SINO-SOVIET RELALTIONS: FROM WORSE TO WORST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100140003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 31, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Sino-Soviet Relations:
From Worse to Worst
I
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Top
Secret
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31 January 1972
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
31 January 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Introduction
Sino-Soviet rivalry is, to both sides, a highly
debilitating phenomenon. Not only have the two coun-
tries forfeited all the benefits of cooperation, but
the foreign policy of each must be devoted in large
part simply to negating that of the other. In the
process, neither has been able to prevent its smaller
Communist allies from enlarging their own areas of
independence. Each must add new military require-
ments to alre?9y burdensome commitments and each must
now contemplate the prospect of sustained, long-term
challenge, however ineffective it may be at present,
to she legitirt:.uy of its own regime.
The US has added a new dimension to this rivalry
by simultaneously developing positive dealings with
both the USSR and China. Moscow and Peking now seem
equally concerned to exploit their relations with Wash-
ington to the other's detriment, and equally fearful
that the other may accomplish the same thing. They
can hardly fail to notice, however, that it is the
US which has placed itself in a position to gain the
most from this triangular relationship.
It would seem to stand to reason, then, that at
some point the Soviets and the Chinese would individu-
ally reach the judgment that all-out rivalry was proving
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence, th. Office of Strategic Re-
search and the Office of Economic Research. It was
coordinated o--th the Office of National Estimates,
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too costly and that the two would then move seri-
ously toward composing their differences. The trou-
ble with this line c,f argument, however, is that it
has "stood to reason" for a long time now without--
tactical moves aside--really affecting the basic be-
havior of the two sides.
Only a deeply felt set of emotional beliefs,
in which national, ideological, and racial factors
all reinforce one another, would seem to account
for the impasse in which they have become locked.
Each side recognizes the price it is paying, but
neither is able to find any better consolation than
the hope--a vain hope, in our view--that a more
sensible leadership will somehow emerge in the op-
posing capital. As of now, it is difficult to fore-
see any but the most superficial improvements in
the Sino-Soviet relationship.
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1. Relations between the Soviet Union and
China have worsened so much over the past 15 years
that each has come to regard the other as its prin-
cipal antagonist. Their rivalry is now so perva-
sive that, when any major new international issue
arises, they instinctively tend to range themselves
on opposing sides. The basic issues and attitudes
separating the USSR and China are so deep-seated
that they are unlikely to change under successor
leaderships. As recent events have indicated, the
prospect is for a continued high level of bilateral
t-3nsion and increased competition abroad as Peking
emerges into world affairs.
China Emerging
2. China's more adroit diplomatic tactics of
the last two years have intensified Sino-Soviet
competition for political influence abroad. During
the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), Mos-
cow's attempts to contain and discredit China were
made easy by Peking's wild behavior abroad and rad-
ical policies at home. During 1971, however, China's
more flexible posture won it diplomatic relations
with 15 countries---among them several key Western
states--and a seat at the United Nations. All this
greatly complicates what Moscow sees as an urgent
task. From the Kremlin's viewpoint, it has become
more necessary, and at the same time more difficult,
to halt the further spread of Chinese influence
abroad.
3. Peking's active diplomacy was in part the
result; of pressures applied by the USSR in 1969,
after armed fighting had broken out on the Sino-
Soviet frontier. These events brought home to the
Chinese the reality of their relative isolation on
the international scene and their vulnerability
to Soviet intimidation. Peking set out to build
up the kind of diplomatic support that might help
lessen its isolation and exposure to threats from
Moscow.
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4. The Chinese at the same time moved aggres-
sively to exploit Soviet vulnerability abroad, in
particular to exacerbate problems between the USSR
and its more restive neighbors. Moscow reacted
strongly. Last summer, for example, the Soviets
pulled few punches in their efforts to counter. Chi-
nese inroads in the Balkans, an area where Soviet
power can still evoke fear, if not respect. Mos-
cow's primary aim was to disabuse the Romanians and
Yugoslavs--and by extension other countries--of the
notion that they could use ties with Peking as a
pressure point against the USSR. The abusive Soviet
campaign succeeded in persuading the Romanians and
Yugoslavs to respond to China's overtures with more
discretion but not to cease their cultivation of
ties with Peking.
The Silo-Soviet-US Nexus
5. It was Peking's opening to the US, however,
that presented Moscow with its most serious chal-
lenge. Although the Chinese motivation in pursuing
contacts with the US is not exclusively anti-Soviet,
China clearly hoped that signs of a new Sino-US
modus vivendi would rattle the Soviets and has done
nothing to allay Soviet suspicions. Indeed Peking
has publicly spoken of its gestures toward the US
as isolating a single "die-hard" enemy--read the
USSR.
6. The implications for Soviet interests of
steps toward detente between the US and China are
enormous. Well before last summer the Russian lead-
ers had spent considerable time worrying about the
problem. Though already alerted, and disquieted,
by last spring's "ping pong diplomacy," they were
hardly prepared for the 15 July announcement that
President Nixon would visit Peking. It was an un-
welcome shock. It frustrated Moscow's efforts to
contain China. More importantly, it intensified
Soviet concern that over the longer term the USSR's
two major rivals might team up to induce a marked
change in the world balance of power detrimental
to the USSR.
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7. In addition to this general apprehension,
the Soviets have a host of more specific concerns.
Already deeply troubled by Peking's growing nuclear
capability, they are afraid, for example, that wider
ties with the West may afford the Chinese readier
access to sophisticated technology that will strengthen
China economically and militarily. Moreover, they no
doubt anticipate that relaxation of Sino-US tensions
over Taiwan or Vietnam could free some Chinese mili-
tary units for redeployment to positions closer to
the Sino-Soviet border. In sum, the Russians fear
that rapprochement with the US would permit China
co devote even more energy to its offensive against
the USSR.
8. Small wonder, then, that Moscow in late
July let loose a spurt of anti-Chinese invective--
d "pent-up flood" of charges, 25X1
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Peking had been less blatant in divulging the anti-
Soviet thrust of its intentions, it is likely that
the Soviets resent Peking's role more than Washing-
ton's in moves toward rapprochement. In Moscow's
view, the Chinese are more malicious and pose the
more annoying and proximate threat to Soviet inter-
ests. Moreover, there is a deep historical bad
feeling between Russians and Chinese, the kind of
ingrained antagonism that does not separate Peking
from Washington--or Moscow from Washington,
9. Over the past few years, Peking has made
the USSR enemy number one, and Moscow clearly re-
ciprocates. The two countries are at loggerheads
on issues directly relating to the territorial in-
tegrity and national security of both states. They
are fierce ideological ar,d political competitois
throughout the "progressive" world. The mutual
antagonism is likely to intensify as each attempts
to exploit its dealings with the US in order to
weaken the other.
Apprd
10. The Soviet leaders apparently are deter-
mined not to play into Peking's hands by jeopard-
izing Soviet-US ties. Indeed, recent Sino-US
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 contacts seem to have given the Russians added in-
centive to breathe new life into Moscow's own :cal-
ings with Washington. Elsewhere, the USSR has taken
initi~.tives designed to blunt the effects of Chinese
move. and, where possible, to turn them to Moscow's
advantage. On the Indian subcontinent, for example,
the Soviets were able to take advantage of India's
concern over US moves toward China, as well as New
Delhi's need for great-power support during the
crisis in East Pakistan, to nail down the Indians
to the close relationship imbedded in the Soviet-
Indian Treaty signed in August. to addition, the
unprecedented vigor with which the top Soviet lead-
ers engaged in personal diplomacy abroad last fall
indicated the priority Moscow has given to efforts
to recapture the initiative.
12. Shortly thereafter, the first face-to-
face confrontations between Soviet aald Chinese
representatives at the UN in late November resulted
in a new genre of personal invective sending shock
waves--and considerable disillusionment--through-
out the General Assembly.
13. One of the subjects at issue was the
fighting in South Asia. The Soviet leaders were
no doubt happy with India's military performance
in East Pakistan, and gratified that Moscow's
strong support for New Delhi enhanced the Soviet
position there. These gains were made, however,
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at a certain cost. Moscow's propaganda was some-
what defensive as it attempted to explain how the
Soviet Union wound up on the side of an isolated
minority in the vote on a cease-fire resolution
in the General Assembly, which passed by 104 to 11.
Worse still, in Moscow's view, was the fact that
Peking and Washington were generally on the same
side of this sensitive issue. The sight of China
and the US working in tandem on a matter of impor-
tance can only have reinforced Russian suspicions
that the two are predisposed toward "collusion"
against Soviet interests.
14. Moscow's propaganda organs have played
heavily on the theme of Sino-American "collusion"
in order to blacken Peking, particularly for al-
legedly betraying the North Vietnamese. The So-
viets think that this line can be used to good
effect with foreign Communists and other "progres-
sive" forces, and Moscow has kept hammering it
horse. Increased US air strikes against North Viet-
nam in December gave the Soviets an unusually good
opportunity to ring changes on this theme. The
Soviets undertook to heighten Hanoi's suspicions
and discredit the Chinese by stressing that Peking's
mild reaction to the raids was designed to avoid
aggravating Sino-American relations before the
President's visit. The Soviet military newspaper
Red Star charged that Chou En-lai "could have stop-
ped these raids" merely by hinting that they would
disrupt the visit of his "new-found friend in the
White House."
Bilateral Relations
15. Other aspects of Sino-Soviet relations are
also sour, and issues such as the disputed border
between the two countries are as far from resolution
as ever. Border talks have been under way in Peking
since October 1969. it has Leen rough sledding.
There are, in fact, hints that the Soviets were not
fully prepared for either the high degree of compe-
tence, or the stubborness, of the Chinese negotia-
tors.
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Appr
16. One Soviet diplomat who served on the Rus-
sian border talks delegation grudgingly remarked
that the Chinese diplomats were "the best he had
ever seen, very disciplined and difficult to influ-
ence." He went on to complain that the Chinese
"only work and sleep; you cannot get to them." The
Soviet diplomat added that the Chinese were better
prepared than the Soviet team and that on several
occasions the USSR had to stall the talks in order
to get rebuttal material from Kremlin archives.
17. In general terms, the Russians continue to
seek a limited accord, including firm demarcation
of disputed areas. The Chinese are pushing for
something more; they insist that the Sov..et military
buildup is the major source of trouble and call for
a mutual troop with rawa.l. Occasionali the Chinese
renew their demand that the USSR acknowledge that
the Tsars seized some 590,000 square miles of Chi-
nese territory, under what Peking calls "unequal"
treaties, but the Soviets naturally refuse to dis-
cuss the matter.
18. The talks currently are being conducted
at the "deputy level" in the absence of Moscow's
chief negotiator, Leonid Ilichev. iiichev left the
The negot..iati.ons will
probably continue to drag on, however, in spite of
the lack of progress. They have helped to cool
down the situation along the frontier, and the two
sides seem to share a common interest in preventing
a sharp deterioration of conditions there,
19. One of the most sensitive, and part i.cu-
larly galling, irritants between the Chinese and
Soviets is their habit of meddling in each other's
domestic affairs and of gloating over the other's
internal political problems. Moscow, for example,
App
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Estimated Sino-Soviet Trade, 1955-Present
2,100
Million
US$
01
1955 '57 59 '61 '63 165
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has sought to exploit the Lin Piao affair to dis-
credit Peking's policies, especially the invitation
to the President. The Soviets seized on a mysteri-
ous plane crash in Mongolia to contribute to the
picture of instability in China. Although the plane
crash took place on 12 September, the Soviets waited
until the eve of China's National Day-S-nearly three
weeks later--to announce the incident. Moscow now
appears chagrined that the new political alignment
in China has not moderated Peking's policies toward
the USSR, and for the first time the Soviets have
started to attack Chou En-lai personally. They are
especially vitriolic about the role he is playing
in Peking's dialogue with Washington.
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20. Despite continued bilateral strains and
intensified competition abroad, both Moscow and Pe-
king have tried to avoid the diplomatic and politi-
cal abyss they faced in 1969 when hostilities erupted
alon the Sino-Soviet frontier. Ambassadorial
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ere restored
in 1970. The annual river navigation talks have
been going on in Peking since December, although
there is no expectation that the two sides will be
able to solve their differences even on this minor
topic. Normally these talks deal with technical
matters related to use of the border rivers 25X1
The Economic Prospects
21. In late 1970 the two sides signed their
first trade agreement since 1967, and trade in 1971
was believed to have increased to about $130 million
from the previous year's rock-bottom level of $45
million. The Soviets have conti.nued to doliver a
few transport aircraft to China, including IL-62
long-range jet transports. The value of Soviet
aircraft delivered in 1971 reached $20 million,
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equalling the previous peak year :or Soviet air-
craft deliveries. These planes made up a sizable
portion of the increase in Chines'. imports from
The Military Dimension
22. Moscow continues to regard its military
strength along the border with China as an essen-
tial ingredient and a high card in its dealings
with Peking. The Soviets may feel a little more
comfortable that the Chinese will not embark on
rash ventures along the frontier now that the Cul-
tural Revolution is past. They probably reason
that Soviet military muscle made a telling impres-
sion on the Chinese during the 1969 border fight-
ing.
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stationed in Eastern Europe.
ese ground and air orces total about
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25. The Soviet build-up since 1965 has prob-
ably given the USSR more forces along the Sino-So-
viet border than it would need to repulse a Chinese
attack. These forces would require development of
adequate support and considerable reinforcement be-
fore they would be capable of major offensive opera-
tions against the peripheral regions of China.
26. Moscow considers the units it has deployed
on the frontier a potent political weapon. With
these superior forces the Soviet leaders are ensured
that they can deal with China from a position of
strength. Moscow may be convinced, for example,
that the mere presence of its troops along the Sino-
Soviet border was an important factor inhibiting
the Chinese from becoming involved in the conflict
between India and Pakistan late last year. In any
case, the Soviets undoubtedly did their best to
get maximum mileage out of this possibility in
their attempts to score points with the Indians.
27. The Chinese viewed the Soviet build-up
with growing apprehension and have now adjusted
their own military forces accordingly. Although
the Chinese apparently do not think Soviet military
action is imminent, there are numerous indications
that they are preoccupied with the possibility of
Soviet attack. Former French Premier Mendes-France,
who completed a three-week trip to China last De-
cember, was impressed by China's obsession with the
Soviet forces, which the Chinese described as "a
million men poised on our border." As nuted above,
the actual combat strength of Soviet forces arrayed
against China is only 360 thousand, but, if all
Soviet forces of all kinds in the Soviet Far East
and Central Asia are brought up to strength, the
total could approach a million.
28. The Soviet build-up was not met by a com-
parable Chinese response until after the border
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30. China's military forces could not engage
in a sustained assault on the Soviet Union. They
could not stop a major Soviet air or ground attack.
They would be capable of inflicting heavy casual-
ties on an invading force, however, and the Chinese
hope this fact will deter Soviet military action.
The Chinese, of course, are well aware of their
military vulnerability and are pushing their ad-
vanced weapons programs ahead to obtain a more
credible deterrent.
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