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December 27, 1971
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Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100142-8 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum Castroism Clarified it" Chile Secret 73 27 December 1971 No. 2i U8/71 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100142-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. OROW' 1 I%CLDDRD PHOM AUTOMATIC [wanuunmr+n AHr~ DII'LAU'AHCATIO$ 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : g T00875R001100100142-8 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 27 December 1971 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Castroism Clarified in Chile Summary Fidel Castro's long stay in Chile has con- vinced him that the Cuban--i.e., his--revolutionary process is the only true way. Although he may be- lieve that there is more than one way to begin a revolution, he makes it clear that violence must be used at one time or another in varying degrees of intensity to defend it. His visit has signaled an end to Cuba's isolation in the hemisphere, afforded him an opportunity to propagandize the success of the Cuban experience, and reaffirmed his position as a revolutionary leader. Castro was able to meet with other Latin American leaders and. Communist Party officials on their home ground and to get their views on the state of the "revolutionary proc- ess in their countries." His official statements and private conversations reflected a scarcely con- cealed hatred of the US and his desire to destroy the influence of the US and other "imperialist" powers. One possible result of his trip will be the intensification of his efforts to socialize Cube completely and create a "socialist man" whose outlook cannot be reversed. Note: This memorandum was produced by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA. Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100142-8 SECRET 25X1 General 1. Now that Fidel Castro has returned to his island bastion from his odyssey in Chile and its brief postscripts in Peru and Ecuador, it may be useful to review the record of what he said and did there. Many of Fidel's statements in Chile were made under unfavorable circumstances for him. Some of his more acerbic remarks, in fact, were aimed at antagonistic questioners. It is possible that these remarks were closer to his real feelings than the well-thought-out answers to friendly interviewers. 2. What has the trip accomplished? Most im- portant, it may have signaled the effective end of Cuba's isolation from the rest of the hemisphere. The economic and political sanctions imposed by the OAS may well continue to crumble. Peru, Ecuador, and possibly several other countries will probably establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, regardless of the outcome of maneuverings in the OAS. 3. Secondly, the relative success of the trip and his personal reception have given him some re- assurance of his popularity with the "masses." Al- though he would probably be the first to admit that he didn't win any new followers, he did satisfy him- self that he stood well with those people he ex- pected to support him. 4. Castro had a lot going for him in this re- spect. His large physical appearance and his breezy informality contribute much to his charisma. To Chileans accustomed to the rather dour Allende, Fidel was quite a shock, pleasant to some, scandalous to others. Where the throngs could make a direct com- parison of Castro and Allende, Castro's proclivity to play basketball, kiss babies, don miners' helmets, etc., captivated many. Moreover, his nonstop trav- eling and speaking must have left most Chileans gasp- ing at the man's stamina. His conduct in this re- gard, if it did nothing else, scotched for the time being rumors of failing health. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100142-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 SFCR FT 25X1 5. Finally, the trip allowed the would-be leader of contemporary Latin American revolutionaries to ex- amine first hand the current revolutionary process in Chile. Castro took great pains to point out the differences in the "revolutionary" trends of Cuba and Chile and paid homage to the Chilean process of via pacifica. He expressed chagrin at Allende's failure to counter reactionary violence with "rev- olutionary" force, and probably believes that unless Allende takes off the gloves the coalition's days are numbered. He was an unhappy militant when he left Chile. "Revolutionary" Process and Dissent 6. Castro's thinking on the "revolutionary" process has gone through transition. His speeches and private conversations suggest that he has en- dorsed the idea that each nation can follow its own distinct revolutionary path. This obviously in- cludes--among other possibilities--the Chilean via pacifica and the Peruvian military populism. Ac- cording to Castro, the basic criteria fo_ revolu- tion are the direct "participation" of the masses in the social, economic, and political life of the nation, and an anti-imperialist (anti-US) view of the rest of the world. Castro says, ""Revolutions are not invented by men. Revolutions arise from real objective factors that produce awareness at a given moment.... Everything must be linked to the masses." 7. Thus, he appears to have abandoned his rigid adherence to the "rural concept; i.e., that revolutions must start in remote sections with peasant support. More- ovar, he now sees the development of larger foci of students and workers in the cities as a vanguard of the defense of the "revolutionary" process af- ter it has been initiated. For example, Allende may have risen to power in Chile through democratic means and the via Pacifica, but this does not mean that undemocraEirc and violent means will not be needed to protect and advance the revolution. 25X1 bEUKEY Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 SF(;R FT with antagonistic students--especially from the Christian Democratic youth--caused Fidel to lose his co+.,1. on occasion. These face-to-face conflicts with detractors and the failure to attract a large turn- cut at his last rally had an effect on him by the end of his visit. His promise to stay out of Chilean politics was cast aside during his farewell speech, and all of his scarcely concealed anti-US feelings rushed to the surface. 11. Castro's main point on dissent is that it cannot be tolerated by a socialist government. Com- munications and propaganda outlets must be taken over 6EURET Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/22IQ:RQP~5T00875R001100100142-8 25X1 by "revolutionaries." Newsmen must lend a "revolu- tionary" interpretation to what they report. The people must be made aware of "truth and reality." Obviously, if they are unable to attain this level of "awareness," they have to be educated, and if that fails, they must be forced. In Castro's ideal- ized concept of socialism, dissent simply does not occur. 12. No matter how impatient Fidel is with dis- sent, he has devised, in addition to short-term vio- lence, long-range plans to eliminate it. This aims at the complete socialist education of the masses. Time after time during his talks in Chile with stu- dents, he hammered on the theme that everyone in a socialist state should be so educated. Education and indoctrination in a socialist society will re- sult in the elimination of capitalistic sentiment and anti-government factions, he explained. Castro on the US 13. In Chile Castro blew hot and cold on rela- tions with the United States. He appeared to make an effort at first to avoid criticism, but by the end of his visit, his true thoughts about the US had become apparent. He accused the US of seeing itself as "the policeman of the world." He dwelt at some length on the US military base at Guantanamo as an affront to Cuba's dignity--but said that he would not be so fool- ish as to try to take it by force. "One single mis- sile could destroy the base, but unfortunately we do not have them," he said, adding, "If we had them we would not launch them... (except) under special con- ditions in which we had no other choice but to defend ourselves." 14. Castro cited the Vietnam war and the revela- tions in the "Pentagon Papers" as proof of America's economic, social, and political "deterioration." He promised that relations will not be re-established be- tween the two nations until a "realistic government" 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/2 : 85T00875R001100100142-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : C Y V M 25X1 comes to power in Washington. The Nixon administra- tion is not, in his judgment, this kind of government. Questioned on the planned visits of President Nixon to Moscow and Peking, Castro said, "The only thing we can say is that Nixon will. not visit Havana." 15. Air line hijacking is a gritty point in current Cuba-US problems, and Castro was emphatic in reaffirming Cuba's past position on the issue. He said he could do little about the problem because the hijackers are, for the most part, minority ele- ments or "political prisoners" escaping from a "re- pressive" US. He added that all hijacked planes are returned to the US, whereas Washington condones es- cape from Cuba and illegally seizes and retains the boats Cubans use to escape. 16. In discussing the possibility of establish- ing relations with other countries, Castro asserted that he is "not desperate to normalize relations with other Latin. American countries." The basic criterion for such relations would be adoption by the others of a foreign policy independent of US influence. In Castro's view, as long as "they obey orders from the United States" there is no sense in recognition. Castro on the USSR 17. The Cuban leader went out of his way to un- derline Cuba's current good relations with the Soviet Union. His support for the via pacifica and his meet- ings in Chile with such orthodox pro-Moscow Communist stalwarts as Ecuador's Pedro Saad are good indications of his bond to the USSR. During his press confer- ence in Santiago, he praised the Soviets for their aid when his country was alone in the early 60s. "I don't care if reactionary birds have written that Cuba is a Soviet colony, the?t we are economically dependent, and more of those mythi. I believe that all revolu- tionaries in Latin America should be glad of this (aid to Cuba from the USSR), to know that under dif- ficult circumstai.ces a country like Cuba could re- ceive the solidarity and support of the Soviet Union." 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100100142-8 SECRET Conclusions 18. Castro obviously made the trip to Chile be- cause the Allende government provides him with Cuba's first ally in Latin America. In addition, the wel- come afforded him an opportunity to bolster his claim to being Latin America's foremost "revolutionary"--a position that in recent years has been called into qv.estion to one degree or another by others--Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella of Brazil, and of course by Castro's host, Salvador Allende. 25X1 25X1 20. There are no clear answers why Castro in- dulged in all the fulsome talk about the Soviet Union and met with pro-Soviet Communist Party leaders. Cas- tro may have managed finally to convince himself of the correctness of Soviet policies; he may have ac- tually modified his view of the revolutionary process; he may have come under considerable pressure to en- dorse orthodox Communism in the hemisphere. Approved For Release 2005/08/2 . 85T00875R001100100142-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100142-8 SECRET 25X1 21. As for Cuban relations with other Latin American nations, it seems clear that the Castro trip was another step toward the eventual lifting of OAS sanctions against Cuba. Other Latin nations will probably follow Peru and Ecuador in re-estab- lishing diplomatic relations. All this activity will help undermine US political influence in the hemis- phere and reinforce the trend on the part of Latin politicians to use nationalism--especially anti- Americanism--as a political weapon. Many of them will be encouraged to adopt continued adamant stands on specifically Latin issues, such as the 200-mile territorial waters problem and the foreign exploita- tion of raw materials. In the latter case, there may be more of a tendency to use nationalization of foreign industry as a political weapon against the US and as a propaganda device to demonstrate an in- dependent foreign policy. These trends had already set in, but the Castro visits may have lent impetus to them. 22. What about the future of Cuba? Castro appears to have gone home more convinced than ever of the correctness of his "revolution." He went so far as to say that after seeing the confrontation in Chile between the revolution and "fascism," he was "more extremist than ever," This may cause him to accelerate his "revolution" into a new phase in which the complete socialization of Cuba and the creation of the "socialist man" will be attempted. 23. In sum, Castro has returned home intent in his support for revolution and on undermining the capitalist system. He remains adamantly opposed to the US, and early rapprochement seems most un- likely. His position is secure in Cuba, and his economic ties to the Soviets assure that their as- sistance will continue indefinitely. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/2 : CIA--RUP85TOO875ROO1100100142-8