COMMUNIST CHINA: WHO'S RUNNING THE SHOW?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100066-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: June 21, 1971
• Content Type: IM

 Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist China: Who's Running the Show?
Confidential
21 June 1971
No. 1710/71
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WARNING
This cloctom-nt contains information affecting the naiional
dcfensc of the United States, within the rnraning of 't'itle
IS, sections 793 and 7911, of the US Code. as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or rc?
ceilrt by an unauthorized Ircrson is hrohihitcd by law.
GROUT'
C 1-'11 11 -ING eHUM Al"AUMAr~O
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Section I:
Section II:
Section III:
Section IV:
Section V:
section VI:
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The Central ('overnment
The Party Hierarchy
The Military Hierarchy
The Foreign Ministry
The Distaff Side of the House
Personality Index
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 June 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist China: Who's Running the Show?
Introduction
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,
which erupted in the spring of 1966, has had a pro-
found impact on the shape and effectiveness of the
nation's leadership hierarchies. Even though a
process of restoring some semblance of "normalcy"
to China's post-revolutionary power structure has
been under way for more than two years, it is still
too soon to answer definitively the question of
"who's running the show" at the national level.
Indeed, there is still a serious problem in as-
sessing the shape and perhaps the function of Com-
munist China's ruling body, the politburo of the
Communist Party. The new body--formed at the ninth
party congress in April 1.969--is a peculiar creation
compared to its predecessor. Prior to the Cultural
Revolution, the politburo consisted of party chairman
Mao Tse-tung and a number of top officials in the
regime, each of whom had a special constituency
that he monitored on behalf of the party. Thus, one
mans primary duty was agriculture; one concerned
himself with economic affairs; one wi-ch foreign af-
fairs; another with party business; yet another with
military matters and so forth. The new politburo
does not appear to be constructed along such lines.
Below the top triumvirate of Mao, his heir-designate
Defense Minister Lin Piao, and Premier Chou En-lai--
who wears many hats both domestic and foreign--only
economic specialist Li Hsien-nien has a clearly iden-
tifiable constituency. For the remainder, there is
no sharp breakdown of responsibilities, and even the
army leaders on the politburo must now be presumed
to be he,-oily irvolved in other than strictly mili-
tary affairs. 1,oout all that can safely be said
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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about the politburo is that most members, although
by no means all, probably participate in setting
the broad outline of policy direction.
In any case, the politburo itself represents
only the tip of a large iceberg. The implementation
of the policies that it helps formulate rests in the
hands of a still emerging and as yet little known
bureaucracy of second- and third-echelon leaders.
This memorandum is an attempt to identify these sec-
ondary officials and to describe how they fit into
the central ruling hierarchy. Unfortunately, there
are still many gaps in our knowledge about the structure
of China's internal governing mechanism. The Cultural
Revolution not only resulted in a sweeping purge of
Mao's principal opponents within the top leadership,
but also raised havoc throughout the old party and
government organizational structure. Al,.ough the
process of putting together the pieces of this appa-
ratus has been under way since at least the ninth party
congress in April 1969, progress has been slow, in part
because both the party and government bureaucracies e.re
being restructured and streamlined, and in part because
many key personnel appointments apparently have been
bones of contention in Peking.
One of the primary objectives of the Cultural
r hierarchy
Hopefully, a more definitive assessment of at least
the central government hierarchy will be possible
after the regime holds its Fourth National Peoples
Congress which, among other things, is expected to
serve as a forum for presenting the full slate of
post - Cultural Revolution ministerial appointments.
There have been reports that Peking intends to hold
this congress sometime this year, but this is unlikely
until some of the political maneuvering currently
under way within the ruling politburo subsides.
In examining the state of the nation's leader-
ship to date, this paper will focus on the three
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major vertical hierarchies in Peking= the central
government, the party, and the military. In each
of these areas, we will attempt not only to provide
a comprehensive listing of known officials but also
to point out, where possible, the division of labor
within these vertical hierarchies and their relation-
ship to one another. The fourth section will examine
in detail the makeup of the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
about which much more information is available. The
final section will take up the distaff side of the
house, with special emphasis on identifying the
wives of the major party and government leaders.
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SECTION I: THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
The primary target of the Cultural Revolution
was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) apparatus, but
because the party and government hierarchies formed
interlocking directorates with many veteran party
leaders concurrently holding top government posts,
it was inevitable that the purge would spill over
into the central government. Premier Chou En-lai
put up a spirited defense of many of his subordinates
and, indeed, he was successful in saving more than a
few from total political eclipse. Even so, well over
half of his government ministers lost their positions
within the first few months of Red Guard terror.
From the wreckage of the Cultural Revolution
the regime is trying to erect a new, streamlined
bureaucracy--a move specifically directed by Mao
Tse-tung on she grounds that the pre - Cultural Rev-
olution structure had become an entrenched elite
operating through a chain of command that was un-
responsive to the "revolutionary masses" and that
was in practice modifying Mao's programs and opera-
ting largely outside his personal control. Never-
theless, the process is intended to do more than
satisfy Mao's anti-bureaucratic bias. It is also
apparently designed to achieve a more clear-cut
division of labor between local and national levels
in which more responsibility for day-to-day affairs
(education, health, production for local use, etc.)
devolves upon the lower levels. The number of min-
istries, according to Chou En-iai, is being reduced
by half, and many cadres have been sent off for
labor "re-education" either permanently or on
rotation. Numerous unidentified new names are now
appearing in lists of departments under the State
Council. Some pre - Cultural Revolution officials
have managed to hang on to their old or similar
slots, however, and during the past few months a
number of long-absent veteran officials have again
appeared.
Two major features about the staffing of the
central state bureaucracy are immediately apparent.
The first is the unusually heavy representation of
the military. In many ministries control presumably
is still in the hands of the military control com-
mittees that assumed supervision during the Cultural
Revolution, and four of the six new ministers who
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have been named thus far are military careerists.
These are men in their forties and early fifties
who, under the old system, would have had to wait
ten to 15 years to acquire comparable positions
of authority within the top-heavy military bu-
reaucracy. Judging from what has been observed
about the new minister of foreign trade, for ex-
ample, these new soldier-administrators are in-
telligent, capable, and articulate, but they
almost certainly have to rely on their largely
civilian vice ministers for technical expertise.
Although it seems safe to assume that not a
single government unit will be free of some form
of military influence, it is also interesting to
note the return of many veteran cadre to their
former places of work. Some are being identified
by their former titles; others have shifted from
one ministry to another as part of the government
reorganization; and still others are listed only
as "responsibile persons" of various unidentified
departments. Their return to duty is ample testi-
mony to Peking's recognition that it cannot cav-
alierly drain the relatively small reservoir of
civilian managerial and technical talent available
to China. It also marks a considerable mellowing
in the regime's political attitude, which must be
particularly shocking to the various revolutionary
activistists who only three or four years ago were
being exhorted to struggle against the "bureaucrats"
and forcibly remove them from office.
The following organizational presentation
represents only the key elements of what is known
about the central government hierarchy.
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STATE COUNCIL
Premier
Chou En-lai Chou appears to be "running
the country"; at one time he
was assisted by 15 vice pre-
miers.
Vice Premiers
Li Hsien-nien Li, longtime minister of
finance, is currently the
only working vice premier;
like Chou, he is extremely
active; his basic field is
finance and trade, but he is
undoubtedly now performing a
much more general, economic
and planning role.
Li Fu-chun Once China's top economic
specialist, Li appears only
irregularly now, and he may be
in poor health. His influence
is felt primarily through the
State Planning Commission, with
which he may still be associated.
Hsieh Fu-chih Hsieh, who is also boss of
Peking city and minister of
public security, had been out
of sight for nearly 15 months
until he reappeared in June
1971. At that time he was
reidentified as vice premier,
but it is not clear whether
he still retains the public
security portfolio.
Central Ministries
(listed alphabetically)
Note: Formerly there were 40 government
ministries and 12 special commis-
sions; as a result of the govern-
ment reorganization which is still
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under way, the number, of govern-
mental units has been drastically
cut; this list includes only those
ministries that are known to still
exist; the regime is apparently
now treating the commissions as
ministries.
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
(Formed by the merger of the ministries
of Agriculture and Forestry)
Minister
Sha Feng
A military man who was
serving as a staff officer
in the Armored Corps in
1965.
Vice Ministers
Li Shu-jung A military man of obscure
origins.
Liang Chang-wu Former vice minister of the
Ministry of Forestry,
Yang Li-kung Former vice minister of the
ministry responsible for
agricultural machinery, an
element of which may have
been transferred to the
Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry during the reorgan-
ization.
MINISTRY OF BUILDING MATERIALS
Minister
Lai, minister since March
1965, is one of onl_; three
ministers who retained their
positions throughout the
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Vice Minister
Pai Hsiang-yin
Pai has been a vice minister
since 1965, but his activities
went unreported for three years
during the Cultural Revolution.
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE
(May have absorbed Ministry of Food)
Minister
Position vacant
Vice Minister
Kao Hsiu
Kao has been vice minister
since 1964.
PINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS
(Absorbed the Ministry of Railways)
Minister
','ang Chieh
Vice Minister
A military man who served in
the Armored Corps in the late
1950s.
Tao has been a vice minister
since 1964, but he was out of
public view during most of
the Cultural Revolution.
Kuo Lu Kuo is a former vice minister
of the Ministry of Railways,
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Minister
Li Hsien-nien Li, a politburo member and
Chou's only active vice
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premier, has been minister
of finance since 1954; none
of his vice ministers has
been identified since the
Cultural Revolution.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFIARS
(See Section IV)
MINISTRY OF i?'OREIGN TRADE
Minister
Pai Hsiang?-kuo A military man, Pai has
received considerable expo-
sure since he was named
minister in December 1970.
He has been de.'cribed as
alert and intelligent; he
shows no signs of any spe-
cialized knowledge on trade
matters but is "quite diplo-
matic."
Vice Ministers
Li Chiang
Li, a vice minister since
1952, was elevated to the
party central committee in
1969; he provides the ex-
pertise.
Lin Hai-yun Lin was named "acting" min-
ister in 1967 following the
death of minister Yeh Chi-
chiang, but Lin was evidently
obliged to give way to the
younger soldier-administrator
Pai Hsiang-kuo.
Chou Hua-min Chou, a vice minister since
1964, has recently made
several trips abroad as part
of the regime's effort to
reassert its role in the in-
ternational community.
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MINISTRY OF FUEL AND CH.,;iv1ICA'. INDUSTRIES
(Forme by the merger of the three industrial
ministries--Chemical, Coal, and Petroleum)
Minister
Position vacant
Vice Minister
Sun Hsiao-feng
Hsu Chin-chiang
Sun is a former vice minister
of Petroleum
MINISTRY OF LIGHT II;DU;TRY
(Formed by the merger of the First and
Second Ministries of Light Industry with
the Ministry of Textile Industry)
Minister
Chien Chih-kuang Chien, a former vice minister
of textiles, has the distinc-
tion of being the first civ-
ilian minister confirmed since
the Cultural Revolution; he is
also a member of the party
central committee.
Vice Ministers
Hsieh Hsin-ho Hsieh is a former deputy of
the Second Ministry of Light
Industry.
Chen Wei-chi Chen is a former vice minister
of textiles.
FIRST MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Absorbed former Eighth Ministry of Machine Building;
now responsible for all civilian machinery plants)
Minister
Li Shui-ching A military man, Li became
openly identified with an
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Vice Ministers
Shen Hung
ultraleftist figure in
Shantung Province during
the Cultural Revolution.
His record in Shantung would
seem to put him at odds with
most conservatively oriented
military officials, but he
evidently has the support of
radical forces in Peking.
Shen is a former vice minister
of the original First Ministry
of Machine Building.
Chou was also with the original
First Ministry; he was criti-
cized by Red Guards during
the Cultural Revolution.
SECOND MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Responsible for China's atomic energy program;
probably under direct military control)
Minister
Position vacant
Vice Minister
Liu Wei
Liu was identified as vice
minister in the early 1960s;
it is not known if he still
has this title, but he was
named to the new party central
committee.
THIRD MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Aircraft industry; directed mainly
at military production)
Minister
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Vice Minister
Hsueh Shao-ching Hsueh, a former air force
officer, was vice minister
from 1960 to 1965; lately
he has been listed with the
central military hierarchy,
suggesting that this ministry
is now under direct military
control.
FOURTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
Electronics industries)
No officials have been identified for this ministry
since the Cultural Revolution.
FIFTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Conventional armaments--tanks, artillery,
small arms, ammunition)
Chiu Chuang-cheng Chiu, former commander of
the Artillery Corps, was
named minister when the
Fifth Ministry was first
set up in 1963; it is not
known if he currently holds
this title, but he has been
making appearances regularly.
He is a member of the party
central committee. Two
former vice ministers have
reappeared since the Cultural
Revolution, but neith:r has
been identified by title.
(Shipbuilding)
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Military Representation
Liu Shih-hsiung Liu made a highly unusual
"special trip" to a ship-
yard in Shanghai in June
1970 to attenc: the launching
of two ocean-going merchant
ships; Liu was identified
at the time as "chairman of
the military control com-
mittee" of the Sixth Minis-
try. No other army man
serving on the central minis-
tries has been identified
in this manner in a radio-
broadcast.
SEVENTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Missiles)
Minister
Wang Ping-chang Wang, a former deputy com-
mander of the Air Force,
was named head of China's
missile production arm when
it was first publicly un-
veiled in 1965. Wang was
heavily criticized during
the Cultural Revolution for
the usual litany of "revi-
sionist" sins, including
opposing Mao's thought,
suppressing the revolution,
and attempting to set up
his own independent kingdom
in the Seventh Ministry.
Despite these criticisms,
Wang was named a member of
the central committee in
April 1969, and, although
he has yet to be identified
by his official title, the
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pattern of his appearances
in Peking suggests he is
currently performing at
least some of his former
ministerial duties.
MINISTRY OF METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY
Minister
Position vacant
Vice Ministers
Lin Tse-sheng
Lin, a vice minister since
1959, resurfaced in good
standing after remaining
out of sight through most
of the Cultural Revolution.
Yang Tien-kuei Yang is a former vice min-
ister of the ministry re-
sponsible for civilian
machinery plants.
Military Representative
Chu Hu-ning Chu's military background
is obscure.
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
(See Section III-The Military)
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY
Minister
Hsieh Fu-chih Hsieh, who is also a vice
premier, has not been identi-
fied by his ministerial title
since early in the Cultural
Revolution. Hsieh recently
reappeared after a prolonged
absence from view, but he
does not appear to be playing
nearly as active a role in
regime councils as before.
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MINISTRY OF WATER CONSERVANCY AND ELECTRIC POWER
Minister
Vacant
Vice Ministers
Chien Cheng-ying
(female)
Chien, a vice minister since
1952, re-emerged in good
standing in May 1970, after
being criticized by Red
Guards during the Cultural
Revolution.
Tu Hsing-yuan Tu, a vice-minister since
the early 1960s, remained
out of sight during most of
the Cultural Revolution.
Military Representative
Chang Wen-pi Chang, a military man from
the East China province of
Anhwei, moved up to Peking
in early 1970, reportedly to
replace annther military man
on the ministry's military
control committee who was
removed from his post for
an unspecified reason.
Special Commiss4 ons
COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Raised to ministerial level in the last few months)
Minister
Fang I Before the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Fang was known as the
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"chairman" of the commission.
The fact that the regime is
now referring to him as "min-
ister" suggests the status of
the commissions has been up-
graded.
Vice Ministers
Hsieh Huai-te Hsieh has been a leading
member of the commission
since its formation in 1964.
Han Tsung-cheng Han, formerly a deputy chief
of a bureau under the com-
mission, recently moved up
to a vice ministerial slot.
PHYSICAL CULTURE AND SPORTS COMMISSION
This commission recently has returned to the
limelight, in part as a result of "pingpong dip-
lomacy." Tsao Cheng, a military man, is the top
official thus far identified with the commission.
The commission is apparently controlled directly
by the PLA General Staff.
STATE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION
Minister
Position vacant
Vice Minister
Hsieh Pei-i
Hsieh has been a leading
official of the commission
since it was set up in 1964.
He was out of public view
during the Cultural Revolu-
tion and was not reidenti-
fied by title until late
lust year.
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STATE PLANNING COMMISSION
(There is evidence that the SPC is playing the major
role in directing China's economic recovery following
the Cultural Revolution. At least three former min-
istries--Allocation of Materials, Labor, and Geology--
have been absorbed by the SPC, thus greatly expanding
its over-all planning capabilities. The State Eco-
nomic Commission (SEC) , on the other hand, appears to
have been abolished. Before the Cultural Revolution
the SPC handled long-range planning while the SEC
supervised short-term production plans. Evidently,
these functions have now been centralized in the ex-
panded SPC).
Minister
Li Fu-chun Li, for many years one of
the regime's leading eco-
nomists, was demoted from
the politburo at the ninth
party congress in April 1969.
Although he is advanced in
years and makes few appear-
ances, there is some evidence
to suggest that he still
exercises some influence over
this important planning body.
Other responsible persons
Formerly there were a large number of deputies
under the SPC, many of whom headed up important func-
tional departments under the central government.
Thus far, however, the only person who has been con-
sistently noted in the company of Li Fu-chun during
his infrequent appearances is Su Ching, a military
man who is reported to head up the military control
committee assigned to the SPC. Su's military back-
ground is obscure, but he may have served with the
General Staff Department of the PLA.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMMISSION
The existence of this commission was first made
public in 1966. It may be responsible for the over-
all direction of China's advanced weapons program.
The civilian aspect of China's R&D program appears
now to be controlled by the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences, which reportedly has absorbed the former State
Scientific and Technological Commission.
No officials have been identified with this com-
mission in recent years, and, in fact, the regime rarely
mentions it. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that
the NDSTC or some successor organization must be super-
vising China's continued efforts in the missile and
nuclear field.
OTHER CENTRAL ORGANS AND SPECIAL AGENCIES
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THE SUPREME'S PEOPLE'S COURT
During the Cultural Revolution, normal judicial
proceedings were suspended and most serious cases were
handled by military tribunals. According to the new
draft state constitution, the stipulation that the
People's Court be "independent, subject only to the
law," is omitted, thus bringing the judiciary formally
under party control. Even though the courts have lost
their separate status, however, the regime is still
identifying officials at the national level. These
include Chen Chi-han, and Wu Te-feng--two longtime
vice presidents of the SPC--Chen Pai, and Yang Lin.
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Itney may be examples ot the so-
e "revolutionary masses," students and other
youthful political activists who came into prominence
during the Cultural Revolution.
THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE
The draft state constitution makes no provision
for the appointment of a chief procurator and does not
give details of the organization and duties of the
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procuratorate, stating simply that "procuratoritl
authority is exercised by public security organs at
all levels." Nevertheless, the SPP is known still
to exist because it was referred to by name in a
Peking broadcast announcing the death of Huang Huo-
hsing, a deputy Procurator. General. Chang Ting-cheng,
who was the chief procurator at the start of the
Cultural Revolution, is a member of the party central
committee, but he has appeared only on major ceremonial
occasions in the past two years.
NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY
NCNA officially is a special agency under the
State Council but in practice operates directly as
a propaganda arm of the party.
Director
Position vacant
Deputy Director
Shih Shao-hua
Military Representative
Chang Chi-chih
Shih is the only deputy
director to emerge apparently
unscathed from the Cultural
Revolution. He may have
close ties with leftist
leaders on the politburo.
CIVIL AVIATION GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
The CAGA is a special agency of the State Council
charged with supervising China's modest civilian air-
line. The CAGA will undoubtedly come into more prom-
inence as China seeks to expand its international
airlines.
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Director
Kuang Jen-nung Kuang, who has headed the
CAGA since 1955, is also a
deputy commander of the PLA
Air Force. Needless to say,
his latter role greatly sim-
plified the institution of
military control in 1967;
Kuang merely put his uniform
back on.
FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE PROMOTION GROUPS
There are numerous associations and special groups
that have begun to re-emerge in recent months as China
has moved toward resuming a more normal diplomatic role
in the world community. Frequently the titles of these
organizations are virtually the same as their pre-
Cultural Revolution counterparts and, more often than
not, the same people are staf-`ing them. However,
these persons are largely functionaries, the meeters-
and-greeters, who make the pr,,]iminary contacts that
must proceed more substantive discussions. They,
therefore, fall outside the scope of this inquiry.
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SECTION II. THE PARTY HIERARCHY
The apex of any Communist party system is the
politburo. Membership is ordinarily kept rather
limited, and the Chinese politburo is no exception.
However, beneath the politburo there exists a large
central bureaucracy of departments, units, and com-
mittees that are essentially structured to mirror
the government and society that the party controls.
In Communist China, before the Cultural Revolution,
the party's Secretariat served as the executive arm
of the politburo. It controlled the day-to-day ac-
tivities of ten or so operational departments or
units that, in turn, supervised almost every aspect
of the party's function and duties.
The leaders of the Cultural Revolution claim
that Mao's opponents thwarted his will by seizing
control of the party apparatus. It is not surpris-
ing therefore, that the head of the Secretariat and
the chiefs of each of the subordinate departments
were among the first victims of the Cultural Revo-
lution. To date, the Secretariat has not reap-
peared, and there is no provision for it in the new
party constitution; about all that can be said is
that responsibility for party reconstruction and
organization now is probably divided among a number
of politburo members, of whom Chou En-lai appears
to be the key figure. Moreover, the regime is be-
ing very deliberate about the pace of reconstruction,
which is presumably an area of considerable sensitiv-
ity in Peking. Of the ten or so original departments
and units, only two have been publicly identified as
still in existence. The International Liaison Depart-
ment (ILD), which is responsible for relations with
foreign Communist parties, has been particularly ac-
tive in recent months, following the naming of Kong
Piao, China's former ambassador to Albania, as the
new director. The ILD is roughly the party equiva-
lent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its
relatively rapid re-emergence can be likened to
that of the Foreign Ministry within the central
ministries.
For the most part, however, the regime is being
extremely secretive about who holds what top party
jobs. For example, not one member of the politburo
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25X1
has been identified in a specific party post, even
though it can be presumed that there is some kind of
divis;_on. of labor among the active politburo members.
Moreover, analysis of the lists of central party and
government figures that attend the major rallies in
Peking clearly reveals that the central party hier-
archy is as big and cumbersome as that of the central
government ministries, despite Mao's efforts to
streamline all levels of administrations.
Nevertheless, it is possible to make a few gen-
eralizations about the staffing procedures for the
party. It is obvious that the military are well
represented not only at the politburo level, but
also at the working level within the central party
hierarchy. It is also evident that, when compared
to the ministries, only a small number of party
cadre have been reinstated in positions of authority.
Conversely, the large numbers of persons appeari
in the party listings 25X1
I Isugge tnat many more activists
are being brought into the party system.
In any event, it is likely to be many years before
the sort of personal data on these new party cadre
that existed on the old party veterans can be accu-
mulated. At the end of this section is a list of
names of Chinese officials who appear destined to as-
sume major party :: esponsibilities in the years ahead.
Most of these persons appear only on major ceremonial
occasions, but a few of them are beginning to attend
certain diplomatic 25X1
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INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
(The ILD is the party organ responsible for the con-
duct of relations with "fraternal Communist parties,"
for the stt:dy of the policies, personalities, doc-
trines, and activities of all Communist parties, and
for the identifcation and encouragement of pro-Chi-
nese groups within those parties.)
Director
Keng Piao
25X1
Other Responsible
Persons
Keng is one of the regime's
senior diplomats. Except for
a brief interlude during the
Cultural Revolution, Keng has
served as ambassador to various
foreign countries nearly con-
tinuously since 1950, his last
assignment being China's lone
ally in Eat Europe--Albania.
He has also served as a vice
minister of foreign affairs,
specializing on Southeast
Asia, Pakistan, and Nepal.
25X1
I
ranks just
below Keng Piao and may be a 25X1
rival of Keng.
Tang Ming-chao Tang handles relations with so-
called "capitalist" nations,
i.e., the West.
Chang Hsiang-shan Chang is one of the chief ad-
ministrators of the ILD.
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SECTION III: THE MILITARY HIERARCHY
Organizationally speaking, the Cultural Revolu-?
tion did not seriously harm the central military
structure. Perhaps the biggest casualty was the
General Political Department., which dropped out of
the news for about two years following the disastrous
summer of 1967. Evidently, the leaders of the GP?D
became directly implicated in the short-lived cam-
paign to "drag out" the handful of revisionists in
the military establishment or the People's Libera-
tion Army (PLA), as it is known in China.
Actually, there was a major purge of army per-
sonnel at the center in late 1966, but it went
largely unnoticed because of the rapid flow of
events following the movement of the Cultural Revo-
lution into the provinces in a major way in 1967.
Although estimates vary, depending on how one de-
fines a military versus a party leader, something
in the order of about one third of China's top mil-
itary brass was removed at that time. There fol-
lowed the purge of the GPD in mid-1967 and the
mysterious Yang Cheng-wu affair in March 1968, in
which three key military officers were sacked fol-
lowing an alleged plot to topple Mao.
itnere were serious i erences
wi in ina s military elite over a wide ran of
defense o.licies
even e
close relationship between the party and army in
China, however, it is obvious that the key decision-
making power rests with the prestigious Military
Affairs Committee, a party organ under the central
committee but probably directly responsive to the
politburo and its standing committee headed by Mao
and Lin. The MAC probably sets the basic guidelines
within which the military hierarchy operators. r~
rom wnat is known about its membership it is evi-
dent that both the younger, more professionally ori-
ented officers and the old, senior marshals have a
share in the decision-making process.
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The implementation of purely military policy---
such as national defense planning, the conduct of
troop movements, training, logistics, etc.---is prob-
ably handled by the General Staff Department finder
the over-all supervision of the Minister of 1'~itional
Defense, Lin Piao. The head of the PLA General Staff
Department, Huang Yung?-sheng, is roughly the counter-
part of the Chief of the General Stdtf in the West.
There is no separate staff headq.,arters for the
ground forces, and the chief of staff, as the situ-
ation exists today, has as his deputies the leaders
of the air force and navy as well as the logistics
chief. The only person who does not formally come
under the chief of staff is the director of the
General Political Department. He probably answers
directly to the MAC.
The third major element within the military
hierarchy is the so-called "administrative unit" of
the MAC. This is a special body that apparently was
set up under the MAC to supervise the army's growing
role in civil affairs as a result of the Cultural
The importance of this body can be seen in the
high party ranking that was ultimately accorded its
top leadership. Five of its seven members were
elevated to the politburo at the ninth party congress
in 1969. If the administrative :snit is, in fact,
the primary organ overseeing the army's performance
of its many civil duties, then it is truly a powerful
group. The military men who were placed in control
of the central and provincial government machinery
during the Cultural Revolution are now being awarded
equivalent positions of authority in the rebuilt
party structure. Thus, the leaders of the adminis-
trative unit are in a position to exercise the major
influence over the future makeup and direction of
the party itself. In effect, the levers of political
control in China today are more highly centralized
than ever before.
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THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFNSE
Minister
Lin Piao
Lin has held this post since
1959, when he replaced Peng
Te-huai, a strong represen-
tative of professional inter-
ests within the military who
openly challenged Mao's au-
thority. In his role asde-
fense inin'ister, Lin usually
restricts his visible activ-
ities to signing anniversary
greetings to other Communist
countries.
Vice Ministers
Hsiao Ching-kuang Hsiao is also commander of
the PLA navy. He appears to
play primarily a ceremonial
role.
Wang Shu-sheng Wang. along with Su Yu (see
below), is believed to play
a major role in overseeing
the defense-related industries.
Hsu Shih-yu Hsu is a commander of t e
powerful Nanking Military
Region in East China. He
111-3
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is one of several regional
commanders brought into the
politburo following the
Cultural Revolution. There
are indications that hr' ranks
high among the active mili-
tary leaders on the politburo.
References to his position on
the MND staff are rare.
MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
(The MAC is actually a party organ,'but it is included
in this section because it is entrusted with the for-
mulation, control, and activation of basic military
policy.)
Chairman
Mao Tse-tung
Vice Chairmen
Lin Piao
Mao himself probably sits as
ex offir;io chairman at the
more important committee ses-
sions.
Lin is the senior vice chair-
man and probably chairs rou-
tine sessions.
Yeh Chien-ying Of the four vice chairmen
below Lin, Yeh makes the
most public appearances.
25X1
Nieh Jung-chen Nieh was once the leading
administrator of China's
advanced weapons program.
He now appears to be po-
litically sidelined; his
MAC position may be purely
ceremonial.
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Hsu Hsiang-chien Inactive
Chen, China's ebulent Foreign
Minister, has been politically
sidelined, perhaps permanently.
His MAC title seems to be purely
ceremonial.
Members
Li Te-sheng Li is also the new director
of the General Political
Department.
Chang Ta-chih Chang is also commander of
the PLA Artillery Corps.
MAC ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT
e minis rative Unit
.:s a ieve to be a specia sub--unit of MAC formed
to oversee the army's performance of its many civil
tasks acquired as a result of the Cultural Revolu-'
tion.)
Huang Yung-sheng Huang, by virtue of his
positions as Chief of Staff
and head of the Administra-
tive Unit, exercises a major
influence over both the
army's professional and po-
litical tasks.
Wen Yu-cheng Wen, commander of the po-
litically sensitive Peking
Garrison, has been out of
sight for about a year.
Wu Fa-hsien Wu is comm.-.nder of the PLA
Air Force.
Li Tso-peng Li is political commissar of
the PLA Navy.
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Chiu Hui-tso Chiu is director of the General
Rear Services Department (Lo-
gistics).
Yeh Chun Lin Piao's wife.
Liu Hsien-chuan Liu is a regional military
figure who supported the
leftists in Tsinghai Province.
PLA General Staff
(This department directs the functions and activi-
ties of the armed forces as a whole; there is no
separate headquarters for the ground forces or the
infantry; the head of the General Staff Department
is, in effect, the Chief of the General Staff.)
Huang Yung-sheng Huang, the former commander
of the Canton Military Re-
gion in south China, was
named to this position
following the purge of
Yang Cheng-wu in 1968.
Next to Lin Piao, Huang
is clearly the most power-
ful active military leader
in China today.
Wu Fa-hsien Wu is commander of the PLA
Air Force.
Li Tso-peng Li is political commissar
of the PLA Navy.
Chiu Hui-tso Chiu is director of the
General Rear Services Depart-
ment (Logistics).
Wen Yu-cheng Wen is also Peking Garrison
commander.
Wang Hsin-ting Wang has been a deputy chief
of staff since 1963.
Peng Shao-hui Peng has been a deputy chief
of staff since the mid 1950s.
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Yen Chung-chuan Yen was named deputy chief
of staff in 1969; he is
closely associated with
Huang Yung-sheng.
Chen Chi-te Chen was named deputy chief
of staff in 1970; he served
with a tactical unit in
Shantung Province during
the Cultural Revolution.
GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
(The GPD is the principal agency within the PLA for
carrying out the party's ideological and organiza-
tional work in the armed forces; it operates under
the direction of the MAC. During the Cultural Revo-
lution,the GPD was temporarily sidelined and its
functions were apparently taken over directly by
the MAC)
Director
Li Te-sheng Li, who was a tactical unit
commander at the start of
the Cultural Revolution, has
risen rapidly in the hier-
archy. He has, in succession,
been named chief of Anhwei
Province in East China, an
alternate member of the
politburo, member of the
MAC, and director-of the
GPD, the army's top polit-
ical commissar. The last
appointment came as somewhat
of a surprise; Li has been a
commander of troops during
most of his PLA career.
Deputy Director
Huang Chih-yung
Huang is political commissar
of the Armored Corps.
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Tien Wei-hsin Tien's military background
is obscure.
GENERAL, REAR SERVICES DEPARTMENT
(The GRS is the highest logistics agency for all
the armed forces; in addition to providing over-all
guidance for the military's supply efforts, it has
become involved in a wide range of civilian trans-
portation matters.)
Director
Chiu Hui-tso Chiu has been director since
1956; he was named deputy
chief of staff in 1969, thus
bringing his department
formally under the control
of the General Staff, headed
by Huang Yung-sheng.
Political Commissar
Chang Chih-ming Chang was moved up from
deputy director in 1967.
PLA SERVICES AND BRANCHES
PLA AIR FORCE
Commander
Wu Fa-hsien Wu, in an unusual move,
was transferred from air
force political commissar
to commander in 1965; as
a member of the politburo,
Wu exercises the primary
political influence in the
air force.
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Political Commissar
Wang Hui-chiu Wang, the ranking deputy
political commissar, was
moved up to replace the
controversial Yu Li-chin,
marking a return to a more
normal promotion pattern
in the air force.
PLA NAVY
Commander
Hsiao Ching-kuang The role of Hsiao, who has
been commander of the navy
since its inception in the
early 1950s, appears to be
primarily ceremonial.
Political Commissar
Li Tso-peng Li, a former deputy commander
of the navy, was moved up to
the top political post in 1967.
His position on the politburo
makes him the most powerful
party figure in the navy.
PLA ARMORED CORPS
Commander
Position vacant
Political Commissar
Huang Chih-yung
Huang was recently named
deputy director of the Gen-
eral Political Department;
it is not clear whether or
not he retains his position
in the Armored Corps.
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PLA ARTILLERY CORPS
Chang Ta-chih Chang, a regional military
figure, was named commander
in 1969; he has also been
identified as a member of
the MAC.
Political Commissar
There is some question about
whether or not Chen still
holds this post.
25X1
PLA ENGINEERING CORPS
Commander
Chen Shih-chu Chen has been commander
since 1952.
Political Commissar
Li Chen Li's military background
is obscure.
PLA RAILWAY CORPS
Commander
Chang I-hsiang Chang was named to the post
in 1968; previously he was
associated with military
training.
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Political Commissar
Position vacant
PLA SIGNAL CORPS
Commander
Position vacant
Political Commissar
Huang Wen-ning Huang has held this post
since 1966.
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SECTION IV: THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
In comparison with other party and governmental
institutions in China, the Foreign Ministry is clearly
a special case. In the first place, simply because
of its functions, the Foreign Ministry receives much
more exposure than other governmental units that are
oriented primarily toward domestic matters. More-
over, as China has sought to resume more or less
normal diplomatic contac4- since the ninth party con-
gress in 1969, it has necessarily had to move faster
in restaffing the various geographic and functional
departments of this ministry. As a result, much
more is known about how it operates than any of the
other governmental units.
Most of the faces showing up in the ministry
are familiar ones. In nearly every case, positions
in the key geographic departments are going to offi-
cials with considerable field experience in their
area of responsibility. A similar trend toward
professionalism has eri evident in the men sent
abroad by Peking since mid-1969 to replace the chiefs
of missions who were recalled in early 1967 for Cul-
tural Revolution "re-education." As in the case
with nearly every governmental unit, there are mil-
itary representatives within the ministry--some of
whom are ranked higher than vice foreign ministers.
But none of them has been identified as yet with
permanent t-ositions in the ministry. In short, the
professionals appear to control the actual opera-
tions of the ministry.
Except for a brief period in 1967, the Foreign
Ministry was spared much of the political upheaval
that afflicted so many other ministries. In April
of this year a successor was named to replace former
Foreign Minister Chen I, but Premier Chou En-lai
still handles most of the major responsibilities
of the job. The new minister, ranking deputy minis-
ter Chi Peng-fei, is only "acting," however, sug-
gesting that the question of who will ultimately
run the show is still being debated.
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(The seven geographic departments that existed be-
fore the Cultural Revolution have been merged into
four as part of the general effort toward stream-
lining the government.)
Minister
Chi Peng-fei Chi, the ranking vice minis-
ter, was named "acting" min-
ister in April. Since that
time he has been playing the
role to the hilt. He accom-
panied various diplomats as-
signed tt.D Peking on a tour
of the provinces organized
by the ministry. Chi appar-
ently retains his regional
responsibility for African
and West Asian affairs.
Vice Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua Chiao, the vice minister re-
sponsible for Soviet and
East European affairs, has
recently assumed responsi-
bility for relations with
Han Nien-lung Han is the vice minister re-
sponsible for Asian affairs.
Hsu I-hsin Hsu is responsible for over-
all administrative matters
in the ministry.
Military Representatives
Li Yao wen Former regional military of-
IV-2
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Ma Wen-po Background obscure
Chen Te-ho It
Department of West Europe and American Affairs
Director
Chang Wen-chin
Deputy Director (Americas and Australia)
Ling Ching
Deputy Director (Western Europe)
Tang Hai-kuang
Head of British, Scandinavian and possible Dutch Section
Yu Chun
Head of French, Swiss, and Italian Section
Yu Hui-min
Officer dealing with Britain
Chang I-chun
Officer dealing with Canada
Chu Chui-sheng
Officer dealing with Finland and the Netherlands
Wu-Chung-chun
Officer dealing with Norway, Denmark, and possibly
Li Pao-cheng
Department of Asian Affairs
IV-3
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Deputy Directors
Lu Wei-chao
Yang Kung-su
Tsao Ko-chiang
Officer dealing with India and Ceylon
Li Ta-nan
Responsible persons
Jen Hou-kun
Kuo Chien-tsai
Tang Ye-wen
Liu Ci: un
Wang Chung-li
Yeh Cheng-chang
Department of Soviet and East European Affairs
Director
Yu Chan
Deputy Directors
Li Lien-ching
Li Ting-chuan
Head of Polish Section
Liu Tieh-cheng
Head of Soviet Section
Yu Hun-liang
Officer dealing with Soviet Union
Li Hui-ching
IV-4
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West Asian and African Affairs Department
Director
Ho Ying
Deputy Director
Ho Kung-kai
Functional Departments:
Protocol Department
Deputy Director
Han Hsu
Responsible person
Wang Hai-jung
Information Department
Director
Chen Chu
Deputy Director
Yuan Lu-li.n
Consular Department
Responsible persons
Kuan Tsung-chou
Lin Ching-yu
General Office
Director
Fu Hao
IV-5
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SECTION V: THE DISTAFF SIDE OF THE HOUSE
The Cultural Revolution has witnessed the rise
of the wives of the regime's two top leaders--Chiang
Ching (Madame Mao) and Yeh Chun (Madame Lin). The
wives of certain Chinese officials have always held
high party positions--such as Premier Chou En-lai's
wife Teng Ying-chao, who has been a member of the
party central committee for years--but Chiang Ching
and Yeh Chun are the first to have been brought
into the elite politburo. Although neither one has
been identified in a specific party or government
post, Chiang Ching continues to be active in the
field of cultural affairs, and she may be given a
formal position in this field, such as the minister
of culture.
The list that follows is by no means an ex-
haustive study, but it does contain the names of
those women who are currently making appearances
at various meetings and diplomatic functions in
Peking.
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Name
Chiang Ching
Teng Ying-chao
Tsai Chang
Lin Chia-mei
Liu Hsiang-ping
Yu Li-chun
Niu Hsin-chen
Hsu Han-ping
Wang Hai-jung
Wang Chen
Sung Ching-ling
Relationship
Wife of Mao Tse-tuna
Wife of Defense Minister
Lin Piao
Wife of Premier Chou En-lai
Wife of politburo member
Kang Sheng
Wife of econc.ast Li Fu-chun
Wife of Vice Premier Li
Hsien-nien
Wife of politburo member
Hsieh Fu-chih
Wife o-' Kuo Mo-jo, vice
chairman of the National
People's Congress
Wife of deputy air force
commander Kuang Jen-nung
Wife of acting Foreign Min-
ister Chi Peng-fei
Reportedly Mao's niece
Wife of vice foreign minister
Han Nien-lung
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SECTION VI. ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF OFFICIALS
Chang Chi-chih, 1-16
Chang Chih-ming, 111-8
Chang Hsiang-shan, 11-4
Chang I-chun, IV-3
Chang I-hsiang, III-10
Chang Ta-chih, 111-5, 111-10
Chang Wen-chin, IV-3
Chang Wen-pi, 1-12
Chang Yao-tzu, 11-5
Che Chih-ying, 11-5
Chen Chien, 11-5
Chen Chi-te, 111-7
Chen Chu, IV-5
Chen I, 111-5
Chen Jen-chi, III-10
Chen Shih-chu, III-10
Chen Te-ho, IV-3
Chen Wei-chi, 1-7
Chi Peng-fei, IV-2
Chiang Ching, V-2
Chiao Kuan-hua, IV--2
Chien Cheng-ying, 1-12
Chien Chih-kuang, 1-7
Chiu Chuang-cheng, 1-9
Chiu Hui-tso, 111-6, 111-8
Chou En-lai, 1-3
Chou Hua-min, 1-6
Chou Tsu-chien, 1-8
Chu Chui-sheng, IV-3
Chu Hu-ning, I-11
Fang I, 1-12
Feng Hsuan, 11-5
Fu Hao, IV-5
Han Hsu, IV-5
Han Nien-lung, IV-2
Han Tsung-cheng, 1-13
Ho Kung-kai, IV-5
Ho Ying, IV-5
Hsiao Ching-kuang, 111-3, 111-9
Hsiao Kuang, 11-5
Hsieh Fu-chih, I-3, I-11
Hsieh Hsin-ho, 1-7
Hsieh Huai-te, 1-13
Hsieh Pei-i, 1-13
Hsiung Chien, 11-5
Hsu Chin-Chiang, 1-7
Hsu Han-ping, V-2
Hsu Hsiang-chien, III
Hsu I-Hsin, IV-2
Hsu Shih-yu, 111-3
Hsu Wen-chih, 11-5
Hsueh Shao-ching, 1-9
Huang Chih-yung, 111-7, 111-9
Huang Wen-ning, III-11
Huang Yung-sheng, 111-5, 111-6
Jen Hou-kun, IV-4
Jen Yun-chung, 11-5
Kao Hsiu, I-5
Keng Pia.o, 11-4
Ku Yuan-hsing, 11-5
Kuan Tsung-chou, IV-5
Kuang Jen-nung, 1-17
Kuo Chien-tsai, IV-4
Kuo Lu, 1-5
Lai Chi-fa, 1-4
Lai Kuei, 11-5
Li Chen, III-10
Li Chiang, 1-6
Li Fu-chun, 1-3, 1-14
Li Hsien-nien, 1-3, 1-5
Li Hui-ching, IV-4
Li Lien-ching, IV-4
Li Pao-cheng, 111-3
Li Shu-jung, 1-4
Li Shui-ching, 1-7
Li Ta-nan, IV-4
Li Te-sheng, 111-5, 111-7
Li Ting-chuan, IV-4
Li Tso-peng, III-5, 111-6, 111-9
Li Yao-wen, IV-2
Liang Chang-wu, 1-4
Lin Chia-mei, V-2
Lin Chien, 11-5
Lin Ching-yu, IV-5
Lin Hai-yun, 1-6
Lin Piao, 111-3, 111-4
VI-1
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2005/d12`:P1"A=FtDP8Q875R001100100066-3
Lin Tse-sheng, I-11
Ling Ching, IV-3
Liu Chun, IV-4
Liu Hsiang-ping, V-2
Liu Hsien-chuan, 111-6
Liu Shih-hsiung, I-10
Liu Tieh-cheng, IV-4
Liu Wei, I-8
Liu Yu-fa, 11-5
Lu Wei-chao, IV-4
Lu Ying, 11-5
Lung Hsu, 11-5
Ma Wen-po, IV-3
Mao Pao-chung, 11-5
Mao Tse-tung, I1I-4
Mao :;ai-chung, 11-5
Nieh Jung-then, 111-4
Niu Hsin-chen, V-2
Pai Hsiang-kuo, 1-6
Pai Hsiang-yin, 1-5
Peng Shao-hui, 111-6
Sha Feng, 1-4
Shen Chien, 11-4
Shen Hung, 1-8
Shih Shao-hua, 1-16
Su Yu, 111-3
Sun Hsiao-feng, 1-7
Sung Ching-ling, V-2
Tang Hai-kuang, IV-3
Tang Ming-chao, 11-4
Tang Ye-wen, IV-4
Tao Chi, 1-5
Teng Ying-chao, V-2
Tien Wei-hsin, 111-8
Tsai Chang, V-2
Tsao I-ou, V-2
Tsao Ko-chiang, IV-4
Tu Hsing-yuan, 1-12
Wang Chen, V-2
Wang Chung-li, IV-4
Wang Hai-Jung; IV-5, V-2
Wang Hsin-ting, 111-6
Wang Hui-chiu, 111-9
Wang Liang-en, 11-5
Wang Ping-chang, I-10
Wang Shu-sheng, 111-3
Wen Yu-cheng, 111-5, 111-6
Wu Chung-chun, 111-3
Wu Fa-hsien, 111-5, 111-6, 111-8
Yang Chieh, 1-5
Yang Li-kung, 1-4
Yang Kung-su, IV-4
Yang Te-chung, 11-5
Yang Tien-kuei, I-11
Yeh Cheng-chang, IV-4
Yeh Chien-ying, 111-4
Yeh Chun, 111-6, V-2
Yen ChunS-chuan, 111-7
Yu Chan, IV-4
Yu Chun, IV-3
Yu Hui-min, IV-3
Yu Hun-Jiang, IV-4
Yu Li-chun, V-2
Yuan Lu-lin, IV-5
VI-2
CONFIDENTIAL
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