SECURITY CONDITIONS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 26, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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CIA INTERNAL JSE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of ]'ntclligence
26 January 1973
OCT No. 1418!73
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Security Conditions in Certain Countries of Southeast Asia
No. l
Summary
Phnom Penh is the only place oi~ the Vice President's
itinerary where there is a highly unpredictable security
condition. The likelihood of terrorist action or demon-
stations against the Vice President in Saigon, Vientiane,
or Bangkok is low, although we cannot totally exclude the
possibility of a violent act.
Our concern over the Vice President's physical safety
in Phnom Penh reflects the Communists' demonstrated capa-
bilities t~ carry out rocket and sapper attacks and acts
of sabota~~a and terrorism within the capital, as well as
the lack of specific ,intelligence generally required for
executin5 adequate protective measures.
Note: This securitz~ memorandum was prepared by CI. .4. It
was produced by the Office of Current InteZZ~~;enee
rind c Na~iona~ Esti-
mates
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SOUTH VIETNA'~
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We see a relatively low risk in Saigon. The cease-fire
agreement should be going in~-o effect early in the morning
on the 28th, and we would consider any deliberate Communist
military or terrorist attack on the person o,f, the Vice
President unlikely. There is some danger that military or
terrorist activity will persist for some hours or days after
the cease-fire begins, especially because enemy troops
apparently have been ordered to launch last-minute attacks
and the security posture will be tense. There has been
relatively little terrorism in the Saigon area, however,
and almost no direct rocket or mortar attacks on ~he city
itself since the Convnunists launched their military offensive
last spring. While we cannot totally rule out such an in-
cident just prior to the cease-fire, a post-cease-fire
spillover against the city or some nearby installation such
as Tan Son Nhut Airfiald would seem a fairly remote pos-
sibility. There will remain a slight danger from accidental
triggering of some undetected explosive device in Saigon.
The South Vietnamese Government will make a maximum
effort to ensure the Vice President's safety acid to pre-
vent any embarrassing incident. South Vietnamese security
forces--the army, the national end local police, and various
intelligence agencies--have ample trained personnel as well
as demonstrated skill and experience in the protection of
visiting foreign dignitaries. Moreover, they will already
have been on high alert against Communist infil?cra~ion or
sabotage in the capital area during the days immediately
preceding the cease-fire. In addition, US military and
security personnel are available in the Saigon area,
including Tan Son Nhut.
We believe the South Vietnamese Government will be
particularly anxious to demonstrate close friendship with
the US, as represented by the Vice President, and to avoid
any suggestion of hostility from its supporters or its
non-Communist opposition. Although there may be consider-
able concern among the South Vietnamese population over
the impact of the cease-fire agreement and some residual
resentment at the US as a result of the demonstrations
whipped up against the original October draft, it is
currently a primary interest of the Saigon government to
make its own adherence to the agreement acceptable to the
people and to take the most positive posture officially to
justify continued aid and support from the US people and
Congress. The non-Communist opposition, while recently
aroused by some of President Thieu's actions aimed at
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tightening his control, is almost certainly too relieved
at the cease-f 3,r~~ and too wary of playing into Communist
hands at this point to instigate any protests o~ demonstra-
tions in connection with the Vice President's visit. South
Vietnamese security forces are, in any event, capable of
controlling and dispersing any demonstrations that might
occur.
There is little reason to expect any security pro.h~.em
in Vientiane. The Lao capital is far removed from the major
battlefronts to the north and southeast, and there have been
no terrorist incidents in the city since 1965. Any Communist-
inspired attempt to harm or embarrass the Vice President
would be ill-timed and illog3.ca1 in view of the ongoing
peace talks in Vientiane between government and Lao Com-
munist negotiators. The local constabulary and military
security forces make up in numbers what they lack in train-
ing and efficiency and can be expected to make a maximum
effort to ensure the Vice President's safety.
The chances of a public demonstration against the Vice
President are also virtually nil. There are some young
malcontents among foreign-educated Lao and the small colony
of expatriate western youth, but they are not politically
active. Local authorities have shown no reluctance to deal
with the few minor civil disturbances that have infrequently
occurred in Vientiane. Popular sentiment is generally pro-
American and the Vice President will probably enjoy a warm
reception.
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Most of Cambodia is highly insecure, and the Phnom Penh
ere are now a ou
muns.st troops operating within a 25-mile radius of Phnomm
Penh. Khmer insurgents make up the bulk of this force,
which also includes a few Vietnamese Communist sapper,
artillery and infantry elements. Cambodian military
units currently deployed in or around the capital are
more than sufficient to contain these forces.
Despite their graaually growing strength in the Phnom
Penh region, thi: Communists still appear to lack the ability
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to launch arty large-scale, sustained assaults on the city.
In view of their professed intention to go on fighting after
the Vietnam cease-fire, they are likely to continue to carry
out harassing attacks against outlying government positions
and to conduct additional hit-and^run sapper raids and acts
of terrorism and sabotage within Phnom Penh itself .
The last major sapper attack i n Phnom Penh was on 7
October 1972, when Vietnamese Communist commandos Caused
considerable damage to one of the city's two major bridges--
which is only a few miles from the US Embassy. Government
troops reacted quickly and effectively to the attack and
killed most of the sappers. Since then, the Communists have
carried out several small and ineffectual rocket attacks
against Phnom Penh's Pochentong airfield. They have also
used frogmen to da.nage several ships at anchor in the city's
port area, and Communist terrorists within Phi~~om Penh
recently have used crude rocket-type devices--with little
effect--against such targets as the National Assembly build-
ing. They have carried out no attempts against U.S. installation:
or personnel since last fall, when they narrowly missed kill-
ing the U.S. deputy chief of mission.
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There is .little likelihood that any hostile demon-
s::ratior_s or embarrassing incidents will occur during
the Vice President's visit , owir:g both to an absence of
~.:ohesive non-Communist objections to U.S. policies and
to the precautions which the Lon Nol government, in any
case, would take to prevent them. Government security
services should be able to assure that any demonstrations
do not get off the ground, and can be expected to surveil
or arrest suspected extremists.
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All of the government's security forces have performed
capably in the past in protecting important foreign visitors.
THAILAND
We see no major security problem in Bangkok. The Vice
President's visit will be well received by Thai leaders and
the people of the city will probably offer a friendly reception.
Thai security forces charged with the protection of the Vice
President's party are efficient. The government is most
unlikely to authorize any demonstrations by students or
others; if any should occur they will probably attract few
participants and be quickly quashed. The Communist insur-
gencies in the hinterland have so far had iio impact on the
security situation in the capital.
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