THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE: ITS STATUS AND EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100062-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: June 15, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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thrive.
69. Ninh Thuan is considered one of the most
pacified provinces in MR-2. The healthy security
situation has produced more confidence in the gov-
ernment, less support for the Viet Cong, and the
gradual development of responsive political institu-
tions. But Ninh Thuan still has its share of the
enemy; the province chief estimated late last year
that nearly half of his hamlets still had some form
of party organization in place.
Military Region 3: Significant Pockets of Residual
Strength
70. MR-3 has been considered a showcase of
pacification, even though the Communists retain a
good deal more residual strength.thun most o:E the
statisti.::s suggest. The government has relatively
firm control over about two thirds of the population,
and no hamlet is considered to be under the physical
control of the Viet Cong. The ratio of allied to
enemy forces in MR-3 is the highest in the country.
There are still around 90,000 US military personnel
in the region, including artillery, helicopter, and
other combat and combat-support elements, but most
American ground forces have now left. Goverment
territorial forces have taken over much of the se-
curity burden, especially since about half of the
South. Vietnamese regulars normally operating in
MR-3 have been in Cambodia.
71. Although there are, still areas of signifi-
cant Communist strength, the Viet Cong apparatus in
much of MR-3 has been weakened. The improved gov-
ernment position is attributable in large part to
the absence of most of the Communist main force units
that once made this area the scene of persistent
heavy fighting. The four Communist divisions that
formerly fought in MR-3 have not been deep into the
region since the spring of 1969. Some of the regi-
ments deployed to the delta in. the second half of
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1969, while the rest stayed in sanctuary in Cambodia
until Sihanouk was upset. Since then, these units
have fought mainly in Cambodia. With them gone, al-
lied forces have kept a fairly tight lid on Commu-
nist military activity in MR-3, and the Viet Cong
apparatus has had to fend for itself.
72. In large parts of MR-3, Communist commit-
tees are kept on the run and well away from the popu-
lace. Yet in some of the most important and heavily
populated provinces, including those closest to Sai-
gon, the enemy organization not only survives, but
still seems to draw substantial local support and to
present a significant threat to local authorities.
Moreover, the Communists are putting a great deal of
energy into attempts to "legalize" their apparatus
in order to operate in territory under government
control; neither the magnitude nor the success of
these efforts is measurable.
73. Thus, although the Viet Cong are in no po-
sition to upset the balance in MR-3 on their own,
and the statistical trends are i.-kely to continue
showing them losing ground, they are by no means
out of the picture. If the Communists were able to
bring back some of their military units now tied up
in Cambodia in order to resume a heavier level of
fighting, their local apparatus in MR-3 might be
able to rebound and it probably could do at least
some of the support tasks it is meant to do.
74. Strong government security forces and ef-
fective police work have taken a heavy toll of Vie:
Cong agents in and around Saigon itself. Covert
networks are still being rolled up from time to time,
and the enemy's party apparatus has been crippled or
destroyed in around two thirds of the capital. But
the Communists are still trying to rebuild, to in-
filtrate urban based groups, and to keep open liai-
son channels into the city. Their capabilities for
terrorism and sabotage clearly have been reduced in
the capital area, but it is much less certain that
real inroads have been made into their political and
subve,-Give networks.
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75. There is so little Viet Cong activity re-
ported from some provinces in MR-3 that it is almost
impossible to get an impression of the state of the
local Communist apparatus. GVN officials in these
areas are almost uniformly confident and cite the
lack of overt activity as evidence of a sharp decline
in enemy capabilities.
76. Binh Lon and Phuoc Long provinces on the
Cambodian border of northern MR-3 fall into this cat-
egory. Neither province is heavily populated, and
because enemy military units that once kept these
provinces under pressure are now in Cambodia, local
Communist operatives have an unhealthy environment
in which to work. Roads are open, lumbering and
other economic activities are on the upswing, and
most people live under the government security blan-
ket. In both Binh Long and Phuoc Long, Cummunist
village committees are forced to live in the jungles.
Communist tax collectors make their rounds, but the
lack of strong grass-roots support for the Viet Cong
suggests they are not very effective. Captured en-
emy documents confirm that the Communists have lost
touch with many of the people in these two provinces.
77. In neighboring Tay Ninh Province, the gov-
ernment mood is decidedly optimistic since the turn-
about in Cambodia last year and the easing of the
threat long posed by strong ^u.;ununist main forces on
the border. The local Viet Cong apparatus still en-
joys a good deal of local support, but now the great
bulk of the population is under some form of govern-
ment control, and government security forces are
keeping the Viet Cong on the run. Many observers
point out, however, that Tay Ninh is one of the areas
where local accommodations and live-and-let-live at-
titudes toward the Communists are widespread. The
return of Communist military units from Cambodia
probably would enable the Viet Cong apparatus in Tay
Ninh to become much more effective than it appears
to be today.
78. Along the coast in Binh Tumor and Phuoc Tuy
provinces, the roots of Communist influence also run
deep, and the Viet Cong apparatus still is quite
strong. Although Ccmmunist village committees are
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not in place and overt Communist activity generally
remains quite low, there were 97 abductions in Binh
Tuy and a sharp increase in Communist attacks in
one district in March, The province chief in Binh
Tuy acknowledges that as many as half the families
in the northern part of the province have relatives
in the Viet Cong; the chief in Phuoc Tuy estimates
that a fifth of the population still support the
Communists.
79. Long Khanh Province falls in the middle
rankings in terms of security in South Vietnam. The
Vat Cong are not credited with "controlling" any
area, but they remain strong and fairly effective.
The province chief estimates that some 900 families
provide support to the Viet Cong; all three districts
have active committees, and enemy personnel are col-
lecting taxes and conducting subversive operations
in most villages. Enemy documents from one district
claim considerable success in recruiting South Viet-
namese soldiers and getting them to desert. A re-
cent press item claimed this same district is one of
the few in MR-3 where Americans and Vietnamese agree
that security has deteriorated since US forces pulled
out in April. Communist attacks and terrorism have
risen sharply suggesting that the Viet Cong have more
freedom to operate than before.
80. So ae of the toughest and most i:csilient
Communist organizations in MR-3 still work in the
three provin:es that ring Saigon on the north, west,
and south (Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and Long An).
Binh Duong has come a long way in reducing the ef-
fectiveness of the VCI, but the Communists still
have regular access to about a third of the people
in the province. In the northern districts some
Communist village committees remain in place, and
both documents and police testimony indicate the
Communists run a fairly successful subversive effort.
Terrorism and abductions are quite common. In re-
cent months the GVN has uncovered more than 30 pene-
trations of its own organizations, including two ham-
let chiefs and three village chiefs.
81. Hau Nghia Province is a long-time enemy
stronghold and has the toughest entrenched Communist
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apparatus in MR-3. It also has the poorest security
in the region and one of the worst security ratings
in.the country. Local government forces, already
woefully inadequate, have been unable to take up
the slack since US forces withdrew last year. GVN
officials estimate that about half the people have
relatives working for the Communists, and the Viet
Cong have access to over half the population. US
.advisers report that the Communists tax, propagandize,
and proselyte regularly. Terrorism in Hau Nghia is
usually much higher than elsewhere in the country.
There were 29 assassinations in January; in February
the victims included three hamlet chiefs.
82. Hau Nghia provides a good example of the
inadequacy of VCI statistics. VCI strength i;s re-
ported at less than 1,000--alipost certainly an under-
statement in view of the levels of enemy activity
and the pervasiveness of Communist activity. The
Communists probably have been quite successful in
establishing themselves in "legal" positions. Some
sources say that village councils are loaded with
Conte Lunists and their agents; at least two penetra-
tions were discovered in the provincial administra-
tion last year.
83. Long An Province also is a traditional
center of Communist strength. The enemy apparatus
in Long An has suffered setbacks repeatedly, but it
still exhibits the kind of resiliency that has enabled
the Communists to flourish there for years. Overt
Communist activity in the form of military attacks
and terrorism is not very high, but the Communists
have ready access to the people in the two most pop-
ulous districts and they can collect taxes, recruit,
and conduct subversive operations. Long An now ranks
in the top half of the countryside security ratings
and VCI strength is said to be below 1,000. But,
as in Hau Nghia, most observers believe the VCI re-
mains stronger and more effective than suggested by
pacification statistics.
Military Region 4: VC Still Under Heavy Pressure
84. The Communists are maintaining their ap-
paratus in MR-4, but its effectiveness has been
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Military Region 4
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reduced by the myriad government forces running op-
erations against them. The massive structure built
by the allies, including three regular army divisions,
territorial forces totaling some 200,000 men, plus
numerous village militia, police, and other security
forces, has simply stifled many kinds of enemy ac-
tivities.
85. The enemy apparatus in the delta suffered
a shock when Sihanouk was overthrown and South Viet-
namese units subsequently drove into Communist base
areas along the Cambodian border. Some government
forces took heart from this development and began to
fight in earnest. Cambodian developments are still
having a substantial impact on the enemy force struc-
ture and supply situation in the delta. Some main
force units are now fighting in Cambodia, many cadre
have been sent there, and indications of weapons and
ammunition shortages are quite common.
86. During the past year ARVN divisions have
moved into the remaining major VC strongholds. They
have built operations bases in the northern districts
of Kien Hoa Province, and the government now has at
least some kind of presence in what had been strictly
Communist territory. An ARVN division has established
fire-support bases in the U Minh Forest for the first
time and has brought-the ground war to the former
enemy sanctuary there. ARVN units have also occupied
some of the slopes of the enemy's Seven Mountains
base area, and have driven into another long-time
base area in the heart of the delta.
87. The Communists readily acknowledge in their
own councils that the massive government presence is
restricting their access to the people. They do not
so readily acknowledge that they have alienated many
of the people whose suppcrt they need. This happened
on a massive scale during the Tet Offensive of 1968,
when many homes were destroyed and people were killed
in areas previously relatively untouched by the war.
Since then, the Communists have lost much of their ap-
peal, and they do not command the fear, respect, and
support they once had. In many provinces the atmos-
phere has changed, with people appearing more relaxed
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and enjoying some prosperity as government security
controls have iwproved. Often there is a clear, if
unspoken, assumption that it is safer and more com-
fortable to live where the government is relatively
strong and the Viet Cong is relatively weak.
88. Yet in some areas the people are still
sympathetic to the Communists and do their bidding.
Moreover, the Communist apparatus in the delta still
functions even though district and village commit-
tees are often kept on the run and have d,.fficulty
staying in touch with the people in the hamlets.
The toll of enemy personnel at the grassroots level
has been very heavy, but the Communists retain a
great deal of resiliency and show time after time
that they can come back if the government fails to
keep the pressure on.
.89. In five provinces in the northern part of
MR-4, An Giang, Sa Dec, Kien Phon , Kien TA.-,ng, and
Go Cong, the Communists are now relatively weak.
These provinces regularly are rated among the most
secure in the country, and none of them has a very
large Viet Cong cadre structure. In some cases good
security can be attributed to aggressive government
forces running a fair percentage of their operations
at night--always a good sign--while in others local
VC forces are simply weak and lethargic. in many
places Communist village committees have been forced
to take refuge in remote areas.-
90. The greatest concentration of grass-roots
Communist strength in the delta lies in four prov-
inces along the main channels of the Mekong River
that flow down to Viet Cong territory in the forests
on the coast. In Dinh Tuong Province, the northern-
most of these provinces, the Communist apparatus is
large, Viet Cong main and local forces are aggressively
led, and they periodically mount strong attacks. But
elements from two ARVN divisions and fairly vigorous
territorial forces are gradually wearing many of the
VC down, including some in the hard-core party ap-
paratus. Many village committees are trying to oper-
ate in absentia, and recruiting in Dinh Tuong is not
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successful enough to provide all the needed replace-
ments.
936. In neighboring Kien Hoa Province, the Viet
Cong probably are still stronger than anywhere else
in the delta. The VC apparatus there numbers more
than 4,500 and the province consistently ranks among
the least pacified in all of South Vietnam. The Com-
munists still enjoy considerable support from the
people and are well organized in the villages along
the rivers and in stretches of mangrove forest along
the coast,
92. The government sent two regiments into Kien
Hoa late last summer and kept the pressure on until
the last few months. The Communists lost a district
seat they had controlled unchallenged for the last
eight years, and many Communist sympathizers felt
the heat and came over to the government, at least
for appearances sake. These defections have dropped
off recently, however, as the government has reduced
its activities, and the Communists have waged an of-
fensive of their own. They overran 11 outposts dur-
ing the first four months of the year. The govern-
ment regiments are gone, but the territorial security
forces are still building outposts, and the general
trend is likely to continue to go against the VC--
but very slowly.
93. In Vinh Binh Province the VC apparatus -s
believed to be only about one third the size of that
in Kien Hoa, but the Communists enjoy widespread sup-
port from the population and they are fighting gov-
ernment forces that are better at promises and plans
than performance. The weaknesses of the province
security forces have made Vinh Binh among the six or
seven greatest security risks in the country. This
may, in fact, understate the seriousness of the sit-
uation there. Considering the skill of the VC in
Vinh Binh the inadequate security forces defending
it, and the sympathy the VC still apparently enjoy
among the people, Vi:ih Binh Province may well be
the softest spot in the whole delta.
94. The Communists are said to have a large
support apparatus (nearly 3,000) up river in Vinh
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Long Province but they are up against tough govern-
ment forces. Even though security in Vinh Long is
still rated very low, Communist forces are more
likely than before to hide in their base areas most
of the time, and they do not have the close contacts
they once had with the populace.
95. The three provinces situated around the
periphery of the enemy base area in the U Minh Forest
(Chong Thien, Kien Giang, and An Xuyen) have some
of the lowest security ratings in the country. Com-
munist operations mounted directly out of the forest
and along communications and supply routes account
for some of the problems. But enemy strength is
durable because of the lackluster performance of the
government's territorial security forces in these
three provinces. In familiar cyclical fashion, en-
emy strength in the U Minh helps keep local govern-
ment forces discouraged and on the defensive; as a
result the government has difficulty in recruiting
or enlisting other aid from the local population.
And this in turn preserves a favorable environment
for enemy operations.
96. Chuong Thien Province is rated the least
secure province in the delta and one of the worst
in the country. Although the VC apparatus is num-
bered at only around 1,500, it has support from many
of the local villages. Seven GVN outposts were
overrun during the first four months of 1971 in the
eastern part of the province. Recently, territorial
forces have put some additional pressures on the Viet
Cong, and ARVN operations in the U Minh are helping
improve security. Chong Thien probably would still
go Communist, however, if given the choice. The
roads remain insecure, and it is difficult for gov-
ernment forces to get around. Local government se-
curity forces are an indifferent lot, and the VC
village committees still carry much weight.
97. In An Xuyen Province, the local Viet Cong
still seem to have an advantage over the government
security system. Two Communist regiments that some-
times sally out of the U Minh into the populated
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areas is one reason for their success. More impor-
tant, however, are the large num;3er of villages where
sympathy for the Communists has been strong for two
decades and which still supply the manpower needed
by the enemy's local support and administrative
structure.
98. Forces are fairly strong on both sides in
Kien Gi ang Province. The Communists maintain a base
area in the north, and they control long stretches
of the canal passing down through the province to-
ward the U Minh Forest. The government has been
putting on pressure, however, and provincial security
forces are building outposts along the canal. Some
of the villagers have begun to respond, markets are
springing up near these outposts, and the Communists
are reportedly having trouble collecting taxes. The
government's progress, however, is still very tenuous.
A recent campaign involving simultaneous operations
by all government security forces in the province was
very disappointing. Moreover, desertions from gov-
ernment ranks remain particularly high in Kien Giang.
99. Elsewhere in the delta there are pockets
of Communist strength, but the provinces mentioned
above are the main problem areas. Most of Chau Doc
Province in the western delta, for example, is qu ti
secure now, but the Communists have a base area in
the Seven Mountains that enables them to keep a sub-
stantial military threat nearby. Communist village
committees are still in place close to the Seven
Mountains, thanks in part to the backstopping pro-
vided by North Vietnamese regulars who come out of
the mountains from time.to time. Since late last
summer ARVN units have been trying to dig the Com-
munists out of their bunkers and caves, and enemy
troops have been too busy to intimidate the province
security forces as they had before. A number of
nearby hamlets that had been abandoned to the Com-
munists have been reoccupied, and more confident
government security units seem to be getting a clear
upper hand in most of the province.
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