HANOI AND US PRISONERS OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100069-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: June 28, 1971
• Content Type: IM

 Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence -Memorandum
Hanoi and US Prisoners of War
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WARNING
-This do itmcnt contains information alfccting t1) national
defense of -ie United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its lransmissiou or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an nnanthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 June 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Hanoi and US Prisoners of War
Summary
Hanoi insists that the question of American
prisoners of war is a postwar issue. Last fall,
however, the Vietnamese Communists began suggesting
that American prisoners might be released in re-
sponse to US disengagement even if the war itself
were not over. This memorandum concludes that such
implications are window dressing and that Hanoi's
long-standing demands for a settlement of the war
are subsumed in its terms for releasing American
prisoners. In short, the Communists are not likely
to release all American prisoners as long as the US
provides Saigon the support necessary to continue
the war.
Note: This memorandum wa3 prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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1. To understand Hanoi's approach to the ques-
tion of prisoners of war, one should keep in mind
the broader military and political issues the Com-
munists insist must be resolved to their satisfac-
tion before the prisoners can be released. Hanoi
still insists on termination of American involvement
in Vietnam, an end to anti-Communist government in
South Vietnam, and the establishment of a new regime
affording the Communists a solid position from which
to work toward full control of the South and reuni-
fication of all Vietnam.
2. In the absence of allied political conces-
sions in negotiations--and because completely ending
American involvement in the near future would prob-
ably bring an end to anti-Communist government in
South Vietnam in short order--Hanoi has concentrated
its fire on the US role in the war. Hanoi's basic
demands on the US are twofold: 1) withdrawal of all
US forces; and 2) cessation of US protection and sup-
port of the present government in Saigon.
3. On the specific issue of prisoners of war,
the Communists have adopted a short-hand version of
this twofold demand. Their standard formulation,
which appeared for the first time in the Viet Cong's
eight points last fall, says that if the US sets a
date acceptable to Hanoi for complete American with-
drawal, the two sides will immediately begin discussing
the release of prisoners. There are two points of
deliberate ambiguity in this formula: first, what
the Communists mean by "complete American withdrawal";
second, what they mean by "discussions"--how long
would they last before prisoners would actually be
released and what other topics would be included in
the discussions.
4. On the second poi,at, the Communists appar-
ently have gone to some le;.;gths in private conversa-
tions to convey the impression that the "discussions"
would be suc^essfully concluded in short order and
the prisoners released fairly promptly. None of our
other evidence, however, suggests that this scenario
would, in fact, occur. Indeed, most of the evidence
available suggests that the Communists are trying to
obtain a date for withdrawal in the same way they
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pushed for a bombing halt in 1968: by insisting the
US move unilaterally, and by implying that this would
produce favorable resulto. Meanwhile, they are as
vague as possible about the form of Communist reci-
procity. It is the first point of ambiguity--what
is meant by "complete American withdrawal"--that is
the key, however. It has always been clear that the
Commun:_sts would drive a hard bargain, although their
demands have not always been specific. Obviously,
if the Communists are asking for a US withdrawal that
is both rapid and comprehensive, they also are impl.
itly demanding an end at least to Washington's direc'L
military support of the Saigon government. In effect,
therefore, their two basic demands for a settlement
of the war are subsumed in their single demand on the
prisoners.
5. Xuan Thuy, Hanoi's chief negotiator in Paris,
elaborated rather frankly on these matters in a re-
cent interview with Chalmers Roberts of the Washington
Post. Mr. Roberts' account
of thg- jnj-_tzrNrizw Anna -3
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25X1
mr. er s ore
aown ar on uy, forcing him either to answer
pointed questions or to display
reply. 25X1
indicat ana a out
no hope of an easy way for the US to obtain the pris-
oners' release.
6. Xuan Thuy argued that the military and po-
litical issues of the war cannot be separated and
that the war must be settled before the prisoner is-
sue can be resolved. As he did in an interview with
Anthony Lewis of the New York Times in late May, Thuy
made a point of underscoring alleged Communist "flex-
ibility" on the prisoner question. But his words
also revealed that this "flexibility" consists solely
of the oft-expressed Communist willingness to discuss
the release of prisoners after a. date for the wtTih
drawal of all US forces has been set.
7. Xuan Thuy made very clear to Chalmers Roberts
that simply setting a date for the withdrawal of US
forces would not bring about the release of American
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prisoners. He called for "total withdrawal" and in-
dicated that Hanoi defines this as the pulling out
of all American military personnel--including advisers,
instructors, &_-id other noncombatants--along with all
South Korean, Thai, Australian, and New Zealand forces.
In addition, he specified that all American military
operations against the Communists, including air op-
erations from Thailand and from carriers at sea, would
have to end.
8. Thuy strongly implied at several points in
the interview that to satisfy Hanoi, the US would
have to halt all military and economic aid to the
South Vietnamese Government. He waffled when Mr.
Roberts tried to pin him down on this matter, but
the main thrust of his argument was clear: the fun-
damental issue is US support for the present govern-
ment in Saigon; as long as this support continues
the war will continue, and as long as the war contin-
ues US prisoners will not be released.
9. In an .:attempt to follow up Mr. Roberts' in-
terview, a US correspondent asked the North Vietnam-
ese press spokesman in Paris on 17 June if stopping
economic and military aid to Saigon was a condition
for releasing prisoners. The spokesman said the Com-
munists insist that the US cease all political, eco-
nomic, and military support of the present government;
he reiterated that the question of prisoner release
could be discussed only after a "reasonable" date for
troop withdrawal is set.
10. In the months ahead Hanoi is likely to play
variations on the prisoner/withdrawal theme in the
hope of encouraging critics of US policy who argue
that setting a troop withdrawal date is the best way
not. only to end American involvement but also to se-
cure the release of American prisoners. One possi-
bility is a Communist initiative pegged to the Mans-
field amendment passed by the US Senate this week.
Hanoi might calculate that a more specific commit-
ment now to release US prisoners--without, however,
altering basic Communist demands--would place Presi-
dent Nixon i. an awkward position. They might also
hope it would stimulate greater public and Congres-
sional support for a withdrawal deadline and that it
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would also have an unsettling effect on the South
Vietnamese political scene and on morale and confi-
dence in Saigon.
11. But a really basic change in the present
two-part Communist demand for release of prisoners
is not likely. Certainly Hanoi will continue to in-
sist that the US must be committed to terminating
its military role in Vietnam before a prisoner re-
lease can even be discussed. There is a bit more
room for Hanoi to maneuver with regard to US eco-
nomic and military aid to the Saigon government--
nut not much. After failing to extract allied con-
cessions that might lead tD a broad settlement in
Vietnam, the Communists have stopped pressing their
earlier demand that the US agree formally to a re-
structured political regime in South Vietnam. But
they still insist on US actions that, if carried out
before a settlement of the war, would pull the rug
from under the present Saigon government. Therefore,
even if the US should terminate its direct combat
role in Vietnam, we believe that Hanoi would stall
on releasing American prisoners until the US stopped
providing Saigon the minimum aid necessary to con-
tinue the war.
12. The light that the Roberts' interview sheds
on Hanoi's terms for releasing prisoners also illu-
minates some other fundamentals in the Communist view
of the present war situation. Since 1969, when the
US adopted President Nixon's Vietnamization policy,
the-Communists have argued that the US is bent on,
continuing, not ending, the war. They acknowledge
that President Nixon is trying to reduce American
participation in the war, but they maintain that
American involvement can end in only two ways: 1)
through negotiations leading to a reordering of po-
litical power in South Vietnam; or 2) through the
withdrawal of US forces and the curtailing of US
support of the present government to the point where
Saigon is not able to contain the Communists.
13. Hanoi's contention that Vietnamization
does not provide a third way to end American involve-
ment is not very convincing as long as the US with-
draws troops steadily and the South Vietnamese are
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able to pick up the additional security burden, as
they generally have over the past two years. This
is one reason we expect North Vietnam to put more
manpower and energy into a more intensive war ef-
fort in the year ahead. By trying to convince the
US that Vietnamization will not work over the longer
run, Hanoi probably hopes to put some teeth into its
argument that Washington must dither negotiate a
settlement satisfactory to Hanoi or simply abandon
Saigon regardless of the consequences.
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