peking foresaw
in tendering the invitation to the American players.
UN corridors are already abuzz with talk about the
significance of the Chinese gesture, and the consen-
sus appe,.rs to be that Peking's chances for admission
to the world body have improved.
The US Target
6. It is obvious, however, that the Chinese
are not simply interested in the reaction of third
parties to their new move. They also have its impact
on the United States firmly in mind. Peking's or-
chestration of the visit--the tendering of the invi-
tation by the secretary-general of the Chinese table
tennis association personally, the warmth of welcome
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accorded the visiting players, the special facili-
ties provided the accompanying newsmen to transmit
copy and film to the United States quickly--claarly
indicates that the Chinese hope and expect to achieve
a maximum favorable impression of Chinese "good will"
in this country. Indeed, the interest the visit has
aroused in the United States, coupled with initial
expressions of pleased surprise in the US media, has
probably caused Peking to escalate its efforts in
this respect. Chou En-lai's hastily arranged meet-
ing with the American team and Peking's belated ap-
proval of additional visas to newsmen Tillman Durdin
and Mark Gayn suggest that the Chinese have taken
additional ad hoc measures to capitalize on the fa-
vorable response their initial actions elicited.
7. All this is "people's diplomacy" with a
vengeance. Without committing themselves directly
on the major state-to-state issues that divide them
from Washington, the Chinese have materially im-
proved the atmospherics surrounding those issues.
This "people-to-people" aspect of the visit has been
stressed in Chinese official comment on the Ameri-
cans' tour and has been underlined by Chou En-lai
himself with his remark that a "new page" in Sino-US
affairs has now been opened. Clearly the Chinese
do not expect the visit by the table tennis players
to be a one-shot affair. Chou has indicated that
additional American newsmen will be allowed to en-
ter China at intervals, and it is almost certain
that other groups and individuals will also be per-
mitted to enter the country. At least some Chinese
groups will probably be sent to the United States
as a "reciprocal" gesture.
8. These exchanges may not be confined to news-
men, scholars, groups of athletes, or the like.
There are in fact signs that Peking may be inter-
ested in arranging visits of US political figures
to China in the future. Sihanouk recently told
that Chou En-lai had remarked
ear y in L ri a - a visit by Senator Mansfield
"might now be possible." Sihanouk added that when
he had raised this subject with Chou (apparently at
Sihanouk's initiative) on an earlier occasion, Chou
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had shown no interest in such a visit. The Chinese
may be considering admission of other members of
Congress as well.
Washington's Reaction
9. The reasons for Peking's interest in "open-
ing" China to US citizens are fairly clear. The
Chinese believe that the international situation is
;:;coming favorable for them and that Washington will
have to adjust itself to the changing situation. To
this end it behooves them to encourage groups and in-
dividuals in the United States who might press Wash-
ington to move farther and faster than it would other-
wise be inclined to do toward bettering Sino-US rela-
tions, and toward eventual recognition of Peking.
Chou's remarks to the table tennis players about the
opening of a "new page" in relations between the two
countries was clearly designed to generate pressures
of this sort.
10. For a variety of historical reasons, how-
ever, "people-to-people" diplomacy is inseparable
from the larger question of state relations between
Washington and Peking--and the Chinese are well. aware
of this' fact. Indeed, much of the discussion at War-
saw over the years has concerned precisely such matters
as exchanges of visitors, newsmen, and scholars between
the two countries. For a dozen years, however, the
Chinese have insisted that the Taiwan issue is the
major bone of contention between the two parties, and
that the kinds of exchanges that now seem possible
were merely of secondary concern. It is unlikely that
their views on this matter have essentially changed,
but there have been signs that Peking is aware that
atmospherics would hale to be improved before real
progress could be made on the central problem. In
fact, this seems precisely what is now occurring--
outside the context of the Warsaw talks.
11. Peking has been watching closely the evolution
of US China policy over the past year and a half--the
private comments of Chinese officials make this quite
explicit--and has clearly taken aboard US statements
that Washington hopes and intends to lessen the long-
standing tensions between the two parties. The Chinese
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have almost certainly also taken aboard US observa-
tions that Washington's attempts to defuse tensions
have met with no response from Peking. The Chinese
invitation to the table tennis players, coming scarcely
three weeks after the United States had lifted all
restrictions on American trnvel to China, was clearly
Peking's response to the earlier US move and an ac-
knowledgement of Washington's previous piecemeal
gestures toward Peking. Thus, the new Chinese ini-
tiative must be viewed as a move on the chessboard
of state-to-state relations as well as a "people-to-
people" ploy.
Bilateral Relations
12. Does this mean that the Chinese now believe
that the time is ripe for a significant forward move
in state-to-state relations? Surely they must suspect,
when reviewing the history of the ar:tagonisms and mis-
understandings of the past 20 years, that Washington
is interested in little more than a slight improvement
in the atmospherics surrounding the difficult relations
between the two parties. The war in southeast Asia
goes on, and the US is still "c;ccupying" Taiwan. These
are formidable obstacles to real movement in bilateral
relations. Nevertheless, there are indications that
important Chinese leaders believe that the US is in-
deed winding down the war in Vietnam, and that the tenor
of discussion of the "China problem" in the United States
is changing, with rising pressure on the government to
reach some sort of accommodation with Peking. If this
is their reading of the situation, the Chinese are al-
most certainly interested in discovering how the Nixon
Doctrine will apply in practice to China and to the
outstanding differences between the two countries.
13. And even as regards Taiwan--still the most
massive obstacle to better relations with the US--
the Chinese are probably beginning to see new reasons
to facilitate a slight thaw in long frozen positions,
and to refix them in a more favorable mode. They may
indeed be finding themselves in something of a dilemma
over Taiwan. On the one hand, their recent successes
in international diplomacy and at the UN seem on the
verge of accomplishing their objective of completely
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undercutting Taipei's claim to speak and act as the
"real China." But, on the other hand, even as this
is occurring, it seems that more and more nations
and individuals are likely to consider that whatever
the two Chinese governments may claim, the National-
ist regime is de lure as well as de facto a separate
entity, exercising sovereignty over precisely the
area under its direct control--Taiwan. From Peking's
point of view, this is a trend that must be re-
versed--and reversed sooner rather than later. To
allow things to drift might well result in a situa-
tion in whir.. Japan was as interested as the United
States, or even more so, in preserving Taiwan as a
political entity separate from the mainland. Some
movement on the Taiwan problem is necessary to pre-
vent this from happening, and the Chinese leaders
may well consider that now, while the United States
remains near the center of the picture and before
too many parties become frozen in a "one China, one
Taiwan" position, is the time to initiate some ac-
tion. Peking in this instance would wish to change
the context of the Taiwan problem without actually
"solving" it.
14. Much, of course, will depend on "pow the
Chinese read their chances of encouraging flexibil-
ity in the US position on Taiwan. They have cer-
tainly been following with great care the evolution
of the relationship between Taipei and Washington
over the past year, and although they are probably
not especially optimistic, it is likely that they
believe that the static situation of the past 20
years is undergoing a change. Since late 1969, Chi-
nese officials have been privately probing for a
firm reading of Washington's views on the Taiwan
problem, and it is likely that Peking will wish to
test the water in Warsaw in the relatively near
future. Indeed, if they wait too long, the approach-
ing vote in the United Nations might inhibit both
sides from resuming the contact in Poland.
15. In any event, political considerations
of the sort noted above are certain to take preced-
ence, in Chinese eyes, over commercial interests.
If the Chinese opt to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities for trade provided by the US decision of
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14 April to reduce economic barriers, it will be
because they believe that additional domestic pres-
sures on Washington to move still farther will thereby
be generated. But Sino-US trade would still be a slow-
growing and sometime thing.
Conclusions
16. Since political considers. ons remain
paramount, it is almost ceztain that Peking believes
that further diplomatic discussions with the US should
not be postponed indefinitely both for the reasons
already cited and also becau,,,e the Soviet factor re-
mains prominent in the Chinese mind. Finally, a clear-
cut indication that Sino-US relations are improving
would advance China's quest for additional recogni-
tion and for entry into the United Nations. Whether
or not any or all of its desiderata can be achieved
no doubt remains problematical. from Peking's point
of view. It is likely, however, that the Chinese see
delectable possibilities and want to explore them.
Probably the Chinese leaders believe that any progress
in Sino-US relations will come slowly. But the in-
vitation to the US table tennis team is a good indica-
tion that they wish to move relations off dead center.
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