THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100140004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 31, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Internal Situation in China
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31 January 1972
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
31 January 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Internal Situation in China
Introduction
Less than six months ago Peking was rockad by
a dramatic leadership upheaval which resulted in
the purge of Lin Piao, the Minister of Defense and
anointed successor to Mao Tse-tung, and at least
four other major military leaders. This action has
left Mao and Chou En-lai the dominant figures in
China, running the country at the head of an ex-
tremely small elite team. While it is clear that
many serious problems remain to be solved and cer-
tain difficulties are being encountered behind the
scenes as solutions are sought, the general out-
ward appearance is one of tranquility.
Even while the leadership struggle was being
played out during the fall o last year, there
were no discernible repercussions on China's in-
ternal stability. National and local administra-
tion proceeded with relatively little d!~sruption.
The economy continued to advance at a steady pace,
with strong gains registered in industrial produc-
tion and with agricultural production holding its
own in the face of continued popula,:ion growth.
In the foreign field, serious problems were met
and handled adroitly, with no pause in the smooth
running of the foreign-policy machinery.
Of the problems that Mao and Chou now face,
the need to decide on new leaders to fill the many
vacant positions on the politburo and in the army
Note: his memorandum was prepared by the Office
o Current Intelligence and was coordinated with
the Office of National Estimates.
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command is probably the most important. The ques-
tion of personnel selection, and thus of power con-
figuration, has bedeviled the Peking leadership for
the past six years, since the beginning of the
Cultural Revolution, and there are clear indications
that it remains a central, and unsolved, problem.
Beyond that, the question of organizational control,
of the relative weight. to be played by the military
and the party in running the country, has not yet
been sorted out. In the aftermath of the recent
purge, however, an effort is clearly being made to
reduce the political power which the military ac-
quired during the Cultural Revolution.
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 Approve6F iheggr eQ4i0, j$ MfffPo6Li Mg6l40004-7
(Elected April 1969)
? Mao T%,e-tung (78) ? Chiang Ch'ing (56)
Chairman, Central Committee Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head,
Cultural Revolution Group
? Chou En-lai (73)
Premier
? K'ang Sheng (72)
er. C evolution
itee~;; I"'n curity Chi;cf
? Chi Teng-k'uei (40)"
Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
iriaotary Affairs
? Chen Hsi-lien (60)
Commander, Shen-yang Military
Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
? Li Hsueh-feng (64)"
ili egion; Chairman,
rov evolutionary
? Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (59)
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal
Revolutionary Committee; Second
Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution
Group
? Li Te-sheng (61) *
Commander, Anhwei Military
District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial
Revolutionary Committee
? Hsu Shih-yu (64)
uty Chief o.Stef?; Com-
? Yeh Chien-ying (72)
Vice Chairman, Military Af-
fairs Committee
lic SecurityJ4ia4ster; Chairman,
? Li Hsien-nien (66)
Finance Minister
? Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown) *
Public Security Vice Minister; Direc-
tor, General Office, Party Central
Committee
? Chu Te (85)
Chairman, National People's
Congress
? Liu Po-ch'eng (79)
Vice Chairman, National People's
Congress; Military Affairs Committee
? Yao Wen-yuan (36)
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal ? Tung Pi-wu (85)
Revolutionary Committee; Member, Vice Chairman, People's Republic
Cultural Revolution Grcup of China
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? Huang Yung-sheng (62
S nary Af-
Rs C
taff; Army
ry Af-
? Li Tso-p'eng (60)
uty Chief of ,taff; Po-
litics r, Navy;
ary Affairs o ittee
al Revolutionary Com-
"Alternate Members ~~ Purged or status in doubt
 Appro
The Leadership Equati6n
1. The fluidity of the leadership situation
in Peking is underscored by the fact that only 11
full and alternate politburo members--discounting
three elderly figures whose membership is honorary--
have been publicly active since last September. Mao
has made three appearances since October, and Chou
continues to maintain a backbreaking schedule. Other
leaders who have been particularly active include
Yeh Chien-ying and army political director Li Te-
sheng. Yeh, who appears to collaborate closely
with Chou, is a possible candidate for the defense
ministry post; in any case, his prominence almost
certainly is intended to symbolize the endorsement
of the Lin purge by China's predominantly conserv-
ative military establishment. We know relatively
little about Li Te-sheng, an alternate politburo
member and former provincial army commander. Li's
current high visibility, however, suggests that he
may be being groomed for full politburo membership
and broader responsibilities in the military hier-
archy. The only remaining active military member
on the politburo is Shenyang Military Region com-
mander Chen Hsi-lien. Because Chen's appearances
have been confined to his bailiwick in northeast
China, it is difficult to determine how much influ-
ence he is exerting at the moment on the decision-
making process in Peking.
2. Among the more active civilian leaders are
Chou's alter ego, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and
several leaders closely identified with extremist
policies in the Cultural Revolution, including Madame
Mao, Shanghai political boss Chang Chun-chiao, and
party propaganda chief Yao Wen-yuan. The last three
are members of Mao's personal entourage, and their
status apparently has not been impaired by the two-
year-old drive against ultraleftists which has re-
rulted in the ouster of two of Mao's long-time rad-
ical colleagues. The continued prominence of Madame
Mao, Chang, and Yao may also indicate that an even-
tually re-formed politburo will continue to be bal-
anced between conservatives and radicals.
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 3. Unfor unately, the pattern of politburo
appearances in recent months raises more questions
than if. answers about the relative influence of
the surviving members. Madame Mao, for example,
invariably appears to be ranked immediately behind
Chou. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that her
actual power, on the wane since 1968, has taken
an upturn. We have assumed that her prerogatives
have been confined largely to cultural matters, but
even in this sphere there have been no press refer-
ences to her guiding influence in the arts since
last summer. She also apparently has failed to
gain membership on the newly formed State Council
Culture Group. There were a number of anomalies
in the major turnout for former foreign minister
Chen I's funeral on 10 January that. indicated that
the situation within the politburo has not been
sorted out and suggested that some of the leaders
who have disappeared into the political woods may
re-emerge.
The Situation in the Provinces
4. The leadership upheaval in Peking has had
relatively little impact on the regional and pro-
vincial party and military hierarchy. Presumably
this means that the majority of civilian and military
leaders in the provinces have received reassurances
regarding their political tenure.
5. Nevertheless, some selective revamping of
party organs is apparently under way. Perhaps as
many as a dozen first or second ranked provincial
party secretaries, both civilians and military, ap-
pear to have been transferred or purged. Those
purged probably have either been tarnished as Lin
Piao supporters or somehow caught up in the inter-
necine quarreling between their conservative and
radical mentors in Peking. But the rationale behind
the local purges is difficult to discern. Several of
the ranking leaders in Kwangtung Province, for exam-
ple, would appear logical candidates for purging be-
cause of their close association with deposed army chief
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of staff Huang Yung-sheng, who was the ranking mili-
tary-political boss in that area until his promotion
to Peking in 1968. Nevertheless, all of Huang's
Kwangtung associates are still in action.
6. There is one striking parallel between the
personnel situation in the provinces and in Peking:
the regime is still dragging its feet in appointing
replacements for the four provir;cial party first
secretaries who appear to have been purged or trans-
ferred in recent months and has failed to fill
vacancies in the major Peking and Nanking Military
Region commands which have existed for 11 and six
months respectively. The most significant provin-
cial figure in this category is the commander of
the Nanking Region, Hsu Shih-yu, who is also a full
politburo member. His absence from public view
since last June almost certainly is related to events
that precipitated the Lin Piao affair, but there
have been no reports that Hsu has been purged or is
in serious political trouble. Thus, he may even-
tually resurface, perhaps in a higher military post.
Hsu Shih-yu's promotion or purge is undoubtedly one
of the most controversial issues confronting the
regime, and the seeming inability to determine his
fate attests to the complexity of the haggling over
personnel still going on behind the scenes.
The Political Role of the Military
7. The pulling and hauling over personnel as-
signments in Peking and the provinces is complicated
by the current campaign to reduce the influence of
the military in civil administration and to reassert
the leadership of the reconstructed party apparatus.
We do not believe that the army's overweening politi-
cal role was the central factor in the attack on
the apex of China's military power structure last
September, although this certainly figured in the
purges. The politburo that had emerged from the
Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 was an unstable
body containing leaders from the major interest groups
which had emerged from the Cultural Revolution.
Difference in outlook and interests persisted, and
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just beneath the surface personal animosities were
strong. There were indications that some members,
perhaps even Chou En-lai, never really accepted
Lin's designation as Mao's successor, and Lin's
activities during the Cultural Revolution made it
likely that he had more than a few enemies among
other important military chiefs. Thus a combination
of factors--a Lin-Chou rivalry, Lin's desire to yid
himself of opponents in the military hierarchy, and
Lin's fear that the current drive against ultra-
leftists would further weaken his position--probably
came together in the dramatic events of last Sep-
tember.
ship organs will be the party's representative--
"whether or not he is a military member." Chen
described these adjustments as a major structural
8. Nevertheless. the Lin affair brought to the
fore a long-standing cc.,ncern, probably shared by
Mao and Chou-En-lai, over the extent and duration
of the military's political role and the need to
get back to regular organizational forms in the
wake of the Cultural Revolution. This concern was
clearly enunciated last month by a Peking publicist
in Hong Kong, Jack Chen. According to Chen, major
policy directives on all national matters are in
the f'iture to be transmitted through the party and
goverr.~.lent. chain of command rather than through the
military. Moreover, the key figure in all leader-
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local military-civil relations. There also was no
suggestion that the regime is prepared to withdraw
the military from civil administration. Recent
domestic propaganda, however, has harped on the
necessity for collective leadership. This general
and vague formula obviously is designed to ensure
that military officers do not dominate local party
organs and to holster the authority of civilian
cadres. Many of the latter are "rehabilitated"
party veterans who probably bridle at sharing au-
thority with less experienced military men.
10. Peking is likely to pursue a cautious i~,.:--
proach in attempting to restore the party apparatus.
Almost certainly a broad purge of China's present
military administrators is not in the offing. In-
stead, many of these men probably will be eventually
redesignated as ?:ivilian party- --government careerists.
In any event, China's powerful regional and provin-
cial military leaders can be expected to use their
political leverage in an attempt to secure their
careers and ensure that their voices will continue
to be heard in national councils on both military
and civil policies.
The Succession Problem
11. The fall of Mao's sole heir last fall has
put the regime back Lo square one in dealing with
the problem of the transfer of power after Mao goes.
At s^me point, steps will have to be taken to draft
and approve another party constitution entailing a
new prescription for Mao's succession. It seems
highly improbable that Mao will again attempt to
designate a personal successor. Quite likely post-
Mao China will nominally be ruled by a "collective
leadership."
12. The smoke of the latest battle has not
cleared sufficiently for confident predictions about
ne collegium after Mao. Barring another major
upheaval, any collective in the future will be
dominated by Chou En-lai if he remains healthy.
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Chou is currently the de facto number-two man, with
no visible challengers on the horizon. Moreover,
it seems likely that most of those who fill the
vacancies now existing on the politburo will be
figures closely associated with Chou.
Policy Moderation
13. There are no signs that the latest go-
round in Peking has interfered with the mundane
tasks of national and local administration.
The over-all moderating trend
in domestic programs--a trend begun in 1969--con-
tinues, and the thrust of radical Maoist reforms
is being blunted in key areas. In education, for
example, most students still have to put in lengthy
stints of manual labor, but there has been a grow-
ing number of official recommendations for improving
academic curricula, for judicious restoration of the
influence of "bourgeois" intellectuals, and for
more advanced theoretical training for academically
gifted students.
14. In economic policy, recent public commen-
tary has affirmed that the 1971-75 economic plan
will continue the middle-of-the-road policies that
have fostered rapid recovery and growth since the
winding down of the Cultural Revolution. The Decem-
ber and January issues of the authoritative party
journal Red Flag stated that further collectiviza-
tion in agriculture will be eschewed, thus indicating
a further erosion of ultraleftist influence in this
key area of national decision-making. Red Flrg also
forecast small improvements in consumer welfare, al-
though investment will be maintained at the expense
of wages and increased economic output will go mainly
for military and industrial modernization.
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15. The Chinese economy made strong gains in
1971, and the ~.iolitical turbulence in Peking last
autumn had no discernible economic spillover. In-
dustrial output for the year rose over 10 percent,
with large increases in the output of steel, coal,
chemicals, electronics, and petroleum, as many new
factories went into production. Armaments production
advanced across the board, and construction of new
industrial and military facilities
16. In contrast to striking successes in in-
dustry and construction, agriculture had only a
mediocre year in 1.971. This was a disappointment
to Peking, since agriculture had been given
increased amounts of chemical fertilizer and equip-
ment. Imports of grain declined to 3.2 million
tons in contrast to the 4-5 million tons that have
.een imported each year since 1961. In any case,
over the next several years domestic food produc-
tion should be able to keep pace with China's an-
nual two-percent population growth.
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