THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 15, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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SECRET (f IRS'
OCI No. 0782/72
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 April 1972
The Situation in South Vietnam
(As of 1500 EST)
1. The government is still holding An Loc
although heavy fighting continues there. Communist
forces have sharply stepped up attacks along the
northern and central coasts. Local Viet Cong
forces are beginning to play a more important
role in the offensive, and the number of enemy
initiated attacks reported throughout South
Vietnam is reaching levels higher than any since
1968.
2. South Vietnamese defenders inside An Loc
are still holding off enemy ground and armor
assaults backed by heavy artillery attacks.
Reinforcements airlifted into the provincial
capital, have provided the additional help needed
to keep the capital from falling, although the
fresh troops reportedly are suffering heavy
casualties. The armored relief column remains
south of the city; press reports claim that some
troops in the column broke and ran under Com-
munist fire on 15 April and are now regrouping
near the district capital of Chon Thanh.
3. anti-
aircraft bursts as high as.8,000 feet have been
observed near Chon Thanh suggesting that the
Communists may be moving heavy AAA weapons
closer to the town. Press reports that the Com-
munists have encircled Chon Thanh cannot be
ARMY review
completed.
SECRET
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DemIlllorlrnd Zone
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confirmed, although the enemy continues to
apply heavy pressure against government troops
strung-out along Route 13 between Chon Thanh
and An Loc.
4. the
Communis i soon strike in northern Tay Ninh
Provincr.. The attacks reportedly will be
supported by tanks, and will have as their
objective control of sections of Route 22 north
of Tay Ninh City.. In early April, a Viet Cong
local force unit in the area was ordered by
the provincial committee to stock enough supplies
to last three months. To date, however, there
has been no significant increase in enemy
activity in northern Tay Ninh; the'last major
action took place on 2 April when the Communists
overran Fire Support Base: Lac Long.
Sharp Fighting in the North
5. The North Vietnamese drive in Quang Tri
is still stalled, but Viet gong and North Vietnamese
forces have sharply stepped up attacks along the
northern and central coast and enemy pressure
is building in the central highlands.
6. During the past 24 hours the enemy has
shelled Da Nang and a nearby airfield, causing
some 40 civilian casualties and damaging or
destroying about 20 helicopters. The Communists
have also shelled nearly all of the principal
towns in the past day or so in the three southern
provinces of Military Region 2 and they have
closed the major north-south highway, Route 1, in
severcil places. A North Vietnamese regiment
is currently attacking a district headquarters
in Quang Tin Province and a Viet Cong unit
reinforced by North Vietnamese troops mauled a
government Regional Force battalion along the
Quang Tin-Quang Ngai 'province border on.15 April.
sEUxET
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7. To the south, in Binh Dinh Province,
the Communists attacked the district headquarters
at Tam Quan, but at last report it was still in
friendly hands. Regional and popular forces
have taken heavy casualties in clashes with
what are believed to be local Viet Cong units
near the town of Phu Cat. In Khanh Hoa Province,
a government patrol was ambushed and lost 17
killed on 15 April.
8. In the central highlands, fighting is
continuing for control of Route 19, in the
An Khe Pass area. The last convoy to try to
get through the pass came under attack yesterday.
About ten North Vietnamese companies are in the
area. The commander of South Vietnamese forces
in the highlands, General Dzu, has told an
American' source that the harassment in the
pass is resulting in supply shortages in the
heavily threatened Kontum area and he has had
to order his forces there to conserve artillery
ammunition.
The Delta
9. 1
the enemy is planning to mount heavier attacks
soon against major population centers in MR-4.
Viet Cong forces in Dinh Tuong Province would
begin artillery and ground attacks on 15 April
and that they would last for 10 days.
Among
the targets to be hit was the rovinc
ial captial
at My Tho.
in Kien Phong
Province claims that COSVN has ordered all
VC cadre to go on a nationwide offensive by
15 April. The ob
jective of the attac
ks,
Vietnamese to accept a coalition government.
The main targets in the delta will be Phong
Dinh, Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong; after these
three provinces are captured, enemy units will
allegedly then advance on Saigon.
"final victory" and force the US and South
is to obtain the
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Thieu's Leadership
10.. President Thieu is strongly emphasizing
his personal role as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces in the current military crisis.
The government has also begun an ambitious
propaganda campaign aimed at stiffening both
popular and official resolve.
11.. In the last several days Thieu has
visited scenes of major action north of Saigon
and in Kontum Province where he "thoroughly
discussed operations now in progress." Unlike
his visit to the northern Quang Tri front early
this month, the latest trips have been given a
great deal of play in the semi-official press.
Government spokesmen have made it clear that
Thieu is taking personal charge of the war
effort.
12. Undoubtedly on instructions from the
palace, the Ministry of Information has in the
last several days energetically sponsored a
campaign to celebrate government victories in
the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area last week and
several smaller battles. There have been many
banners in Saigon and numerous accounts on the
government radio and television stations.
11. There are also widespread stories
that President Thieu has ordered that province
capitals are to be defended at all costs.
Prime Minister Khiem publicly ordered last
week that no government officials are to leave
their place of duty for any reason without
authorization. He may have had in mind
iiscouraging any repetition of the hasty
retreat from Quang Tri made by many officials
when that city came under enemy pressure
earlier this month.
A. President Thieu's close identification
with the war effort and the attempts by the
government to promote public confidence make
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the present see-saw battle at An Loc, a
provincial capital not far from Saigon, an
important battle for psychological as well as
military reasons.
Viet Cong Appeal for Support
15. The Viet Cong have issued their own
version of Hanoi's 11 April appeal for more
international support of their war effort.
In a communique broadcast on 15 April, the
chairman of the National Liberation Front called
on the socialist bloc and other nations to
"strongly support the Vietnamese people in
their efforts to completely defeat the US
aggressors." The Viet Cong document closely
parallels Hanoi's communique, which was
delivered directly to Soviet party leader
Brezhnev and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.
The fact that the Vietnamese Communists are
repeating their call for support suggests-
that they may not be happy with the initial
Soviet and Chinese responce, although it is
also possible that Hanoi is secretly trying
to squeeze more voltage out of the Soviet and
Chinese propaganda mills.
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