THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AT THE CROSSROADS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130103-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 103
• Publication Date: October 10, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
CT
Intelligence Memorandum
The People's; Liberation Army at the Crossroc.ds
Secret
73
10 October 1972
No. 2075/72
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S C`,R FT'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of intelligence
10 October 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The People's Liberation'Army at the Crossroads
Ever since the founding of they People's Republic
of China in 1949, the Chinese Communists have been
attempting to reconcile the revolutionary legacy of
a guerrilla arm-- with the requirements of national
defense in the nuclear aae. This split in personality
was underscored in 1965 when China abruptly abolished
ranks in its armed forces only a few months after
successfully detonating its first atomic bomb.
The purge of Defense Minister Lin Piao, Mao
Tse-tung's heir designate, in September 1971 ended
a 12-year period of increased political activity by
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) during which it
became deeply involved in the turmoil, created by
the Cultural Revolution. Since Liri's demise, the
Peking regime seems to have been trying to reduce
the army's participation in political affairs and
to redirect it toward a more conventional military
rule. It is clear, however, that proponents of
continued heavy military participation in economic
and governmental affairs are not giving ground
willingly, and tensions over the PLA's proper po-
litical role remain high.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current InteZZigenee and coordinated within CIA.
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Lin Piao and the Army
Lin Piao became defense minister in September
1959, following the dismissal of Marshal Peng Te-
huai, with a mandate from Mao to repoliticize China's
armed forces. Under Lin's guidance, the armed
forces--known collectively as the People's Libera-
tion Army--became the model for political emulation
throughout the country. The eminence of the army
reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution
when the PLA, ordered by Mao to "support the left,"
supplanted the shattered civilian party structure
and, as the sole remaining national administrative
hierarchy, was obliged to run the country. Ironically,
despite their years of political indoctrination, most
of the officers who were thrust into governing posi-
tions sided with moderate, not Lin's leftist, ele-
ments, and the PLA proved to be one of the major
forces in undermining Mao's "Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution." With Lin's removal, the high-
water mark of army involvement in civil political
affairs passed.
The PLA now is clearly in a state of transition.
A new set of priorities is being forged, with more
emphasis on military tasks and less on political and
economic pursuits. During the Cultural Revolution,
the PLA's combat readiness suffered because of its
heavy involvement in civil affairs. Efforts to de-
termine the extent of the army's continuing politi-
cal involvement are hampered by the significant
overlap between the party and military hierarchies,
particularly in the countryside. For exaitiple, orders
flowing from Peking through party channels to the
provinces are implemented by men who are at once
party leaders and military cadres. This ambiguity
will remain until the party-army cadres drop their
military titles or are replaced by civilians.
The purge of Lin Piao was accompanied by the
removal of over half of the PLA high command, in-
cluding the chief of staff and the heads of the
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air force, the logistics arm, and the political
commissar of the navy. Although these top leaders
have not yet been replaced, the PLA probably re-
mains the most powerful of the three major hier-
archies of political power in China--the party, the
state, and the military. This is not to say that
the army has escaped the divisive factionalism that
virtually destroyed the party and crippled the gov-
ernment administration. The same strong and per-
sistent disagreements over policy and personnel
issues that rend the party cut across the military
establishment too. Thus, the intensity of the
personal conflicts generated by the Cultural Revolu-
tion and the depth of distrust among the prominent
participants have combined to delay the resolution
of questions concerning the PLA's future politico-
military role. Whatever else happens, it seems safe
to assume that as long as Mao, the architect of the
politicization of the PLA remains on the scene,
political activity will remain an important, al-
though certainly not the dominant, part of the
army's mission.
The Impact of the Lin Piao Affair
Chinese Communist government spokesmen have
officially affirmed the story that Lin attempted
an armed coup against Mao and then died in an air-
craft crash while fleeing to the Soviet Union.
This story repeats the essentials of the explana-
tion of Lin's downfall circulated by the regime
throughout China beginning in October 1971. Since
then, t.ie campaign to discredit Lin has gone through
two major stages, and there are indications that a
third and perhaps final stage has recently been
launched. Soon after the affair, some documents
related to it were issued by the central committee.
But the most detailed exposition of Lin's alleged
activities was presented in documents released
during the second phase.
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From the point of view of the military estab-
lishment, the most damning charges leveled against
Lin were that, with the assistance of various cen-
tral and provincial military officers--most of them
reportedly from the air force--he plotted an armed
coup that had led to several assassination attempts
against Mao and other top leaders in Peking. The
central military leaders implicated in the plot were
quickly removed, and the PLA was placed under a
cloud of suspicion. For a month, virtually all air
force flight activity ceased, and normal activity
did not resume for at least another month. During
this hiatus, a thorough investigation of a number
of air force officers was probably cond1xcted. Pew
leaders of the other services appeared in public,
and a strident propaganda campaign was launched
calling for the army to place itself under firm
party control. In the New Year's editorial, the
slogan "the PLA must learn from the people of the
whole country" was added to the old refrain that
"the whole country should learn from the PLA"--a
line that was symptomatic of the army's heightened
prestige under Lin in the 1960s.
A mixture of old veterans and second echelon
officers began to perform the public, and presumably
the actual, duties of their departed colleagues.
The milita::y's status remained uncertain until 1
August, Army Day, when the regime felt obliged--
and confident enough--to issue an authoritative
joint editorial that absolved the PLA of any
lingering guilt-by-association with the Lin Piao
affair. Stressing that the army was united both
internally and with the peopla, the editorial gave
the military its cleanest bill of political health
in a year. This was the first major holiday cele-
brated in traditional style since Lin's downfall,
which suggested that the dust was beginning to
settle in Peking. The editorial skirted most of
the important issues, however, including the army's
future political role, indicating that political
unity within the regime had not yet been achieved.
Perhaps what was most significant about Army
Day was what did not happen. Replacements were not
named to the high-level military positions vacated
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in September, despite rumors that Yeh Chien-ying,
who currently functions as de facto defense minister,
would be named to that post. Nevertheless, several
military veterans who fell during the Cultural Revo-
lution were included in the long list of leaders
attending the banquet on the eve of Army Day. No-
table among them was the former Wuhan Military Re-
gion commander, Chen Tsai-tao, who had openly de-
fied Maoist authority during the "Wuhan Incident"
in July 1967. Thus, although there hrive been some
signs of forward movement in reorganizing the mili-
tary establishment and reasserting civilian party
control, progress toward redefining the PLA's po-
litical status has been, and will probably continue
to be, slow.
The most significant central military figures
who have dropped from sight following Lin's removal
are listed in Table I. The high-ranking military
purgees, Group At include five politburo members--
Lin Piao, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-
peng, and Chiu Hui-?tso--all of whom stand accused
of colluding to overthrow Mao. Based on their
factional alignments during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the five make an unlikely team; Huang, com-
mander of the Canton Military Region until early
1968, strongly supported conservative forces in
South China; the attacks against him by the radical
Red Guards were so vigorous that only the personal
intervention of Premier Chou, not his direct su-
perior, Defense Minister Liri Piao, ensured Huang's
political survival at the time. Lin appeared to
favor the radical forces and may well have been
one of the leaders of the ultraleftist May 16
Group--as some regime documents now charge. Wu
Fa-hsien and Li Tso-peng were clearly associated
with leftist elements. But the political position
of Chiu Hui-tso is a good deal more ambiguous; he
may have been in the conservative camp. The politi-
cal cowolexions of othsar missing PLA leaders also
vary widely.
Thus, at first glance, it is difficult to ac-
cept the regime's version of the coup plot. It has
been sever%tl years since the Cultural Revolution,
however, and the general left-right split in the
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TABLE I (continued)
Last Public
Appearance
Hsiao Chien-fel
General Staff Department
May 71
Wei Tung-t'ai
Member PLA Headquarters
May 71
Li Fu-tse
Member PLA Headquarters
Jul 71
Wang Ping-chang
National Defense Scientific and
Jul 71
Technological Commission
Kuei Shao-pin
PLA Navy
May 71
Liu Chin-ping
PLA Air Force
May 71
Lo Yuan-fu
PLA Air Force
Jul 71
Ho Chen-ya
PLA Air Force
Jul 71
Liao Kuan-Hsicn
PLA Air Force
Jun 71
Kuo Chao
PLA Artillery
Sep 71
Yen Chia-an
Second Artillery
May 71
Yu Ching-shan
Possible Second Artillery
Sep 71
Wang T'ing
Member PLA Headquarters
Jul 71
Hsiao Ch'un-hsien
Possible Failway Engineer Corps
Sep 71
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CENTRAL MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAVE FAILED TO
APPEAR IN PUBLIC SINCE THE LIN PIAO PURGE
? Lin Piao
? Huang Yung-sheng
? Wu Fa-hsien
? Li Tso-peng
? Chiu Hui-tso
^ Yen Chung-chuan
GROUP B
Ch'en P'ang
Wang Hsi-k'o
Tai Chin-ch'uan
Yen Chun
^ Chang Hsiu-chuan
Ts'eng Kuo?hua
T'an Chia-shu
Liu Chin-hsuan
Wang Tzu-feng
Lo Shun-ch'u
Li Chi?*'ai
Last Public
Appearance
Minister of Defense, heir-designate 3 Jun 71
Chief of Staff PLA 10 Sep 71
Deputy Chief of Staff PLA, Air 10 Sep 71
Force Commander
Deputy Chief of Staff PLA, Navy 9 Sep 71
1st Political Commissar
Deputy Chief of Staff PLA, Director 24 Sep 71
General Rear Services Dept.
Deputy Chief of Staff PLA 28 Sep 71
Deputy Director, General hear yep 71
Services Department
Deputy Director, General Rear Sep 71
Services Department
Deputy Director, General Rear Jun 71
Services Department
Deputy Director, General Rear Jul 71
Services Department
Deputy Political Commissar, Navy May 71
Deputy Commander, Air Force May 71
Deputy Commander, Air Force Jul 71
Deputy Commander, Railway Dec 71
Engineer Corps
Deputy Political Commissar, Peking May '71
Military Region
Vice-chairman, National Defense May 71
Scientific and Technological Commission
Appeared in Peking in March 1972, al-
though I isting suggests that he no longer
retains his previous title of Deputy Com-
mander, Air Force.
? Politburo Member
^ Central Committee Member
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PLA at that time may have been sup'rseded by new
alliances. While the PLA was running the country,
army men began to bear the brunt of the inevitable
criticism for mistakes in policy, and this could
have drawn the military leaders closer together.
A Central Committee document endorsed by Mao and
circulated throughout China in the summer of 1971
contained a sharp and detailed criticism of the
army's political activities in the Canton Military
Region. The choice of this military region must
have been a source of personal embarrassment to
Huang Yung-sheng, but this was not the major reason
for issuing the document. It was clearly meant to
be a warning to other regions and to other military
leaders in general. Several of the missing PLA
leaders; including Huana, apparently were already
in some political trouble in the fall of 1970,
when they were reportedly required to make a self-
criticism at a central committee plenum. Opposi-
tion to the foreign policy initiatives toward the
US may also have developed within the PLA high
command; at least some army figures may have argued
that any .nitiatives toward Washington must be
balanced by a matching improvement of relations
with Moscow, a position the regime attributes to
Lin. These and other less visible issues--such as
a purported but uncorroborated shift in priorities
away from advanced weapons and other defense spend-
ing in the fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75)--could
nave prompted a change of alliances among members
of the politburo to conform with the picture pre-
sented in the documents the regime is now circulating.
Of the 11 next most important missing leaders
(Group B), seven are from the air force, navy, or
general rear service department. They probably fell
as a result of the close connection with their chiefs.
When other missing military leaders (Group C) are
assessed, it appears that the purge at the center
was concentrated at the highest level of the mili-
tary establishment and has not significantly reduced
the PLA's presence in the government bureaucracy.
In the provinces, the impact of the purge of Lin is
even less evident, perhaps because it is not yet
complete. A large number of provincial military
cadres--some of whom may be deputy commanders or
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HIGH RANKING PROVINCIAL MILITARY OFFICERS WHO
HAVE FAILED TO APPEAR SINCE THE LIN PURGE
Hsu Kuo-chen
?1 Li Shu-mao
Ho Lin-chao
T'an Kai-yun
Wang I
^ Liu Feng
? Liang Hsing-chu
Han Tung-shan
Hsu Kuo-fu
Lin Wei-hsien
Min Hsueh-sheng
? (Nang Chia-tao
U Wang Wei-kuo
U Chen Li-yun
E Liu Hsing-yuan
Wang Pu
Lu Ting-tien
Chang Chen-tung
Lu Yang
Yang Min
Cheng Chi-wen
Last Public
Appearance
Deputy Commander, Lanchow MR Oct 71
Deputy Commander, Lanchow MR Jul 71
Deputy Political Commissar, Sep 71
Sinkiang MR
Deputy Political Commissar,
Sinkiang MR
May 71
Tientsin Garrison Commander Sep 71
1st Political Commissar, Wuhan MR Aug 71
Commander, Chengtu MR Oct 71
Deputy Commander, Wuhan MR Jul 71
Deputy Commander, Wuhan MR Jul 71
Deputy Commander, Wuhan MR Jul 71
Deputy Commander, Wuhan MR Jul 71
Commander, Heilungkiang MD Dec 71
Political Commissar, Shanghai Air Jul 71
Force Command; named as plotter
in official party documents
Air Force leader in Chekiang; named as Jan 72
plotter in official party documents
Former Canton MR 1st Political Com- Mar 72
missar; reportedly transferred to
Szechwan Province; also reportedly
arrested.
Commander, Air Force, Canton MR; May 71
named as plotter in official party
documents
Deputy Political Commissar,
Chengtu MR
Sep 71
Deputy Commander, Sinkiang MR Aug 71
Deputy Commander, Anhwei MD Sep 71
Political Commissar, Honan MD Aug 71
Deputy Commander, Hunan MD Nov 71
Deputy Commander, Hunan MD Sep 71
? Politburo Member
^ Central Committee Member
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TABLE II (continued)
Last Public
Appearance
Liu Shan-fu
Deputy Commander, Hunan MID
Oct 71
Wang Ken-yuan
Deputy Commander, Hupeh MD
May 71
LI Kuci-hsiu
Deputy Political Commissar, Hupeh MD
May 71
Chung Ying
Deputy Commander, Kirin
Jul 71
Huang Yun-ch'ang
Deputy Commander, Kirin
Jul 71
Wu Chin-feng
Deputy Commander, Liaoning
Jul 71
T'ang Chien-ju
Political Commissar, Shantung
May 71
? T'ien Pao
Political Commissar, Tibet MD
Aug 71
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"II ell, iJ t"u ~f"n4 1,.011 n. rr+.f Chmnnun dln" and it V.U.
u /,ur4
,rail er J? ti{r"4Vt pro':i e, "A, f l" t"u -w I" d"f rr
Still Entrenched in Politics.
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in equivalent positions-.have been out of sight
since 1971, and some of them may have been impli-
cated in the Lin affair. But a host of other
reasons could explain their absence from view, in-
cluding illness, retirement, transfer, or political
downgrading unrelated to the purge. A considerable
number of army cadres have moved unaccountably into
this type of limbo during the last several years.
The limited scope of the purge in the provinces
in no small measure reflects the army's powerful and
continuing role in party an state affairs. Faced
with this situation, it is unlikely that civilian
party leaders in Peking could have immediately car-
ried out as extensive a shake-up of provincial mili-
tary leaders as they did at the center. Indeed,
the regime has gone to considerable lengths to por-
tray the Lin affair as a palace coup, an-1 it appears
anxious to assure provincial military figures that
a widespread purge is not in the cards. The over-
whelming majority of PLA officers in leading posi-
tions in the provinces have in fact appeared since
Lin wa-- purged and presumably are in good standing.
The PLA in Politics
Although the political power of the PLA ap-
parently has been brought more firmly within the
sphere of civilian party control, military men con-
tinue to dominate t;ie reconstituted party apparatus
in the countryside. The accelerating campaign to
return veteran civilian cadres who were purged or
demoted during the Cultural Revolution to their
former posts has as yet had little effect at the
highest levels of provincial party and government
leadership. PLA officers still occupy nearly 70
percent of the top positions on the provincial
party committees established last year, and they
also dominate the provincial "revolutionary com-
mittees"--the local government instruments set up
during the Cultural Revolution.
An example of the power of the military cadres
was the disclosure in a radio broadcast from Anhwei
Province on 4 September 1971 that, since the spring
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of 1970, propaganda teams drawn from regular units
had been sent to more than a third of the province's
70 counties to perform "ideological and organizational
work"---i.e., party building. These mobile military
teams were praised for "ferreting out active counter-
revolutionaries" on the local revolutionary commit-
tees, strongly implying that the army cadres had
authority to eliminate anyone they did not favor or
whQ opposed them.
Despite periodic campaigns criticizing army
cadres for "arrogance and complacency" in their
dealings with the masses (i.e., civilian authori-
ties) and the almost total reconstruction of the
civilian party apparatus, only limited inroads
have been made against the power of the military
in the countryside. This is primarily because the
party committees were often established under the
tutelage of armed forces cadres, who ensured that
military interests were well represented.
There has been a significant change in the
media's treatment of the army's role since the Lin
Piao affair. Soon after Lin's fall, a number of
radio broadcasts and newspaper articles began to
stress an old but politically important theme:
that the party always controls "the gun," and that
army authority must be subordinated to party au-
thority,
the army's sub-pro-
vincial party committees, which--unlike their
civilian counterparts--were not decimated during
the Cultural Revolution, were then and still are
the forums in which decisions are reached and the
apparatus through which information and orders
flow. Since the leaders of these military party
committees are usually also the dominant figures
in the counterpart civilian party organization at
the local levels, issues tend to be decided within
military circles and are presented to the civilian
body as faits accomplis.
The military has enjoyed a wider latitude in
party reconstruction than might have been expected
because of continuing weaknesses in the civilian
party structure, both in Peking and in tha provinces.
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During 1.970-71., when most sub-provincial level party
committees were being re-formed, the top leadership
in Peking was embroiled in a series of political dis-
putes that, while not eliminating central control,
reduced the speed and effectiveness with which the
central. authorities could move in provincial affairs.
While a great deal of attention was devoted to the
creation of the provincial party committees, it ap-
peared that sub-provincial committees--many of them
set up earlier and clearly not under direct central
party supervision--operated under a much looser rein.
Whether or not the PLA cadres in each province re-
ceived detailed and explicit instructions for their
party-building task, the military had established
itself both as the authority for order and civil
administration and as the ultimate arbiter of dis-
putes in most rural areas by the time party recon-
struction efforts were launched on a broad scale.
Since moderate elements had gained the upper hand
at the center, most provincial-level party committees
came to be dominated by like-minded military officers,
and the same pattern probably emerged at the lower
levels. Numerous radio broadca:;ts ident!.fying the
top party leaders in counties and communes show that,
whatever their orientation, military men were heavily
represented at these levels.
Another major factor in the perpetuation of
army control over party affairs in the countryside
has been the reluctance on the part of the much-
maligned veteran civilian cadres to reassume ad-
ministrative and political responsibility. Despite
the open criticism by domestic media of the military
cadres' lack of technical and administrative com-
petence and of their insufficient understanding of
local conditions, veteran cadres have been slow to
reassert themselves. Harassed by a seemingly un-
ending series of political rectification campaigns,
civilian cadres have tended to let the soldiers run
the show and receive the inevitable criticism from
higher authorities. This probably has made life
superficially easier for many civilians over the
past few years, but the regime's current drive
"boldly" to re-employ veteran cadres and reassert
party control over the army is ending this relative
isolation from responsibility. Nevertheless, in
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view of the unsettled leadership situation in Peking
and the legacy of past criticism, both civilian and
military cadres will tend to move slowly and cau-
tiously, and the military officers on provincial and
sub-provincial party committees will not abruptly
relinquish their important role.
Perhaps in recognition of the realities of po-
litical power in the provinces, one recent theme of
domestic propaganda has been the advocacy, of "col-
lective leadership" under the over-a,.l authority of
the civilian party committee. The army has contin-
ually been warned to observe strict discipline and
obey orders, and in numerous instances military
officers and local civilian cadres have worked to-
gether harmoniously. A number of articles published
since the Lin purge stress the wisdom of a collective
in which civilian cadres hold the majority. This is
an inferential criticism of arbitrary rule by the
leading figure on a given comrAittee, who is usually
a PLA cadre. The actual impact of this call fnr
diluting army control appears, at best, to be mixed.
The exhortations may even have prompted a counterat-
tack by advocates of continued military dominance of
civil affairs. During most of last year, army cadres
were portrayed in propaganda as providing political-
ideological guidance, but relying on civilian cadres
for advice on technical points and local conditions.
Early this year, however, the propaganda line changed,
and PLA cadres were urged to "learn techniques and
methods in production and management" to enhance
"their ability to lead production." This new theme
appears to be at cross purposes with the campaign
for the "bold" reemployment of veteran cadres and
is probably a reflection of a continuing disagreement
vithin the central leadership over the extent of
future army participation in civil affairs.
It is clear that regular troop units have been
almost totally withdrawn from the myriad order-keeping
duties they acquired as a result of the breakdown
during the Cultural Revolution. But it is also true
that military men continue to play an important po-
litical role through continuing "support-the-left"
activities. PLA participation has been scaled down
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in some schools, factories, and communes and com-
pletely eliminated in others, but the military
presence apparently is still strong in the remain-
der. No geographic patterns in the spotty picture
have yet emerged; In addition, domestic media
articles castigating unnamed class enemies for the
"erroneous" view that left-support work is not a
long-term task have continued to appear, and the
authoritative Army Day joint editorial has praised
personnel engaged in such work.
The debate over the army's involvement in civil
political affairs has been on for some time. The
late Edgar Snow, in a magazine article published in
May 1971, quoted Chou En-lai as saying that the PLA
officers assigned to civilian jobs had "become gov-
ernment workers and are no longer in charge of army
work." Chou's remarks doubtless reflected in part
Peking's sensitivity to the charge by foreign ob-
servers that the army was runninc he country, but
they also suggest that he and other civilian moder-
ates want to reduce the army's participation in
civil affairs. Despite persistent rumors to the
contrary, the military was still heavil involved
in left-support tasks.
The reason for the slow pace of disengagement
may not be so much a lack of agreement on whether
to phase the army out of civil affairs duties,as it
is a question of timing. Many moderate troop com-
manders, who were thrust into leading civil party
positions as a result of the Cultural Revolution,
are probably more than willing to return to fLill-
time military duties. Most army officers were ill-
equipped to handle the varied civil administrative
and economic tasks for which they became responsible,
and as a result they became the targets of increas-
ingly harsh and explicit criticism for their errors
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in policy implementation. While such criticism
has been relatively muted this year, the PLA's im-
age of omnipotence that developed under Lin Piao
in the 1960s is still tarnished, and many officers
are probably anxious to get off the griddle.
A large part of the problem is finding suit-
able civilian replacements. Peking's current cam-
paign to return veteran cadres, many of whom were
removed during the Cultural Revolution, to their
former posts has been confined almost completely
to the sub-provincial level. It appears that many
of the old provincial-level leaders, while accept-
able to the moderates, are still too controversial
for rehabilitation, probably because of opposition
by leftist elements in Peking. On the other hand,
the moderates are probably opposed to the large-
scale infusion of new blood, and this may have
caused a virtual stalemate. The question of re-
placements for army men on provincial party com-
mittees is also complicated by the difficult com-
promises that had to be made in order to form the
committees. This process had not begun to bear
fruit until two years after the formation of the
last revolutionary committees, which were them-
selves the products of acrimonious compromise.
The persistence of political uncertainty in
Peking may be influencing the return to civilian
party control of the countryside in another way.
Some military cadres who would prefer to relinquish
their military titles in favor of their civilian
party posts may be reluctant to move until the
political situation becomes more stable. The mem-
ory of what happened to their predecessors during
the Cultural Revolution may be fresh enough in
the minds of these soldiers to counsel caution.
Finally, there are undoubtedly some officers who
have come to enjoy their political power and are
lobbying to maintain both their military and party
posit-lons.
As in the countryside, PLA cadres continue to
occupy a large number of posts in the central gov-
ernment hierarchy. Six of the nine ministers ap-
pointed during 1971 were army men, and no signifi-
cant reduction of military personnel in the bureauc-
racy can be detected as a result of the Lin purge--
although it perhaps is also significant that only
shcxr,?[
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onr: new minister has been identified since last
September. Ministers and other high-level bureau-
crats in the government who have been drawn from
the army have relinquished their mil:,'.tary duties--
a very different situation from that obtaining in
the provinces, where leading members of revolution-
ary and party committees remain part of the mili-
tary hierarchy and frequently command troops.
The Training Issue
Although Peking has been unable to reach a
decision on the army's left-support tasks, domestic
media since the crisis of September 1971 have indi-
cated a clear change in the relationship between
PLA political activity and military training. Th
suggests that the army's combat readiness, which
deteriorated during the Cultural Revolution, was
an issue in the Lin Piao affair. The increasing
public prominence since Lin's fall of several high-
ranking military veterans known for their emphasis
on military professionalism is consistent with this
shift. The Army Day editorial balanced a call for
improved military training with praise for "three
support and two military work"--the program that
caused training to lapse in the first place--in-
dicating that this change hLs not yet superseded
the army's involvement in civil political affairs.
The pressure for such a shift will, however, in-
crease as more time is devoted to training.
The prevalent theme in early and mid-1971 was
that political considerations took precedence over
military affairs--or, as Lin had put it, being
"good" in politics (the "first good") was a pre-
requisit(i to success in the other three of the
"four goods" he had enunciated in 1961 (work style,
military training, and management of living). It
is likely that conservative troop commanders, many
of whose units were widely scattered during the
Cultural Revolution because of their civil polit-
ical duties, were impatient to restore a high de-
gree of combat readiness. Despite evidence of
increased training and the China-wide war prepara-
tions campaign following the Sino-Soviet border
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zo.
Training Advances.
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e1r D Vrr
clashes in 1969, the emphasis in early 1971 in do-
mestic media--and probably in the armed forces as
well--still was heavily weighted in favor of polit-
ical considerations. Numerous examples were pub-
licized of troops studying political texts before
engaging in field training, or even interrupting
their field training to study a newly released Pe-
king editorial. These articles repeatedly criti-
cized the view that expanded civil affairs duties
would adversely affect military training, and
stressed -L.hat supporting industry was an important
factor in carrying out Chairman Mao's army-build-
ing program.
The vigor and persistence of these articles
suggested that there were powerful people within
the defense establishment--and possibly within
the civilian party hierarchy as well--who were
dissatisfied with the state of combat readiness.
To be sure, the debate was not entirely one-sided.
In a thinly veiled call to strengthen military
training, a broadcast from Anhwei on 5 June 1971
recalled that the Paris Commune was overwhelmed
by superior armed force and warned that "success
or failure in military battles determines the
survival or destruction of political power."
But the pendulum did not finally swing to-
ward those who advocated increased military pre-
paredness until mid-September, at the height of
the Lin purge. A Peking domestic radiobroadcast
on 13 September told of a company commander who
interrupted political study to launch a program
to improve military training--a scenario that was
the exact reverse of many earlier articles. More-
over, when one of the soldiers in this hypotheti-
cal company questioned the move on political gro"nds,
the commander was said to have responded that "to
carry out military training to prepare against a
war of aggression and to defend the socialist mother-
land is politics in itself"--a clear contradiction
of Lin Piao's "four goods." Finally, the broadcast
presented a negative example in the form of a com-
munications squad that spent so much time working
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oU,f'1u err
in a pig sty that its members were substandard in
communications skill. This "contradiction" was
said to h&,ve been resolved by spending more time on
military training and less on production.
The example of the company that had increased
its military training was echoed almost immediately
in the PLA newspaper, Liberation Army Daily--a fur-
ther indication of support by powerful elements
within the military for the new line. Published on
17 September, the article attacked unnamed comrad s
who held the erroneous idea that training could be
ignored in deference to political or production
assignments, adding that "we cannot wait for the
fighting to begin before studying military affairs."
This new emphasis on upgradir,. military training
has been subsequently reaffirmed, and "swindlers
like Liu Shao-chi"--the current term for Lin Piao
and his allies--are routinely condemned for setting
politics against military affairs. Domestic media
now treat political affairs and military training
as complementary and mutually supporting pursuits.
The New Leadership
Since the purge in September 1971, a number of
second-echelon military leaders Lave appeared regu-
lary and have been performing the public--and pre-
sumably the other--duties of their former superiors.
(See Table 1V). At the same time, several veteran
PLA officers have either re-emerged from long periods
of relztive obscurity or have become increasingly
prominent. But the question of appoi:;:tments to top-
ranking vacancies in the military hierarchy appears
to be closely related to other unresolved policy and
personnel questions, and the regime has stopped
short of filling these vacancies.
The most proi:;inent of the military leaders who
have improved their public and probably their real
political positions are three of China's "old mar-
shals"--Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Hsiang-chien and Nieh
Jung-chien. Yeh, already a powerful party figure
in military and foreign affairs, now functions as
25X1
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? Minister of Defense
? PLA Chief of Staff
^ Deputy Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
^ Deputy Chief of Staff
^ Deputy Chief of Staff
^ Deputy Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
? Director General Politi-
cal Department
^ Deputy Director GPD
Deputy Director GPD
? Deputy Chief of Staff,
Director General Rear
Services
CURRENT PLA LEADERSHIP
September 1971
Huang Yung-sheng
Chang Tsai-chien
Chen Chi-te
Peng Shao-hu i
Wang Hsin-ting
Yen Chung-chuan
Hsiang Chung-hua,
named June 1972
Li Te-sheng
September 1972
Yeh Chien-ying-de facto;
but no rcllacement an-
nounced.
vacant
appeals regularly
Last public appearance
was 29 March 72, may be
in trcuble.
appears regularly
appears regularly
appears regularly
appears regularly
appears regularly
Huang Chih-yung
Tien Wei-hsin
Chiu Hui-tso
^ Political Commissar GRS Chang Chih-ming
^ Deputy Director G RS (,hang Tien-yun
^Deputy Director GRS Chang Ling-pin
? Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Fa-hsien
Air Force Commander
^Air Force Political
Commissar
^Air Force Deputy
Commander
^Air Force Deputy
Commander
^Air Force Deputy
Commander
Wang Hui-chiu
Tseng Kuo-hua
Kuang Jen-nung
?Politburo Member
^Central Committee Member
appears regularly
appears regularly
vacant
appears regularly
appears regularly
appears regularly
vacant
appears regularly
appears regularly
appears regularly
appears regularly
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N Navy Commander
? Deputy Chief of Staff,
Navy 1st Political
Commissar
Navy Deputy
Commander
Navy Deputy
Commander
Navy Deputy Political
Commissar
^ Navy Deputy Political
Commissar
PLA Armor Force
^ PLA Artillery
Commander
PLA Artillery Pol
Commiss