MUTUAL TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE: THE SOVIET VIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100065-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: June 19, 1971
• Content Type: IM

 TAD FCTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
DP85T00875R001100100065-4
secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Mutual poop ~Zeductians in Europe:
The Soviet View
Secret
~~l
19 Junc 1971
No, 170#/7?
25X1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 June 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMO.RT~NDUM
Mutual Troop Reductions in Eurox~e? The Soviet View
Introduction
The Soviets developed the issue of force re-
ductions in Europe as a useful diplomatic device in
the 1950s and continued to initiate proposals on
the ,subject until the early 1960s. By 1965, how-
ever, the Soviets had abandoned the idea of force
reductions, in part because they hoped for uni-
lateral US reductions and in part because they
feared the accusation that mutual cuts would help
the US shift troops to Vietnam. Soviet coolness
toward reductions prevailed until last year, and
the USSR saw NATO propc~Gals on the subject pri-
marily as a tactica:. counter to its own call for
a Conference on European Security (CES).
Only in June 1970 did the Pac?- respond favora-
bly to NATO's overtures and, together with renewing
its call fo:t a Conference on European Security (CES),
recommend discussions on "reducing foreign armed
forces on the territory of EuroFa?an states." The
issue was then left dormant by the Soviets until
this spring, when party chief Brezhnev raised the
subject in his report to the 2~th Party Congress,
which allowed for discussion of limiting indigenous
as well as foreign forces. This was followed in
quick succession by other statements of Soviet in-
terest in the subject by Premier Kosyg_n and lesser
officials. In a speech at Tblisi in mid-May, Brezhnev
bluntly urged ?he NATO countries to "start negotia-
tions" on force reductions. Then, on 11 June, the
party chief stated outright that the talks ~~uld treat
both foreign and indigenous forces. According to
Note: This memora:adum u~as prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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initial repor,:s, Ambassador Dobrynin's remarks to
Secretary Rogers on 16 June did not expand signifi-
cantly upon Soviet thinking, but again registered
Soviet enthusiasm for force reductions. Now this.
topic, which Moscow defines as "reduction of armed
forces aild armaments in Central Europe:," i:a regu-
larly punt forward as a "Soviet initiat:ive.'~
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The Political Uses of Mutual~Force Reductions
1. Despite years of proposing force reduc-
tions in Europe, the Soviets themselves may have
not yet defined precisely what they want or even
how they intend to proceed. They do seem intent,
however, on using their present momentum to re-
capture the diplomatic initiative in Europe. Since
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the USSR has unin-
terruptedly pursued a course of trying to relax
tensions in Europe in ways which, with minimal risk
to its own position in the eas: ~rn half of the con-
tinent, woulQ open up the western half ~o increased
Soviet influence. The interaction of this policy
and the FRG's Ostpolitik, however, has created a
situation in which Berlin has become the sticking
point for the entire detente process. Failure to
make substantial progress on the status of the
divided city has bogged down Soviet initiatives
for a CES as well as ratification of Bonn's trea-
ties with Moscow and Warsaw acknowledging the per-
manence of postwar borders. Western success ~n
maintaining these linkag^s has put the USSR under
considerable pressure either to make concessions
on, Berlin or to find another issue tY:at woul d get
around tris problem and gives a new push to detente.
Reduction of forces, pre^isely because it is such
a long-standing NATO ?proposal, is such an issue.
Also, a Soviet initiative is at this stage a sen-
sible Grw ?~c respond to Western pressures for
c?iminishe3 forces since unyielding opposition to
t:'Zis notion would reflect badly on Soviet "deten-
tist" p~~licy in Europe.
2. The Soviets expect political gains from
the process--which they recognize will be pro-
tracted--of arranging negotiations on mutual force
reductions. In propaganda terms, they have gained
a temporary advantage over NATO and can now pose
as being more eager and ready for progress than
the :Jest. Moreover, they expect that this pos~~ture
will help them on other detente issues. Moscow
probably also hopes its proposal will generate
strains within NATO and that the opportunities for
mischief-making in NATO will increase as negotia-
tions draw near. Finally, the prospect of nego-
tiations on the issue will underscore to the West
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Europeans the "temporary" character of the US mili-
tary presence on the continent. Moscow certainly
hopes to exploit this point and to make clear that
although the U5 military presence will eventually
end, the Soviet Union will be a permanent politi-
cal, economic, and military force on the continent.
(Nevertheless, the Soviets presumably recognize
that discussion of force reductions could also
serve to reassure the West Europeans that any US
troop withdrawal will be accompanied by a similar
diminution of Soviet forces.)
3. Finally, the issue of mutual force reduc-
tions can readily be harnessed to one of the main
objectives of the USSR's European policy--formal
recognition and treatment of the GDR as a sove~:eign
state, It would be virtually impossible to exclude
East Germany from participating in negotiations on
this subject, and participation would accord it a
status West Germany and its allies have long with-
held. Even progress toward negotiations would have
some effect, although only actual talks would pro-
duce durable formal results. Much of the difficulty
in the Berlin negotiations arises from Western un-
willingness to acknowledge GDR claims to sovereignty
(in this case primarily with respect to civilian
access to Berlin), and the Soviets now have an al-
ternate route by which to buttress East Germany's
efforts toward wider international recognition.
This is not to say that the "tTSSR will lose all in-
terest in the Berlin talks, but having provided
itself with a second track on the GDR question,
it now has the option Ui switching back and forth
b=:tween them as circumstances dictate.
Military and Economic Factors in Force Reducta.ons
4. There are virtua~.ly no compelling military
arguments against force reductions from the Soviet
viewpoint. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are con-
siderably in excess of those needed for security and
police functions. The Soviets maintain 20 motorized
rifle and armor divisions in East Germany, but only
two divisions in Poland, ''our in Hungarlr, and five
in Czechoslovakia. The bulk of `orces in the GDR
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serve basically as a defense against NATO rather than
merely to keep East Germany in line. We cannot judge
what the Soviets conceive to be their securit~? re-
quireme:~t in East Germany, but it seems likely that
they could contemplate a reduction of a quarter or
a third of their forces without undue alarm--if op-
posing NATO forces could be simultaneously pared.
Indeed, the maintenance of the present-level Soviet
farce in East Germany since the late 195Qs probably
has been, in some measure, the product of inertia
and an unwillingness to take the requisite political,
decisions to reduce it. Also, the presence of five
Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia since 1968 might
serve to help quiet earlier military qualms about
force reductions.
5. The reassignment of units withdrawn from
Eastern Europe to other areas of potential tension,
the Sino-Soviet border, for example, would no doubt
commend itself to Soviet military planners. There
is some evidence that Soviet ground forces facing
NATO have bean forced to slow down the pace of mod-
ernizatior~ to accommodate the Sino-Soviet corder
build up. Redeployments could enable the Soviets
either to increase the rate of the build up against
China or the rate of modernization of the residual
forces opposite NATO.
6. The effect of any mutual force cut on the
military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
will of course depend upol.i the terms of the agree-
ment. Moscow ca~z be confident, however, that it
cannot be forced to accept terms so asymmetrical as
to worsen its relative position; indeed, it prob-
ably expects that, once talks get under way, the
pressures for success will result in an agreement
that does not fully offset the Soviet advantage in
reinforcement capabilities. More distantly, the
Soviets may hope that their detente policy, given
further momentum by a mutual troop reduction, will
at a later stage induce the US and other NATO mem-
bers to make .further, unilateral cuts in their de-
fense efforts.
7. It is difficult to be precise-about the de-
gree to which Soviet interest in force reductions is
motivated by economic considerations. Even if the
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units withdrawn were demobilized, the immediate re-
duction in spending would be small in the context of
total military spending. On the other hand, since
there is considerable debate under way within the
Soviet leadership over the allocation of resources,
even a nominal snift of resources from defense pro-
grams could help to reduce internal criticism of
present policies. The Soviets wou1~3 probably also
view the 100,000 or more men that could be released
by such force reductions as a welcome addition to
their tight labor supply. In the longer term, the
removal of the requirement for modernizing these
forces would add to the immediate savinoa. In ad-
dition, the Soviets might hope that the symbolic
impact of initial progress on .European force reduc-
tions, together with movement at SALT, could lead
to more exte~zsive arms control measures that would
entail much more significant savings in the future.
8. Lespite all these advantages, it remains
true that tl~~e USSR has been a long tirne in coming
around to embracing the NATO offer to negotiate. It
has hesitated, in large part, because it still was
tempted to wait for unilateral US cuts. Evidently a
decision was taken, as part of the foreign policy
calculations preceding the 24th CPaU Congress, that
US domestic sentiment for withdrawals could not be
coun+:ed on to do -the trick but that it could be use-
ful as a pressure on the US pc~sition in negotiations.
9. In al:arger context, there are fairly clear
signs of reserva~ions in Moscow about. the general
wisdom of thy.detente approach to Europe. The precise
nature of these reservations is unclear, but the de-
fensive tone of remarks by Soviet leaders and authori-
t~tive Soviet publications over the past several ~iionths
suggests that they spring from a deep ideological dis-
trust of Western motives and, probably, a Y:een sense
of vulnerability to the Western influences that would
be given freer rein in the East-West contacts inherent
in detente. As applied to the gv~~astion of mutual troop
reductions, the argument from such premises probably
is that nationalist aspirations in the East European
populations, and perhaps in the Communist parties as
well, would receive dangerous encouragement from even
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modest withdrawals of Soviet troops. Undoubtedly a
few supplement .his argument by contending that the
present Warsaw Pact - NATO balance is parlous. and must
be ,improved by inducing unilateral Western cuts. The
leadership has evidently ovc:Lriden such objections,
but they will serve to stiffen the Soviet position if
and when talks get under way.
10. The Soviets are also influenced by their
long-standing fears about West Germany as a poten~:ial
military threat. These concerns have g::eatly dimin-
ished in r.Acent years, but residual misgivings may
stil? persist about the relative :;eight of West Ger-
many in NATU if the US presence is ~~educed. On bal-
ance, however, the advantages of a US reduction prob-
ably outweic~ht, in Soviet calculations, these more
hypo;:hetical dangers.
Elemr,;~!?lts of the_ Soviet Negotiating Position
l1. In terms of negotiating tactics, the So-
viets can be expected to try to put NATO on the de-
fensive at the outset of any negotiations. Their
proposals would probably be simple and appealing;
designed to ~,ontrast favorably with complicated and
cautious NATU formulas. Moscow might propose, for
example, an across-the-board cut in foreign troop
levels by a quarter or a third, a similar cut in na-
tional forces in the two Germanies and perhaps some
of their immediate neighbors, and the elimination of
all nuclear wea~;ons within this zone. The Soviets
might well be willing to leave to NA~rO the burden of
initially spelling out the definition of troops, and
relation between numbers of troops and military units,
the problem of equipment levels, etc.
12. Generally, however, Moscow has thus faa: re-
sponded to Western attempts t~ probe its negotiating
position with deliberate obscurity. This tactic is
like?,y to persist for some time, since the very pros-
pect of negotiations works, in the view of Moscow, to
its advantage. Thus there is little basis for detailed
prediction of what proposals the USSR might ultimately
table at a conference.
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13. A primary Soviet objective would be to ob-
tain a significant raithdrawal of US troops from Europe
and a reduction of NATO advantages in such areas as
tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, Moscow might
make proposals aimed at blocking the future creation
of .a European nu.~lear force. These would be intended
not only to prevent she development of such a European
force but also to complicate, if. possible, the general
integration p~ucess within .the EC.
14. As for the area of coverage, the USSR prcb-
ably will want to concentrate on reductions in Central
Europe and also to press for provisions intended to
deny the U5 the option of relocating troops in the 1J:"
or Iberia. With respect to the Mediterranean there
are arguments for and against its inclusion from the
Soviet standpoint: the USSR would like to reduce NATO's
naval a~?~.rantage here, bvt it would not wish to limit its
ability tc~ support its Arab clients or to expand its
own growing capabilities.
15. It is far too early to speculate on whether
Moscow "really" wants an agreement on Mutual force re-
ductions. The Soviets are not likely to be sure them-
selves until they have a better idea of what kind of
terms might be attainable. The political mileage the
topic affords, the eventual degree of unity NATO can
maintain, and the inherent complications of the prob-
lem all suggest that, although t-he US5R will not fail
to put together an appealing proposal, it will want to
retain considerable flexibility for some time to come.
A reduction of the US presence in Europe will probably
be its main specific objective, but it cannot now be
determined what price M~~cow might ultimately be wi11-
incr to pay i~.r this, or indeed whether it may not see
even greater advantage in an indefinite polii:s.cal ma-
nipulation of the'.issue.
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