CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 31, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
IN'T ELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Chinese Foreign Policy
Secret
IV]. 8
31 January 1972
No. 0827/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
31 January 1972
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Chinese Foreign Policy
1. For the past two years Chinese foreign
policy has been outgoing, adroit, realistic in its
appraisal of the possible, and carefully shaped to
the demands of normal state-to-state diplomacy.
That it has not always been thus needs hardly be
stressed. At times Peking has sacrificed diplo-
matic give and take to strident propaganda, has
emphasized the primacy of revolutionary activity
around the world, or has all but sealed itself off
from normal intercourse with much of the globe.
Yet even when their rhetoric has been harshest,
the Chinese have been prudent--even cautious--in
action. Their most decisive moves, in Korea and
along the Indian border, have been, in Chinese
eyes at least, defensive in nature. Their wild-
est flights of rhetoric have generally been a means
of concealing disappointment or even impotence,
rather than the prelude to new and impulsive action.
Their celebration of revolutionary activity has
largely been confined to the propaganda sphere;
where material aid has been involved the risks
have been relatively small. Indeed, a good part
of this aid can probably be related to the pres-
sures of Peking's decade-long duel with Moscow,
rather than to innate Chinese faith in "revolu-
tionary possibilities" abroad.
2. This does not mean that changes in the
style of Chinese foreign policy have been unimpor-
tant. They have been very real and sometimes very
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and was coordinated with the
Office of dationaZ Estimates.
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sudden. But the perspective of over 22 years sug-
gests that these changes have in large part re-
flected the pressures of domestic Chinese condi-
tions and politics, although it is unquestionably
true that they have often occurred in periods when
Chinese foreign policies appeared to have lost mo-
mentum and effectivenesr,. Viewed in this perspec-
tive, the present style in Chinese foreign policy
may have quite a long run ahead o it, since it ap-
pears to have survived intact the domestic shock
of the purge of Lin Piao and already has a string
of international successes to its credit, with the
prospect of more to come. This would be especially
true if the Chinese leaders consider the President's
visit a success. Such a success would further en?-
hance the prestige of Chou En-tai, who is proba:aly
the principal architect and certainly the principal
executor of Peking's current approach to foreign
affairs. Yet even when the style of Chinese for-
eign policy has changed, the basic aims of that
policy have remained constant. Broadly speaking,
these include a quest to ensure that China is con-
sidered and treated as a major power and that its
views on world affairs are taken into account, an
attempt to carve out for itself a sphere of influ-
ence in East and Southeast Asia (this is in effect
a corollary of Peking's drive for Great Power sta-
tus), concern for national security and protection
of China's borders, recognition of Peking's irre--
dentist claims to Taiwan, and, when consistent with
the aims above, patronage of revolutionary move-
ments elsewhere in the world.
3. These aims are in many respects more gen-
eral than they are specific. They are aims which
for the most part are "national" rather than "rev-
olutionary" in nature and which parallel the aims
of other states with Great Power pretensions. And
(the "recovery" of Taiwan aside) they aim primarily
at the extension of Chinese influence rather than
at the physical expansion of they Chinese state.
Moreover, there is a strong elenent of the defen-
sive in several of the aims. All this of course
does not mean that the ideological factor in the
conduct of Chinese foreign policy can be ignored.
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The Chinese leaders see the world through ideological
glasses, and the tenses color everything they see.
They are Communists, and they expect the eventual
triumph of Marxism as the result of an inevitable
historical process, althorgh they do not appear
to have any sort of time frame in mind. Even
when their revolutionary rhetoric and Posturin
have been most
Ithe Chinese leaders have
taken a relatively balanced and realistic attitude
toward both opportunities and dangers. Peking has
of course on occasion sacrificed relatively minor
diplomatic advantages on the altar of revolutionary
rhetoric--as when Choi in 1964 offende-l newly in-
dependent African states with his demand for further
revolution--but lapses of this sort can be best ex-
plained in terms of China's over-riding concern with
its rivalry with the Soviet Union. Mo:.-eover, when
bilateral relations have been sacrificed in this
way, the Chinese have made few, if any, gains on the
revolutionary side of the ledger.
The Soviet Quarrel
4. Nearly all of China's long-term interests
and aims are involved in the dispute with the Soviet
Union (treated more fully in a separate paper). Mos-
cow has been engaged in a campaign to isolate Peking
diplomatically and to denigrate, its Great Power pre-
tensions. As part of this campaign Brezhnev in 1969
proposed an Asian "collective security pact" clearly
directed against China--a move that if successful
would create a Soviet sphere of influence in the
Chinese back yard. The Russian military buildup in
Siberia directly threatens Chinese security and Chi-
na's northern borders, while Moscow has sought to
undercut Peking's claims and pretensions in the
ideological sphere. There is no visible solution
to this formidable list of problems, nor is there
much likelihood that Peking will seek solutions in
a meaningful way while Mao Tse-tung lives. Mao is
personally committed to the quarrel, and on this
point in particular he demands unquestioning loyalty
of his associates. But even if Mao were not in the
picture, it is hard Lo envision a meaningful rap-
prochement between Moscow and Peking, although a
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lessening of present tensions is possible. The
challenge each country presents to the other is
very real, yid there is no way to exorcise the
common border.
5. The dispute with Moscow, then, is a "given"
in Chinese foreign affairs, and much of Peking's
diplomacy is organized around this fact. But the
Chinese, the weaker of the two parties, have been
careful to keep the quarrel manageable. Chou En-
lai's airport meeting with Kosygin in September
1969 led to virtual elimination of shooting in-
cidents along the border, and the subsequent talks
in Peking have kept tension from boiling up again.
The Chinese behavior in these sessions--eagerness
to keep talking but disinclination to negotiate
outstanding issues--suggests that Peking now be-
lieves that a Soviet strike agrinst China is not
likely in the near or middle term. The Chinese
obviously do not think they are out of the woods,
but they appear to believe that the worst and most
immediate danger is past. Indeed, their own dip-
lomatic efforts in the past year and a half have
been so successful that Peking's international
"offensive" no longer appears to be merely a re-
action to Soviet policies but in large measure an
end in itself--an important step on the road to
achieving Great Power status.
An Open Door Policy
6. In setting out to counter Soviet diplo-
matic ploys the Chinese found themselves with
certain advantages. Peking had been partly iso-
lated from the international community since the
founding of the People's Republic. The Cultural
Revolution had deepened that isolation markedly.
This situation had created such an imbalance
within the international community that the first
signs of a diplomatic thaw in Peking encouraged
a wide variety of governments to explore the pos-
sibility of improved relations with the mainland.
These overtures have been met, for the most part.,
at least half way. The Chinese have adroitly
played on the special interests of individual
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countries, emphasizing common interests (and some-
t.mes discovering them where they had not existed
before) and minimizing differences, ideological
and otherwise. They have espoused policies of
less interest to them than to other, smaller na-
tions--the 200-mile territorial sea limit, for
example; and they have retailed themes certain to
receive a warm welcome in many quarters--the need
for "small and middle sized nations" to resist the
superpowers, for example. They have stressed tra-
c'itional diplomacy and bilateral relations, and
their overtures to others have been discreet and
selective, rather than blatant and all-inclusive.
They have not been universally successful with
this approach, but their successes have been fre-
quent enough to build real movement in Chinese
foreign policy.
Latin America
7. Part of the Chinese effort has been fur-
ther afield than ever before. The Chinese have
now for the first time established two embassies
on the South American mainland; several other Latin
American states are also considering establishing
relations with Peking. The Chinese are maintaining
a low posture now that they are ensconced in Latin
America ,,and seem perfectly content to allow others
to come c+_ then. The negotiations with Argentina,
for example, have now dragged on for some time.
Earlier, before the UN vote, the Chinese appeared
to be more anxious, and their courtship of Peru
was arduous in the extreme. Peking s=tems deter-
mined to live down its image as a Fomenter of trou-
ble. The Chinese have been very correct in their
bilateral dealinga, they have not encouraged ex-
tremist movements, and they have even offered loans
to countries with which they have not yet estab-
lished diplomatic relations--Ecuador, for example.
Africa
8. Peking is also being very correct t.n Af-
rica, where it suffered serious setbacks in 1965,
largely as a result of constant harping on revo-
lutionary propaganda themes. This rebuff may have
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been particularly galling because the Chinese had
accompanied their revolutionary talk by very little
action, much of which was ineffective. In any
event, they appear determined not to make the same
mistake twice. 't'his tactic has restored them to a
position roughly commensurate with that of the
early 1,960s: Peking now has 20 embassies on the
continei)t . seven of them established in the past
15 months, As in Latin America, the Chinese dip-
lomatic effort has been discreet and low-keyed,
but particular emphasis has been placed on liberal
Chinese grants and loans along with other forms of
economic aid. The most spectacular aid project is
unquestionably the Tan Zam railroad, which will
eventually link the Tanzanian capital of Dar es
Salaam with the Zambian copper fields. This is a
major project by any standards, and it is partic-
ularly impressive given the limited nature of Chi-
nese resources.
9. Peking s3erls to be somewhat more active
in East Africa than it is elsewhere on the con-
tinent. The Chinese have just granted a large
loan to Sudan. They are cultivating Ethiopia as-
siduously. They have developed what might almost
be called a special relationship with Tanzania,
where they are not only engaged in railroad build-
ing but also have a virtual monopoly on the train-
ing and supplying of the Tanzanian armed forces.
Although this obviously gives Peking a position
of real importance in Dar es Salaam, the Chinese
have been almost painfully "correct," being care-
ful not to give offense to the rather suspicious
and prickly Tanzanian Government by throwing their
weight about or by attempting to recruit or in-
doctrinate Tanzanians on a significant scale.
Middle East
10. The Chinese are also active in the Middle
East, but this area ranks low on Peking's order of
priorities. They have been cultivating Southern
Yemen for several years and moved quickly to ex-
ploit Sudanese differences with Moscow last year
(as. noted above, they have recently granted a large
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loan to Khartoum), but they recognize that they
can be consistently outbid by the Soviet Union.
For a time in 1969 and 1970, Peking seemed inter-
ested in attempting to flank Moscow on the left,
but it has proved difficult to build a relation-
ship with the more intransigent and radical Arab
states, and the Chinese had begun to give up on
the hopelessly fragmented and impractical feda-
yeen movement well before it was dealt a body blow
by the Jordanian Army. Peking has on several oc-
casions---most recently this past autumn--engaged
the Egyptian Government in dialogue, but rapproche-
ment has invariably foundered on the rock of Egyp-
tian military dependence on Moscow.
Europe
11. Cultivation of the underdeveloped coun-
tries, is not new for Peking; cultivation of the
stat.~:s of Europe is. Indeed, in some respects it
would, appear that the Chinese have recently been
more interested in developments in Europe than in
the "third world." This interest is catholic; it
applies to states in Western as well as in Eastern
Europe. It is in Europe that Peking's argument
that "middle-sized" states have a common interest
in standing up to the superpowers comes into its
own. This theme strikes an especially responsive
chord in Romania and in Yugoslavia, both at odds
with the Soviet Union. Other East European states
have remained fixed in the Soviet orbit::; tentative
Hungarian gestures toward Peking were viciously
slapped down by Moscow last spring.
12. The Chinese aim with respect to Eastern
Europe is transparent: to bedevil the Soviet Union
and to distract its attention from the Chinese bor-
der. Peking's aims in Western Europe are a little
more diffuse, but it is obviously mainly interested
in promoting greater European independence of the
United Stales. This helps explain recent, and
fairly intense, Chinese interest in the Common Mar-
ket. But in addition to hobbling and distracting
the American colossus, China may genuinely see a
certain limited community of interest with these
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states--Britain and France in particular--which,
like China, are "great powers" without being super-
powers.
South Asia
13. Great Power relationships and balance of
power considerations are even more evident in Pe-
king's diplomacy toward the Indian subcontinent.
China's special relationship with Pakistan, formed
in the mid-1960s as a means of countering Indian
power and Soviet influence in South Asia, had begun
to weaken well before the recent war. Peking dis-
played great reluctance to offer strong propaganda
support for Pakistani policy in East Bengal, and
it had hinted to Islamabad more than a year ago
that it might soon raise its representation in New
Delhi to ambassadorial level. Chinese verbal sup-
port after hostilities began was rather tardy and
not nearly as wholehearted as in 1965, and Peking
showed a notable reluctance to make menacing mili-
tary gestures toward Ind. a. In the aftermath of
the fighting the Chinese have beer less than eager
to receive President Bhutto, and although they have
withdrawn their diplomatic personnel from Dacca,
they appear to have positioned themselves to an-
nounce recognition of Bangladesh after a suitable
interval. The Chinese appear also to have concluded
that India is unquestionably the dominant power on
the subcontinent, and they may draw from that con-
clusion the corollary that Soviet influence on the
subcontinent can only be countered by directly com-
peting in New Delhi. Whether this is possible,
of course, will in part depend on the evolution of
Indian attitud':s toward China.
Southeast Asia
14. Closer to home, the Chinese "open door"
is only partly open. Relations with Burma, badly
strained during the Cultural Devolution, have im-
proved fairly steadily over the past two years and
are now relatively cordial if not intimate. Bur-
mese recognition of Bangladesh does not appear to
have disturbed Peking. The Chinese have warmly, but
still fairly cautiously, responded to gestures by
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, and have
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offered some c-estures of good will themselves; trade
with Malaysia in particular seems destined to pick
up. Where major political problems intervene, how-
ever, Peking has simply remained coldly aloof. The
Chinese have ignored ambiguous and half-hearted
Thai exploratory probes, and they have set such a
high price on rapprochement with Indonesia that the
issue is hardly a live one at this time. Peking
has had little or nothing to say about Malaysian
ideas about neutralization of Southeast Asia--ex-
cept to intensify its cultivation of Kuala Lumpur.
Asian Allies
15. In 1969 Peking set about to repair the
damage the Cultural Revolution had done to rela-
tions with both its Asian allies, North Vietnam
and North Korea. This had. largely been achieved
by early 1971, but Peking's recent overtures toward
the United States have to some degree upset the
balance again. The two countries have reacted in
opposite ways. Where Pyongyang hopes that the
evolving relationship between Washington and Peking
might lead to a change in the Korean status quo
which North Korea has unhappily accepted for nearly
20 years, Hanoi fears the visit might result in Chi-'
nese acceptance of a status quo which North Vietnam
has been actively trying to change for nearly as
long a time. Nevertheless, the relationship between
Peking and Hanoi, while clearly disturbed, does not
appear as strained as in 1968, when the North Viet-
namese firot decided to talk in Paris. The Chinese
have gone to considerable lengths to assure the
Vietnamese that they will not deal behind their
hacks. Moreover, Peking is fully aware that if it
upsets Hanoi too much, it is likely to push North
Vietnam into the arms of Moscow.
16. Pyongyang, on the other hand, is now en-
gaged in a "mini-thaw" of its own paralleling in
some respects that of China. Moreover, Kim Il-sung
has issued a firm endorsement of the Chinese invita-
tion to the President; he is the only top Communist
leader to have done so. The Koreans clearly expect
Chinese efforts to gain US agreement to withdraw
its forces from the Korean peninsula, and the Chi-
nese have publicly made it clear they will do just
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that. Peking may suspect, however, that a rapid
phase--out of the American presence in Korea could
lead to an increase in Japanese influence in the
southern half of the peninsula--an undesirable de-
velopment from the Chinese point of view.
Ja an
17. Chinese attitudes toward Japan are partic-
ularly complex. Trade continues to increase, but
recognition still remains some distance in the fu-
ture. The Chinese are bending every effort to hurry
things along. They have slightly modified their
demands and packaged them attractively, and above
all they seem prepared to deal with the "mainstream"
faction of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, in-
cluding Premier Sato's heir apparent, Foreign Minis-
ter Fukuda. If, in the process of coaxing the Jap-
anese into recognition, Peking can whipsaw Tokyo
and Washington on this and the closely related Tai-
wan issue, so much the better. But Chinese calcu-
lations do not seem to rest on an attempt to drive
a wedge between the United States and Japan, and
Peking probably believes that the chances of doing
so are fairly low. It is pursuing Japanese recogni-
tion because Japanese acknowledgement of mainland
sovereignty over Taiwan would reduce the chances of
a "one China, one Taiwan" solution to the problem
of the island's future. In short, Japanese recogni-
tion is a means to an end, not an end in itself,
and normalization of relations does not mean rap-
prochement.
18. In fact, the Chinese consider Japan a
major foreign policy problem--perhaps their great-
est problem after the USSR, although one that is
not likely to become acute for some time. The Chi-
nese leaders have not forgotten that Japan and
China have fought two wars in the past 75 years,
that Japan and China are natural competitors in
Asia with Japan far ahead on the economic side of
the competition, and that Japan like the Soviet
Union is permanently China's neighbor. Even as Pe-
king is wooing Japan in the home islands, it is
warning against revived Japanese "imperialism" and
playing on latent fears of Tokyo elsewhere in East,
Southeast, and South Asia.
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The United States
19. The fact that the United States is not
physically an Asian power seems to be clearly in
Peking's mind as the President's visit approaches.
The Chinese appear to think that in practice the
Nixon Doctrine will mean a less "forward" US pos-
ture in Asia. They probably also believe that a
neo-isolationist mood is gaining strength in the
United States and that this will result in the US
Government paying less immediate attention to the
Far East. In these circumstances the Chinese al-
most certainly feel less menaced militarily by the
United States, and they probably believe that an
exploration of general Asian problems as well as
of bilateral issues is now in order.
20. Whether or not an understanding is
achieved, the very fact that discussions are taking
place tends to upset the Russians. This, of course,
is a major object of the exercise for the Chinese,
and certainly the overriding consideration when the
idea of a high-level visit was first mooted. But
the Chinese have certainly not forgotten that Wash-
ington can still menace China without assuming a
"forward" posture in Asia; moreover, an ideological
gulf separates the two countries. Nevertheless, Pe-
king is making unprecedented efforts to prepare it-
self and the Chinese populace for tht President's
visit, and it clearly considers that high stakes
are riding on the trip.
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Addendum: "People's Wars"
21. In many respects China has for half a dec-
ade been disengaging from active material support,
as opposed to propaganda celebration, of foreign
revolutionary movements. This disengagement has
been uneven, but the general trend seems clear. The
preoccupations of the Cultural Revolution played a
large part in this general movement, but since that
upheaval ended a conscious decision seems to have
been taken to stand further, back from most forms of
revolutionary activity. Such a decision is not in-
consistent with Maoist doctrine, which claims that
to succeed true revolutionary movements must rely
on their own resources.
22. The most clear-cut Chinese action in this
area has been a move to disengage from support of
"Marxist-Leninist" (i.e., pro-Chinese) Communist
splinter groups in Europe, Latin America, and else-
where. The Chinese have disowned such groups, cut
off any subsidies to them, and have insisted that
they would not mediate disputes among them. They
have also steered clear of most heterodox insurrec-
tionary groups around the world. They have pri-
vately denounced the Tupamaros and similar bands
in Latin America, they kept hands off last year's
insurrection in Ceylon, and they have not encour-
aged self-proclaimed "Maoists" in East B
ows to the fedayeen movement, but this too has
been drying up (as is the movement itself, of course).
On the other hand, Peking continues to give a small
amount of aid to anti-Portuguese guerrillas based
in Zambia and Tanzania, mostly in the form of small
arms and a minimum amount of training. This seems
designed to keep Peking's anti-colonialist as well
as its revolutionary credentials valid.
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Some Chinese aid still
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23. The exception to this pattern--and it is
an important one--is in Southeast Asia. But even
in this area the returns are mixed. The Chinese
do little or nothing for Communist insurgent move-
ments in the Philippines and Indonesia, and although
a radio station broadcasting in the name of the
Malayan Communist Party exists on Chinese soil, Pe-
:king is not offering material aid to the insurgents
in that country. In the case of the two remaining
insurgencies--those: in Burma and Thailand--not only
are there supporting radio stations on Chinese soil,
but Peking is also actively aiding the rebels, offer-
ing them both training and arms. Both the Burmese
and the Thai Communist parties have long and inti-
mate ties with Peking, and some of the leaders of
each party reside in China.
24. The Thai Government has long been hostile
to Peking and is involved in the Indochina war;
there is therefore every reason for the Chinese to
continue to support the insurgents. In the case of
Burma, however, a different set of circumstances
prevail. Material Chinese aid was first supplied
the rebels only at the height of the Cultural Revo-
lution, and Peking and Rangoon have since moved a
great distance toward rapprochement. There are
therefore practical reasons for the Chinese to cut
off supplies to the insurgents, and for some time
important Burmese officials believed this was hap-
pening. Last month, however, a major, long-drawn-
out battle took place between the insurgents and
government forces, indicating that the insurrection
was very much alive.
25. There have been signs that a number of
revolutionary movements have been unhappy with re-
cent developments in Chinese foreign policy--and
that the Burmese insurgents in particular resented
Ne Win's recent trip to Peking, at Chinese invita-
tion. The Chinese have evidently been prepared to
brazen out general left-wing unhappiness over the
President's visit, but at the same time have shown
extreme sensitivity about their revolutionary cli-
ents in Southeast Asia. Late last spring Chou En-
lai specifically mentioned the Burmese Communist
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Party when giving voice to this concern. In short,
Peking probably is not willing to risk the displeas-
ure of its clients in the delicate period just be-
fore the President travels to China. If, however,
Peking backs away from "people's wars" even in
their own back yard, the first signals may appear
along the Burmese border.
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