EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INCHES TOWARD MORE POLITICAL UNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100131-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 131
• Publication Date: November 15, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
European Community Inches Toward
More'oliriical Unity
Secret
73
15 November 1971
-No. 2095/71
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 November 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
European Community Inches Toward More Political Unity
Summary
The European Community has now had about i -,-ear's
experience with a system of consultations on foreign
policy agreed to by the chiefs of government -t The.
Hague in December 1969. The results have not been
spectacular. This was perhaps to be expected given
the timid approach of the Six to the question of
the institutions required. Only the prospect of
British participation persuaded some of the Six to
agree to such consultations, and there is still a
strong "waiting-for-London" atmosphere surrounding
the issue. For some time to come the impact of the
community in world affairs will derive more from its
collective economic weight than from the nascent
"coordination" of foreign policies.
Nevertheless, the Six have an established rou-
tine of regular and frequent meetings on foreign
policy. Their representative, in other countries
are acquiring the habit of mutual consultation.
The consultation framework is being used more and
more on an ad hoc basis to discuss timely issues.
On the other han~Tc., there is no permanent support-
ing organization, and it is generally recognized
that the consultation process also suffers from
tenuous links to public opinion and parliamentary
procedures. These questions are now part of a more
general debate taking place in the press, the vari-
ous "European" lobbying groups, and th-a European
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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Parliament over how to reinforce the institutions
of the entire European integration movement. In-
terest in Europe's future political organization
is certain to become livelier with signature of a
UK accession treaty later this year and a summit
meeting of the present and prospective members
likely soon thereafter.
Indeed, the coincidence of the community's en-
largement, movement toward East-West detente, and
efforts to forge a united response to recent US eco-
nomic measures suggests to many the need for a de-
cision-making procedure on political matters. Prime
Minister Heath--at the Zurich ceremony in September
commemorating Churchill's 1946 "United States of
Europe" speech--called for a common European for-
eign policy, for defense cooperation, and for demo-
cratically based institutions. Britain will pre-
sumably attempt to further these goals in the en-
larged community. Their achievements will. depend
on how some basic questions are answered: How rapidly
should integration entail sacrifices of national
sovereignty? What axe the advantages of detente in
relation to West European unity? How compatible is
a "European identity" in political and defense mat-
ters with reliance on the US as the ultimate security
guarantor?
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Introduction
1. The Hague summit meeting of the Sax at the
and of 1969 set the stage for negotiations to en-
large the mQmbership of the European. Communities.
It also opened the way for "progress in the matter
of political unification, within the context of en-
largement." The linkage between the two issues was
not fortuitous. An earlier attempt at political
unification among the Six, by the so-called Fouchet
Committee set up by the Bonn Declaration of July
1961, had failed. France's partrers were unwill-
ing to accept an arrangement which, in the absence
of the British, would have effectively confirmed
the predominant political role of Paris. They also
feared that the EEC, EURATOM, and the Coal and Steel
Community might be undercut.
2. The prospect of the community's enlarge-
ment has now enabled the Six to avoid repeating the
doctrinal disputes of the Fouchet area. Because of
the growing influence which the community is assuming
globally they have found it advisable to abandon the
old forensics and instead to try to raise the level
of their political responsibility to match that of
their de facto power. It is evident that in jointly
taking up such problems as the Middle East, East-
West relations in Europe, or the Mediterranean, the
Six are aware both of the implications of develop-
ments in these areas for the community as a whole
and of the potential for common action.
3. Although the national interests of the mem-
bers will Lend to diverge for an indefinite period,
this may give them more re--tson to seek a forum where
each can influence the others. Also, trade and eco-
nomic matters--as in the case of EC-US relations--
clearly have political consequences that are out-
side the three communities' competence, and call
for general political debate.
Consultations on Foreign Policy
4. Following the Hague summit, a group of senior
officials from the Six met under the chairmanship of
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Etienne Davignon, Director General for Political Af-
fairs at the Belgian Foreign Ministry, to draw up a
report for the foreign ministers in implementation
of the Hague decisions. The report was finally
adopted in October 1970. Its stated goals: to "as-
sure-better mutual comprehension on the major prob-
lems of international politics" and to promote the
"harmonization of points of view, the concerting of
attitudes and, when it seems possible and desirable,
common actions."
5. Meetings of foreign ministers (or chiefs
of state under extraordinary circumstances) are
scheduled every six months. Preparations for these
sessions are entrusted to a committee of foreign
office directors for political affairs, which meets
at least quarterly and which can establish expert
working groups on particular problems. In addition,
ambassadors of the Six accredited outside the com-
munity are invited to consult among themselves on
problems of common interest.
6. The role of the EC Commission in these
consultations is vague. Its opinion is invited
when the consultations touch on activities of the
communities. An Informal meeting of the foreign
ministers with members of the political committee
of the European Parliament is called for twice a
year. The EC Council president r~ports to the Par-
liament once a year on the progress rchieved in
unification. Finally the foreign ministers are to
prepare a general report, by November 1972, evaluating
the results of their efforts.
7. Britain and the other candidate countries
for EC membership do not participate in the meetings
of the Six. They are provided "information that is
likely to interest them" on the consultation,, of the
directors' political committee. Following ministe-
rial-level meetings, the four applicants are -told of
the results of the deliberations. Working procedures
have developed along the following lines. Once the
ministers have agreed on certain topic:: for discus-
sion, the political directors decide on the terms of
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reference and assign varionns aspects of the problem
to particular countries. Initial country papers are
then discussed within a working group of experts
drawn from the respective foreign offices. The po-
litical directors either accept the papers or send
them back to the experts to iron out remaining dif-
ferences. The ministers have discretion to give
the studies whatever degree of official sanction they
deem appropriate.
The Middle East
8. The Six have thus far dealt with two for-
eign policy problems in some depth, the Middle East
and a Conference on European Security. The Arab-
Israeli dispute in Middle East caused the greater
controversy. It was obvious from the beginning that
there were serious differences between France, on
the one hand, and the other five, in varying degrees,
on the other. The latter were particularly concerned
not to leave an impression that France wo.ld receive
a mandate to speak for them in the Four Po,ier talks
in New York. Nevertheless, the Six felt they could
not shirk discussion of one of the more burning policy
issues and one on which the Europeans themselves have
long felt they were remiss in not asserting Europe's
interests "with one voice."
9. Because of known differences, the Six de-
liberately excluded from the initial phase of con-
sultations several of the touchiest topics. These
included the question of Israel's withdrawal from
occupied territory, its final boundaries, and pro-
cedures for establishing peace. At the Munich meet-
ing of foreign ministers in November 1970, the Six
agreed to discuss four issues: freedom of naviga-
tion of the Suez,.demilitarized zones, Jerusalem,
and the Palestinian refugees. Basic differences
emerged between France and its partners. The French
were by far the most sympathetic to the Arab side
and eager to impose a settlement, This led to much
pulling and hauling over language that threatened
to go beyond the UN Security Council's Resolution 242.
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10. By last March the Dutch thought the consul-
tations had gone far enough and the Germans said they
were "thoroughly frustrated" with the project. The
Italians openly questioned the sense of trying to
arrive at a common position which could have little,
if any, influence on the Arabs and Israelis. The
French, disappointed by the failure to achieve a
greater measure of agreement, began to stress the
"educational value" of the exercise.
11. Largely because of external circumstances
that weake:ied opposition to France's tactics, the
Six were able two months later to agree on a watered-
down position paper. Secretary of State Rogers'
press conference in March was apparently read as an
indication that the US was no longer opposed to out-
siders suggesting "solutions" to the parties. The
contrast between Egypt's reply to UN mediator Jar-
ring's questionnaire and the negati',e response fron+
Israel was cited by a French offici.:,.y, as ::awing ma;;ie
a compromise paper possible. An Icraeli diplomatic
and press c paign against the efforts of the Six to
coordinate Middle East positions backfired and ended
in stiffening their resolve.. According to a German
official, the foreign ministers had no choice but to
reach some sort of agreement.
12. The paper included a reference to the dis-
puted French-language version of Resolution 242:
withdrawal from "the occupied territories," instead
of just "occupied territories." Controversy was not
long in breaking out again. Despite an understanding
that the permanent representatives of the Six at the
UN would make a joint report to U Thant on the commu-
nity's deliberations, the French took on this role by
themselves. The reaction of France's partners was
"furious." For its part, Paris was scarcely less dis-
pleased when German Foreign Minister Scheel during
a visit to Israel in July implied that the Six were
in less than full agreement and that the position
paper was still subject to the interpretation of
the member.states.
13. Despite the skepticism resulting from
these fiascoes, the community members decided in
July to continue their study . of the Middle East.
Work is now going forward on the possible elements
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of a Middle East peace settlement and the jurid-
ical guarantees it should contain. Differences
among the Six on these topics are reported to be
diminishing. Although the Italians and Dutch
have continued to oppose the production of any-
thing that might be labeled an EC paper, the
Dutch have recently slid that they feel in-
creasingly une?vy in this position.
14. One proposal coming out of the Middle
East consultations is for the community to under-
take'an aid program to ameliorate the Palestinian
problem. But the major value of the consultations
has been that the five have learned a good deal
about problems, such as refugees and Jerusalem,
which their foreign offices had not hitherto con-
sidered deeply. The US Embassy in Bonn says that
the Middle East consultations marked another stage
in German readiness to "speak out less self-con-
sciously if still modestly." The five were also
made aware of the difficulties of coordinating
foreign policy when there are no rules for decision-
making and no permanent- staff to aid the procedure.
At the same time, the consultations demonstrated
how difficult it is to back out of an implied com-
mitment to reach some sort of agreement in the
name of "European unity," regardless of the ,in-
stitutional framework.
Conference on European Security
15. In the early stages of their cxperimert
in foreign policy coordination, the Six agreed to
consult on East-West relations and the implications
of a Conference on European Security. Despite the
obvious immediate interest of the members in this
question, the initial phase of their consultations
failed to produce a formal paper. The failure was
probably due less to profound differences of atti-
tudes than to the awareness of France's partners
that, because of the NATO consultations, they need
not make concessions to Paris in order to have
their voices heard?
16. Although the Six had agreed at the be-
ginning to avoid duplicating NATO's work, much of
their discussion prior to the June NATO ministerial
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session in Lisbon came to revolve around two.ques-
tions under debate in NATO. These were the form a
Conference on European Security might take and the
nature of preparations for it. The EC consultations
gave the French another forum in which to advocate
their special ideas on how to proceed to the desired
conference. In May the Fa.ench characterized the
consultations as "not very satisfactory," mainly
because the Six were not prepared to take a more
"positive" view of a security conference. Since
then; several of France's partners have shown
sympathy for the French proposal to hold a conier-
ence at the ministerial level in three stages. And
the French, in turn, have shown signs of agreeing
to a long period of careful preliminary examination
of the procedures and substance of a Conference on
European Security.
17. The Six have not been able thus far to
reach a common position on their objectives at a
Conference. They have, however, presented the
foreign ministers with a paper on the interests
of the Six in the fields of economic, scientific,
and technical cooperation. The paper will in turn
be presented for consideration in r~ATO. A further
suggestion that the Soviet Union and the East Euro-
peans be informed at the outset of the "special
and separate" role which the EC would play in nego-
tiations on these topics met with firm French
opposition in October.
18. The issue of a security conference is
certain to prove an even greater test of the ef-
fectiveness of the consultative mechanisms on the
Six than the Middle East because their interests
are more directly involved. They face a dilemma
of how to reconcile the feeling of France's part-
ners that the Community cannot approach the ques-
tion of detente in disarray with the opposition
of the French to a "bloc" approach. The French,
in line with their policy of de-emphasizing com-
munity institutions, oppose representation of
the Commission at a security conference. The
Dutch, at the other extreme, favor a community
presence, despite misgivings that too much co-
ordination by the EC could interfere with dis-
cussions in NATO and strain ties with the US.
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19. Basically, the security conference con-
sultations among the Six reflect the usual differ-
ence between the French, who recognize the need
for West European strength through unity but want
to maximize their control, and the other five, w'.to
believe that the Six should adopt common positio:is.
The Mediterranean
20. Last May the Six agreed to consult on
the Mediterranean, as distinct from the Arab-
Israeli problem. The Germans and Italians, who
initiated the discussions, had no exaggerated ex-
pectations. The German idea was to draw the Six
into an analysis of the security situation in the
area and to foster a coordinated community response
in the economic and aid spheres. Bonn recognized
that differences among the Six on the Mediterranean
ran as deep as those on the Middle East, but sought
a forum in which to make their opinions heard.
Foreign Minister Scheel recently stated that Ger-
many, as a member of the community, has "become a
Mediterranean state, taking its place beside the
traditional ones." "Because of this," he added,
"it must help devise a Mediterranean policy which
goes somewhat further than trade in citrus fruits."
He might have added that the community has no such
policy even on citrus fruits.
21. It seems doubtful that the political
consultations will lead to any progress on the
commercial front. The Six are reluctant to raise
subjects directly covered by the community trea-
ties and thus require active participation by the
Commission. In their: Mediterranean consultations
the Six must also avoid Military issues that would
encroach on NATO prerogatives.
22. In July the French proposed that the study
be'organized into three parts--the Mediterranean Mid-
dle East, Mediterranean North Africa, and the Euro-
pean Mediterranean. This was agreed to, but the po-
litical directors of the foreign offices of the six
failed to follow up when they met in September, They
have since decided to have another try at framing a
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mandate for a Mediterranean working group. France
has a much more restixcted view-than the others on
how to approach the Mediterranean topic. According
to a German official, Paris fears that countries
such as Greece and Spain would be troubled if the EC
were to consider their broad geopolitical role in
the area.
China
23. The first exchange among the Six on policy
toward Communist China took place at the meeting of
the political committee on 21-22 September. Italy
had proposed a special meeting, but the Germans con-
sider premature any "in-depth" study of China policy
by the Six and agreed only to include the topic in
a larger agenda. Agreement to discuss China grew
out of Conflicting pressures on Bonn. On the one
hand,'there was the desire to put first things first--
i.e., relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. On the other, some of Germany's partners
were anxious to begin more formal consideration of
China policy and within Germany there was increas-
ing criticism of Bonn's lack of a China policy. In
any event, the discussions this fall were little
more than restatements of known government positions
on Chinese representation in the UN.
Political Unification Working Group
24. In addition to the various groups of ex-
perts on specific substantive issues, the Six set
up a group to monitor progress as a whole and to
suggest improvements in the consultation process.
This group has not yet begun to discuss any particu-
lar proposals for European pblitical'integration.
Instead, it has concentrated on procedures for con-
sultations among ambassadors of the Six in other
countries and in international organizations, and
on guidelines for an "information" policy to keep
the candidate countries and other non-EC states in-
formed on the consultations.
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Effectiveness
25. The consultations have so far served to
clarify national foreign policy positions, not to
change them. Whatever shifts are detectable in the
attitudes of the. Six vis-a-vis Israel and the Arabs,
for example, are probably more the result of a grad-
ual reassertion of the security and economic inter-
ests of individual West European countries than of
a movement to assert these interests as a bloc.
And Rome, especia y
skeptical of French intentions, is aware that the
EC enlarges its role in the Middle East. All of
France's partners are conscious of their joint po-
tential for influencing French positions even though
they are wary of French pretentions to "speak for
Europe." The French themselves, to judge by their
recent reluctance to push hard on further Middle
East studies, seem impressed that EC consultations
may restrain rather than bolster Paris' hand.
27. Regardless of the lack of concrete achieve-
ments to date, the consultations are now an estab-
lished forum for considering foreign policy matters.
Belgium has proposed that pre-trip "briefing consul-
tations," such as the Germans gave their EC partners
before Brandt's meeting with Brezhnev, become rou-
tine procedure. In October,. the Six agreed to
"harmonize" their views on Indian Prime Minister
Gandhi's trip to Western Europe and, afterwards, to
hear full reports on her visits to Brussels, Paris,
and Bonn. As the consultations proceed, more topics
find their way to the agenda. In October, the po-
litical directors discussed the problem of a suc-
cessor for UN Secretary General and the Soviet pro-
posal for a World Disarmament Conference.
28. Perhaps the biggest bonus of the consulta-
tions has been the realization that existing proce-
dures fall short of the system required for. real po-
litical unity. Foremost among the weaknesses is the
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absence of a standing secretariat to facilitate the.
consultative process and provide continuity between
meetings of the experts and political directors. A
Quaff, official, for example, recently remarked that
it becomes increasingly difficult for his and other
political directors to keep tabs on the political
work of t.he,EC as the number of projects before them
increases. He suggested that a small secretariat
might be helpful.
29. The infrequency of the meetings of the for-
eign ministers themselves--only twice a year--also
weakens the existing system. So too does the lack
of popular interest in or support of the proceedings.
This defect could perhaps be rectified, in part at
least, if a more meaningful role were given the Euro-
pean Parliament. Finally, the near total exclusion
of defense questions from consideration detracts
from the over-all impact. No link with NATO's
"Eurogroup"--which does consider such questions--has
been established.
30. The French official cited above ruled out
"at the mom^nt" the creation of a secretariat fcr
political questions.along the lines of the EC Com-
mission. Others have maintained that an independent
body like 'he Commission is required to begin a dia-
logue that would include the Council (representing the
governments) and the European Parliament. In a recent
series of articles criticizing community procedures
but admiring the looser arrangements of the political
consultations, EC Commissioner vahrendc.*:f admitted
that the "only" thinjs lacking in the latter were ef-
fective, common institutions, and binding rules of
procedure.
31. The existing state of these consultations
nevertheless accurately reflects the reluctance of
the EC members to subordinate their individual na-
tional, interests.. The Dutch, for example, recognize
the inadequacies of the current. procedures but find
some security in them.. Dutch leaders have made it
clear in parliamentary cl.ebates that they are not
prepared to move further along this road until the
British participate fully. Others share the Dutch
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fear that a "strengthening" of the consultative pro-
cess might not only fail to contribute to the devel-
opment of a political community but could reinforce
the claims of France--or Germany--to speak for the
Six.
On to a New Look for "Europe"?
32. While the foreign office consultations
have been proceeding on their uncertain course,
other developments bearing directly on a "Political
Europe" have also been taking place. Early this
year, France gave indications it was willing to ad-
dress the question of how to build Europe institu-
tionally. In a press conference last January, Pres-
ident Pompidou said that an eventual European Con-
federation would have td-have a "European govern-
ment the decisions of which were binding on all the
states belonging to it." The starting point could
not be "technical organizations," but "a coming to-
gether of the national governments for the purpose
of taking decisions valid for all." Pompidou fore-
saw three stages: first, the Council of Ministers
as it presently functions; second, a Council where
national ministers would be specially charged to
handle European questions; and finally, a Council--
composed of "European" ministers--with its own
"executive agents" separate from the national admin-
istrations. Moreover, he added "the day there is a
genuine European government, there must be a genuine
European Parliament."
33. Pompidou's sketch of an eventual "European
government" as well as the process of arriving at
it has raised many questions. For example, the
concept of a "confederation" capable of making bind-
ing decisions on its members might seem more descrip-
tive, in fact, of a federal system.
34. In the intermediate stages, also, impor-
tant questions are unanswered. What relation would
the "European ministers,"--still members of their
national governments--have to other national minis-
ters? Is the role of the EC Commission to decline
as the power of European ministers increases? Would
the Council's "new look" encourage it to deal with
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problems outside the competence of the'community'
treaties and thus further erode community principles?
What assurance would there be, in the absence of any.
proposals to limit the intermediate stages by precise
deadlines, that the deadlocks characteristic of the
present Council system could be overcome? There is
really no "constitutional" phase foreseen, and it is
doubtful that a project so far-reaching in its impli
cations as a "European government" could be properly
launwhed by a diplomatic conference that envisages
a parliamentary role only at the end of a very long
road.
35. The ambiguities in Pompidou's proposals
reappear in France's approach to the Communities.
There is no doubt that Pompidou puts greater stress
than his predecessor on the community framework, but
he always has reservations. Political consultations
are to be fostered, but with a minimal role for the
Commission; monetary union is to be pursued, but ad
hoc bodies such as the Committee of Central Bank
Governors should implement important aspects; the
Six should act jointly on the narcotics problem,,
but the work should be entirely separate from the
EC structure.
36. Notwithstanding the reluctance of France
to endorse "supranational" institutions, Pompidou's
proposals do suggest, for the first ;ime, that a
dialogue with Paris on the issue may be possible.
No matter hogs equivocal some of the language, France
and its partners can now at least claim to be talk-
ing about the same thing.
31. Brandt spoke publicly in April of Germany's
wish for a "Europe an. government, reasonably organized,
which can take the necessary decisions in fields of
community. policy, the activities of which are subject
to parliamentary control." Scheel proposed in a news-
paper interview that "guidelines" be formulated for
a discussion of Pompidou's ideas. And he foresaw an
"organ independent of the national states" partici-
pating in decision-making, a strengthening of the
European Parliament, ar applying the "tested insti-
tutional principles" of the community treaties.
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states participate in wielding the powers thus trans-
ferred, and how? How will authority be divided
among the European Parliament, the Council, and the
Commission? Harmel suggested that powers might be
transferred "issue by issue" and that these powers
should be "delegated" before being transferred fi-
nally.
38. Addressing the institutional question in
the Belgian senate, Foreign Minister' Harmel raised
three questions that would have to be considered at
each of Pompidou' s stages: What powers should be
transferred to community institutions? Will the
39. While willing to have France spell out its
ideas more clearly, none of the Six has been willing
to begin serious discussion of institutional ques-
tions until the community is in fact enlarged. An
Eiysee official conceded in July that Pompidou's
thoughts on naming European ministers were still
"very general" and were likely to remain so until
the. UK was in. When Pompidou met Brandt in June,
he reportedly said that the institutional question
should be discussed one day, buy. not just then, "in
order not to complicate further Heath's task at
home."
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42. While government leaders have been chary
of offering "blueprints" for political unity, various
groups and individuals have vigorously tried to
arouse public opinion to its importance. The need
for a parliamentary role in the unification process
and the desirability of a body independent of the
member states at least to propose common policies
have been stressed.
43. wo studies, still in process, may have
some influence,, Jean Monnet's Action Committee,
which includes leaders from all political parties
except the Gaullists in France and the Communists,
has promised a report next year on the forms a po-
litical union of the EC might take. In addition,
the EC Commission has appointed a group of experts
to recommend community institutional r'forms. The
study was set up to examine the possibilities for
re-enforcing the powers of the European Parliament
in light of its recently acquired budgetary respon-
sibilities. The Commission takes the view that
budgetary competence involves legislative power and
that this,. in turn, requires a re-examination of
the interplay of all community institutions. Using
its right to propose amendments to the Rome Treaty,
the Commission intends to submit its views to the
Council in 1972.
44. The problem of institutional reform has
also been considered in connection with the peren-
nial proposal to elect the European Parliament.
Representatives to the Parliament are still appointed
by the respective national legislatures from among
their members, even though the EEC and EURATOM trea-
ties provided for eventual election by "direct uni-
versal suffrage." The Council has never acted on
the draft convention submitted to it by the Parli-
ament in 1960 which would implement an election pro-
cedure in two stages. Because of renewed pressure
from the Parliament and agitation in the legisla-
tures of several of the member countries, the Coun-
cil has recently begun to debate the question again
and to discuss it with the Parliament's political
committee.
45. A priorities problem complicates the par-
liamentary election issue. Elections are opposed
by some as long as the competence of the Parliament
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states would be discriminated against in the exist-
ing Parliament if representation were proportional
to population.
over, popular election would probably have to en-
tail a change to a bicameral system; the small
is so restricted; others reject greater parliamen-
tary powers because the body is not elected.. More-
46. It is doubtful that the direct election
question will come to a head before the Commission
presents its over-all program of institutional re-
form. Nevertheless the Italians or Dutch could pos-
sibly decide before then to push national legislation
providing for direct elections from among present
members of the respective national parliaments. In
any case, it is now generally acknowledged by all
save the Gaullists that parliamentary elections and
a greater parliamentary role must be dealt with soon.
Summit Talks
47. The Hague summit in 1969 demonstrated that,
at.the present: stage of the European integration
movement, political decisions to launch major new
initiatives must still be taken in the highest level
"inter-state" forum. Since last May when sharp di-
vergencies over monetary policies developed within
the community after the German and Dutch floated
their currencies, demand for another summit meeting
has steadily increased. On 26 September, Scheel
formally proposed a summit of the enlarged EC to
"take decisive steps to rurther the cause of Euro-
pean unification and to fix new guidelines for the
community's internal development and foreign rela-
tions and for political cooperation among the com-
munity countries." The proposal was accepted in
principle by the,foreign ministers of the Six and
the four applicants at their meetings in Rome on
5-6 November.
48. It seems clear that., there will be some dis-
cussion of institutional problems at such a summit.
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49. While the Six generally agree that the sum-
mit conference is the proper instrument for setting
in motion new common initiatives, summitry has several
limitations. Commissioner Spinelli recently pointed
out that as currently envisaged the summit conference
has no institutional support. Without some continu-
ing machinery, declarations of intent at the summit
are likely to become diluted--as were the proposals
for economic and monetary union--and reduced to
"inter-state pseudo-solutions." Spinelli's suggested
approach is to combine proposals for popular election
of the European Parliament with a reaffirmation of
the right of initiative of the Commission and an in-
stitutionalization of the summit conference as an
over-all guidance mechanism. Although this line of
argument comes from a leading and long-time European
"federalist" and is doubtless too advanced for most
of the European government leaders to support at
this time, Spinelli has at least defined the ground
that needs to be covered'before "European" institu-
tions axe reached.
50. The motives for continued political devel-
opment of the community are clear. Internally, the
decision-making processes, slow and cumbersome in a
community of six, are likely to be even more so
in a group of ten. The monetary crisis has demon-
strated the fragility of a unity expressed primarily
in the elimination of customs barriers. and a common
external tariff. A true economic and monetary union
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would need the capacity to deal with regional, so-
cial, environmental, industrial and research, trans
portation, energy and agricultural policy. More-
over, with the community acquiring more financial
resources of its own, it will need more efficient
instruments to manage its fiscal, financial, and
budgetary affairs. Also the need for political
decision.-making at the European level is seen as
the only--way-to maximize Europe's influence in
future dealings with the US and to safeguard
Europe's interests in an era of East-West detente.
51. How far and haw fast the Europeans proceed
toward this sort of unificatic- may depend on how
they deal with the question of -uropean defense.
National responses to a lessened US military presence
in Western Europe would be incompatible with a Europe
otherwise attempting to unify its economic and for-
eign policies. The British and German governments
are certain to encourage the development of European
defense cooperation but the French are likely to re-
main cautious and even grudging. The most likely
area for movement is in conventional arms, although
Paris and London may coma to see advantages in some
"combination" of their nuclear deterrent forces.
But a genuine European deterrent set.ms Pctainable
only when the members are ready to commit themselves
to greater political unity than they are now prepared
to accept. They would also have to be certain that
the deterrent would add measurably to their security
and that the US would be willing to support, it.
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