CHINA AND JAPAN: BREAKING THE LOGJAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130032-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: February 14, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence memorandum
China and Japan: Breaking the Logjam
Secret
a L
14 February 1972
No. 0833/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
14 February 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
China and Japan: Breaking the Logjam
Since the Communists came to power on the
China mainland in 1949 relations between Tokyo and
Peking--like those between Washington and Peking--
have been difficult and frequently bitter. The
logjam that has characterized Sino-Japanese rela-
tions, however, is beginning to break. Peking
chose 1971--the year it opened doors through
"ping-pong" diplomacy and was received into the
United Nations--to mount a carefully orchestrated
campaign to convince the Japanese that the ti
was ripe to come to tnrmn w, f-h Chin
a
Proce ura an sub
stantive differences remain, but the question now
appears to be when, rather than if, Sino-Japanese
diplomatic ties will be re-established after a
hiatus of over three decades.
Peking's reasons for seeking a reconciliation
are clear. The Chinese feel that the power pat-
terns of the past two decades in East Asia are
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
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changing and that they have a good chance of pres-
suring Japan into breaking diplomatic ties with
Taiwan and recognizing Peking as the sole legiti-
mate government of China. This, they apparently
reason, would have significant reverberations
throughout Asia since Japan is both the region's
most industrially advanced nation and Taiwan's
most powerful Asian ally. Furthermore, the Chi-
nese probably believe that if Tokyo recognizes Pe-
king pressure on Washington to follow suit will
increase.
In addition to the short-term goal of further-
ing the Chinese Nationalist's diplomatic isolation--
and thus, perhaps, hastening the day when Taiwan
will once again come under Peking's control--Chi-
nese policy must come to grips with an emerging
diplomatic environment characterized by shifting
alignments, fragile alliances, and a groiving?empha-
sis on regional--rather than global--affairs. In
such a world, Peking would see obvious advantages
in establishing formal lines of diplomatic communi-
cations with Japan--the most economically advanced
nation in Asia and potentially its strongest mili-
tary power. Diplomatic ties open the possibility
of settling disputes within "normal" channels, and
a pattern of cooperation might be possible in in-
stances where the interests of Japan and China con-
verge. Moreover, Peking would like to put itself
in a better position to blunt Soviet efforts to
draw Japan closer to Moscow.
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While attention has focused on Peking's maneu-
vers and on the drama of the "China mood" in Japan,
Peking and Tokyo have each taken concrete steps in
private to lay the groundwork for future ties.
After President Nixon' s trip to l?eking,
movement toward improved Sino-Japanese relations
is likely to speed up, and talks aimed at normali-
zation could open before the close of 1972.
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The Long Road Back
1. Japan's attack on the mainland in the
1930s led tc the severance of diplomatic relations
between Imperial Japan and Republican China. A
peace treaty with Nationalist China was signed in
1952 after the Nationalists had been driven from
the mainland, but a theoretical state of war exists
between Tokyo and the Peoples Republic of China...
The absence of a peace treaty, and diplomatic rela-
tions between China--the largest and most populous
nation in Asia--and Japan--the most highly indus-
trialized and economically advanced country in the
area--has been a persistent prob],m for both for
over two decades.
2. Although there were overtures aimed at ex-
panding trade during the 1950s, the first concerted
attempt to move toward normalization of Sino-Japa-
nese diplomatic relations came in the early 1960s.
Peking, still suffering from the adverse domestic
effects of the Great Leap Forward and seeking an
adequate diplomatic response to the widening rift
with Moscow, made a number of Iles tures toward the
non-superpowers of the "intermediate zone," a
category in whicn the Chinese included European
countries as well as Japan.
3. The most important result of this policy
was the first Sino-Japanese Mer:lr,randum Trade Agree-
ment in 1962. Although it was the fifth "private"
trade agreement between Peking and unofficial Japa-
nese trade representatives since 1949, it was the
first to make real progress toward placing Sino-
Japanese trade on a more permanent basis. In late
1963 and early 1964, Peking followed up on the
agreement by proposing that trade offices be opened
in Peking and Tokyo and that newsmen be exchanged.
The Chinese also proposed that the number of cul-
tural exchanges be doubled and that commercial air
links be established? Along with these proposals,
the Chinese began an aggressive campaign to expand
trade, including offers to purchase entire indus-
trial plants from Japan. Between 1963 and 1964,
total trade with Tokyo more than doubled.
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4. In order to fan the "pro-China" mood that
was developing in certain Japanese circles as a re-
sult of rapidly increasing trade and also of France's
recognition of Peking in January 1964, Chou En-lai
announced in May 1964 that he favored the nornializa-
tion of Sino-Japanese relations after "50 disagree-
able years." He added that talks should open at
the ambassadorial level in a third country where
both countries had embassies. Soon thereafter, Mao
himself offered a sweetener by saying that Peking
supported Japan's claim to several small islands in
the Kurile chain in the northern Pacific, occupied
by the Soviet Union since the close of World War II.
5. These statements, however, were probably
mostly for the record. Peking continued to show
more interest in left-wing political figures and
parties operating at the fringe o Japanese poli-
tics than in the movers and shakers of the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party. In fact, the Chinese
were almost cert.aihly far more concerned about the
economic side of a relationship with Japan than
they were about formalizing diplomatic relations.
At the time, China was groping its way out of the
disastrous Great Leap Forward and needed all the
economic and technological sustenance Japan could
and would provide. Peking was in a mood to over-
look political differences to get it,
.Soon after taking office in 1960, the late
in Taipei, this was one step too far.
of the ruling party and the Chinese Nationalists
prime minister Ikeda enunciated a "forward looki..ig"
China policy based on taking "one step at a time."
In early 1964, he finally apprc+r~_, . Export-Import
Bank financing for the sale of c',mplete vinylon
plant to the mainland. For the conservative wing
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8. Well into 1965 the Chinese issued ritualis-
tical calls for ambassadorial-level talks even as
chances for such a develo ment rew d'
Vietnam War escalated.
By mid-1965, Peking was steadily denouncing the
"Sato gang" as the "number-one hatchetmen" for the
US in Asia.
9. Sino-Japanese relations, already soured by
the Vietnam War, deteriorated still further during
the period of the Cultural Revolution in China. The
general withdrawal of China from normal diplomatic
intercourse was accompanied by especially virulent
attacks on Japan. By supporting radical-left student
groups in Tokyo, by allowing Red Guards to disrupt
intercultural exchanges, and by permitting the harass-
ment and imprisonment of Japanese newsmen and business-
men, the Chinese allowed their image and assets in
Japan to fall to a post-war low.
10. By late 1969, Peking had begun to emerge
from the diplomatic isolation of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, but there was no immediate move to improve
Sino-Japanese relations. The Nixon-Sato communique
of November 1969 introduced a new element of uncer-
tainty and tension. Peking blasted the communique
(which said that the security of Nationalist China
was "most important" to Japan's security) as proving
that the US was grooming Tokyo to be both Washing-
ton's "gendarme" in the Far East and the new patron
of Nationalist China. Throughout 1970, Peking's
propaganda hammered at the theme that the revival
of militarism in Japan was inevitable and that Japan
was set on a course of economic and military domina-
tion throughout Asia. This line was undoubtedly
helpful to Peking in restoring good relations with
its Communist neighbor, North Korea. It was prob-
ably of minor advantage in scoring propaganda points
in those countries of Southeast Asia which had been
occupied by Japan in World War II. 25X6
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Peking's Spring Offensive in 1971
11. Peking's unproductive policy was in large
part a product of Chinese fears--for the future if
not for the present. China had fought two wars with
Japan in the past 80 years, Japan was China's natural
rival in East Asia, and the Japanese economy was
clearly far ahead of that of China with the gap widen-
ing. Japan presented a difficult problem for China,
and in the face of it Peking tended to temporize.
12. When the Chinese finally opened their 1971
campaign to woo Tokyo, they were already well em-
barked on their "open door" policy of improving re-
lations with a wide variety of states. Indeed, the
Japanese campaign was almost certainly held up until
a fundamental decision--to improve relations with
Washington--had been taken. Once that decision had
be.un taken, however, it was evident that Peking no
longer regarded Japan as a second-rank state. In-
stead, the Chinese appeared ready to treat Japan as
a Great Power in its own right and not simply as a
surrogate of American power in East Asia.
13. Once the decision had been taken, the Chi-
nese moved with skill and dispatch. In December
1970, they quietly ordered an easinc of travel re-
strictions for visitors from Japan,
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__]opposition did not long survive the impact 25X1
of events--in particular those surrounding the fa-
mous international table tennis tournament held in
Japan last March. The Chinese team attending this
tournament represented the first official Chinese
visitors to Japan since the onset of the Cultural
Revolution; the leader of the team projected great
friendliness toward the Japanese people in general
and pro-China Japanese politicians in particular;
and, of course, before the tournament was over the
announcement had been made that the US table tennis
team had
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17. While these negotiations were under way,
Chou En-lai received a delegation from the Komeito,
the Buddhist-based "Clean Government Party," which
every year since 1967 had petitioned Peking for an
invitation to China. After long discussions in
Peking, a joint communique was issued on 2 July.
In it, China's conditions for normalizing relations
were precisely and publicly defined for the first
time. Although two of the five conditions were sub-
sequently dropped, three have remained. With only
slight variations, they form the basis of China's
policy on re-establishing diplomatic ties with Japan:
1) the Peoples Republic of China must be recognized
as the sole legitimate government of China; 2) Taiwan
must be recognized as an integral part of China; and
3) Japan must abrogate its 1952 treaty with Taipei.
The Japanese Response
18. In a sense, the question of normalization
of relations had long been facing the Japanese Gov-
ernment.
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22. The seating of China in the United Nations
on 25 October--on Peking's terms and over the op-
position of both Washington and Tokyo--meant that
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Sato had bought no time
24. Speaking to the press at the conclusion
of the San Clemente talks on 7 January, Sato softened
the impact of controversial clauses in the November
1969 Nixon-Sato communique which the Chinese have
found objectionable. In his interpretation last
month, he scated only that Tokyo would continue to
consider US requests to assist countries in the
area from bases in Japan. He stressed that joint
communiques were not treaties and had no validity
except to express thinking at a certain period.
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Peking's Conditions and Expectations
29. Some of the concerns articulated by the more
conservative elements within the Liberal Democratic
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Party strike a responsive chord in a fairly wide
spectrum of Japanese political opinion, particularly
as they relate to the conditions the Chinese may
demand for recognition.
30. This point has been a feature of the Chi-
nese position on recognition since Peking first set
forth its terms last July. There has been no public
departure from this formula since
31. This "hardening" is more apparent than
real, and in fact the Chinese continue to show some
flexibility as well as sensitivity -
lems on the issue.
Peking might well accept a Japanese affirmation that
the UN vote had simply invalidated the treaty, which
would be an easier pill for the Japanese to swallow.
In his New Year's Eve address Sato used a similar
line of argument to explain how the UN vote had con-
siderably altered the situation that had prevailed
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at the time Japan agreed to the 1952 treaty.
32. Nor is Peking likely to introduce a new
set of pre-conditions once negotiations are under
way. Normalization of relations would mean that
Japan would break diplomatic; relations with Taipei
and recognize that Peking is the sole legitimate
government of all of China--including Taiwan. These
actions would be a major step toward isolating Pe-
king's historic enemies in Taiwan and would increase
pressure for early US recognition. Because Peking
almost certainly believes that under present cir-
cumstances the chances are good that Taipei will
drift toward a de facto "two-Chinas" position to
avoid an eventual solution to the Taiwan problem
on mainland terms, it wants Japanese recognition
as soon as possible. Indeed this is the primary
motivating force behind the Chinese drive to induce
Tokyo to normalize relations.
33. The Chinese cannot be sure that time is
on their side with respect to the Taiwan issue.
They are therefore most unlikely to raise difficult
economic issues connected with Tokyo's relationship
with the island until negotiations are successfully
concluded. It is significant that Peking has thus
far been careful not to demand that the Japanese
Government adopt policies detrimental to trade rela-
tions between Tokyo and Taipei. Peking has simply
put pressure on individual Japanese businesses to
wind down or at least not increase their investment
and trade with Taiwan, and it has not yet been really
adamant even in this. The Chinese of course realize
that if Tokyo breaks diplomatically with Taipei,
Japanese businesses will be more hesitant to risk
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additional capital in Taiwa:.. Even during 1971,
under the dual impact of China's stepped-up pressure
on individual firms and the uncertancy resulting
from the expulsion of Nationalist China from the UN,
Japanese applications for new projects involving
capital investment in Taiwan fell off sharply. It
is new investments that most concern Peking, and
after recognition the Chinese are likely to press
for an end to further Japanese investment as part
34. While the diplomatic and economic isola-
tion of Nationalist China is a crucial goal, longer
range factors also are shaping Peking's current ap-
proach to Tokyo. All of these relate to China's
attempt to come to grips with the rapidly changing
situation in Asia. As the US has lowered.-its in-
ternational and Asian profile and the Vietnam War
has wound down, the Soviet Union has stepped up
efforts to expand its presence in Asia, and the
likelihood of regional conflicts like the Indo-
Pakistani war has increased. All of this portends
a much more complex world than Peking has thus far
confronted, a multipolar world of fragile allegiances
and shifting alignments rather than the bipolar world
that characterized the cold war in its classical
phase.
Chinese paranoia on ie-su sec o
1oscow a ds another ingredient to its policy toward
Japan: the desire to counter growing Soviet in-
fluence in Asia in general and to stem at the outset
Soviet efforts to woo Japan into a closer relation-
ship with Moscow. Peking wants to be in a position
to undermine any Soviet schemes for an "Asian Se-
curity" system and to at least have the option of
trying to enlist Japan's diplomatic support in future
regional disputes. The Moscow angle also influences
Peking's attitudes toward the US presence in Japan.
A consistent goal of Peking's propaganda over the
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past decades has been to split Tokyo and Washington,
destroy the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and
force the US out of Asia. In a multipolar Asia,
however, Peking may see advantages to a continued
US presence in Japan at least f a t;,,,A
36. In any event, Peking almost certainly
believes that the relationship between Washington
and Tokyo will never again be as close as it once
was, and that this fact will prove a complicating
one in the multipolar Aa; a f-h a+- ; _ hnro ,a-1-1 ,,..; ~,.
Even if the
US presence in the region declines and Peking is
succei ful in containing Soviet influence in East
Asia, ChJ.na will still be left facing its long-
standing rival--a rival which for obvious physical
reasons cannot and will not go away. In short,
Peking io fanning the present "China mood" in Japan
as part of a wider campaign to solve the Taiwan
issue on its own terms and in order to establish
contact and communication with a country which it
recognizes must play a major future role in East
Asia. But it can hardly expect the "China mood"
to survive indefinitely in the Japanese islands,
and in the aftermath of the present glow it prob-
ably expects that the interests of Japan and those
of China are likely to clash more often than they
coincide.
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