CENTERS OF POWER IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130080-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: May 1, 1972
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Centers of Power in Iran
Secret
F7
May 1972
No. 2035/72
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WARNING
This document contains iu"ormatiun affecting t}ie national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
ottour - --1
NXII'LuDc" I'wOmM RUTPAATIC
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O[1:I,AA9IYICAT c1 ~,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1972
The study of polities is the study of 'vJluence and the influential.... The
influential are those who get the most of what there is to get. Those who get the
most are the elite; the rest are mass.
(I-lhtrold Lasslvell)
Summary
One of' the most dramatic efforts at modernization among the less
developed countries is taking place in Iran. This modernization l'ollows no
bloody coup or overturn of' the social order, but is an attempt by a
long-established political and social system to adapt itself'and its institutions
to new needs.
Power in Iran remains, as it has been, in the hands of a small segment of
society which enjoys the available rewards of money, status, and political
influence. Heading the list of the privileged I'm is the Shah, followed by the
royal family, and courtiers, followed by politicians, influential businessmen,
entrepreneurs, and educators, A new class of professional bureaucratic intel-
ligentsia is beginning to il' this group is not absorbed by the elite, it
may play an increasingly important independent role. In the privileged
group, but playing an essentially negative role at present, are those members
of the educated professional class-sonic even from establishment families-
who refuse to cooperate with the ruling elite, and the clergy, whose strength
lies in the emotions of the Iranian masses and whose opposition to the
Shah's governmmnt is nearly total.
Note: This report was prepared by the Office of Current intelligence and coordinated
within CIA.
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A Mountain Village, Typical of Most of Iran
A Modern I lousing Development, Still Limited to a Few Urban Areas
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The Iranian social-political structure under the Pahlavi dynasty today is
in broad outline much as it developed during the Qatar dynasty (1792-1925)
that preceded it. In the 50 years of the PaMavis, secularization of govern-
ment and massive western influence have moclified, but not. yet transformed,
Iranian society. Current trends, however, suggest that the pace of change
may speed up sharply.
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The Traditional Iranhn System
We have decided that o National Consultative Assembly shall be formed and
constituted in Tehran with deputies to be elected by the following classes of
people: The Princes, the cleat', the Qa/ar family, nobles and notables, land-
owners, merchants and tradesmen
(Proclamation of Mozaffar ed-Din Shah establishing
the first national assembly, 5 August 1906)
Iran has had from the earliest times a clearly defined class structure,
exl.licitly recognized by all participants. The major class categories have
occupied almost the same relative positions through the centuries; first, the
ruling family; then tribal leaders and warriors, bureaucrats, religious leaders,
businessmen; and finally the peasants and laborers. Even major historical
events have had little effect on this structure. Thus, when the Arabs con-
quer: d Iran in the 6tlt century AD and imposed Islam, the Persian ruling
class quickly went over to the Arabs, converted to Islam, anad preserved their
own position and social structure. In the process, however, they put a unique
Persian stamp on the governmental institutions that evolved from the Arab
conquest. New Moslem religious leaders, for example, fitted neatly into the
slots vacated by the Zoroastrian priestly class, and the masses became
Islamized without serious resistance. Again, when the Qajar dynasty was
dethroned by Reza Shah in 1925, most of the nobles and notables went over
to the Pahlavi dynasty, thus preserving their wealth and status, although in
this case sharing power with new faces brought in by Reza Shah.
This adaptability of the elite has helped today's Shah in his efforts to
reshape and modernize Iran, but ensuing changes have fostered a new class of
professional bureaucratic intelligentsia that the traditional system may not
be able to absorb. Moreover, the Shah's unprecedented attention to the
lowest classes, if it results in giving them real political power, would over a
longer term drastically alter a stable, centuries-old system.
In point of fact, however, and despite the apparent permanence of the
classes, upward social mobility has always been possible in Iran and is
becoming increasingly so. Each class possesses to some extent a checking
influence that can be brought to bear upon other groups and classes. Lower
and lower - middle class individuals have occasionally been able to move. into
the political elite to become prime ministers, even shahs, as typified by Reza
Shah who came from a peasant family. Gardeners, water carriers, stable
boys, and cobblers have sometimes climbed to positions of power. Channels
for this upward mobility have been few and scattered, but there are enough
examples to provide credibility.
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Normally, entry into the ruling class has been controlled by the politi-
cal elite themselves through sponsorship of selected individuals. Wealth, at
least until recently, has usually been a necessity, and land ownership has in
the past been the major source of wealth. Nonetheless, the ever-present
possibility of advancement has served to deflect demands for structural
changes and has helped maintain the system by allowing an oecar;ional
success story. By this means, the Shah today obtains the technical skills and
modern expertise he needs to carry on his reform program. Whether the new
arrivals in the elite will become part of the traditioi.al establishment or
become the nucleus of reformers capable of altering the status quo remains
an open question.
Two key elements in the functioning of the Iranian political system are
the dowreh, or circle of associates, and family connections. Informal con-
tacts thus provide the real motion in Iranian political life. These contacts and
connections often are made by virtue of membership in one or more
dowrehs. These meet periodically to promote mutual interests, and while the
basic reason for the formation of a dowreh may be professional, family,
religious, or intellectual, the circle's most important function is the building
of a network of personal ties to assist the members in their political and
economic endeavors. If, for example, one member is appointed to a min-
isterial position, cfher members of th, dowreh caa expect to move forward
politically. Most active politicians belong to several dowrehs. Moreover, the
dowrehs frequently cut across class lines, thus serving to relieve inter-class
pressures and animosities. In this function, the dowreh also serves as a
mechanism for the non-elite to move into the elite status.
One of the oldest dowrehs, the "French-doctorate group," met weekly
for 25 years. In one three-year period its 11 members included a prime
minister, three cabinet ministers, two senators, three ambassadors, the di-
rector of the National Oil Company, and the president of the Tehran
Chamber of Commerce. Another prominent dowreh, in this case a poker
club, includes General Fardust, deputy chief of SAVAK; General Khatami,
chief of the air force, and Taqi Alavi-Kia, brother of a retired SAVAK
general, who is a builder with lucrative contracts for air force housing. This
dowreh has direct contact with the Shah through Fardust and Khatami, and
with Princess Ashraf-the Shah's twin sister-through Fardust. Alavi-Kia
provides a channel to the business and commercial worlds through his own
contacts and those of his brother, who is engaged in the agro-business
industry.
Along with the dowrehs, family relationships retain mayor importance.
Below the monarchy, Iranian society is dominated by a relatively small
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group of elite f'anlilies, which wield power and influence not only in politics
but also in business, commerce, and the prol'essions. Members of these
('amilies move from government to political jobs to private pursuits and back
again with facility, and indeed their political influence may be nearly as great
when they are in private life as in public office.
The principal criterion for membership in the elite in Qajar times was
wealth to buy land, office, and political power. At the end of the 19th
crntury the principal oi'('ices, whether for local tax collector or cabinet
minister were, in effect, auctioned off at the annual New Year's ceremony.
Low birth or social status was no obstacle to high position. In actual
practice, most of the peasant population was cut oft' from the mewls of
attaining wealth and hence political power. Once obtained, however, either
by personal ability or, more likely, by sponsorship of an already influential
person, social acceptance and political power followed almost automatically.
Although new faces often (lid enter the elite, as time passed much 01'
the political power tended to be passed around within the same group of
families, The change of dynasty in 1925 produced a new crop of elite
personalities, but these quickly became indistinguishable from the bulk of
the influentials who easily transferred their allegiance from the Qajars to the
Pahlavis.
The core of the elite establishment is perhaps 12 families. An additional
30 families cluster around the core and some 150 more are influential.
t-trhaps 20 percent of the families, including most of the top 40, were
prominent under the Qajars. The immediate family of the Qajars lived in
political obscurity under Reza Shah, although maintaining a sore o('shadow
court among themselves, and a few served the Pahlavis in minor capacities.
The Monarchy
"The Shah is confused, frustrated, suspicious, proud, and stubborn, a
young num who lh'es in the shadow of his father. His fears, questionings, and
;indecisiveness are permanent instabilities of character. Yet, lie has great personal
courage, many Western ideals, and a sincere, though often wavering, desire to
raise and preserve his country. "
(US t:mbassy, Tetuan 1951)
"fie (the Shah) is completely sell=assured and is confident that he is leading
the country in the right direction. Ile is also web-ir for: ved, and his ability to
keep abreast of developments around the world is remarkable. Ile has all agile
mind, sees the point quickly, and gets right to the ,heart of the: issue. "
(US tirnbassy, Tehran 1970)
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Nasr ed-Din Shah Qajar
Ruled 48 years, assassinated
Ahmad Shah Qajar
Ruled 16 years, deposed
Reza Shah Pahlavi
Ruled 16 years, exiled
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Has so far ruled 32 years - ?
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The monarchy, as the apex of the social-political pyramid, has been a
constant feature of Iranian life and has been a major factor in maintaining a
national identity. Individual monarchs, however, have been treated with less
respect than the institution. From 1795, when the first of the Qajar Shahs
took power, to the present time, only two out of nine shahs (lied in office of
natural causes. Four were deposed, two assassinated, and there was one
complete change of dynasty. Two attempts have been made to assassinate
the present Shah.
This great pc'.tentiai power of the shah's office has frequently been
watered clown by personal weaknesses that left real authority to courtiers,
by poor communication and the Iona distances between the capital and the
provinces that have allowed provincial governors virtual autonomy and, until
recently, by lack of regular military forces under the control of the central
government. Between 1921 and 1941, Reza Shah began to bring provincial
administration under central control. The present Shah has continued this
process; today he is the major locus of power in Iran and probably possesses
more effective power over more of the country than any ruler has for a
millennium.
The Shah's father, General Reza Khan, was proclaimed Shah by parlia-
ment in 1925. He gained the throne at a time of national confusion and on
the strength of his military exploits. Although barely literate, his forceful
character and ruthless drive made him feared by all, hated by some, and
loved by few.
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi assumed the throne in 1941 -at the age of
22-when his father was forced to abdicate after the Russian-British invasion
of Iran. He immediately faced problems that would have taxed even a more
experienced leader-foreign occupation, with the Russians apparently deter-
mined to annex permanently most of northern Iran, a depressed economy,
and runaway inflation. Politicians, released after 20 years from Reza Shah's
iron control, again began maneuvering for personal advantage and position.
The qualities that had made Reza Shah great were not all transmitted to his
son. Ore observer remarked that Mohammad Reza's eldest sister, Shanis,
inherited Reza Shah's common sense; Ali, the younger brother, now dead,
his brute physical strength; amd Ashraf, Mohammad Reza's twin sister, his
merciless determination; while Mohammad Reza inherited his father's dream
of national progress. In his early days as Shah, Mohammad Reza was not
esteemed by his own family, The Queen Mother appeared to hold her eldest
son in contempt. She was frequently reported to be intriguing against him
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and promoting Ali as a more worthy successor, and on one occasion she
remarked that it was a pity Ashraf was not the Shah.
The present Shah grew up in isolation from the Iranian political scene.
Reza Shah's autocratic style gave his Crown Prince little chance to develop
any independent following, and he had virtually no direct contact with
government operations. In addition, Mohammad Reza's four years of school-
ing in Switzerland provided an exposure to Western concepts of democracy
quite alien to his father's methods. The Shah also saw that his father, with all
his puwer, could be overthrown with hardly a hand raised in his behalf. Even
the army on which Reza Shah had built his reputation failed to make more
than a token resistance. Finally, the Shah was sensitive to the corruption
that had overtaken Reza Shah in the latter years of his rule.
Another fv for probably played a role in Mohammed Reza's personal
aid political development-circumstances of the birth of his heir. First
married in 1939, it was 21 years and two marriages later before a Crown
Prince, another Reza, was born. A first marriage to Fawzieh, King Farouk's
sister, was primarily a political move. The only issue of this marriage, which
ended in divorce after 1 1 years, was a daughter. In 1950 the Shah married
Soraya Esfandiari, who produced no children and was divorced in 1959. His
marriage in 1959 to Farah Diba, a Parisian-educated member of an old but
somewhat impecunious family, was followed at last by the birth of two sons
as well as two daughters. The rapidity with which the Shah pushed his
reform program after 1960 probably had some relationship to the fact that
he felt he had assured the continuation of the Pahlavi dynasty.
In the first decade of his rule, the Shah's influence was basically
negative. He could veto an action or policy of his government, but his ability
to initiate policies was limited by political opposition and bureaucratic
lethargy. In addition, in this period the Shah remained isolated from real
politics, surrounded by a coterie of often venal court sycophants and
generally diverted by fun and games. In private conversations with foreign
representatives, however, the Shah frequently appeared to be trying to
define his role. When in the course of a conversation with the US ambas-
sador, the latter expressed the opinion that the Shah should remain aloof
from politics and become a symbol of unity, the Shah commented wryly,
"My sister Ashraf asked me yesterday whether I was a man or a mouse," and
then added seriously "Do you mean that I should stay in my palace at
Saadabad, selfishly enjoy my pleasant gardens, dogs, and horses, and do
nothing about the tragic situation of my country?"
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There is some indication that on occasion the Shah at least condoned
forceful action, In 1956, the then minister of court in a conversation with a
US Embassy officer "clearly implied" that former prime minister Razmara
had been murdered "with the full knowledge of the Shah, if not on his direct
order." The minister of court also stated that he had acted as intermediaiy
between "the court" and the murderers of Mossadeq's police chief', General
Afshartus. In general, however, the Shah continued in a passive position,
apparently attempting the role of a constitutional monarch, reigning but not
ruling.
The watershed in the Shah's development toward his present style of
rule was the premiership of Mohammad Mossadeq 1951 to 1953. Mossadeq,
an aged and inveterate oppositionist, had retired from politics in the late
1920s but returned to political life after the abdication of Reza Shah.
Resuming a long-standing feud with the Pahlavis-both Mossadeq and his
wife had close family connections with the deposed Qajar dynasty-
Mossadcq soon found a popular issue in his opposition to British control of
the Iranian oil industry and was able to win the support of nationalists,
Communists, intelligentsia, and religious leaders. When it became apparent
that Mossadeq, using the oil issue, was determined to reduce the monarchy
to a figurehead, the Shah finally took a stand. Even so, he was certainly
pushed by other members of the royal family and the court-notably his
sister Ashraf and his mother-who feared loss of their own positions and
power.
The ensuing confrontation, with important army elements supporting
the monarch, resulted in a clear-cut victory for the Shah. From this point on,
he became increasingly assertive, and in the last decade he has become the
final authority in determining both domestic and foreign policy, in initiating
programs, and in making key appointments. His domestic opposition has
been silenced, by imprisoning or neutralizing some and coopting others.
Today, the government of Iran is the Shah.
The Pahlavi Ideology
"The Monarchy ensures the stability of the country. None of the Parties
can head the country toward destruction because their activities take place
wide' n the monarchy. By tittering the magic word 'Shah' everything can be
brought under control. "
(Comment by the Shah in an interview for Jeune Afrique 7 July 1971)
The Shah sees himself in the role of a latter-day Cyrus the Great who
will restore to Iran at 'east a portion of its old glory as a power to be
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reckoned with in its own part of the world. His coronation in 1966, 25 years
after lie assumed the throne, and the grandiose celebration of' the 2,50001
anniversary of the founding of the Monarchy were the Shah's way of
publicly affirming his belief' ?n the validity of royal rule. Although lie
frequently insists on the possibility of a true constitutional monarchy in
Iran, his actions suggest that lie does not foresee it in his time. A non-
charismatic leader, he has taken on many of the trappings of totalitarianism;
scarcely - town of any size does not have its Avenue Pahlavi and it is a nnenn
city, indeed, that does not have a traffic circle dominated by a statue of the
Shah or his father. Massive rallies are held, complete with giant portraits of'
the Shah and banners bearing quotations by him, and no polit',cian ventures
a suggestion without carefully pointing out that it fits within the framework
approved by the Shah. In fairness, it is to be noted that Iranian monarchs
have always surrounded themselves with symbols of their power and the
bulk of' the population expects them to.
The Shah is the master of what has bc;en called the "Pahlavism":
4( T
consider it vitally important for citizens of this or any other country
to enjoy every sort of constitutional liberty except one-the liberty to betray
the country."
"It is now the duty...of all men and women...with equal rights and in
complete freedom, to exercise their legal and national rights...and to send to
the houses of parliament their true representatives...."
"The guiding philosophy behind our revolution is the principle of
individual and social freedom as well as the freedom and independence of'
Iran." While the more sophisticated foreign or local observer may scoff', on
the whole such declarations are accepted in Iran as meaningful statements of'
intent.
The Shahh's major preoccupations are Iran's military position in the
area, social reform to provide his country with a trained and loyal citizenry,
and economic development to support both programs. Although in theory
he favors responsible political activity, he has made it clear on more than one
occasion that this has a low priority.
The Shah's views on opposition were stated succinctly in an interview
lie gave last August: "We like opposition. We want opposition. We are
encouraging opposition. We have parties like the Mardon...in the opposition,
but their difficulty is that therr- is nothing much for them to oppose. ...tile
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plain fact is that all thin our people ..,had been clamoring for through the
ages has been granted them under the I2-point Program of the Revolution,,,
The Shah approves party candidates for parliament before they are
permitted to stand for ek etion, In some case:; he may specify who will Will.
By this meats he is not only ,assured of a parliament that will be responsive
to his programs, but he cm provide wider participation ol'some groups, e.g,,
women who would otherwise not he elected,
'I'Iie Shah takes a hard line in negotiations with outsiders, although he is
amenable to compromise to reach an agreement that favors Iran. The
periodic negotiations Willi tl- oil consortium are (lie best examples of this.
Starting with extreme demands, coupled with hints of what could happen to
consortium interests, a firm position is held until the last minute possible
when a quick Iranian concession leads to a settlement. Iran ends up with t'
henithy increase in oil revenues and the oil companies are usually relieved to
have gotten oI'f with less than Iran's m aximuni demands.
Short of assassination or a sudden illness, the Shah will probably
continue his present style of ruling for perhaps as much as two decades. The
Crown Prince will not reach his majority for another ten years, and while
some responsibilities may be delegated to him as he grows older, the Shalt
will remain the overshadowing personality as was his own fatter.
The court was considered at one time to be the center of licentiousness
and depravity, of corruption and influence peddling, but the Shali has in
recent years tightened his control, and the court's role has diminished. For
example, the Queen Mother-once an inveterate intriguer--is seldom heard
from, and the Shah's half-brothers, reported in the past to be potential
contenders for the throne, now appear in public only to open sports events,
present trophies, or officiate at ceremonies too inconsequential for the
Shah's personal attention.
Access to court personalities is still considered important, however, to
ensure success in l iisiness and political activities. The Shah, on his side, relies
on some ten people to provide him direct access to major interest groups.
These advisers include Queen Farah; Princess Ashraf; Manuchehr Egbal.
chairman of the National Irmian Oil Company; General Ayadi, the Shah's
personal physician; Sharif-Emami, a senator and old-time polit'ri:m; Prime
Minister 1-ioveyda; Ardeshir Zahedi, former foreign ministY:r; Generals
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The t oIilical [life of Iran, 'I )72
The Shah's 10 closest advisors and the
elite groups with whom they provide contact.
Majlls and
Senate
Members (90)
Ministers
and Deputy
Ministers (75)
Military-Security
Organization
Leaders (50)
Note: The numbers In parentheses refer to
the estimated membership In each group.
High Business, Professional,
and Quagl?Qovernment
Personnel (100)
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Fardust and Yazd?inpanaI; and Minister of Court Alain. They do not work as
a leant; several, in fact, are rivals, it situation that the Shah probably
encourages.
Queen Farah has been by all accounts an influence for good, and, of all
the court personalities, she probably has the most influence on the Shah. She
is intelligent and cosmopolitan in outlook and appears to take her position
seriously. She has been active and effective in promoting social issues and,
unlike many others connected with the court, she has never been touched by
scandal.
Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, was for years the central figure
in nearly all the scandal connected with the court. Her intervention or,
behalf of her paramours was notorious, and it was widely rumored that she
herself was involved in drug-smuggling. She has become more discreet,
how'ier, and is even undertaking semi-diplomatic missions for her brother.
Ashraf has also energetically promoted women's rights, both in the UN and
at home, and has participated in other social causes. Despite her improving
image, however, she retains many of her old characteristics. Ashraf's repre-
sentations on behalf of contractors or consultants are still decisive in the
award of government contracts, adthough she apparently no longer gets a
kickback for this service.
Over the years Ashraf has helped several men up the bureaucratic
ladder. The current favorite of the 52-year-old Princess appears to be
36-year-old Parviz Raji, assistant to Prime Minister Hoveyda. Raji, who has
family connections with two of the core families, is rated as one of the more
promising young men in the government. Educated at Oxford and with
considerable experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. he has been given
the personal rank of ambassador. This kind of relationship probably has
mutual advantages, aside from the purely personal. It gives Ashraf a valuable
pipeline into the Prime Minister's office, while Raji is assured of a powerful
influence in his subsequent career, providing they part amicably. Ashraf's
enmity can also be powerful. A feud between Ashraf and former foreign
minister Ardeshir Zahedi was at least partly responsible for Zahedi's removal
from office in 1971.
Generals Morteza Yazdanpanah and Hossein Fardust owe their posi-
tions to long-standing friendship with the Shah. General Yazdanpanah was a
friend of Reza Shah before the latter took the throne in 1925, serving him
faithfully in a variety of military and cabinet posts, although he later fell
from favor. He was the present Shah's military tutor and has maintained a
close relationship for 40 years.
sr;RET
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Major (4eneral I lussein I',ndu ,l i, ;I t ?nlt.iiil, )i;,i \ ;n?I w;1'. ;l
childhood
I'riend ol? the Shah. Ile first niel Ilic ('rown I'rinee in t'lenwnlnry school and
accuntlrutied him to school it tiR iliri I;urtl and inllil;,i v r?Ilege in Iron.
The Shalt (foreground) atul Major General Iii ssein Fardnst (r): Childhood Friends
Except for a brief period, I"ar~.lusi has ;always held in,port;,rnl positions and
had great authority even though hip, nnilil;irv promotions I::;vt? been at a near
normal talc. Fardust has been chiefnl' lice Shah's Special lntel!igence Group
and deputy chief of the Naliunal I4tlelligence anti Security Org;uiiialiun, lie
is quiet, unassuming, and nteticulotus in currying out his duties. Fardust is
well oft financially but is considered personally Itunrst. In his own words,
"whatever I have, I have tlt rough Ihr grace of the Palace.,.
laafar Sharif-I:mumi, h_'-year-old president oI' the Senate, is another
veteran government official and politician. wills sonic reputation I?or
venality. lie was a long-lime civil servant in the railw;,v ,,dntinistralion, at
one time a key element in Re/;, Shah's ntoderniialion. ;,Id has held a variety
of :;ubcahinel and cabinet level joys. Shatil'-I:inatu,j is generally considered
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responsible for leading the Soviets in 1958 to believe that Iran would be
receptive to a non-aggression pact. It is possible that he was acting at the
Shah's behest in an effort to persuade the US to increase economic and
military aid. At any rate, although the Shah was said to have been em-
barrassed by the unexpected arrival of a high-level Soviet delegation prepared
to negotiate a pact, the incident did not hurt Sharif-Emami's career; he was
subsequently chosen by the Shah to be prime minister.
Ardeshir Zahedi, a former foreign minister, owes his present influence
to his personal devot-on to the Simi, although he comes from an old
provincial land-holding family. He is the son of gun army general, who ;helped
the Shah oust Mossadeq in 1953, and was married for several years to the
Shah's oldest daughter Shahnez; he held no responsible government posts
until his marriage, He showed no outstanding ability in any post but
apparently responded well to the Shah's directions. Zahedi was probably
removed as foreign minister for several reasons-one of them, allegedly, his
failure to turn out more heads of state for the 2,500 anniversary celebration
at Persepolis. lie still appears to enjoy the personal confidence of the Shah,
however, and will probably retain his position close to the Monarch.
Eventually, he likely will be appointed again to some official position,
perhaps to the Senate.
Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda earns his role as a close adviser to
the Shah by virtue of his office. However, not all prime ministers have had
the confidence of the Shah, and I-loveyda has successfully transformed his
official position into one of influence. Hoveyda, nonetheless, has made it
clear that he acts only by the authority of and under the direction of the
Shah.
Dr. Abdo] Karim Ayadi, the Shah's personal physician, appears to be
the major channel through which the Shah dabbles in commercial business.
His close association with the Shah seems to date from a term as chief
medical officer of the Imperial Guard Division; he does not come from an
elite familT..
Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, a physician, is from one of the top 40 families
that traditionally has been powerful in the province of Khorassan. lie was a
protege of Ahmad Qavam, the most powerful politician of the late 1940s,
who apparently became acquainted with the Eqbal family in the early 1920s
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when Qavam was governor-general of Khorassan. Eqba! has been prime
minister, minister of court, and has held at least six different cabinet posts.
He has been a parliamentary deputy, a senator, an ambassador, a civil
adjutant to the Shah, and chancellor of the University of Tehran. He is at
present chairman of the board of the National Iranian Oil Company. Eqbal is
a competent administrator but has been described as a "consummate
demagogue." When he became prime minister in 1957, he disappointed
many of his supporters by being a complete yes-man for the Shah. From a
personal point of view, however, this was a wise decision; his subsequent
career has been notably successful.
The most prestigious post in this charmed circle is that of minister of
court, who serves as director of the Shah's executive office. Typically, he is
an "elder statesman" type, from an established family, and with long
experience in government. More important, he must have the complete
confidence of the Shah, who may use him for unofficial or unattributable
activities. The incumbent, Amir Assadollah Alam, at 53 is one of the
youngest to have served in this post. The Alam family was once the biggest
landlord in the country and is one of the dozen most important families.
Alam's father and Reza Shah were friends, and Assadollah and the Shah have
been close since boyhood. Alam has served the Shah effectively in a wide
variety of important posts and once was prime minister.
'7 consider the Shah more wise and more discerning and more knowl-
edgeable in the details of affairs than all other beings. The alteration, transfer,
adaptation, and ordering of affairs and officials has always been reserved to His
Majesty alone and is still reset ved to the dictates of the Exalted Will. If you find
the present situation good, keep things as they are. If you find it bad, change
them. "
(The reply of Nasr de-Din, Shah's minister of finance, to a request from the
Shah that the cabinet try to bring order out of the bureaucratic chaos in 1881.)
In Iran, about 300 persons hold or have held in the immediate past
significant political power; most of these come from the top families or have
close connections with them. The extent to which political power has
become concentrated in a few hands is illustrated by the fact that from the
Constitutional Revolution in 1906 to the present, there have been 120
different cabinets but only 39 prime ministers. Two men each were ap-
pointed prime minister 11 different times. Cabinet posts were similarly
concentrated. In one decade, some 400 cabinet posts were filled by only 144
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persons. In the last 20 years, nine men have served as prime minister, all
these born or married into one of the top 40 families.
Prime Minister I-loveyda is a good example of a politician whose family
per se (lid not entitle hint to high-level office but whose contacts enabled
him to go to the top of the executive ladder. I?loveyda, born in 1919, is the
son or a former ambassador. He was educated in Damascus and Beirut, where
his father was posted, and later at the London School of Economics and the
University of Brussels. He entered the diplomatic service in 1944 and was
stationed in Germany. There he served with Hassan All Mansur, a member of
one of the top 40 families, and with Abdollah Entezam, a member of a
prominent Qajar family who later became an influential politician.
Throughout his subsequent career, Hoveyda maintained close relations
with both men. In 1958 he became special assistant to Entezam, at that time
chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company. Two years later Hoveyda was
appointed to the Board of Directors. When his old friend Hassan All Mansur
formed a political party at the Shah's behest, Hoveyda joined the party, and
when Mansur became prime minister in 1964 he personally picked Hoveyda
as minister of finance. Hoveyda and Mansur married sisters, daughters of a
prominent Tehran financier from a traditionally important family in
Azerbaijan. The net of family influence thus spread: the sisters are also
related to a former Qajar prime minister, and through him to the Qavarn
family, of which Ahmad Qavam, 11 times prime minister, was the most
prominent. After Mansur's assassination in 1965, the Shah chose Hoveyda as
his successor.
Cabinet members belong to the political elite by definition. However,
the make-up of the cabinet has changed markedly in recent years. The
traditional cabinet represented a balance of political forces as well as
judicious juggling of the limited number of qualified people available; a
cabinet therefore might contain two or three men who had already served as
prime minister and many who had been in other cabinet posts or important
government jobs. When the Shah assumed undisputed control of the cabinet,
he favored a "technocrat" type of cabinet minister-a person with
specialized experience, education, and ability and, more importantly, with
no independent political ambitions.
The present cabinet reflects this shift. The average age is 48, the
youngest being 41 and the oldest 58. Nineteen of the 23 ministers were
educated abroad, nine in the US, six in France, two each in Belgium and the
UK, and one in Pakistan. Only four were educated exclusively in Iran. Eight
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ministers were trained as engineers and four in law. The cabinet has three
representatives of establishment families: Abbas Ali Khalatbari, Minister of
Foreign Affairs; Minister of State 1-ladi Hedayati; and Manuchchr Kalali, also
minister of state. In contrast, the 20-nian cabinet of mid-1964 had nine
members of establishment families.
Since its first meeting in 1906, parliament has been an arena for the
exercise of influence that often has opposed the monarchy. From the outset,
the me:nbers drew together to protect their own positions, initially against
the excesses of a reactionary and corrupt court and in later years by
alternately offering their services to the Shah or obstructing his programs.
The present Shah as well as his father found it necessary to bring parliament
Linder tight control when the members wished to force through their own
measures.
The 40 major families have always been repres_::ted in parliament.
From 1906 to 1967, 400 out of some 3,000 seats in the Majlis (lower house)
were held by members of these families. Many of the other seats were held
by other members of elite families, mostly provincially based, or by their
hangers-on. In the Senate, the nationally prominent families were even more
1-^avily represented.
Moreover, Parliament was landlord-dominated from the beginning. In
the first 20 sessions (1906-63). 52 percent of the deputies were landlords.
Even in the 21st session (1963-67)-after major reforms-35 percent were
landlords. This situation made it impossible to get any effective land reform
legislation passed until the oppositionist spirit of parliament had been
drastically curbed.
The Shah took advantage of widespread charges of rigging in the 1961
elections to dissolve the senate and the house. Although the constitution
required that new elections be held within a month, it was more than two
years before they were actually held. In the interim the Shah, by royal
decree, had put in effect his own land reform program and had begun actual
distribution of land. He had also managed a pcpular referendum on his
reform program.
After land reform was enforced, parliaments have had a different look,
and the Shah, through his political parties, bas carefully chosen the deputies
to be elected, and no deputy is now identified as a landlord or a representa-
tive of landlord interests, although a large number of provincial
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constituencies are represented by the same people as pre-reform parliaments.
It appears that the Shah's major criterion for his deputies is that they not
overtly oppose his reform program, That they personally belong to the
traditional power structure is irrelevant.
As an example, in eastern Iran, an area as large as Austria, the family of
Court Minister Assadollah Alam has been dominant for nearly two centuries,
and the same four constituencies have alway, been controlled by the family.
One has been represented since 1957 by a cousin and brother-in-law of
Assadollah; before then another cousin of Assadollah held the seat. A second
has been represented by an Alam protege for at least 12 years, while the
third seat is held by a long-time protege, a Baluchi tribal chief; and the
fourth is held by another cousin of Assadollah. Still another constituency in
the area is represented by a member of a prominent family who is a cousin
of Assadollah and a brother-in-law of a present deputy from the area.
One innovation of the Shah's has been to see to it that women are
elected to the Majlis. However, in view of the fact that female higher
education has, until recent years, been confined to the wealthier families, it
is not surprising that the women deputies come from this class. One of them,
Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi, from Kermanshah in western Iran, descends from
the Qajars and belongs to a major iandowning family. Since at least 1947,
the Dowlatshahis-male and female-have been the Shah's choice for one of
the seats from Kermanshah.
Despite the persistence of family influence, the base for political power
is changing in parliament and the influential deputies clearly intend to make
the most of the change. Some of the new faces who are not well connected
may be in the process of building their personal power, a prerequisite for
eventual elite status. A considerable number have served two or three terms
in the post-reform parliament. If they use their position to improve their
finances and do favors for the right people, they may well be on their way
up. In addition, some may be able to build a reputation in their home
constituencies and thus improve their chances of being choseii for election in
the future. Another change is the increase in the well-educated group. In the
1906 parliament, 54 percent of the deputies had a traditional religious-based
education. The remainder had a secular education- 23 percent had gone
through grammar school, four percent held doctorates, and 19 percent had
varying degrees of secondary education. In the 20th Majlis (1963-67), the
last period for which such information is available, 89 percent of the
deputies were educated in the secular system; 28 percent of these held
doctorates. With the Shah's emphasis on younger, better-trained deputies,
this proportion has probably since increased.
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The Military
The highest-ranking military officers show many of the hallnlarl.s ol? the
clite. III a sa1111)le o! .37 general oIIlcers, II1l1I?e Illilll (10 percent were horn ill
'I'ellran, i.e., close to the COMA, and 30 percent hear elite mint:;: others ire
found to have nlarrit.tl into elite hurlilies? Most generals speak loth French
and FAnLIlsh and have hall military training in the PS, France. or the UK.
'T'here appears to be less tendency nl)w fur suns to follow their fathers into
the military service, probably because nun-military careers are now more
easily available and are alternate routes to influence.
military career is, however, 111 opportunity or if lower- M. nlitlllle-
class Inan to raise his status. At~endance at a free military high school and
the military academy is one cl;;iunel. A ntunher of ;general ofl?icers have
followed this route, ;dlhough at the Iillle today's generals were in secondary
whoa! the early and middle Il)30s the military high school was ;l typical
choice or nlenlbers ui the elite as well as for lower'-level Individual, con-
sider'int a military career. In the future, officers comm.! up Ill-o1.1211 the
military high sci;ool are more likely to he ruin t lit, middle and lower classes.
A civilian high school graduate can he atinritted directly to the military
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academy, but the expenses of a civilian high school education suggest that
the free military high school may be increasingly attractive to the low
income groups. Whether many of these will attain high rank without other
requirements of the traditional elite-patronage, wealth, and proper mar-
riage-is still a question.
An outstanding example of a traditional military family is the
Jahanbanis. General Amanollah Jahanbani, now retired, was born about
1890. He is the great grandson of Fath Ali Shah, who died in 1834. The
Jahanbanis are thus related to the Farmanfarmayan-one of the very top
families, which also derives from Fath Ali, Shah. Amanollah's father was a
governor-general of Azerbaijan and was killed by Russian occupation troops
there in the early 1900s. Apparently as compensation, Amanollah was
appointed to the Nicolayevski Cadet Corps at St. Petersburg in 1907. After
graduation, he attended a Russian artillery school and the War Academy. He
returned to Iran imbued with Russian ideas, remained close to the Russians
even after the Bolshevik revolution, and has been a prominent member of
the Iran-Soviet cultural society. Although he was aide-de-camp to Ahmad
Shah, Jahanbani supported Reza Shah's coup against his Qajar cousin in
1921 and rose rapidly in the military hierarchy. One of Jahanbani's mar-
riages-to a daughter of Mozaffar ed-Din Shah (1853-1907) also linked him
with the fabulous Farmanfarmayans. (He also has two other wives, or- of
whom is a Russian; in 1947 she was reported as a channel used to pay Sov,:.t
agents.)
Of Amanollah's 1 1 or so children, three sons are generals. One is deputy
commander of the Air Training Center, another is commander of the
Armored Center; and the third is commander :)f an armored brigade. A
fourth son is a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while
one of his nieces has married a half-brother of the Shah. And so the
influential network is elaborated in another generation.
Air Force Chief Mohamtuad Khatami, the military man with perhaps
the most influence on the Shah, provides a good illustration Ur other routes
to elite status. Khatami, unlike the majority of general officers, was a
provincial-from Resht on the Caspian. His father owned a tea house, a
humble enough occupation but one which could produce a modest degree of
wealth. The father apparently began to deal in real estate-land speculation
in Iran has long been a way to quick wealth-and was able to send his son to
the American High School in Tehran. Entrance was probably facilitated by
the fact that Mohammad's mother was a relative of the Iman Jomeh, a
prestigious religious figure in Tehran who is related to Nasr ed-Din Shah
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Qajar (assassinated in 1896). Khatami attended the military high school and
the air force branch of the military college; he was commissioned in 1941.
After training in the UK he became the Shah's personal pilot, a duty which
he apparently continued as he moved into command jobs in the air force. He
piloted the plane in which the Shah fled from Iran in August 1953 as a result
of his dispute with Mossadeq. Khata ni was promoted over contemporaries
and some senior officers to commander of the air force in 1958 holding this
post longer than any other force commander.
Khatami began to build a family network by marrying about 1950 a
cousin who was also related to the Iman Jomeh. This wife was killed
accidently in 1957 during a firing demonstration, but two years later
Khatami married the Shah's half-sister, Princess Fatimeh. He has prospered
greatly since. He is now chairman of the board of the Iranian National
Airlines, chief of the council of the Civil Aviation Department, and
reputedly co-owner of a construction company which has obtained lucrative
government contracts. lie is a member of the poker-playing dowreh that
includes General Fardust and a prominent contractor who may front for him
in construction deals.
The Religious Leaders
Religion and religious leaders have played important political roles in
Iran from the earliest times. In the pre-Islamic era the Magi, a priestly class,
had charge of all justice. Justice, morality, and religion were in fact in-
separably connected. Doctrinally, it was held that the top ranking clergy had
the authority to judge a king accused of criminal acts and that the head of
the church had the right to choose the successor to the throne from a list of
close male relatives of a deceased monarch. While; the Moslem conquest of
Iran changed religious practices, basic relations between government and
religion remained much the same.
The Shiah* clergy-the ulama-play an important, but probably de-
clining, political role. Before World War 1, the ulama collectively formed the
most self-conscious center of power outside the government. With the spread
of secular education and under direct and indirect assaults from the govern-
ment, the clergy have lost much of their political power. Nevertheless, they
maintain significant influence among the masses and have a demonstrated
capacity for troublemaking. Ever since Shah Islam was established as the
state religion in the 16th century, the ulama have continuously opposed each
*Shi'ism, a heterodox form of Islam, is the dominant sect and, in effect, the "orthodoxy "
of Iran.
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succeeding monarch. Their opposition has a theological basis, for in essence
Shiah Islam considers all temporal rulers as illegitimate and asserts that
legitimate guidance in human affairs can conic only from the mo/taheds, the
religious leaders. The mo/taheds are the representatives on earth of the
Imam-Cod's spokesman-who is the sole source of authority. Each Shiah is
required to follow the teachings of a mo/taped. Applying this doctrine to the
Shah and other governmental officials, the clergy's view is that the state
should ultimately be no more than their ':,.ecutive arm.
Other factors have served to strengthen the clergy's hand. The central
Shiah leadership has always been in Iraq and thus beyond the immediate
reach of the government in Tehran; the clergy has had control of large sums
of money, derived from a religious tithe that is not subject to government
control; and until recent times, the clergy had almost exclusive control of
law courts and education. The clergy, itself' fiercely xenophobic, has also
been prominently identified with popular anti-foreign causes. The mo/taheds
have been held in high regard by most Iranians, if not the most influential,
and have developed close ties with the guilds and bazaar merchants, groups
that have also felt themselves to be victims of the political elite.
The ulama reached the peak of their influence in the 19th and early
20th century. They were instrumental in persuading the shah to launch the
second Russo-Turkish war in 1827, and in 1872 they forced Nasr ed-Din
Shah to cancel a concession to the British and dismiss the reform-minded
prime minister who negotiated it. Late in the century they led a successful
mass movement against another British concession, and in 1906 they formed
an unlikely coalition with political radicals to force a constitution on a
reluctant shah. More recently, religious leaders were prominent in agitation
against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951-53, and they have been
constant and virulent critics of the Shah's reform programs on the grounds
that such reforms violated religious principles.
Detailed information on the clergy is not available. There are perhaps
100,000 clergymen ranging from the mullah, the lowest clerical post, to the
mo/tahed. There are, in addition, para-religious personnel, such as prayer
writers, chanters, and Koran readers. A few years ago, annual income from
property controlled by the clergy was estimated at $30 million, and this was
in addition to tithing for which no estimate is available. One prominent
mo/taped is said to distribute about $200,000 a month to clergymen
dependent on him, to support religious students, and to provide food for the
poor.
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RI LICIOUS LI i\I)I I S
In 1906 Supported Reforms That Decreased Shah's Power (above)
In 1960 Opposed Reforms TImI Increased Shah's Power (k-i"Iit )
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Probably no more than 10 percent of the clergy who receive govern.
ment support can be counted as outright supporters of the Shah. "I,Ilcy are
probably the least influential of the clergy and are considered by many to be
no better than government employees. Probably 50 percent are in outright
opposition to the government and are wholly dependent on their popular
following for support; this includes nearly every religious leader of any
stature. The remaining 40 percent qualify as fence-sitters, maintaining a
popular following but avoiding overt attacks on the government.
Every monarch has had to come to terms with the religious leaders.
Until the Pahlavi period, the clergy generally were able to exert great
pressure on government. Reza Shah, in his drive to centralize power and
modernize Iran, could brook no opposition and moved directly and force-
fully to eliminate the political power of the ino/taheds. Mohammed Reza
Shah, of necessity, has followed much the same course.
Unlike his father, however, the present Shah appears to admit at least
the latent power of the clergy. He makes a public show of piety and on
appropriate occasions visits religious shrines and contributes to religious
causes. He even claims divine protection, pointing to the two unsuccessful
assassination attempts as proof. Rather than indiscriminate suppression, he
has attempted to win to his point of view those religious leaders who he
thinks are open to persuasion.
The Sliali acts forcefully, however, against those ch,rgymen who openly
take a strong position against him. Ayatollah Khomeini, whose arrest
touched off serious riots in 1963, was forced into exile in Turkey and later
into Iraq. Others have been held under house arrest, and at least one is
reported to have died in prison. As in other cases, the Shah holds out the
promise of rewards for cooperation together with the near certainty of harsh
punishment for opposition. On the whole, the clergy seem to have bent less
than other elements of Iranian society.
The Soviet Embassy for several years has been maintaining discreet
contacts with various members of the clergy, but the Soviet intention
appears to be primarily to gain access to the masses for pro-Soviet, anti-
Western propaganda.
Professional Bureaucratic Intelligentsia
The spread of education in Iran is providing the trained manpower the
Shall needs to draw up and run his industrialization programs, staff his
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bureaucracy, and man his armed forces. Through education many persons of
middle- or lower-class origins are moving into positions of power and
influence. The system in which they must operate, however, continues to be
the traditional one based on family, wealth, influence, ability to maneuver,
and tight control by the few.
The major question, which may remain unresolved for as much as a
generation, is whether the traditional system will be able to adjust and
absorb the professional bureaucratic intelligentsia* into the elite or whether
this intelligentsia will force a really revolutionary change in the way Iran has
been ruled for centuries.
The present Shah, utilizing the flexibility of the system, has been able
to coopt many of today's technocrats and set them to work constructively
within the system. 13y making available to them the rewards of class, status,
and power, he has persuaded many that the only alternative to using their
skills to benefit their country is protracted and fruitless opposition or
permanent exile abroad. The Shah well realizes the strength of this sort of
appeal. In a conversation with a foreigner, the Shah-asked if he knew that
members of the Literacy Corps were subverting their pupils-replied "Don't
worry, we know just who those young men are and will be offering them
high-level jobs as appropriate."
The influx of the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia into the elite
and near elite positions has aroused some resentment on the part of the
traditional families. One member of a family so old that he considers both
the Qajars and the Pahlavis to be upstarts has described many rising army
officers as "hamami," bath house attendants, because their social origins are
so low.
The two political parties approved and supported by the Shah draw
much of their membership from the new intelligentsia. The limited political
participation provided by these parties may satisfy to some extent the desire
of the intelligentsia for such activity. In general, however, those intelligentsia
who work in the system realize that genuine political activity is foreclosed
for them, and for many this must reinforce the cynicism which is such a
marked feature of all levels of the Iranian elite.
"This group is defined as those who have a modern education, are highly skilled in a
particular area or field, and are engaged in bureaucratic, i.e., non-entrepreneurial jobs.
Until 1900 only a handful of Iranians had received a modern education or studied abroad;
these few were absorbed into the system. In 1922 :here were 91 students in institutions
of higher learning in Iran, in 1953-54 there were nearly 10,000, and in 1970 there were
nearly 70,000. Most of the current student group is of middle- or lower- class origin.
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