THE SITUATION IN EAST PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 114
• Publication Date: October 12, 1971
• Content Type: IM

 Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
intelligence Memorandum
The Situation in East Pakistan
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
73
12 October 1971
No. 2074/71
I _
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its c-"it?mts to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is proi.bitcd by law.
IXCLUDCD FROM AUTOMATIO
DOWNONAOINO AND
DCCLAAAI-ICATION
,.. Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 October 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in East Pakistan
Introduction
On 25 March 1971, President Mohammad Yahya Khan
ordered army units in East Bengal, the country's
eastern wing, to "do their duty" and "restore the
authority of the government" in the province. Civil
war resulted, leaving a residue of bitterness that
will not be easily dissipated.
Yahya maintained' that he acted in defense of
national sovereignty to thwart a plot by the Awami
League--the East Pakistani political party led by
the charismatic Bengali Sheik Mujibur Rahman--to
proclaim an independent republic of Langla Desh.
The Awami Leaguers asserted that autonomy within
the existing governmental structure, not independ-
ence, was their goal.
in the early stages of the military crackdown,
the army, composed mainly of West Pakistani troops,
focused primarily on soldiers and police recruited
from amoiig the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the
Awami Leaguers. Later the military wrath was turned
on Bengalis in general and the Hindu minority* in
'Hindus were apparently attacked because they were
associated with India, which was thought to be re-
sponsible for the Bengali "uprising." There were
approximately 10 million Hindus in e total East
Pakistan population of 75 million on 25 March.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
,qFC:R FT
particular. The Bengalis retaliated against the
Moslem Biharis, the non-Bengali minority group,
many of whom had emigrated from India's Bihar
state at the time of partition of the subconti-
nent. The Biharis, who tended to support the cen-
tral government, were encouraged by the authorities
to attack rebel Bengalis. A rag-tag Bengali mili-
tary force was hurriedly organized from among Ben-
galis previously in the army or police, but it was
no match for the regular army advance. Within a
period of weeks the entire province was in the
hands of West Pakistani troops, and repressive acts
against the civilian population led to a massive
exodus of Bengalis---particularly Hindus--into India.
Over nine million refugees have now made their way
across the border, and, although the flow has de-
creased from a high of 100,000 a day, an atmosphere
of fear persists and refugees--still primarily Hin-
dus--continue to cross the border at the rate of
around 30,000 a day.
The arrival of the refugees brought Indo-Pak-
istani relatJ.c,ns to a new low. India has threat
ened to take 'unspecified "unilateral action" unless
the flow ceases and the Bengalis can safely return
to their homes in East- Pakistan, The Indians
maintain that a political solution must be reached
through negotiations between Islamabad and East
Pakistan's elected leaders--most of whom belong to
Sheik Mujib's banned Awami League and hold positions
in the secessionist Bengali government set up on
Indian soil near Calcutta. Since the Indians still
imply that a stable East Pakistan is the sine qua
non for peaceful relations between New Delhi and Is-
lamabad, an examination of internal conditions in
East Bengal (and Indian perceptions thereof) can
provide some insight both as to the future of Pak-
istan and the likelihood of war or peace between
the two South Asian powers.
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
SECRET
Yahya's Early Moves
1. The day of ter President Yahya sent the army
into action in East Pakistan, stringent new martial
law regulations were proclaimed in the East wing.
The orders, issued under the writ of martial law ad-
ministrator Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, banned
all political activity, outlawed the Awami League,
made the car,nying of weapons illegal, and ordered
an end to a three-week Bcngali boycott of central
government activities. The same day Yahya rein-
forced the martial law with a speech justifying the
military intervention, branding Sheik Mujib a trai-
tor and the Awami League a traitorous organization.
2. Yahya, nevertheless, asserted that he would
transfer power to the "elected representatives of
the people" as soon as possible, moving forward when
law and order were again established toward that
"cherished goal." How this was to be accomplished
was left vague. In the national elections held be-
ginning last December, the Awami Leap;ue won 167 of
the 169 National Assembly seats elecced from East
Pakistan--a majority in the 313-i e:rber assembly--
and 288 of the 300 East Pakistani Provincial Assem-
bly seats. After Yahya had banned the League and
branded some of its members traitors, it was diffi-
cult to envisage how he could transfer power to the
"people's representatives."
3. Indeed, for several weeks no attempt was
made to outline a political program that might be
acceptable to the Bengali people. Instead, Islama-
bad seemed determined to bludgeon them into submis-
sion, and at least several thousand Bengalis are
believed to have been killed. Sheik Mujib was ar-
rested on 26 March, and one month later reports sur-
faced that he would be tried for treason. The funds
of the Awami League were frozen, and the systematic
effort to seek out and arrest League members con-
tinued. The Australian high commissioner in Islama-
bad warned his government that the martial law ad-
ministration was destroying the League and thus re-
rrQving the one element that had the popular support
to act asa stabilizing force in East Pakistan.
Moreover, Mujib's immense prestige and charismatic
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
SECRET
appeal make him perhaps the one person capable of
accepting on behalf of his people a workable po-
litical compromise for the future of East Pakistan.
4. The Awami League's spectacular success in
the December elections had all but eliminated other
parties from the political map in East Pakistan.
With the banning of the League, these parties--nota-
bly the three separate Muslim Leagues and the Pak-
istan People's Party (PPP) led by the ambitious
West Pakistani politician, Z.A. Bhutto--have at-
tempted to take over. They have little grass-roots
support in the East, however, and despite the gov-
ernment's encouragement and its preference for deal-
ing with them, they appear more adept at quarreling
with each other than at winning political support
from among the backers of the outlawed Awami League.
5. In the early stages of the fighting, the
army gained control of Dacca, the capital of East
Pakistan, but only after over half the population
had fled the city. By 8 April all other major
cities were under military control. The Bengali
secessionists held sway in the countryside, how-
ever, and several large.aree;s flew the new flag
of Bangla Desh. Normal economic activity almost
completely ceased throughout the province.
6. Tikka Khan was sworn in as governor of
East Pakistan on 9 April. His first message,
broadcast on the 18th, was an appeal to these who
"wished Pakistan well" to return to their normal
duties or "be destroyed completely." The governor
made derogatory reference to the "defunct" Awami
League, but added that its "destructive course"
had been plotted by a vocal, violent, and aggres-
sive minority. The implication was that a member
of the League need only to disprove his membership
in the minority group to become acceptable to the
government. Presumably, a,future Bengali govern-
ment in East Pakistan might be manned, at least in
part, by repentant Awami Leaguers. What has oc-
curred since Yahya laid down the broad outline of
his East Pakistan policy--denouncing and punishing
activist members of the Awam?. League and other "ex-
tremists" while ostensibly seeking the cooperation
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9 IIa"
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
of the rest of the population in the province--has
been an effort to fill in the blanks and make the
program work.
Bengali and Foreign Reaction
7. Few members of the Awami League showed any
interest in testing the government's implied amnesty.
As of 10 May, only three of the previously elected
representatives had come forward. Most cf the no-
table members of the smaller parties in East Pakistan
whom the President had approached to work with his
government were also refusing to cooperate. A purge
of East Pakistani civil service officers reduced the
availability of Bengali administrative talent, and
on 22 May, Yayha, who appears to have consistently
underestimated the Be:igali will to resist, admitted
that it would take longer than he had first antici-
pated to transfer power to a civilian government.
8. The Bengali insurgents, although continu-
ing to lose in direct encounters with the army,
were nevertheless building up their forces. More-
over, New Delhi, presumably hoping to ensure that
an independent Bangla Desh would have no reason to
doabt Indian ood will, moved quickl to relp. F____1
wi
tion reduced active cooperation by peasants with
the n
guerrilla fighters, but few guerrillas were be-
trayed to the martial law authorities and the insur-
gents continued to receive at least passive civilian
support. Throughout May, Benga-.i resistance to the
martial law administration remained determined, al-
though largely ineffective.
9. In the meantime, the Indians were voicing
their mounting alarm over the continuing and grow-
ing refugee influx. New Delhi's efforts to drama-
tize the economic and social burdens that war in
Pakistan thrust upon India (aided by refugee atroc-
ity reports in the Western press) were succeeding
both in gaining worldwide sympathy for New Delhi
and in giving Islaniabad a bad international press.
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
10. Yahya, however, conceived his main mis-
sion to be the preservation of national unity.
Bengal had to be pacified before progress toward a
civilian government could occur, and this could
hardly be expected to improve the government's im-
age or to stem the refugee flow. Nevertheless, in
part at least to stall off possible war plans in
India and to avoid antagonizing potential aid do-
nors, Yahya made some gestures to placate his crit-
ics.
11. In mid-May, he sent a letter to the UN
secretary general asking for help in drawing up a
relief program and in coordinating relief efforts.
The slow pace of the UN administrative machinery
could be counted on to give the President plenty
of time to continue his pacification program in
Bengal. On 21 May, Yahya broadcast an appeal for
all bona fide Pakistani citizens "who have committed
no crime" to return to their homes. These citizens
were advised not to listen to false propaganda and
to rest assured that law and order had been restored
in East Pakistan. Because the military would deter-
mine who had and who had not committed crimes, very
few refugees answered the call. Possibly, Yahya had
not intended them to.
12. as of
27 May, tne government was still seeking to force
Hindus and senior officials of the Awami League to
leave East Pakistan. Hindu residents were adjudged
a permanent threat to security and apparently until
that threat was reduced, i.e.,until a sufficient
number of Hindus had left the country, the govern-
ment's repressive policy was to continue.
/ Five other im-
portant Awami League Jeaders, including Tajuddin
Ahmed, the prime minister of the Bangla Desh gov-
ernment in exile, were, according to the press,
tried in absentia and sentenced to 14 years in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
SECRET
prison. The government also began drawing up a
list of Avami League members who had successfully
undergone a screening process and were now "cleared"
to participate in a new civilian government. A
large number of these people had already escaped
to India, and the government's attempts to cajole
o:: cudgel those remaining in East Pakistan into co-
operating met with indifferent results.
14. On 24 May Yahya found it necessary to
make another bid for Bengali support. He again
made an amnesty offer, specifying that those who
had not committed crimes prior to their flight
would be permitted to return. He noted that it was
no crime to have once been identified with "Bangla
Desh," which was simply a term for a region of Pak-
istan like the Punjab or Baluchistan. This was the
President's most forthcoming statement up to that
date. He added, however, that returning refugees
would undergo a government check, and it is doubt-
ful that he anticipated that many Hindus woi.:`..-d sub-
mit themselves to another government "sorti-,iy out."
Indeed, refugees continued to flee into India at
increasing rates, and to ensure their permanent de-
parture, the government began offering "abandoned"
Hindu land free to any tribesmen in West Pakistan
who wished to settle in the East wing. Shops and
other property belonging to departed Hindus were
also reportedly distributed to deserving Biharis
and non-Hindu Bengalis who cooperated with the
regime.
15. The situation had stabilized enough by
24 May that Yahya felt secure in welcoming foreign
journalists back into the East wing, but on 25 May
the US consul in Dacca reported that Bengali resist-
ance was continuing and that law and order was again
deteriorating.
Islamabad Tries to Consolidate Power
16. The month of June marked a period of deter-
mined effort to consolidate the central government's
physical hold on East Pakistan and to establish a
mechanism whereby a civilian government, loyal to
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
erru rP
Islamabad, could be created. During this period, the
army continued to concentrate on the Hindu community,
while the government made another effort to refute
charges that it was guilty of persecuting Hindus.
17. On the political front the government met
with little success. Martial law administrator Tikka
Khan announced the formation of local "peace commit-
tees"--civilian liaison bodies with top-level access
to the military establishment. These committees were
touted as mechanisms through which the people could
express their wishes. Because they were staffed pri-
marily with Muslims, however, in practice they be-
came adjuncts to the government's anti-Hindu campaign;
they also provided a means by which loyal East Pak-
istanis could be identified and groomed for positions
in the new administrative order. "Peace committee"
members were generally feared and hated as quislings.
Many became targets for assassination squads of the
Mutki Bahini (the Bengali name for the guerrilla
force).
18. Awami Leaguers in Calcutta had established
the exile government of Bangla Desh on 14 April. On
7 June, Syed Nazrul Islam, the acting president
(Mujib had been appointed president-in-absertia) set
forth the conditions for a political settlement with
Islamabad: Mujib, along with all other political
prisoners, was to be released unconditionally; the
Pakistani Army was to withdraw from the East wing;
and Islamabad was to recognize the government of
Bangla Desh and pay reparations for damages inflicted
since 25 March. These demands were unacceptable to
Islamabad. No attempt to negotiate took place, and
Yahya's preoccupation with pacifying the provir,-s
continued. Although both sides :lave since expressed
some willingness to move toward negotiations, no
significant progress has been made.
press conference announcing that 21 refugee reception
On 14 June Tikka Khan give a
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
OCR FT
centers were to be established along the border with
India and that 8,000-10,000 East Pakistanis had al-
ready returned. Tikka Khan discounted the Indian
figure of 5,500,000 Pakistani refugees already in
that country and said that one million was closer
to the mark. Most foreign observers regarded the
Indian figures as only moderately inflated and dis-
counted the Pakistani claims.
20. On 20 June YahiTa, referring pririarily to
Awami Leaguers who refused to cooperate with the
government, termed politicians "absolutely irrespon-
sible." At that time, however, the government
planned to bring "loyal" League members into the
provincial government although denying them an op-
portunit to participate in the central administra
tion.
21. Under some pressure from the international
community, he again made a stab at bringing the
refugees back home. Among the contrivances, was a
cash awards program to entice reformed secessionists
home. When neither this nor other proposals were
successful, Yahya on 18 June for the first time ap-
pealed to "members of the minority community" to re-
turn. He asserted that all Pakistanis, irrespective
of caste, creed, and religion, should have no qualms
about returning to their homes.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9 WINNNErn
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
23. On 28 June Yahya made a major policy
speech, outl. i.ng his plans for a new constitution
and an event; .1 transfer of power to a national
civilian gov-rnment. He called for by-elections
to fill the East Pakistan Assembly seats that had
been declared vacated. Yahya talked in terms of
"about four months," but no exact timetable was
set. The speech, which could hardly have beeii ex-
pected to cut much ice with the Bengalis, appeared
to be aimed primarily at placating West Pakistani
politicians--particularly Z.A. Bhutto--who were
growing impatient at the delay in turning power
over to the civilians. Yahya made it clear, how-
ever, that the martial law administration which
had been ruling in both wings of Pakistan since
March 1969, woi,.ld continue in some form even after
the new civilian government took over.
** Before 25' March, the population of East Pakistan
was about 75 million and that of.Wes.t Pakistan 59
million.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
SECRET
Positions Har'en
25. Relations with India continued to deterio-
rate as the summer wore on. The Indians had embarked
on a fruitless diplomatic offensive in June to con-
vince the international community to cut off aid to
Pakistan until Islamabad restored a stable government
in the East wing. The Indians saw little progr:tss in
East Pakistan--refugees continued to stream across
the border, raising the total to seven million by the
end of July-.-and-they increased the state of their
military readiness and began to strengthen their po-
litical, economic, and military ties with the Soviets.
The Indian-Soviet Friendship Treaty that was signed
in early August indicated New Delhi's frustration
over its inability to end Yahya's heavy-handed tac-
tics in suppressing Bengali resistance. Should the
Indians be forced to opt for a "unilateral" solution
to the problem, New Delhi wanted the treaty as a
backstop and as insurance against Chinese interven-
tir-n.
26. Yahya, meanwhile, continued to work for
the political reorganization of East Pakistan. He
had said that it would be a "good thing" to ban all
regional parties, thereby implying that the Muslim
Leagues, because of their "nationwide" appeal in an
Islamic state, were in a particularly favored posi-
tion to lead the people of East Pakistan. In fact,
the Muslim Leagues have most of their support in
the West, and all three did badly in East Pakistan
in the December 1970 elections. In recent months,
two of the Muslim Leagues have agreed to merge, and
under Yahya's prodding the third--and most impor-
tant--may go along. Z. A. Bhutto's Pakistan People's
Party, which did well in West Pakistan in the last
election, is attempting to expand into the East Pak-
istan void. Bhutto, however, has been associated
in the minds of most East Pakistanis with the events
leading up to the army crackdown last March and is
believed to have little popular support in the prov-
ince.
27. Little forward political movement occurred
during July. The main event was the appointment on
15 July of A. M. Malik, a Bengali Muslim who had
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
SECRET
figured prominently in Pakistan's independence move-
ment, to serve as President Yahya's special assist-
ant for East Pakistan's displaced persons and relief
and zehabilitation operations. Yahya touted Malik's
appointment is evidence that he considered the situ-
ation stable enough to begin giving responsibility
back to civilians, but Malik was largely written off
in East Pakistan and India as a "tame Bengali" and
an old man with little force and exercising little
authority. Yahya said that although he was consid-
ering Malik as a possible future governor for East
Pakistan, the time for such an appointment was not
yet propitious. Malik; himself, had been reluctant
to take the refugee job, fearing that he would be-
come a target of Mukti Bahini reprisals.
28. The fact that Malik's appointment was
window- climbing a is revealed by the refugee
totals
Moreover, the government admitted
that it was reluctant to guarantee the restoration
of property that had already been turned over to
Bengali Musl,:,;ns and Biharis to returning refugees.
29.. Although by the end of June several
"cleared" Bengalis were appointed to administrative
positions in East Pakistan, the government's effort
to attract collaborators was still not going well
in July. The appointment of additional civiliax;
staff members was reportedly being considered, but
the list of former Bengali civil service officials
suspected of supporting the Awami League ran into
the hundreds, which meant that Bengali bureaucratic
talent would be hard to obtain.
30. Pacification remained the main thrust of
Islamabad's efforts. Although loyal Bengali and
Bihari militia groups (Razakars) were recruited to
aid in maintaining law and order, the guerrillas
were becoming more effective and the risks of col-
laboration more apparent. Yahya had announced plans
;:o visit East Pakistan in early August, but the se-
curity situation apparently has been so uncertain
that he still has not gone.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
SECRET
31. On 1 August the Pakistani Government an-
nounced that 88 of 167 Awarii League members elected
after the December election to sit in the National
Assembly were cleared to take their seats. An an-
nouncement that 94 of the 288 Awami Leaguers elected
to the Provincial Assembly had also been cleared was
broadcast on 19 August. The rest, 47 percent of the
Awami League's National Assembly representatives and
and 67 percent of its Provincial Assembly represent-
atives, were ordered to stand trial on treason and,
murder charges. Not surprisingly, few of the ac-
cused were expected to turn themselves in, and over
half the League members on the cleared list had long
since fled to India.
32. Undaunted, Yahya proceeded with his plans
to turn the government over to selected civilians.
By-elections for all vacant seats are scheduled to
begin in December, and Relief Coordinator A. M.
Malik has been appointed governor of East Pakistan,
effective 3 September.' Although cosmetic changes
continue, meaningful political accommodation has
not been forthcoming.
33. To improve its image, the government be-
came more receptive to plans for creation of an in-
ternational relief team under UN auspices to work
inside East Pakistan. Actual operations still moved
slowly, however. The head of the UN relief opera-
tions cited government inefficiency, disruption of
inland communications and transport, passive resist-
ance by the civili.a.,.: population, and the expected
growth of violence and sabotage by guerrillas as the
main roadblocks.
34. In ai,other gesture, the government billed
as an "important step" its plan to allow all people
whose property had been damaged during the fighting
to file claims with insurance companies or with the
central government. But the short deadline for
lodging these claims ruled out most refugee partic-
ipation, and the persecution of Hindus, although
less blatant, continued throughout August and Sep-
tember.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
5LUKJi 1'
The Situation Today
35. The danger of a major conflict between In-
dia and Pakistan remains high as a result of the
continuing crisis in East Pakistan. Indian military
preparations have been markedly increased, and Pak-
istani troops have moved to forward positions along
their borders. At no time since the 1965 Tndo-Pak-
istani war has either country been in so high a
stat.a of military readiness.
36. The security situation in East Pakistan's
major cities, although slipping somewhat recently,
has improved since the early days of the civil war.
The situation in the countryside is not yet under
control and it too may be deteriorating. The guer-
rilla forces are becoming more effective and numer-
on shipping at the port of Chalha indicate an inten-
sified and more sophisticated campaign.
37. The East Pakistani people--except those in
certain limited areas like the Chittagong Hill Tracts
where enmity between tribals and Bengalis is of long
SEUJKE'JL
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85TOO875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
SECRET
standing--appear to wish the guerrillas well. The
army's policy of invoking "collective responsibility"
against villages suspected of aiding the guerrillas
is effective'in preventing active peasant collabora-
tion in many areas, but the people are reluctant to
betray the guerrillas and are often willing to pro-
vide them food. In at least one subdivision,
Gopalganj in Faridpur district, the secessionists
reportedly have established a civilian hierarchy
parallel to the official structure.
38. The government civil service remains de-
moralized and inefficient. Many officials are con-
cerned that their work is no longer relevant, and
others have not yet recovered from seeing family and
friends killed and property destroyed. The govern-
ment's continuing policy of replacing key Bengali
officers with West Pakistanis and sending displaced
Bengalis to "exile" in the West wing is also demor-
alizing. Some officials at the district and township
level are concerned that the Mukti Bahini may view
them as collaborators. But most of the Bengali civil
servants are privately pro - Bangla Desh, and none
so far as is known has been assassinated. As a re-
sult of all these factors, government operations have
virtually ceajed in many areas, and the service in
general is far from satisfactory.
39. The political situation has changed little
over the last several months. Malik has assumed the
East Pakistani governor's job and appointed an all -
East Pakistani civilian cabinet. Most of the cabinet
members have been fairly prominent in local politics,
but only two had belonged to the banned Awami League
and they are regarded as turncoats by many Bengalis.
Most of the other members are from the smaller par-
ties; several of them were badly defeated in the De-
cember races for the National Assembly. In sum, the
army will maintain ultimate control, and,the Bengalis
know it. Yahya has appointed the army commander in
the East as the new martial law administrator--a
post theoretically subordinate to that of governor
but actually parallel to it.
40. President Yahya issued a general amnesty
on 5 September to "all those who have committed or
are alleged to have committed offenses during the
-15-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
disturbances in East Pakistan from 1 March to 5
September 1971." The amnesty was to extend to per-
sonnel of the armed forces, the East Pakistan Rifles,
the police, and militia. It did not apply to cer-
tain Awami League assemblymen and "other"' individuals
against whom criminal proceedings were already ini-
tiated. Thus amnesty for Mujib and other important
members of the League was not granted. Although
Yahya's announcement apparently is indicative of
Islamabad's desire to create conditions for polit-
ical reconciliation with East Pakistan, most Ben-
galis and refugees remain hostile and distrustful.
And their distrust is not without evidece of jus-
tification. Although the government claimed that
large numbers of prisoners were released following
the amnesty, the US consul general in Dacca reported
that most persons of significance remain in custody.
In Chittagong, government information offices photo-
graphed the release of prisoners who were subse-
quently escorted back to prison. The consul has
also heard one second-hand, but plausible, report
that 30 Hindu families in Mymenssingh town who took
advantage of the amnesty to return home went on to.
India after their property was not given back.
41. A new constitution, drawn up by Islamabad,
will eventually be submitted to the National Assem-
bly for consideration before it is proclaimed by the
executive branch, probably sometime after the by-
election. Yahya plans to hold elections to fill va-
cant National Assembly seats on 12-23 December and
Provincial Assembly seats on 18 December-7 January.
Therefore, on 10 October he announced new regula-
tions governi.ig political activity in the country.
Such activity, which had been bannec' since March,
was now permissible, albeit under stringent control.
For example, although political parties could begin
campaigning for the by-elections, they could not en-
gage in activities "prejudicial to the ideology,
integrity, or security of Pakistan." Those who con-
travened the new regulations would be subject to
fines and imprisonment. 'The new regulations make
it difficult for any party to campaign upon a pro-
gram not in harmony with Islamabad's policies, and
as such, they are not likely to be greeted with much
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100114-9
 Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9
v+v vi..a.~ ...
enthusiasm in autonomy-minded East Pakistan. Never-
theless, Yahya appears determined to follow through
with his program, despite the Bengalis' anticipated
widespread lack of cooperation. By scheduling elec-
tions and permitting political activity he may be
attempting to forestall Indian military action or
lessen foreign criticism of his East Pakistani pol-
icy.
sEUxET
Approved For Release 2009/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100114-9