ISRAEL: PEACE, POLITICS, PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160036-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: February 22, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
ISRAEL: Peace, Politics, Parties
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CIA
DOCUMENT KREES BRANCH
FE CO
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81
22 February 1973
No, 1628/73
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 February 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
ISRAEL: Peace, Politics, Parties
Summary
Israeli leaders reiterate publicly and privately that they stand ready at
any time to negotiate a peace settlement with the Arab states. Most Israelis,
however, believe that the Arabs are not ready for a formal peace and that
even if they were, they would not be willing to swallow the considerable
territorial requirements that Tel Aviv regards as necessary for "real peace."
Prime Minister GoIda Meir charges that since the 1967 war the Arab
states have consistently refused to make peace. Their whole policy, she says,
is aimed at one objective: to force Israel to withdraw to the lines that existed
before 1967, where it would be ea.sy prey for new Arab aggression. Until the
Arabs accept Israel as a state, the Israelis insist they must preserve the
defensive advantage that the occupied Arab territories provide.
Mrs. Meir and Foreign Minister Eban have frequently said that if the
Arabs would come to the negotiating table, they would be surprised to find
how flexible Israel would be. Nevertheless, after 25 years of border conflict
and war Israeli leaders are so distrustful of the Arabs that they are unwilling
to exchange the security advantages afforded by the occupied territories for
what might turn out to be just another piece of paper. How much territory
Israel should keep for security is the prime subject of discussion when the
matter of a peace settlement is raised. With the Arabs continuing to refuse to
negotiate and to give every indication that they want nothing less than the
destruction of Israel, the Israelis have become tougher on the territorial
issue. Israel is preoccupied with security and survival; Israeli officials have
frequently stated their determination to resist international pressures to
accept anything that they consider would endanger their security. As Mrs.
Meir has said, "The Arabs can lose several wars and still be. around; Israel can
lose only one."
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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The Easy Way: The Status Quo
Israeli leaders are convinced the defensive advantages afforded by the
occupied territories, combined with Israeli military superiority, will enable
Israel successfully to fend off any Arab military thrusts. Defense Minister
Dayan says that if he had to make a choice between going to war or
returning to the pre-war borders, he would choose war. The new cease-fire
lines shorten the Israeli frontier, fill out the narrow 10-mile waist of pre-war
Israel, provide improved defensive positions (Golan Heights, Jordan River,
Suez Canal), and put Arab aircraft and artillery farther away from key Israeli
cities.
The Israeli Government's attitude toward settlement prospects is sup-
ported by the vast majority of the Israeli public. The "peace" element in
Israel?those who believe there is a good enough chance for peace to justify
an offer to sacrifice substantial territory?is tiny and without influence. In
the most recent parliamentary elections, in October 1969, peace candidates
had less than five percent of the total vote. Fedayeen attacks, the refusal of
the Arabs to negotiate peace, and a constant stream of intemperate, anti-
Israeli statements from Arab leaders have served to keep this group small.
Conservative religious parties and other parties of the right, which fear the
government may be willing to give up too much, are much more in evidence.
The Israelis would, of course, like a peace that would end border
conflicts, casualties, extended military duty, high taxes, and economic
restrictions. Betweeti the end of the 1967 war and October 1972, Israel took
more casualties?about 860 dead and over 3,200 wounded?than it did in the
1967 war. Virtually all Israelis, conscious of the oppression of Jews through-
out history, are willing to pay the price. None, however, like it.
Since mid-1970, Israel's security position has markedly improved. In
August 1970 the cease-fire along the Suez Canal brought quiet to Israel's
most dangerous front. Lebanon has never posed a military threat and Syria,
although more formidable than Lebanon, confines itself to an occasional
foray against Israel. Jordan's King Husayn wants no more war with Israel,
and since September 1970, when he began to move against the fedayeen,
Israel's Jordanian front has been peaceful. The fedayeen, despite occasional
operations mounted from Lebanon and Syria, present no real threat. In
Egypt, Israel's old nemesis Nasir died in September 1970, and in July 1972
his successor Sadat reduced Egypt's already meager military options by
throwing out Soviet pilots, advisers, and technicians. By 1972 no credible
Arab military force could press Israel toward unilateral concessions.
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Indeed, Israel was enjoying the status quo and was discounting any
advantages a settlement might bring. While Israeli leaders usually deny they
prefer a "no-peace" situation, Foreign Minister Eban observed last year that
the status quo was "complex, but tolerable." There has been no serious
threat to Israel for over two years. The territories, including the usually
active Gaza Strip, are quiet because of tough pacification measures that are
mild in general, but tough when necessary. Moreover, a trend epitomized by
the municipal elections on the West Bank in the spring of 1972, has
developed toward a grudging but pragmatic accommodation by resident
Palestinians to the Israeli occupiers.
The Stalemate
Israel has ventured few initiatives and has made only minor procedural
concessions since UN mediator Jarring began discussions on a peace settle-
ment after passage of UN Security Council Resolution 242 on 22 November
1967. The discussions have foundered on varying interpretations of the
resolution. The Arabs view the resolution as requiring Israel to withdraw?or
at least to make a commitment to withdraw?from all the Arab territories
occupied during the 1967 war; then, indirect peace negotiations could
produce a document which made a bow to the legitimacy of the Israeli state.
Tel Aviv, on the other hand, insists that the resolution is not self-imple-
menting, that it merely sets forth a set of principles, the details of which
must be hammered out in direct negotiations. In the years of intermittent
talks with Jarring and the four powers, Tel Aviv has not deviated from its
position; there can be no valid peace without direct negotiations, there can
be no Israeli withdrawal without a valid contractual peace treaty, and, even
then, Israel will withdraw only to "secure and recognized borders."
Although Tel Aviv sees little prospect for an over-all peace settlement,
it is interested in an interim agreement with Egypt on the Suez Canal. In
November 1970, Defense Minister Dayan proposed a mutual pull-back of
forces along the Suez Canal. In early 1971, Sadat said that Egypt would
reopen the canal if Israel would make a partial withdrawal from Sinai. Israel
replied that it would agree to a partial withdrawal from the canal (the extent
to be determined by negotiation), but its conditions were tough: Israeli ships
must have transit rights in a reopened canal; the cease-fire must be extende0
indefinitely; Egyptian military forces must not return to the East Bank; ar d
Egypt must thin out its forces on the west bank of the canal (presumably
including the air defense 5' stem). Israel also warned that a partial withdrawal
of Israeli forces from the Suez should not be taken as a step toward full
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RESOLUTION 242 (1967)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967
Tho Security Council.
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle
East.
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and
the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area
can live in security.
Emphasizing further that all Member Status in their acceptance of the
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.
1, Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establish-
ment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should
include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
political independence of every State in the area and their right to
live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political inde-
pendence of every State in the area, through measures including
the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to
proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the
States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to
achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the
provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the
progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
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withdrawal. An interim agreement, Israel stipulated, would be separate and
would not call for implementation of Resolution 242. Agreement has
foundered on Israeli opposition to Egyptian military forces across the canal
and on Cairo's linking an interim agreement to a final peace settlement. In
November 1971, Israel said that it would not interfere if Cairo wanted to
clear and reopen the canal on its own without an agreement, but that Tel
Aviv would continue to insist that Israeli forces remain in their positions and
that Israeli ships be permitted to use the canal.
Israeli Requirements
At the UN General Assembly in October 1968, Foreign Minister Eban
outlined nine general principles that Israel regards as essential for a "just and
lasting" peace settlement. These requirements remain the basis of Israeli
policy:
1. A peace treaty arrived at by negotiation between the parties directly
involved, contractually expressed, and including a renunciation of all
belligerency.
2. The establishment of new, permanent, "secure and recognized"
boundaries by agreement.
3. The establishment of other security arrangements to avoid a break-
down of the peace.
4. Open frontiers and freedom of movement across borders.
5. Unreserved freedom of navigation for Israeli shipping.
6. Recognition that the refugee problem is not only an Israeli problem,
but a regional one to be solved with international assistance.
7. Christian and Muslim access to and responsibility for their holy
places in Jerusalem.
8. Contractual Arab acknowledgment of Israel's sovereignty, integrity,
and right to national life.
9. The establishment of a framework to provide for regional coopera-
tion in the Middle East on resources and communications.
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Eban stressed that the first two principles were "absolutely indispens-
able." The second principle regarding boundaries is probably the most
critical issue to the Arabs. The question of where the boundaries should be
set is the most controversial in Israel. Under the third principle?other
security arrangements?Israel has in mind, in addition to direct territorial
changes, a series of demilitarized zones in the several Arab states that would
prevent Arab forces from moving into areas from which Israel withdraws.
Israel has no faith in international policing of demilitarized zones, par-
ticularly in any UN guarantees, and is convinced that guarantees are no
substitute for defensible borders. Moreover, the Israelis are unlikely to
accept any demilitarized zones behind the 1949 armistice lines. Dayan says,
"We must not go back to demilitarization with UN forces. I don't want to
see any foreigners here. For better or worse, we have to look our neighbors
in the eye, without anyone coming between us. If we can reach an agreement
with the Egyptians or the Jordanians, OK, but not demilitarization super-
vised by foreigners or the Security Council." Mrs. Meir adds that she "simply
cannot understand any Israeli who, after all that has taken place in the past,
is prepared to rely on someone else."
Principle four on open frontiers reflects Israel's desire for freedom of
movement of persons and trade between Israel and the Arab states. Eban in
1968 indicated that Tel Aviv would permit Jordanian access to port facilities
on Israel's Mediterranean coast and allow Arabs, as well as Israelis, to visit
places of religious and historic interest. When Israel talks about unreserved
freedom of navigation for Israeli shipping (principle five), it means not only
unrestricted passage through a reopened Suez Canal, but also free access to
Israel's port of Elat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Rights to transit the
Suez Canal are mainly a matter of face for the Israelis; most Israeli trade goes
from its Mediterranean ports to Europe.
In dealing with the problem of the Palestinian refugees (principle six),
Israel proposes an "international conference" of delegates from the Middle
East states, other states that contribute to refugee relief, and UN specialized
agencies involved. The conference would draft a Five Year Plan to solve the
refugee problem. Israel would insist that only limited numbers of Arab
refugees return to Israel. The Israelis envision international funding to
compensate refugees who remain in the Arab countries.
Under principle seven Israel disclaims any intent to seek unilateral
jurisdiction over the holy places of Christianity and Islam. The reverse of this
coin is that Israel intends to maintain control of re-united Jerusalem. The
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eighth principle, the call for formal acceptance of Israel by the Arab states, is
closely allied with the first, but is a specific and separate requirement that
the Arabs contractually recognize Israel. Principle nine, regional cooperation,
flows from this in that it speaks of cooperation on resources and com-
munications in the Middle East, presumably involving Israeli technical assist-
ance to the Arabs. Several of these are pie-in-the-sky items, expressing
Israel's hope for "normalcy" and eventual Arab-Israeli cooperation.
The Territories Issue
Officially, Israel has avoided formally specifying its territorial objec-
tives, but public statements by hneli leaders indicate that they are so
substantial that they virtually foreclose the possibility of Arab agreement in
the foreseeable future. The Israelis do not believe peace is possible now, are
not willing to pay a high territorial price for less than full peace, and seem
quite willing to wait a long time to get the peace settlement they want.
Former prime minister Eshkol has said that Israel "will sit tight [on the
cease-fire lines] for 20 years if necessary."
Israel has said categorically that it will not return to the borders that
existed before June 1967 and that this refusal is "absolute, basic, irrevo-
cable." The Israeli Labor Party's (ILP) 'oral doctrine" (which is written) of
April 1971 probably is the most reliable guide to Israeli territorial demands.
The document was drawn up by top ILP leaders in the government, in-
cluding Defense Minister Dayan, and was approved by the party convention.
The ILP, led by Prime Minister Golda Meir, is the largest political party in
Israel and the principal component of the governing coalition. The oral
doctrine is, however, party?not government?policy; it is not necessarily
accepted by other political parties, including other members of the coalition.
The document states that: the Golan Heights will remain under Israeli
control; no Arab army will be permitted to cross the Jordan River; Israel will
return much of the West Bank to Arab rule, retaining only a "security
presence" in the Jordan Valley or along the ridge of hills in the center of the
West Bank, or both; some border areas will be "straightened out," particu-
larly those where Israel is a narrow stnp between the West Bank and the
Mediterranean; a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty will be the
capital of Israel; the Gaza Strip, along with Sharm ash-Shaykh and a strip of
land connecting it with Elat will be retained by Israel; the remainder of the
Sinai will probably be demilitarized. Eban described these conditions as
"essential to prevent new wars and ensure Israel's security."
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Prime Minister Meir in a press interview in March 1 971 gave a similar,
but somewhat fuller, description of Israel's requirements. Mrs. Meir added
that the border around Elat would have to be "negotiated anew," and the
Latrun salient west of Jerusalem would have to be removed, Mrs. Meir also
hinted that Israel might ask for some control over the Gilead Heights in
northern Jordan beyond the present cease-fire lines. The Latrun salient was
useful to the Arabs during the 1948 war, and in 1967 and 1968 the fedayeen
shelled Israeli settlements in the Beisan Valley across the Jordan River from
the Gilead Heights.
Another Israeli proposal that treats the territoriai issue is the "Anon
Plan," drawn up by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon shortly after the
1967 war. Although it is Allon's personal scheme, it has gradually won wide
public approval and probably has the general support of most of the cabinet.
Allon concentrates on the disposition of Jordan's West Bank. He proposes
that the Jordan River be Israel's new "security border" and that Israel annex
a 12- to 18-mile-wide defensive zone parallel to and immediately west of the
river from Beit Shean to the Dead Sea, some 65 miles. This strip?covering
about a third of the West Bank?would have some 20 Israeli fortified
settlements. An Israeli-controlled corridor in the Jericho area would be open
to travelers between the East and West Bank. East Jerusalem would remain
in Israeli hands, and major border changes would be made at Latrun, Kefar
Ezyon (the Etzion bloc) settlement, and Hebron. The rest of the West Bank
could be either an "autonomous" Palestinian entity or returned to .Tordan.
In either event, it would be demilitarized. Both Dayan and Mrs. Meir have
proposed that Israelis retain the right to settle anywhere they choose on the
West Bank.
Israelis are agreed on the over-riding importance of ensuring the
nation's security. They hold differing vie ?NS, however, on just how much
territory is needed and how many Arabs the country can absorb. Some
planners think only in terms of military requirements; others want to annex
certain territories for historic or religious reasons; and still others favor a
combination of both. Economic motives also are important. As the Israelis
have gained a degree of acceptance in the occupied territories, the idea of
keeping them has become more attractive. There are a few on the far
left?the "minimalists" or "doves"?who would offer most of the territories
in the hopes of tempting the Arabs into a viable peace agreement. On the
right, the "maximalists" or "hawks" want to keep all the land Israel now has
and integrate it into Israel. Many of the moderate middle are concerned that
annexation of more territory and absorption of more Arabs will dangerously
dilute the Jewish character of Israel; hence, they want only as much territory
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as will enhance security without adding many Arabs. In a poll conducted in
April 1971, only four percent of the Israelis favored return of all of the
territory occupied in 1967. About 93 percent favored holding all of Jeru-
salem, 86 percent wanted to keep the Golan Heights, and 72 percent
believed that Sharm ash-Shaykh should be held. While 73 percent of those
polled said that they would trade "some" territory for peace, when pressed
on which territories only 18 percent would return even the Sinai.
The oral doctrine and the AlIon Plan should probably be regarded as
Israel's basic negotiating position. Eban, while insisting that everything in the
oral doctrine is negotiable, states that most of its points are "so crucial that
peace will not be possible if we do not get them." Dayan calls the Golan
Heights, Sharm ash-Shaykh, and the Jordan River Israel's eastern border
"vital." He maintains that Israel must be the sole judge of what comprises
"secure boundaries." It would be fine if the Arabs agree, the defense
minister says, but if they do not, "the borders (as determined by Israel)
would be the non-agreed borders." Although Mrs. Meir says that she has
neither a plan nor a map of her own, and that she does not want to keep all
the territories or to stay on all the cease-fire lines, she insists that Israel must
have secure borders. Mrs. Meir said last September that Israel "needs more
than minor modifications; some must be major and less major, but not
minor."
The Israelis are thus agreed among themselves that the Golan Heights,
Jerusalem, and Sharm ash-Shaykh must remain in Israeli hands. Tel Aviv has
indicated that it does not intend to permit a return to the pre-war situation
in the Golan Heights, where Syrian artillery freely harassed the Israeli
settlements in the valley below. Control of the heights has more than
military advantages. It also gives Israel control of the Baniyas River, a major
tributary of the Jordan River, and access to the Yarmuk River and its
valuable water. Control of Jerusalem is not necessary to Israel's defense; tile
Holy City is wanted because of its historic, religious, and emotional associa-
tions. The Israelis are determined never to return East Jerusalem to Arab rule
or to cede a united city to international control. The most the Israeli
Government has ever conceded is that it will permit free access to the
Christian and Moslem shrines, under the jurisdiction of religious institutions.
Attitudes toward Sham ash-Shaykh have hardened over time. From
Israel's point of view, Sharm is useful to Egypt for only one purpose?
interdicting maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aqaba. Thus Egyptian demands
, are prima facie evidence of Egyptian aggressive intent. No Israeli wants to
risk a repetition of the situation of 1956 and 1967, when Egypt summarily
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closed off access to Israel's important port of Elat. The Israelis, remembering
the removal of th. US force in 1967, have adamantly opposed suggestions of
a new form of international control since the end of the 1967 war. They
have long insisted that Israel itself must retain physical control of Sharm
ash-Shaykh, and having built roads, tourist facilities, etc., there, they have
over the past couple of years argued for a substantial swath of Sinai to
guarantee land access to the area.
The bulk of the generally barren, lightly populated Sinai does not
appear to be in dispute. All indications are that the Israeli leaders want
Sharm ash-Shaykh and a route to it, plus an area around Elat; most of the
remainder of the peninsula could presumably be returned to Egypt under a
demilitarization agreement. In November 1972, Dayan said that Israel should
not go back to the old international border with Egypt, that Israel should
keep the Gaza Strip, retain control of the Strait of Tiran, and negotiate a
new line "connecting Sharm ash-Shaykh wIth the Mediterranean." He
avoided specifics, saying only that a new border in Sinai could be negotiated:
it would be "somewhere between" the Suez Canal cease-fire line and the old
international border. Israel is currently establishing several settlements in
northeast Sinai south of the Gaza Strip. They are designed to sever the Gaza
Strip from the Sinai and to establish trong defensive position in an area
which was the scene of hard fighting in the 1967 war. In 1971, Ha'aretz, an
influential Israeli newspaper, published a map which it claimed delineated
Israeli requirements in the Sinai Peninsula. On the map, the line was drawn
from west of El Arish on the Mediterranean directly across the peninsula to
Ras Muhammed at the tip of the Strait of Tiran.
The Population Dilemma
Differences among Israelis over "annexation versus non-annexation"
center primarily on the heavily populated territories: the West Bank and to a
lesser extent the Gaza Strip. The essential dilemma is that to retain these
territories is to absorb many Arab inhabitants as well. Some 600,000 Arabs
live in the West Bank area, about 350,000 more in the Gaza Strip. These, if
added to the 450,000 Arabs in pre-war Israel would bring the total to 1.4
million Arabs, a considerable demographic threat to the 2.5 million Jews in
Israel given an Arab birth rate twice that of the Jews. The Israeli Govern-
ment has never officially iaiked about retaining the West Bank in the same
categorical terms they have used in referring to the Golan Heights, Sharm
ash-Shaykh, and Jerusalem. Some 100,000 Arabs fled the Golan Heights
when the 1967 war began, and only a small number of Druze remain. The
Sinai contains only a few thousand wandering Bedouins. The Old City of
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Jerusalem has an Arab population of some 72,000; the Arabs already are
outnumbered by Jews, and Tel Aviv is consciously settling more and more
Jewish immigrants there to establish an overwhelming majority.
Until the Israelis were able to halt Arab terrorism in the Gaza Strip in
late 1971 and early 1972, they had expressed little interest in retaining the
area. Before that, Israeli officials generally had talked only in negative terms,
i.e., that the strip could not be returned to Egyptian control. In May 1972,
Israeli Minister of Information Galili openly declared that Israel intends to
retain control of the Gaza Strip indefinitely. Israeli officials have not said so
for public consumption, but they have stated privately that some very
considerable shifts of the Arab population out of the strip will have to be
made. They are breaking up the several refugee camps there and are seeking
to place refugees close to municipalities where they can find jobs?a device
the Israelis hope will break the "refugee complex."
In the past few weeks, ILP leaders have been debating the future of the
Arab territories, specifically the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The debate
was prompted by Dayan who had proposed an extended period of Arab-
Israeli co-existence, during which Israel would step up economic invest-
milts, raise the standard of living, extend public services, and make social
improvements with the ultimate aim of I,inding the Arab inhabitants of the
West Bank and Gaza to Israel. Dayan, who is very pessimistic regarding a
favorable peace settlement, contends that Israel should not push for a
settlement involving these areas now. Israel, he believes, needs more than
territorial security on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Jews must have
the right to "settle, work, and pray" in these territories. Dayan believes that
the government should either decide to close its borders to Arab workers
coming into Israel or help them with their problems and accept them as
permanent laborers. Some 55,000 Arabs now come to Israel to work, about
40,000 of them legally.
As long ago as 1968 Dayan called for economic integration "froin
Jerusalem to Gaza." In May 1969, he said his prime concern was not to force
the Israeli victory down Arab throats, but to find "a human as well as a
political solution." He pointed out there are 2.5 million Jews and 100
million Arabs; Israel could fight them, he said, but "eventually we shall have
to live with them, not like the French did in Algeria, or the British in India,
but like equal human beings, working together." Dayan's political lieutenant,
Minister of Transport Shimon Peres, supported his chief with a plan for a
federal arrangement between Israel and the territories in which "instead of
dividing the country, you divide the administration." The plan has not been
spelled out.
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Finance Minister Sapir, Allon, Eban and Mrs. Meir have all criticized
Dayan's "integrationist" proposals. They say his plan is disguised annexation
that closes off chances for a peace settlement. They call it unsound both
demographically and economically. Sapir has pointed out that Israel already
has spent $33 million on the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, money he
Leheves could have been more profitably spent in solving Israel's housing and
immigration problems. Sapir contends that economic and social integration
of the Arab population would inevitably lead to political integration and
endanger the Jewish character of the state.
The Personal Angle
The more recent attacks on Dayan smack of jockeying for political
advantage. The parliamentary elections scheduled for October 1973 may be
part of a succession struggle, because Mrs. Meir, now 74, says she would like
to step down, and if not dissuaded by her party, she will probably do so not
too long after the elections. Dayan, Sapir, Anon and Eban regard themselves
as potential successors. Sapir, the leading candidate, if his health and inclina-
tions permit, is regarded as a "minimalist" on the Arab territories issue. He is
particularly concerned that Israel not dilute the Jewish majority. Sapir not
ol:ly strongly disagrees with Dayan over integrating with the West Bank, but
also has publicly taken Dayan to task for his contention that Sharm ash-
Shaykh is more important than peace. According to Sapir, "It's not just a
matter of a formula, Sharm ash-Shaykh, or ensuring sea passage through the
Red Sea or the Suez Canal; this is of utmost importance, but what is most
important is peace." Sapir, like the others, favors retaining the Golan
Heights, Gaza, Sharm ash-Shaykh and East Jerusalem.
Mrs. Meir is somewhat less "dovish" on the territories than Sapir, but
she has spoken out r.igainst the "maximalists." She does believe there can be
no return tL the old borders, that the new borders must give no natural
advantage to the Arabs, and that the expanded Israel should contain as few
Arats as possible. Mrs. Meir has frequently reiterated that she did not want
"to count the population every morning when she got up to see if it was still
Jewish." She has acknowledged that perhaps Israel could provide more social
services for Arabs in the territories, and she would like to see a greater
government effort to develop employment opportunities there rather than in
Israel.
AlIon, with an eye to the succession, has lined up in the recent debate
with Sapir and against Dayan. Allo;, in fact, has recently come down on the
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need for reasonable territorial compromises. By moving closer to the
"doves" he probably hopes to influence the ILP king-maker, Sapir. A11011
says Israel should push for negotiations instead of settling for the status quo.
He argues that instead of permanently occupying the territories, Israel
should press for a settlement that guarantees Israel "free access to all the
areas now under Israeli administration, without leaving Israel in control." He
would preserve the Jewish character of the state, and he opposes Israeli
settlement in the heavily Arab-populated areas of the occupied territories.
He believes that the croblem of employment in the territories must be solved
within the territories.
Eban agrees with Sapir and Allon on the need to keep Israel's options
open for peace. He believes that Israel should have new borders, but that
they should not enclose a sizable Arab minority. He generally favors the
Mon Plan for the West Bank because it removes an area heavily populated
by Arabs. Emphasis, he feels, should be shifted from the employment of
Arabs in Israel to a more vigorous development of the territories' economy.
Parties and Factions
Mrs. Meir has now shut off the debate, apparently to prevent further
breaches in the party, and perhaps also to deny the popular Dayan further
publicity. Mrs. Meir's govornment is a coalition, and its various components
do not agree on the territorial questions. Differences exist not only between
the two main coalition parties, Mrs. Meir's Labor Alignment and the
National Religious Party, but also within the Alignment itself. Mrs. Meir
argues that Israelis have no need to fight among themselves or draw a map as
long as the Arabs are not ready to negotiate. Rather than risk the sort of
debate that could cause further friction within the coalition and the party,
she falls back on a proposition on which everyone can agree: Israel will stand
firm on the cease-fire lines until there is a binding contractual peace agree-
ment and withdraw only to "secure and recognized borders."
"Doves" in Israel, the Israeli "minimalists," are not an important
political factor; they represent less than five percent of the voters and hold
only a half dozen seats in the 120-seat Knesset. Even the largest element in
the "peace without annexation" group, the Rakah (New Communist) party,
holds only three seats. Its membership is mostly Arab, and it follows an Arab
nationalist line.
The "right" is a more important element. The most vocal and the
second largest party in Israel is the super-nationalist GAHAL party, which
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Lino-up of the Israeli Political Parties
in the Seventh Knesset - 120 seats
(elected October 1969)
Government Coalition:
Number seats
Labor Alignment (Israeli Labor Party,
(Mapai, Ahdut, Rafi); MAPAM)
56
Alignment Minorities Party (Tame Arab parties)
4
National Religious Party (NRP)
12
Independent Liberal Party (Moderate
non-socialist)
4
76
Outside Coalition:
GAHAL (Herut-Liberal Bloc) - right
26
Agudat Israel (Ultra-orthodox - religious)
4
Poali Agudat Yisrael (Religious; labor arm of
2
Agudat)
State List (dissident RAF I) - center right
4
Free Center (Split-off from Herut) - right
2
Haolem Hazeh (New Force) (maverick: Uri
1
Avneri) - left
RAKAH (Arab Communist)
3
MAKI (Jewish Communist)
1
Independent
1
120
*Make-up of Labor Alignment: 56 seats: MAPAI 33
Ahdut 8
(Israel Labor Party-MAPAM) Rafi 8
49
MAPAM 7
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has polled 22 percent of the vote and holds 26 Knesset seats. GAHAL, led
by former Irgun terrorist Menahem Begin, advocates the immediate annexa-
tion of all the occupied territories and the re-establishment of the ancient
borders of Eretz Israel (The Land of Israel), purposely left undefined.
GAHAL is really an alliance of two groups, Herut and Liberals, but they
agree on an expansionist line. Begin condemns all suggestions that any of the
occupied territories be given back; once asked about their return, he replied
"What do you mean? They have been returned to Israel." GAHAL is not
now a member of the government coalition. It quit in August 1970 after
Mrs. Meir had said she would accept the principle of withdrawal and agreed
to renew indirect talks through Ambassador Jarring. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment is still sensitive to charges that it is likely to "give away" too much
of Israel's heritage in order to obtain peace. GAHAL has only limited
potential for providing an alternative to the Labor government, but it can
cut into labor's electoral margin and make governing more difficult. This is
enough to worry the Labor Party.
There are a handful of annexationists in such right-wing splinter groups
as the. tiny Free Center Party and the State List party (dissident RAFI).
Also, the "Whole Land of Israel Movement," though not a political party, is
an annexationist lobby with several Knesset members from various parties in
its ranks. It advocates the present cease-fire lines as the minimum permanent
borders and calls for the expulsion of the Arabs from the territories.
The most important elements on the Israeli right are the religious
parties, on whom the labor parties have depended to form coalitions. No
Israeli party has ever won a majority on its own. Mrs. Meir's Labor Align-
ment came close to achieving one in the 1969 parliamentary elections, but
she still needs the National Religious Party, the largest of three religious
parties, to carry on the government. In the last election, the three religious
parties received some 15 percent of the vote and hold 18 seats in the
Knesset. The National Religious Party won 12 percent of the vote and holds
12 seats. Its influence is disproportionate to its popular support, however,
and it holds three cabinet posts. The religious parties are deeply concerned
about ,he retention of the Old City of Jerusalem with its Wailing Wall, its
Jewish tombs and cemeteries, and about the biblically important West Bank,
which the Israelis administratively term Judea and Samaria. They established
without government support the Jewish settlement at Hebron on the West
Bank, which is developing into a large, modern, rapidly expanding Jewish
community. Israeli investment there is considerable, and it seems unlikely
that any proposal to isolate the Jewish settlement at Hebron?Israel's second
most holy city?would cause a new uproar.
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Beside those whose primary concern is with keeping only sites of religious
significance, there is a strong "maximalist" element in the National Religious
Party that opposes withdrawal from any of the territories. The party is
involved in a bitter leadership struggle, and a decision to return most of the
West Bank (e.g., implement the Allon Plan) would almost certainly split the
party and probably would bring about a cabinet crisis. The relationship
between the Labor Alignment and the National Religious Party was con-
stantly strained over the past year as a result of a bitter domestic struggle
between the secular and the religious parties on the role of religion in the
state. Since the departure of GAFIAL from the coalition in 1970, the
government became more dependent on the support of the National
Religious Party and therefore more sensitive to its views.
The main coalition member, Mrs. Meir's Labor Alignment, holds a
middle ground on the territories. There are differences within the Align-
ment's four factions and among the rival leaders. The ILP is made up of
three labor groups which at various times have come together, fallen out, and
been reunited. The MAPA1 Party of the early pioneer Zionist establishment
is now led by Mrs. Meir and Sapir. Smaller and to the right is the RAFI
group headed by Dayan and Shimon Peres, and smaller and to the left is the
Ahdut Ha'Avoda led by Allon. In the Knesset, MAPAI holds 33 seats, RAF1
eight, and Ahdut eight. Knesset seats were awarded by agreement and do not
reflect relative strengths within the party. In an internal party election
engineered by Sapir in December 1970, MAPAI won some 67 percent of the
vote, while Ahdut drew 19 percent and RAFI only 14 percent. Sapir,
although no longer party secretary, is still the real boss who rallies the
majorities and dispenses favors to the faithful and punishment to the unruly.
The other partner in the Labor Alignment is MAPAM. It did not fully
merge with the ILP because of policy and personality differences. It stands
on the extreme left wing of the Israeli labor movement. It has modified its
earlier pro-Soviet line, but still tends to be pro-Arab in outlook and is the
only "middle of the road" Israeli party that permits direct Arab member-
ship. Early on, MAPAM called for the return of all territories taken in the
1967 war, but has since moved closer to accepting the position that some
additional territory is necessary for security. In the event of a serious peace
proposal by the Arabs, MAPAM would argue for considerable concessions.
MAPAM leaders, in fact, made it clear when they entered the Labor Align-
ment that they did so in part to counter Dayan and strengthen the hand of
the anti-annexationists.
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At its party convention in December 1972, MAPAM urged restraint in
annexing territory "not necessary for security" and in actions likely to
undermine the basic rights of the Arabs in Israel and in the occupied
territories. MAPAM spoke out against creating permanent settlements in the
territories which might become "an obstacle to peace," but gave its approval
to a new settlement in northeast Sinai south of the Gaza Strip. The
disposition of Gaza, the party said, should be decided on the basis of Israel's
security needs, the desires of the residents, and a solution to thr) refugee
problem. MAPAM indicated that the Golan Heights and the West Bank could
be derMlitarized and returned after a new border was negotiated. The party
insisted that Jerusalem remain the capital of Israel. The party made no
specific mention of Sharm ash-Shaykh, stating only that a settlement shculd
be based on demilitarization of the area "until" the necessary border
adjustments for Israel's security are made.
Dayan is immensely popular with the Israeli public and highly respected
as a military expert; nevertheless, he has little political wal;op in the ILP.
Mrs. Meir and the "Old Guard" establishment want to keep him within the
party because he is a great asset in the party and would be dangerous to
them outside. He knows this and obtained concessions by threatening to bolt
the party in the 1969 elections. He may press his advantage agaia in 1973,
AlIon may have a little more strength in the party than Dayan, but he is
by no means as popular with the public. The two are bitter rivals. Eban, a
-MAPAInik," has no personal political constituency and owes his position
primarily to his verbal and diplomatic prowess. Eban links himself with
"doves" like Sapir. It has been rumored recently that Sapir is grooming Eban
as Mrs. Meir'.; successor.
The Electorate
Issues of peace and security are of over-riding concern in debate and of
little consequence in votes. The Israeli voter is likely to vote for his chosen
party, its established philosophy, its leaders, and its over-all policies, rather
than the party position on any specific question. He votes for a whole
system of beliefs?a way of life?whether it be labor-socialist, free enterprise,
religious, or Communist, in a "womb-to-tomb" atmosphere, with utmost
faith that his part; 's leaders will come up with the right formulas. If he
disagrees with the party, he is more likely to try to reform party policies
than to shift to another party. This is why the parties are so important in
Israeli political life.
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Despite a tripling in the size of the electorate and shifts in its composi-
tion (e.g., the addition of greater numbers of Jews of Middle Eastern and
North African origin, as opposed to European, and the increased number of
Sabras), in the seven parliamentary elections since 1948, Israel's labor-
oriented socialist parties (MAPAI, Ahdut Avoda, RAFI, and MAPAM) have
received between 48 and 52 percent of the vote, the free enterprise rightist
partic.ss such as GAHAL (Herut-Liberal Bloc) 24 to 28 percent of the vote,
the rel,Igious parties 12 to 15 rrcerit, the Communist 3 to 4 percent, and
assorted independents and mavericks less than 3 percent.
In the elections of October 1969, the only one since the 1967 war, the
newly formed Labor-MAPAM Alignment lost seven seats of the 63 held by
its constituent parts. Labor's main rival, GAHAL, gained three seats, winning
a total of 26, The Israeli voter in 1969, as before, in effect voted for the
status quo. History would suggest that he will do so again this year, even if
the debate on the issues of peace, security, and the territories is wide open.
Indeed the debate so far has had a familiar ring; neither the debaters
nor their views are new, and spokesmen of most of the partie;. have
reiterated the general views of their parties. GAHALists expect to pick up a
few seats from the Alilnment, but as the result of domestic social and
economic problems, not foreign issues. Mrs. Meir, as leader of the Labor
Alignment, has taken a tough and popular stance on foreign policy issues and
has all but eliminated the possibility of any effective criticism from the right.
The alignment contains almost the whole galaxy of Israeli stars: Mrs. Meir,
Dayan, Alion, Eban, Sapir, and Peres; its principal problem in 1973 will be
to muffle internal differences.
The impact that a truly serious Arab proposal for an over-all peace
settlement would have on the Israeli electorate is difficult to measure. Few
Israelis could be convinced that a settlement is anywhere near. In any event,
most voters would probably continue to accept their own party leaders'
definition of what is required for "secure and recognized borders." Mrs. Meir
has the prestige and stature to change public opinion if she chooses. Dayan,
too, as the most trusted of Israeli military experts, could play a key, if not
determining role, in border decisions. The vast majority of Israelis would be
inclined to accept his judgment on the territory required for security and
territory that can be given up without endangering security. Dayan's ability
to influence the public on this matter underscores why the ILP will try its
best to keep him within the party fold.
If there is any change in the next few months, it will almost certainly
be toward a harder, not a softer, position than that enunciated in the oral
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doctrine. The general trend since 1967 has clearly been to feel increasing
security in the physical possession of Arab territory and to put no trust in
Arab statements and proposals.
Can the Arabs Reassure Israel?
It Would take a virtual torrent of Arab statements and professions of
sincerity over an extended time to convince Tel Aviv that the Arabs?after
25 years of hostility?finally had gone beyond a grudging willingness to
accept the continued existence of Israel to an lie int desire for a peace
settlement. Tel Aviv views the Arab peace efforts to date as no more than
maneuvers to force Israel back into its pre-war borders and to prepare a new
Arab onslaught. The Arabs' call for the solution to the Palestinian refugee
problem is seen as another device to dilute the Jewish Israeli state by forcing
Israel to re-incorporate large numbers of Arabs within its borders. Israeli
leaders still cite the Arab resolution at Khartoum after the 1967 war that
called for "no recognition, no negotiation. and no peace with Israel." The
Israelis feel there must be a total transformation of the Arab attitude toward
the Israeli people and the existence of the Israeli state before real peace is
possible. They foresee no such transformation for years to come.
Israeli leaders have all along contended that the test of Arab sincerity is
direct negotiations. Mrs. Meir has said, "If they aren't willing to set down
with us, they don't accept us." Tel Aviv attaches great importance to direct
face-to-face negotiations and has regularly insisted that there be such nego-
tiations at some point before any peace settlement. Tel Aviv, however,
would certainly require more than face-to-face negotiations. Tel Aviv would
look for signs of Arab acceptance of Israel's "nine principles" as explained
by Eban.
It would not be difficult for the Arabs to give visible evidence that they
would accept the stir.e of Israel. King Husayn's reported plan to rebuild and
repeople the east side of the Jordan River Valley would almost certainly be
favorably received in Israel. Dayan, in talking of an interim settlement with
Egypt, indicated that it would be a "good sign" if Cairo began to rebuild the
cities on the west baniz of the Suez Canal. This would be a sign to Tel Aviv
of a real change of heart in Egypt.
With the sometimes exception of King Husayn of Jordan, Israel sees the
differences among Arab leaders only as varying degrees of untrustworthiness
and unreliability. As seen in Tel Aviv, the only real common denominator
among the Arab leaders is their anti-Israel phobia. Tel Aviv was happy to see
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Nasir go, not only because of his staying power in the face of defeat, but also
because of his strong, negative influence throughout the Middle East. His
successor Sadat is no real improvement in the Israeli view; he is erratic and
unpredictable, and the Israelis allege he is looking to the Big Powers to solve
his problems for him. When Sadat declared his willingness to make peace
with Israel, Mrs. Meir asked, "but does he mean it?" Mrs. Meir has said that
Sadat, like his predecessor, lacks the courage to stand up to defeat and make
peace.
Most Israelis view Husayn as somewhat of an anomaly in the Arab
world. Recently Mrs. Meir paid him an unusual tribute, saying she really
believed that the King was sincere in his desire for peace. Israel could not yet
make peace with him because?although Husayn was on the right track?he
wanted to "return to the situation of pre-war 1967." Israelis recall that
Husayn was drawn into the 1967 war, and they believe he could be again. He
is not his own master, they say; and is therefore unable to make a separate
peace with Israel. Even if he should attempt to meet Israeli terms, they fear
he would be quickly disposed of and replaced by a radical, probably
pro-Soviet, government. The Israelis fear that a peace settlement with one
Arab head of state will be disavowed by a successor, another reason why the
value of territory for security looms large in Israeli eyes.
The Palestinians: A Footnote
In some Arab minds, the problem of the Palestinian refugees is almost
as important as the return of the occupied Arab territories. Most Israeli
leaders, however, regard the refugee problem as essentially an Arab concern.
They have indicated that they would cooperate in offering each refugee a
one-time choice between repatriation and resettiement outside of Israel with
international financial help. The Israelis would want to be assured that the
overwhelming majority chose resettlement.
The Israelis say they would not negotiate with the Palestinians. Mrs.
Meir contends, "They have nothing to offer us, and we have nothing to offer
them." Ir the historical Palestine 1tween the Mediterranean and the borders
of Iraq, according to Mrs. Meir, there can be only two states, one Arab and
one Jewish. She contended that the Palestinians form a majority of the
population of Jordan and have accepted the citizenship of Jordan. "If they
want to change the name of the state from Jordan to Palestine, this is not a
decision to be made by Israel." The capital, she said, is not in Jerusalem or
the West Bank, but in Amman. Mrs. Meir flatly opposes the establishment of
any independent Palestinian state on the West Bank; it would, she says, be
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"too small to be viable, but big enough to make war against Israel." Her
statements mirror the widespread sentiment that if the Israelis were to make
concessions, such as permitting any of the refugees to return to their original
homes, it would open the floodgates and eventually swamp the Jewish
majority.
Mrs. Meir, Sapir, Eban, and Dayan all oppose the establishment of a
Palestinian state on the West Bank. The Israelis summarily rejected King
Husayn's proposal of March 1972 (made in connection with the Israeli-
sponsored municipal elections on the West Bank) for the formation in the
post-settlement period of a federal state made up of East Bank Jordan and
an autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank. Mrs. Meir scored the
proposal because it was unilateral and suggested Jerusalem as the capital. Tel
Aviv's real opposition, however, is deeper. No Israeli wants an independent
state on the West Bank; "Fourteen Arab states are enough."
Only Allon has shown signs of flexibility. He recently said that Israel
will have to face up to the problem of the refugees and hold talks with both
the Jordanians and Palestinians. Peace with Jordan, he went on, demands a
permanent solution to the Palestinian problem. He said that he believes there
is a distinctive Palestinian people and a "painful and vexing" Palestinian
problem. Allon said closing the door on the problem would only push the
Palestinians toward extreme nationalism, more fighting, and terrorism. Allon
did not spell out what he has in mind, but his original plan suggested that the
part of the West Bank not under direct Israeli control could either be
returned to Jordan or be established as a semi-autonomous entity.
Meanwhile?Back in the Territr ries
In June 1972, Dayan noted that the choice of locations of the Israeli
settlements in the occupied Arab territories had been carefully planned and
conformed with Israel's statement that it would not return to the former
boundaries. Eban has said that the settlements were centered in the areas
"where we believe we will remain after the change of borders." Mrs. Meir has
remarked that "nothing had been done in the occupied territories "without a
cabinet decision" and added that no particularly stormy arguments had
preceded these decisions.
Dayan has championed the argument that Israel had to "create facts"
(establish defensive points via Israeli settlements) in the occupied territories
if it did not want to be pushed back to the pre-war borders. In 1969 Dayan
called for the establishment of a "new map." He stated flatly that Israel
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could not wait for the Arabs to negotiate, but must unilaterally shape its
own future borders into a "new reality from which Israel does not intond to
withdraw." "Israel," Dayan said, "should leave no option to the Arabs."
While Dayan is the most vocal proponent of "creating facts," the develop-
ments in the occupied territories have, as Mrs. Meir suggested, been carried
out with general government approval, including the ILP and Sapir.
Israeli officials insist that "everything is negotiable," and nothing is
irreversible, but the growing "facts" in the occupied territories indicate the
contrary. These include the establishment of Jewish settlements, joint
Israeli-Arab businesses, the expansion of trade and commerce, the extension
of Israeli banks and use of Israeli currency, an integrated postal system, the
extension of Israeli law and social and health services, the extension of
public utilities such as telephone and electricity, the improvement and
expansion of the highway system, and the construction of tourist centers,
airports, and military bases. Some of these contributions were made in the
belief that economic and social programs would undercut the appeal of
fedayeen and terrorist groups. Others seem to aim at tying the areas to Israel.
As of November 1972, there were some 45 settlements in the ter-
ritories. Fifteen of these are in the Golan Heights, 18 are on the West Bank,
three in the Gaza Strip, and nine in Sinai. In October 1972, Finance Minister
Sapir reported that $72 million has so far been invested in these settlements.
Jerusalem
East Jerusalem is a case of outright Israeli annexation. After the 1967
war, the Israelis merged the old city and its 70,000, mostly Arab, inhabitants
with West Jerusalem and proclaimed the united city the capital of Israel.
(Israel had held West Jerusalem since the 1948 war and declared that area
the capital in 1970.)
The Knesset on 27 June 1967 increased the size of the city, from 14
square miles to 40 square miles, merged the previously divided city services,
and installed Israeli law. Tilt? Israelis have steadily moved toward "Israeliza-
tion" of the city. As of 1 January 1969, Jerusalem's population was
275,000, composed of about 205,000 Jews and 70,000 Arabs. The Israeli
master plan for Jerusalem in 1985 projects a population of 400,000, with
295,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs. Within the expanded mun:cipal area,
housing construction is designed to help create a single city with a resident
Jewish majority so as to make any future attempts to re-divide it all but
impossible. By April 1972, about 7,500 housing units had been built for an
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estimated 26,000 Jews, New Jewish immigrants, particularly those from the
Soviet Union, are given priority.
In annexing Jerusalem, the Israelis have thus far expropriated over
4,000 acres, of which 3,000 are believed to have been owned by Arabs, most
of whom have refused compensation for fear of legally acknowledging the
Israeli take-over. Israel has also moved many government offices into East
Jerusalem. Because the Arabs refuse to sit on the Jerusalem municipal
council, it is composed entirely of Jews and operates as do other Israeli city
councils?except that it receives more high-level cabinet guidance.
West Bank
For some time after the war, the West Bank presented a difficult and
complicated problem of control for Israel because of the presence of some
600,000 Palestinians. This has eased considerably.
To deal with this problem, Israel has established 13 Jewish settlements
in the Jordan Valley (the "defensive zone" plan along the Jordan River
proposed by AlIon). Another five settlements arc on the West Bank heights
(preferred by Dayan), at Kefar Ezyon just south of Jerusalem, and at
Hebron?both sites of pre-1948 Jewish settlements. One Israeli settlement on
the West Bank is located in the Latrun salient area. In addition, the Israelis
are completing a 240-mile north-south all-weather road from the Yarmuk
River at the southern tip of the Sea of Galilee down to the port of Elat.
In the five years since the war, the economy of the West Bank has been
turned around, away from Jordan and toward Israel. Some 20,000-30,000
West Bank Arabs now work in Israel, and while trade with Jordan continues,
trade between Israel and the West Bank has sharply increased. Local and
municipal governments depend on the military government for financing,
and Israeli public utilities have been extended. A growing body of Wet
Bankers, although they clearly do not love the Israelis, are benefiting
economically and are developing an interest in the status quo.
Although the militarv government has regarded any resumption of Arab
political activity in the territories as potentially dangerous, in April-May
1972?largely at the instigation of Dayan and to offset Husayn's federal
union proposal?the Israelis sponsored elections in the major towns of the
West Bank and, despite terrorist threats and Amman's opposition, obtained a
large turnout of voters. Minister of :,-.risport and Communications Shimon
Peres, an associate of Dayan, subsequently publicized a proposal that would
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tic the West Bank, and eventually the other territories, to Israel in some sort
of federal relationship. Perhaps with some Israeli urging, the Arab mayor of
Hebron, Muhammad Jabiri, suggested shortly after the municipal elections
that a regional executive assembly, composed of West Bank and Gazan
representatives, should be formed "to negotiate for peace."
Israel denies it wants to annex the West Bank outright, but a satellite
territory on the West Bank, turned away from and independent of Amman
and bound closely to Israel, is in fact being established. Israel seems to be
trying to draw a pragmatic assent from the Palestinians to such an arrange-
ment, based on the premise that the Israelis are going to be around for a long
time,
Golan Heights
In the 500-square-mile Golan Heights of Syria the Israelis have been
able to act freely because the Arab population of some 100,000 has fled.
The Israelis have treated the Golan Heights as an absorbed area, vital for
strategic and defensive reasons. They have razed abandoned Syrian towns
and villages, vastly improved road communications, developed new water
resources, and established strong defensive military installations. They have
set up 15 Israeli settlements, and one of the newer ones will have an aircraft
parts factory. The settlem ents are connected with the Israeli electric grid and
telephone system and are under Israeli courts and laws. Schools and health
clinics have been opened for the settlers and cooperative Druzes; Israeli beef
cattle graze and Israeli fruit trees and wheat grow on former Syrian land.
Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip, formerly Egyptian, has been the most intractable of all
the occupied Arab territories to the Israelis. Gaza has been the scene of
sporadic Arab terrorism, and anti-Israeli sentiment is virulent among the
Arab refugee population. The refugees, who make up two thirds of its
350,000 population, live in poverty in eight over-crowded refugee camps. In
August 1971, Israeli authorities instituted a get-tough program to eliminate
terrorism in the Strip and by December they had largely succeeded. The
program consisted principally of aividing the camps into smaller units and
resettling large numbers of refugees. Despite the terrorist problem, Israel has
established three Israeli settlements in Gaza and plans more.
Along with security control, the 1: lulls in Gaza have had to deal with
underemployment. In the first six months of 1968, many thousands of
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Gazans were "encouraged" to move to the West and East Bank of Jordan
and were transported there by the Israelis. Reports conflict on the numbers
involved. The Israelis say about 20,000, but UNRWA officials believc about
50,000 persons may have been moved out. In any event, not enough moved
to suit the Israelis. In August 1967 the Israelis opened their gates to Gazan
laborers. Currently some 9,000 workers with valid permits are employed in
Israel, and perhaps another 12,000 are working without permits. In Gaza,
the Israelis have set up one Israeli-run and one Arab-run citrus packing plant,
both of which went into operation in 1969. The citrus industry is Gaza's
principal economic activity, producing some 100,000 metric tons of fruit a
year. Other local industries have been encouraged by the Israelis, and Israeli
manufacturers are sending Israeli semi-finished goods into Gaza for final
processing. The Israelis have also transferred some plants into the Strip, and
the Gazan electrical system has been connected to the Israeli grid. Recently
the Israelis have initiated a program aimed at the eventual elimination of the
refugee camps, integrating them into regular municipal centers. Last
November, regular passenger rail service from Tel Aviv to Gaza was re-
established. The line had been idle since British mandate days.
Sinai
Israel's interest in the deserts of he Sinai Peninsula is largely strategic.
The main Israeli defense line runt; along the Suez Canal, the so?called
"Bar-Lev" line. At Sharm ash-Shaykh, which controls the entrance to the
Strait of Tiran and loads to Israel's port of Elat, the Israelis are digging in
with the intention for an indefinite stay. In addition to the Israeli military
airfields, barracks, etc., tourist accommodations have been built, and a new
civilian settlement named Ophir is under way. A new all?weather road,
opened in 1971, connects Sharm ash-Shaykh with Elat, and two other Israeli
settlements and/or tourist centers have been built midway between Elat and
Sharm ash-Shaykh. A ferry uervice from Elat to Sharm ash-Shaykh is also in
operation. On the Mediterranean side of the peninsula the Israelis have
established six additional, settlements, a fishing settlement at Bardawil and an
agricultural settlement outside the town of al'Arish on former Egyptian
farmland. Four other settlements have been located between al'Arish and the
Gaza Strip, at specific Israeli con,rol points.
The Israelis began operating the offshore oil well in the Balaaini area
along the Gulf of Suez shortly after the 1967 war. Subsequently, on-shore
wells were restored to production. Total production has now reached some 5
to 6 million tons annually, more than the Egyptians had previously been able
to extract.
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