THE PERSIAN GULF: THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100140014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 21, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Persian Gulf: The End of Pax Britannica
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21 September 1972
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CI NTRAL IN'1'I L.LIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 September 1972
INTELLIGENCE" MEMORANDUM
The Persian Gulf: The End of Pax Britannica
The I'ax Britannica in the Persian Gull' has ended after more than 150
years, and three newly independent states have emerged. They will be
seeking their way
Singly or in taudi.;n-, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been
touted as candidates to fill the vacuum left by the British. If military power
were the sole prerequisite of leadership, Iran Could provide a Pax I'ersica, but
the Shah is embroiled in disputes with Kuwait and Iraq at the head of the
gulf and Abu Dhabi down the coast. Cultural and historical differences are
added impediments to the exercise of leadership by Iran. Saudi Arabia seems
precluded from the role of protector for many of the sarne reasons, although
it does have a good deal of inlluence with the ruling families in Bahrain and
Qatar.
Two non-gulf states, Jordan and Pakistan, have stepped forward, pri-
marily to offer trained and politically safe military and security personnel to
replace British forces. But neither country is likely to become an effective
force in gulf affairs. Regional cooperation or security arrangements will
probably not develop in the near future, but the chances of success would be
brightened if the difficulties that the United Arab Emirates is having with
Iran and Saudi Arabia could be resolved.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of?Current Intelligence and coordi-
nated within CIA.
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Background
Britain's decision of January 1968 to terminate its treaties of protec-
tion with nine Persian Gulf' sheikdoms and to withdraw its military forces
from the area by the end of 197 1 signaled the conclusion of the last vestige
of the 19th century's /'ax Britannica, The dismantling of the British advisory
and defense arrangements opened the way for political changes in the
sheikdoms and ordained that their isolation from international affairs would
be a thing of the past. Many knowledgeable observers believed that the
British exodus would bring upheaval in its wake and open the area to
revolutionary movements.
Three independent states-Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven-member
United Arab Emirates-were established in the second half of 1971 as the
British completed their withdrawal. An effort by the UK to get all nine of
these sheikdoms to federate was wrecked by traditional antipathies and the
fear of some rulers that they would be eclipsed by others. For Bahrain and
Qatar, the transition from the status of profs cted sheikdoms to sovereign
nations was a relatively painless procedure. The union of the other seven
sheikdoms into the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, was difficult.
Three years of negotiations were required before the feuding sheikdoms,
formerly known as the Trucial States, accepted union. Iran's threat to
oppose a union of the Trucial States unless the Shah's claim to ownership of
three gulf islands-Abu Musa and the two Tunbs-was recognized also in-
hibited the establishment of the union.
The oil wealth of the sheikdom of Abu Dhabi guaranteed that its ruler,
Sheik Zayid, would be the dominant figure in the union. Now the president
of the United Arab Emirates, Sheik Zayid has energetically involved himself
in Arab world politics. He has traveled extensively and has contributed gifts
and loans to other states. Zayid sees his international connections as poten-
tial assets if support is needed against Saudi Arabia or Iran and also thinks
these connections will increase his prestige at home.
The rulers of Qatar and Bahrain, on the other hand, have been content
to devote themselves to domestic affairs, and their countries remain in the
backwater of Arab life. Qatar's ruler, Amir Khalifah al-Thani, was momen-
tarily in the limelight in February 1972 when lie deposed the former ruler,
his Cousin, in a quiet palace coup. Amir Isa, the ruler of Bahrain, is preparing
a constitution and planning for the election of a constitucnt assembly. These
political changes will probably be effected by the end of 1972.
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Bahrain, with more than 200,000 people, has the largest and most
sophisticated population of the gufl'sheikdoms, but is not as richly endowed
with oil as Qatar or Abu I)Iiabi, Qatar, whose population is about 130,000,
had an oil income in 1971 estimated at $200 million. Abu Dhabi, with a
population of perhaps 60,000, had an estimated oil income of $440 million
in 1971. In per capita terms, it is the richest state in the world,although only
ten years ago it was sunk in the traditional penury of desert isolation. Dubai,
the largest of the seven members of the United Arab Emirates, has a
population of about 75,000. It is the commercial center of the lower gull'
coast with a flourishing entrepot and gold smuggling trade and has recently
begun to exploit an offshore oil field. The population of the other five
sheikdoms--Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and
f ujairah-range from about 5,000 to 35,000. These sheikdoms are scarcely
more than strips of desert and lagoon interspersed with poor fishing and
agricultural villages. Only Sharjah has pretensions to prosperity. The prin-
cipal sources of income for these shcikdonls are bizarre excursions into the
field of international philately, rents obtained from oil companies for explo-
ration concessions that have so far proved unrewarding, and stipends from
SheikZayid. Their main hope is that some day they too may strike it rich
with oil.
Critics of the Britain's decision to end its military and political commit-
ments argued that, in the absence of a regional security system, the gulf
would become subject to subversive movements, persistent conflicts between
rival Arab states, and international tension between Arabs and Iranians that
would be exploited by the Soviet Union. The result, they said, would be
grave peril to Western oil interests and supplies. The political transition was
relatively orderly, however, and the dire predictions have not yet been borne
out. Although there has been wrangling and some tension, overt external
military attack on any of the gull' sheikdoms seems unlikely. The political
institutions of the new states are fragile, however, and their security may be
threatened by other developments. lntra-ruling family disputes may lead to
palace coups, which are usually unrelated to ideology; territorial disputes,
revolutionary movements, or external clisruptive influences could cause trou-
ble; indeed, the union itself' could break up.
Breakup of the union
Sheik Zayid's oil wealth is a powerful adhesive for the union, but at the
same time it has led to jealousy and has raised questions in the minds of the
rulers of the other six members of the union about the Sheik's intentions.
Zayid's efforts to enlarge the Abu Dhabi Defense Force rather than the
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SheikZayid chairing a meeting of the union's council of rulers.
union army provide evidence for those who suspect that the Sheik's goal is
to become the sole ruler of the union, Some of Zayid's actions on the
international scene-his recognition of the Soviet Union without consulting
the other rulers and his controversies with Iran and Saudi Arabia-are
regarded as high-handed and unwise byl rind some of
the other rulers.
While none of the poorer sheikdoms seems likely to pull out of the
union soon, several are keeping their options open by maintaining contact
with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Ajrnan, Unim al-Qaiwain, and Ras al-Khaimah
either have been securing, or are negotiating for, financial aid from King
Faysal or the Shah. Zayid and the union government understandably oppose
direct foreign assistance to a sheikdom and have requested that all aid be
funneled through the union government.
The fragility of commitment to the union is also demonstrated by
Fujairah's and Ras al-Khaimah's approaches to the Sultanate of 0111an on
possible union. Worsening relations between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, or
Iran and Abu Dhabi, could lead to problems for the union.
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Territorial disputes
The numerous territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf-most of them
related in one way or another to oil issues-are probably the greatest threat
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United Arab Emirates
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to regional stability and cooperation. Prominent among them is the long-
standing quarrel between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia that has disturbed
relations between Sheik Zayid and King Faysal. The Saudi monarch refuses
to establish diplomatic relations with the union until the matter is settled.
Zayid's decision in early 1972 to exchange diplomatic missions with Mos-
cow, although it has not yet been implemented, further irritated the Saudi
monarch.
The core of the Abu Dhabi - Saudi dispute is popularly, but inaccu-
rately, believed to be the ownership of the Buraimi Oasis. Its nine towns and
villages are now divided between Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Oman, but,
it is said, all are claimed by Saudi Arabia. In fact, King Faysal has indicated
that he is willing to abandon his claim to Buraimi in return for border
modifications elsewhere. As a lace-saving device, King Faysal has Suggested
that a referendum be held in Buraimi to determine the preference of the
inhabitants, or that a UN mediator visit the area to determine the residents'
wishes. This was done in Bahrain in 1970 when Iran's claim to the island was
laid to rest. The real barrier to reaching a settlement is the Saudi demand for
a corridor to the Persian Gulf', to run between the Qatar border and a point
west of Abu Dhabi's oil terminus at Jebel Dhanna. This would give the
Saudis access to a bay that could be developed into a port. The Saudi
territorial plan is known as the "Riyadh Line of 4 May 1970."
Sheik Zayid is reportedly willing to cede the Saudis a corridor to the
gulf (though narrower than that sought by Faysal), to redefine the border,
and to share potential oil revenues in certain disputed territories. But the
Sheik contends that to give in to King Faysal's full demands would lead to
the dismemberment of Abu Dhabi and the loss of at least a third of its
territory. If the Saudis were to acquire a corridor and a stretch of the coast,
it is not clear what this would mean for the existing Daruma offshore oil
concession area. Oil has not yet been found in commercial quantity, but the
prospects seem promising.
Zayid's proffered concessions have been rejected. A Saudi official has
stated that unless Saudi demands are met by Abu Dhabi, his government
may reassert the even more extensive claims it made in 1949. King Faysal's
demand for a "window on the gulf" is publicly justified by the Saudis on the
rather vague grounds of economic development and defense needs. More
specifically, the Saudis want a corridor so they can lay a pipeline from the
new, and not vet producing, Shavbah oil field to the coast.
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I'he Most economics outlet or a pipeline wou c be a route
straight north to the Abu Dhabi coast. I he Saudis' corridor plan is designed
to provide a site within Saudi jurisdiction that would serve not onlyShay-
ball, but also any other Saudi fields in the Rub al-Khali area. Otherwise,
output from this area would have to pass far to the north to the Saudi coast,
through Abu Dhabi or Onlan-the latter undesirable for security reasons.
A Saudi military take-over of a gulf corridor is not likely; such an effort
would be difficult to mount logistically and would have adverse political
repercussions. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia displayed its military capability
when it moved several thousand National Guard troops to Salwah on the
Qatar border in early 1972. This was presumably done to bolster the new
Anlir of Qatar following his ouster of the former ruler, but the troop
movement may also have been designed to impress Sheik Zayid.
The US has tried to get the Abu Dhabi - Saudi territorial dispute off
dead center, but the Saudis have been intransigent, talking about "sacred
Saudi soil" and sticking to what appears to be a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to
Sheik Zayid. King Faysal is not convinced by US arguments that Sheik Zayid
would be less likely to enter into tics with Iraq and other Arab radicals if the
Saudis improved their relations with the United Arab Emirates. King Faysal's
displeasure with Zayid was increased by Abu Dhabi's acquisition of jet
fighter-bombers and tanks. The Saudis, who suspect that the weapons would
only be used against then, have called the purchase "criminal and senseless."
King I-Iusayn of Jordan, wishing to carve out a role for himself in the area,
has offered to serve as a mediator in the dispute. 1-lusayn plans to visit Saudi
Arabia in the near future and has already met with Sheik Zayid. The
Jordanian monarch sought to convince Zayid that better relations with the
Saudis and Iranians are a prerequisite for regional stability, but his efforts to
resolve the territorial issue have so far shown no signs of success.
Relations between Sheik Zayid and the Shah of Iran are also marred by
a territorial dispute. In late 197 I, shortly before the termination of the
British role in the gulf and just prior to the formal establishment of the
union of the Trucial States, ;ran took over three islands in the gulf-Abu
Musa and the two Tunbs. Iran's claim to the small and sparsely populated
islands had an historical basis. But more important was the Shah's conviction
that the islands were strategically esse:-tial to Iran. If they were in unfriendly
hands, he contended, they could provide bases from which Iran's vital
shipping routes might be attacked. The Shah therefore made it clear that he
would oppose any union of the gulf states unless he controlled the islands.
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Kuwait Daily News
Demonstration against the Shah's occupation of three gulf islands.
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The ruler of Sharjah, eventually agreed to give in to
the Shah in return for financial and economic aid from Iran. On 30
November-one day before the British responsibility for defense of the
Trucial States lapsed--all Iranian naval task force landed a small garrison on
Abu Musa without incident. As for the two Tunbs, the ruler of Ras
al-Khaimah refused to negotiate. Nonetheless, an Iranian force landed there
and skirmished briefly with the Ras al-Khainlall police. The message of this
operation was not lost on the gulf rulers. Nonetheless, it aroused consider-
able resentment and provoked a loud outcry throughout the gulf.
Essentially, the islands dispute is a conflict between two different
cultures, Arab and Persian. The Arabs resent Iranian intrusion into the gulf,
and Sheik Zayid has not been content to drop the issue. In his travels and
reception of Arab leaders, the Sheik has gone out of his way to flag the
matter by frequently referring to Arab ownership of the islands and to the
need to preserve the "Arab character" of the gulf'. Zayid has probably been
under some pressure from radical Arabs to pursue tile issue, and Iraq has been
the cheerleader for Zayid's comments, apparently hoping to reduce Iran's
influence in the gulf by keeping the dispute alive. The Shall, who had felt
that the gulf islands issue had been put to rest, has reacted angrily to Zayid's
carping. Some Iranian officials, perhaps as a stratagem to frighten Zayid into
silence rather than with serious intent, have suggested that Iran is "tempted
to do something about Zayid."
Saudis and jeopardize any hopes the Shah might have of injecting Iranian
influence into the area. Relations between the United Arab Emirates and
Iran have been so strained that ambassadors have not been exchanged,
although Iran has been given permission to open a consulate in Dubai.
There were indications in July 1972 that the differences over the
islands were being resolved. Low-level talks between union and Iranian
officials were under way, and negotiations for a meeting in Europe between
Sheik Zayid and a personal emissary of the Shall were in progress. Since
then, however, many of the Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates,
have again publicized the dispute Over the islands, this tillle via a letter to the
UN Security Council. As a result, it seems unlikely that the Shall or any
Iranian official, except perhaps the Iranian ambassador in London, will now
meet with Zayid. The Shah has threatened to withdraw diplomatic recogni-
tion from the United Arab Emirates by 30 September if the controversy is
not resolved to his satisfaction.
Moreover, Iranian adventurlsm on the Arab side of the gulf would engage the
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Another source of territorial disputes centers on oil exploration and
exploitation in the Persian Gulf. A number ol'states have signed median-line
agreements to set off areas for exploration, but not all have been able to
reach accords. Currently under review are conflicting claims for exploration
rights advanced by competing US oil companies that involve the offshore
boundaries of Sharjah and Ajnan and of Sharjah and Unim al-Qaiwain. On
land, conflicts between the member sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates
resulting from complex family and tribal jealousies and the profusion of
enclaves have led to frequent territorial disputes and to occasional violence.
Revolutionary Movements
Revolutionary movements also pose a threat to the gulf states. Oper-
ating under the banner of Arab nationalism, a number of leftist clandestine
groups are continuing to encourage domestic discontent. The unpopularity
and conservatism of some ruling families, traditional tribal and dynastic
rivalries, and the disorientation of populations swept into new social and
economic situations by oil wealth are all sources of discontent. Until the
1967 Arab-Israeli war, much of the external support for subversive move-
ments cane from Cairo, but changing Egyptian policies since then have
opened the field to other contenders for the revolutionary spoils, such as
Iraq and Yemen (Aden).
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Among the other lower gull'states dissident or ani?r.atic~ns are disunited
and ineffective. Local security forces ill probably be
able to cope with domestic threats I'm some time to conic.
The l3aathist regime in Iraq, which is hostile to all sheiks, sultans, and
shahs and has been trying to extend its presence and influence in Kuwait,
Bahrain, and the United Arab Imirates, poses a threat to the gull' states. F
Iraq apparently marked Bahrain or special
attention during the first halt of 1972, but its eft'orts were inept and largely
unsuccessful. The sheikdom of Ras al-Khaimah, a member of the United
Arab Emirates, is also considered to be a center of Iraqi activity.
Bagli ac has long believe(I
that -t has a legitimate and important ro a at gu affairs, and it is anxious to
expand its trade and presence in the region. Suspicion of Iraqi intentions is
strong in the area, however, and the I3aathists' ability to achieve influence is
limited, given Iraq's domestic troubles with the Kurds, its current financial
problems, and its preoccupation with disputes with Iran. Although Iraq, the
self-appointed leader of "progressive" forces in the region, has scored points
with gulf radicals by championing the Arabs' condemnation of Iran over the
islands issue, Baghdad's meddling in the gulf is still only a nuisance, not a
serious threat.
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perhaps, to economic and military aid. In the long run, the USSR may
encourage leftist movements, but it is unlikely to provide substantial equip-
ment or support to any group before it has demonstrated its worthiness.
There are, in fact, limits to the Soviet Union's freedom of action. Iran, for
instance, is sensitive to great power presence in the Persian Gulf, and
Iranian-Soviet relations would be tested by evidence of additional Soviet
activity. The Shah is already discomforted by the Soviet-Iraq Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation.
Russia moved with alacrity in early 1972 to offer to exchange diplo-
matic missions with Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Only
Sheik Zayid of the United Arab Emirates accepted the offer, doing so
Without Consulting the other rulers of the union skeikdoms. Under pressure
from several countries, Zayid has postponed the actual exchange of repre-
sentatives, but he says that the agreement must be honored. An effort is
being made to ensure that the Soviet mission in Abu Dhabi is small and that
consulates are not set up elsewhere in the union.
Jordan and Pakistan are making intensive diplomatic efforts to establish
themselves as significant actors in the gulf arena. King 1-lusayn's growing
interest in establishing ties with the gulf states is related, in part, to Jordan's
estrangement from some Arab states such as Egypt. Rebuffed by his neigh-
bors, the King has turned to one of the few areas in the Arab world where
Jordan may still exercise influence, make friends, and secure badly needed
financial assistance. In addition to offering, military and security personnel to
the new gulf states and Oman, King I-Iusayn has been active on the diplo-
matic front. He has recently visited Sheik Zayid and the Shall, and will visit
King Faysal soon. 1-lusayn hopes on these trips to mediate Abu Dhabi's
disputes with the Saudis and Iranians.
Pakistan has long had commercial interests in the gulf, and thousands of
Pakistani workers are employed there. The defeat by India and the loss of
East Pakistan last year led President Bhutto to emphasize ties with Muslim
states, especially the more affluent ones in the Persian Gulf, where he might
tap the oil wealth of the sheikdoms. By associating himself with Islamic
states of the Middle East, President Bhutto hopes to gain political benefits
among the Muslims at home.
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The United Arab Emirates' disputes with Saudi Arabia and with Iran
are the major problems in the gulf'. Although neither dispute is likely to
produce armed conflict, each impedes moves toward cooperative security
arrangements. Should the territorial disputes be resolved, however, the new
gulf' states-proud of their independence and suspicious of their bigger
neighbors-are unlikely to rush into formal or informal arrangements with
more powerful nations. In addition, the gulf states all suffer from domestic
stresses and strains that could be aggravated by subversive elements. Inr
portant factors in determining how long the gulf states have to put their own
houses in order will be the ability of the new states to hold external
subversive influences at bay and whether the neighboring Sultanate of Oman
can hold its extremist dissidents in check.
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