THE CURRENT STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130030-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 10, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Alemorandum
The Current State of Sino-Soviet Relations
Secret
25X6
70 25X1
0-Fehruary 1972
No. 0831/72.'
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 February 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Current State of Sino-Soviet Relations
Peking Attacks Soviet-Japanese Contacts
1. China's first direct comment on Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko's 23-28 January visit to
Japan was carried by the New China News Agency on
3 February. It blasted Moscow for '-stepping up
collusion with the Japanese reactionaries to oppose
the people of China" and for "contending with the
US" for spheres of influence in Asia. The a.rticlc
alleged indirectly that Japan was willing to act
as an accomplice to Soviet designs.
2. Quoting the official communique and Japa-
nese press articles, the news agency outlined the
major issues allegedly covered during the Groms::z
visit, especially the "anti-China issue," "sup-
pression of national liberation movements in Asia,"
the extension of Soviet influence in Asia, and
Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation. The agency
cited an Asahi Shimbun article in charging that
Moscow encouraged Japanese "occupation" of Taiwan.
The Chinese reported the agreement to discuss a
Soviet-Japanese peace treaty but emphasized that
despite "seemingly relaxed statements" on the
Northern Territories--the four northern Pacific
islands occupied by the USSR at the end of World
War II--Moscow did not promise to return them to
Japan. Obviously alluding to Soviet territory
Note: This memorandum, the 48th in a series of
biweekly reports on Sino-Soviet relations, was
prepared by the 'Office of Current Intelligence
and the Office of Strategic Research and was
coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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SECRE'T'
claimed by Chinae the news agency repeated Japanese
press comment that Moscow would not dare return the
islands to Japan as that would cause a "chain re-
action" in other areas "occupied" by the USSR.
3. Chou En-lai had made some forthcoming
statements to the Japanese on the eve of Gromyko's
visit in the hope of blunting the impact in Tokyo
of his trip. The New China News A2en2Z article,
which repeats some of Chou's themes, leaves little
doubt ':,slat Peking would view closer Tokyo-Moscow
relations with genuine concern.
Soviet Propaganda on China
4, Moscow has continued to assail the Chinese
leadership and its policies. Many of Moscow's barbs
focus on the President's trip. The Soviets charge
that the Chinese leadership is selling out the birth-
right of the Chinese revolution through its opening
to the US. in a 6 February Pravda article the Soviets
raised the delicate subject of a Soviet attack on
China. This issue had not been discussed in the
Soviet media in over a year. It came in the form of
an attack on Joseph Alsop. Pravda charged that Alsop
had "impudently concocted the lie" that Moscow had
asked Washington to look the other way in 1969 while
it undertook "the nuclear castration of China." The
article accused Alsop of contradicting the official
US rationale for the opening to China when he wrote
that the main purpose of the Nixon visit was to re-
strain Moscow from an attack on China. The author
stated that "no one intends to undertake such an
attack."
5. Aisop's columns on Soviet policy have al-
ways irritated the Soviets, but his comments on
Moscow's intentions toward China at a time when the
Soviets are seeking to press for detente in the West
are particularly resented. Moscow mal' hope that the
Pravda article will serve to quiet speculation that
it might be considering more drastic measures against
Peking. (Of course, such comment would do little to
quiet Peking's apprehensions about Soviet intuitions.)
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Moscow
Border crossing by
Uighur tribesmen
6 February
AFGHANISTAN ,.%r`~
Peking
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SECRET
Central Asian Minority Problems
7. According to a Japanese press report from
Moscow on 6 February, a "Soviet source" has claimed
that 2,700 Uighur tribesmen, evading the fire of
Chinese guards on the Sinkiang border, defected to
the USSR on the night of 27 January. There has been
no confirmation of this incident, and no unusual
military activity has been noted in the area. In-
formation on events in this area, however, is very
limited. If the report is true, the escape rep-
resents the first sizable defection in recent years.
The most significant migration of Chinese minorities
into the USSR occurred in 1962, when, with Soviet
encouragement, approximately 50,000 border tribesmen
crossed over. Peking responded at that time by
closing Soviet consulates in Sinkiang--which the
Chinese considered centers of subversion directed
toward the minorities--and by tightening controls
on access to the immec-ate border areas.
8. The Soviets have obvious reasons for at-
tempting to discredit the Chinese by calling atten-
tion to minority discontent. The press report must
therefore be treated with caution. Recent Soviet
and Chinese propaganda indicates the problem of
-3-
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SF(;R FT'
minorities remains a source of friction. The Soviet
New Times weekly of 28 January--the day after the
Ma egeR escape--noted that non-Chinese offer "stub-
born and ever increasing resistance" to Peking and
that "many thousands" have escaped from Tibet and
Sinkiang. The article ended on the usual note--
criticizing Peking's posture as fighter for na-
tional liberation while it is "forcing assimilation"
of its own minorities. Soviet broadcasts in Uighur
to Sinkiang are playing the same tune, contrasting
conditions in the USSR with "naticnal oppression"
in China.
9. Peking's commentary on the South Asian
situation has suggested some concern over potential
Soviet appeals to Chinese minority groups. The
People's Daily editorial of 31 January on Bangladesh,
for example, noted Soviet support of Indian inter-
vention in East Pakistan under the "principle of
national self-determ;.nation." The editorial spe-
cifically asked whether this justification permits
foreign intervention any place, i.e., China, where
a problem of minorities exists. Earlier Chinese
commentary on Bangladesh explicitly suggested that
Moscow might be interested in intervening on behalf
of Chinese minorities. During the UN debate, China's
chle'E permanent delegate, Huang Hua, charged that
the USSR had "organized counter-revolution in Sin-
kiang" in 1962 and implied that another such effort
could be used as a pretext for future. armed aggres-
sion against China.
to exploit the Soviet minorities' dissatisfaction add
another dimension to these exchanges.
Peking has directed special propaganda
e orts toward Ukrainian troops stationed along the
Sino-Soviet border as well as minorities in Central
Asia. No samples of such broadcasts are available,
but they were of sufficient concern to the Soviets
to have drawn sharp comment from Kirghiz party boss
Usubaliyev at the 24th party congress last March.
He called for vigorous efforts to counter Peking's
"malicious slander" of Moscow's handling of minority
problems. It seems clear that each sid-. realizes the
other has vulnerabilities on the minority issue and
that each will continue to fan the ther's problem.
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