SOUTH OF THE HIMALAYAS: THE VIEW FROM PEKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160037-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 26, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
South of the Himalayas: The View From Peking
OP, 0
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NOT DESTROY 7 Secret
Dl t26 February 1973
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 February 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
South of the Himalayas: The View From Peking
Summary
At a time when Chinese diplomacy has generally been deft and success-
ful, it has lost ground in South Asia. China's staunchest ally in the region,
Pakistan, has been dismembered, leaving India far and away the region's
strongest power. Worse, India is allied with the Soviet Union, Peking's
greatest enemy. As a result, Peking's policy has been generally hamstrung,
except in the smaller nations of the region.
Peking's current South Asiarr policy may be the result of unforeseen
events as much as of calculation, In the period after the Cultural Revolution,
its perception of Moscow as a dangerous adversary and its freshly rekindled
desire to assume China's "rightful" role in world affairs generated an attempt
to forge closer ties not only with old friends in South Asia, particularly
Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), but also with India. Then, in the spring of
1971, came the Bengali separatist crisis in Pakistan's East Wing. In the
beginning. 'eking tried both to support Pakistani unity and maintain its
letente with India, but when full-scale fighting broke out in December 1971,
its diplomatic balancing act not surprisingly collapsed.
The Chinese now find their South Asien policy mortgaged to the
Pakistanis and to Bhutto. The Chinese find it necessary to maintain Bhutto
in office for fear of ending up with someone worse. At the same time, they
would like to strengthen him so that he would feel freer to move toward a
settlement with Bangladesh and India. Only then would the Chinese consider
the time ripe to renew the move to rapprochement with India.
In Peking's eyes, a Sino-Indian rapprochement would trigger an adjust-
ment in big power interests in the region: i.e., a more self-sufficient India, a
more modest role for the Soviet Union, and a larger role for Peking and
perhaps for the US as well.
Note: Comr ants and aucrles regarding this publication are welcomed. They may be
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The Making of a Policy
In the late 11960s, Peking, emerging from four years of intense in-
trospection during the Cultural Revolution, again turned its sights beyond its
borders. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and periodic skir-
mishes along the China-USSR border had persuaded Peking that the USSR
was an immediate and dangerous adversary. This judgment provided a focus
for Chinese policy In South Asia, where it became a Chinese objective to
foster a belt of friendly states, free from significant Soviet influence if not
wholly amenable to that of China-an aim congruent with Chinese desire for
an important role in world affairs. These considerations pointed Peking
toward more conventional ties and contacts with states without much regard
to ideological hue.
On the Indian subcontinent, Peking's task was two-fold: to firm up
Chinese relations with old friends, especially Pakistan and Ceylon (now Sr:
Lanka), and to forge new and closer bonds with India. Even though Pakistan
had remained one of China's few close allies during the Cultural Revolution
and Chinese leaders felt deeply about the friendship, by 1970 Peking appears
to have decided that success or failure of its policy turned on reconciliation
with New Delhi. Although India, lacking nuclear arms, posed no real military
threat to Peking-the Indian Army had been chastened by the Chinese in
1962 and the Himalayas were a formidable barrier-China was uneasy over
the possibility that India might acquire more powerful weapons, or, worse
yet, that the Soviets might secure base rights on Indian territory.
The Chinese decided that the situation called for moderation and
flexibility. Hostile propaganda dropped away. Peking refurbished its already
formidable credentials in Islamabad by assuring President Yahy& Kahn that
any detente with 'India would not be pursued at Pakistan's expense and by
granting a new $200-million loan. Chinas relations with Sri Lanka improved
after Mrs. Bandaranaike was elected prime minister in 1970; they improved
again when Chou En-lai convinced her that China was not involved in the
unsuccessful Ceylonese left-wing uprising of April 1971 and then granted a
sizable hard-currency loan to Colombo.
Cy 1970, Peking was dropping discreet hints that the Chinese were
interested in exploring ways to mend relations witt' New Delhi. There were
overt gestures of friendship, including one by Mao himself on May Day
1970. Moreover, the Chinese maintained a hands-off attitude toward anti-
government tribal and ethnic insurgencies in India's far northeast. The
mn-nentum of the Sino-Indian rapprochement was shown in November 1970
when the Chinese advised the Pakistanis not to be surprised if Peking
normalized ties with New Delhi. Perhaps not coincidentally, Indo-Soviet
relations cooled somewhat during the period.
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Crisis on the Subcontinent: A Fly in the Soup
The general trend toward better relations was ended when the crisis in
East Pakistan erupted in March 1971. The events in East Pakistan have
controlled the pace and substance of diplomacy and politics in South Asia
ever since. The Bengali separatist drive in the East posed serious policy
problems for Peking. In the past China had lent propaganda and other
support to indigenous national liberation struggles as a means of advancing
its interests in nonaligned and economically underdeveloped countries.
Bengali independence, however, could stivaulate separatists in Baluchistan
and the Northwest Frontier Province, Iei,dlng to a complete breakup of
Pakistan and perhaps even to fragmentatio.: of the entire subcontinent. Such
an unstable situation was sure to engage thi; interest of outside powers like
the Soviet Union and US, and Peking could see little immediate gain in
espousing the Bengali cause at Islamabad's ';xpense.
The turn of events also clearly endangered Peking's budding detente
with New Delhi. As the crisis deepened, the Indians came to attach great
importance to Bengali independence and thus were more interested in arms
and political backing from the big powers, rather than long-range diplomatic
goals, such as normalization of Sino-Indian relations. Heavy-handed Chinese
support for Pakistan, the Chinese recognized, couldd, cement Moscow's posi-
tion in New Delhi. A major factor in Peking's calculations was the concern
that Moscow would take advantage of the situation to expand Soviet
influence in South Asia. Chinese apprehensions on this score were raised by
the accelerated pace of high-level Indo-Soviet consultations in the spring and
early summer.
Peking's choice of policy was complicated, almost hamstrung, by a lack
of assets in the region. China had insufficient standing with India to play the
role of honest broker and attempt to reduce tensions through mediation. On
the other hand, a forceful Chinese reaction would only underscore Peking's
limited ability to influence events on the subcontinent and would clash with
the reasonable image it was trying to project. Great distances and difficult
terrain limited Peking's ability to bring its military power to bear, or even to
supply the Pakistani Army for extended periods. Confronted with a rapidly
deteriorating situation and cross-currents of policy goals and perhaps lacking
a solid understanding of the subcontinent's political tides, Peking chose to
counsel restraint, bringing what influence it could to bear on behalf of a
peaceful settlement.
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The Undoing of a Policy
Almost from the start, Peking's moderate approach was compromised
by an increasingly apprehensive and inept Pakistani Government, and an
ambitious, opportunistic regime in New Delhi. T,ie Chinese reacted with
relative mildness to Indian statements sympathetic to the cause of an
independent Bangladesh, while a ministerial-level Pakistani delegation to
Peking in mid-April failed to elicit firm Chinese backing.
China's less-than-wholehearted support for Pakistan was accompanied
by continuing signs of Peking's interest in picking up the threads of detente
with New Delhi. The Chinese were not deflected from this course even by
the signing in early August of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, which
clearly was directed against China as well as Pakistan. Remarkably, Peking
made no public comment, and cyan in private Chinese officials tended to
disparage the pact's importance.
Indeed, Peking may have interpreted the treaty as proof of the need for
warmer relations with New Delhi in order to neutralize Soviet influence and
persuade India to ease its pressure on Pakistan.
e ing gave weight to these private efforts with a
small but highly visible signal-an invitation to an Indian table tennis team to
attend a tournament scheduled in Peking in November.
The two-track policy reassurance for Pakistan and detente with India
collapsed as the crisis on the subcontinent came to a head. In early Novem-
ber, Islamabad dispatched to Peking another delegation, this one led by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had long been identified as a friend of China. In
the face of this obvious Pakistani bid for stronger backing, the Chinese went
no further than to reaffirm their support for Pakistani unity and for the
government in Islamabad and to call for a negotiated settlement among
India, Pakistan and the Bengalis. The Chinese die; agree to continue dis-
patching military supplies, but made no commitments to take military action
should India attack Pakistan.
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Bhutto's visit and the rhetoric surrounding it did not stop the Sino-
Indian flirtation. In early November, Chou sent a telegram to Mrs. Gandhi
expressing the hope that Sino-Indian friendship would continue to grow. A
public statement in mid-month by Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
suggested that New Delhi was considering raising its diplomatic mission in
Peking to the ambassadorial level
Only when significant skirmishing between Indian and Pakistani army
regulars broke out along the border in late November did Peking's rhetoric
begin to harden. At the UN, Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua called
the Indo-Soviet treaty a military alliance that had led to "bare-faced armed
aggression against Pakistan," but his main jabs were against the Soviets
rather than the Indians. Nevertheless, the fat was in the fire, and the
outbreak of full-scale war during the first week of December scuttled
Peking's hopes for improving relations with New Delhi.
This sequence of events may well have disillusioned Peking about the
possibility of serious diplomacy with New Delhi. In fact, the Chinese may
not have given sufficient weight to the steady divergence in Peking's and
New Delhi's interests. Whatever New Delhi's long-range goals, they were
subsumed in efforts to gain an immediate solution to the East Bengal
problem. New Delhi was less interested in detente with Peking than in signs
that Peking would not intervene militarily and that the Chinese were en-
couraging Islamabad to negotiate a political settlement with the rebellious
Bengalis. Thus, although Peking may have thought the prospect of rap-
prochement was sufficient to stay New Delhi's hand, the Indians had other,
more pressing business.
The War: A Bit Role for Peking
Chinese policy during the war in December was basically defensive;
through diplomacy and propaganda, but little else, Peking sought to confine
the war in time and space, to avoid any possilility of Chinese military
involvement, and to save as much of Pakistan's West Wing as possible. The
East Wing was written off as India gained the upper hand almost im-
mediately. The Chinese attempted to lay primary responsibility for the
outbreak of fighting on the subcontinent at Moscow's door.
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Peking prudently tailored its efforts to avoid foreclosing a Chinese role
in post-war South Asia. Throughout the war, the Chinese avoided military
moves that could be read as provocative. Once the Fast Wing had been
overrun, the Chinese sent carefully modulated signals in the form of
diplomatic protests against alleged Indian violations of the Tibetan frontier
that were designed to deter any Indian plans to mount a full-scale invasion of
West Pakistan. The Chinese refrained, however, from directly threatening the
Indians and, by issuing the protests well after the events that occasioned
them, were able to control their impact.
In support of Pakistan, the Chinese stepped lap their propaganda
directed against New Delhi, condemning Indian aggression and charging Delhi
with pursuing an expansionist policy. Peking's heaviest brickbats, however,
were reserved for the Soviet Union. The Chinese branded Moscow's support
of India the "main reason" for the crisis and at the UN bitterly denounced
the Soviet veto of a Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire and
withdrawal to pre-war boundaries. By focusing on Moscow rather than
Delhi-a practice that has persisted-Peking may have been signalling the
Indians that, even though they were in the process of dismembering China's
ally Pakistan, the Soviets and the intrusion of Soviet influence into South
Asia were Peking's main concerns. China's low posture was in part due to
concern about Soviet reaction to a more active Chinese role.
Picking Up the Pieces
With Pakistan's quick defeat in the East and inability to make com-
pensating gains in the West, the Chinese were left with a salvage job. Years of
backing Pakistan had secured a loyal, but now weak and dismembered ally.
The budding detente with India had not blossomed, yet India was more
clearly than ever the major power in the region. Worst of all, while Moscow
had effectively upheld Indian interests, and had scored gains as a result;
Peking was seen to lack the political and military means to support its ally.
Moreover, the new government in Bangladesh owed much to New Delhi,
something to Moscow, and nothing to Peking.
Even if a re-examination of Chinese policy in South Asia were to be
undertaken, there clearly would be no change in Peking's basic goal of
neutralizing Soviet influence on the subcontinent. Chinese leaders remained
obsessed with the Soviet threat to Chinese security. Prospects that even an
all-out Chinese commitment could build Pakistan into a counterweight to
Indian and Soviet power in South Asia were slight. Indeed, there was a clear
danger that the Chinese could be frozen out of the play of events in the
region.
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The logic of the situation seemed to argue for another effort to mend
fences with India, even if this meant further reducing the Chinese commit-
ment to Islamabad. New Delhi, almost certain! sensing Peking's
eased the way.
There were at the same time pressures pulling Peking in the opposite
direction. Peking may have calculated that to enter into early negotiations
with New Delhi over the terms of rapprochement would place t'- i. Chinese at
a tactical disadvantage. India, flushed with success, unchallenged on the
subcontinent and in alliance with Moscow, was in a strong position to drive a
hard bargain with China and thus unlikely to be in a mood to compromise
on essential points. Moreover, Peking could not easily disengage from its
commitment to Pakistan. China could not walk away from an investment of
this magnitude without damage to its international reputation, and perhaps
to its self-respect. Some in Peking clearly had a strong feeling of obligation
to Pakistan-for years, China's sole friend
Moreover, in a
purely strategic sense, for Peking to break with Islamabad in order to
normalize relations with New Delhi would run the risk of leaving Pakistan
open to Soviet exploitation with no guarantee that the Chinese could register
compensating advances in India.
Still, Peking had a few low cards to play. Smaller countries, particularly
Sri Lanka and Nepal, were wary of India's increased willingness to flex its
muscles and were receptive to ties with China warmer and broader than
before the war. Pursuing even this limited option made sense only if the
Chinese attempted to shore up Pakistan and deferred overtures to India.
In effect, the Chinese committed themselves to the durability of the
Bhutto regime, which had -eplaced the discredited Yahya Kahn government
shortly after Pakistan's defeat. In practical terms, it meant Chinese lilitary
and economic assistance and, more important, diplomatic support o-' a kind
that would help strengthen Islamabad's position vis-a-vis Delhi and Dacca. It
meant that if Bhutto were not to be undercut domestically, Peking would
have to link its diplomacy with Islamabad's, allowing Bhutto to set the pace
on such key issues as recognition of Bangladesh and a general peace settle-
ment in the subcontinent.
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The Emergence of the Post-War Policy
It is by no means certain that the Chinese leaders saw things so clearly
in the immediate aftermath of the war. The outlines of Peking's policy did
not begin to emerge until early February 1972 during a Bhutto visit to
China; indeed, Bhutto's trip may have forced Peking's hand regarding the
course it planned in South Asia. The impetus far the visit came solely the Pakistani side; the Chinese appeared reluctant.
In any event, what emerged from Bhutto's visit was a continuation of
the basic approach the Chinese had adopted at the time of the Bengali crisis
in March 1971 -no reduction in Chinese supgort, but no marked increase in
their commitment.
he joint
communique issued at the end of the Bhutto visit contained a Pakistani plea
for nations to refrain from rushing to recognize Bangladesh. The Chinese
merely acknowledged "understanding" of Islamabad's'position.
n late February the
Chinese left no doubt that they were keeping their colors nailed firmly to
Pakistan's mast. The Chinese inserted a gratuitous clause in the Sino-US
Shanghai communique calling for self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir,
long a flashpoint of contention in South Asia politics, and a move as sure to
please Islamabad as it was to anger New Delhi.
Peking Cultivates India's Lesser Neighbors
In reaffirmation of the Pakistani tie, Peking played its other low cards
in South Asia. Chinese cultivation of the smaller South Asian states, inter-
rupted during the Indo-Pakistani war, was resumed in early 1972. The new
n In
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power balance in South Asia deepened concern among the smaller states
regarding Indian ,xpansionism, and Peking played on such fears. Although
the basic impulse of Chinese policy was anti-Soviet and although the Chinese
fashioned their diplomacy with an eye toward New Delhi, Peking's courtship
of less-developed countries suggests that warm relations with Sri Lanka,
Nepal and, to a lesser extent, Bhutan and Afghanistan, would probably have
been pursued with some gusto even without the stimulus provided by
Moscow and New Delhi.
After Pakistan, Sri Lanka has come to be the main object of Peking's
political attention and economic largesse in the region. Against the backdrop
of India's role in the creation of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Bandaranaike's
government, already shaken by the uprising in April 1971, had grown
increasingly concerned over the possibility of renewed strife on the eve of
the first anniversary of the uprising in April 1972. Sri Lanka turned to
Peking and accepted Chou En-lai's offer of small arms and artillery, made a
year before but put off by Colombo. The Chinese rushed deliveries to Sri
Lanka; some supplies were flown in directly at Ceylonese re uest and
expense.
Peking cemented its position in Colombo when Mrs. Bandaranaike
visited China in mid-summer 1972. The Chinese gave her a mammoth
reception and red-carpet treatment throughout her stay. She talked with
Mao, and received a $44-million loan for economic development. Chou En-lai
publicly endorsed Mrs. Bandaranaike's appeal for international recognition
of the Indian Ocean as a "Zone of Peace"-a project with which the Chinese
had flirted for several years. By way of contrast, the Chinese publicly gave
the cold shoulder to a leader of the Peking-oriented wing of the Ceylonese
Communist Party, who visited China during the summer.
Peking's commitment to the well-being of Mrs. Bandaranaike's govern-
ment has not been open-ended. The Chinese seem concerned that Sri Lanka,
which spends well beyond its means on social welfare and consumer pro-
grams, could become a serious drain on Chinese resources. Although China
has contributed close to $80 million in aid since the uprising in 1971 and in
December renewed a rice-rubber exchange arrangement highly favorable to
Colombo, the Chinese have made clear that Sri Lanka should put its
economic house in order and rely mainly on its own efforts to develop its
economy. Moreover, Peking has not responded with dispatch to recenL
Ceylonese leas for accelerated rice shipments.
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Peking has traded on Nepal's fears of expansionist tendencies in New
Delhi to forge closer ties with Kathmandu. As in the case of Sri Lanka, mutual
distrust of India seems to form the basis for the current warm Sino-Nepalese
relationship; the Chinese are little concerned about Soviet penetration in
Nepal. Peking offered Kathmandu economic help during its difficult negotia-
tions with New Delhi in 1970-71 over a new transit and trade treaty, but the
Chinese have taken care not to give India cause for alarm and have not
fundamentally altered Nepal's status as a Himalayan buffer state.
The highlight last year in Sino-Nepalese relations was a visit of Prime
Minister Bista to China in late November. The Chinese entertained Bista
royally: Mao received him and Chou En-lai held two rounds of talks with the
Nepalese delegation. More important, the Chinese gave Bista the economic
assistance he asked for at Chou's insistence and with Mao's blessing.
Bhutan, secluded in the heart of the Himalayas and long a virtual
protectorate of India though an independent state and UN member. is of
only marginal interest to Peking.
cia s neo a diplomat, accompanied a sports team to Peking. There they took
the first steps toward establishing more normal relations. The foreign
minister expressed hope for closer ties and a border agreement within three
to five years. In this area, however, the Chinese probably aim at little more
than an occasional tweak of Delhi's nose. Most of the Sino-Bhutanese border
is not in dispute, and Peking has published maps that concede at least one
major disputed area to Bhutan.
Last year two Bhutanese offi-
China's policy interest in Afghanistan, aside from gaining a toehold on
the Soviet border, revolves around Kabul's relationship to Pakistan. Peking
turned its attention toward the Afghans in early 1972 because it feared that
they might attempt to profit from Islamabad's defeat. If Kabul were to
support independence or autonomy for Baluchistan or Pushtunistan the
danger of a complete breakup of Pakistan would be enhanced.
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Pressures from the Afghans on Pakistan, real or imagined, apparently
have eased, and the Chinese have recently negotiated a civil air agreement
with Kabul. As long as Peking re committed to the Bhutto regime,
however, and as long as !3,iutto's 1. rower in Islamabad seems even
remotely threatened by communal uni,..., i, , Chinese are likely to use what
influence they have in Kabul-still far less than that of Moscow-to persuade
the Afghans to keep hands off.
Recognition of Bangladesh: A Policy Immobilized
All these moves have been peripheral to the problem of the newest state
on the subcontinent. Peking's post-war South Asian policy has foundered on
the issue of recognition of Bangladesh, which itself has been tightly linked to
the larger and more complex questions of a settlement to the war and the
terms for subsequent accommodation on the subcontinent.
Although China's commitment to Pakistan appeared solid in the spring
of 1972, there were indications that Peking was seeking room for maneuver,
if only to preclude leaving India and the Soviets with an open field in
Bangladesh. After hedging on recognition in the communique following
Bhutto's visit in February, Chinese propaganda generally avoided direct
attacks un Prime Minister Mujib and his regime. In April, Chc u even voiced
Chinese disapproval of the way Yahya had handled the Bengali crisis, telling
a delegation of American scholars that Peking did not defend the policies of
Yahya's government "for it had done bad things."
The immobility of Chinese policy was confirmed during the debate over
Bangladesh's membership in the UN. The Chinese apparently shared Bhutto's
judgment that his precarious position in Islamabad precluded him from
agreeing to Mujib's demand for recognition prior to a meeting between the
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two leaders. This in turn led them to espouse a veto, if necessary, tc block
Dacca's proposed entry into the UN. Although running the risk of further
delaying implementation of the Simla ngi:ements negotiated between
Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi in July, Peking apparently believed the veto could
prevent serious dc'.erioration in Bhutto's domestic position and would give
the Pakistanis time to strike a bargain with Dacca and New Delhi under more
favorable circumstances. In the UN debate, Peking contended that Bangla-
desh should be denied entry because Dacca and Delhi had fallen to comply
with the December 1971 resolutions, especially clauses calling for with-
drawal of foreign troops from Bangladesh and repatriation of prisoners.
Peking obviously would have preferred to have kept Dacca out without
exercising its veto and damaging its larger interests in the third world. A veto
denyi,hg entry into the UN on the grounds that the applicant had not
fulfilled tike t' rms of a UN resolution was undoubtedly painful, as this was
precisely the rationale that had been used to exclude Peking from the UN for
21 years. When Chinese diplomats in early August passed word that Peking
intended to exercise its veto, they were almost certainly attempting to
forestall moves to bring the Bangladesh question before the Security Coun-
cil. In the end, the Chinese were outmaneuvered by pro-Bangladesh 'orces in
the UN, led by the Soviets, and several substitute Chinese measures that
would have postponed consideration were voted down. China ended by using
its veto.
Despite these setbacks, the turn of events in South Asia has done little
to change the basic rationale and impulse of Chinese policy. Discussions
between the Alec Douglas-Home mission and ranking Chinese officials,
including Chou, convinced thr British that Peking was still almost totally
preoccupied with the Soviet threat and that China's view of India was
colored, if not conditinned, by this concern. With a powerful Soviet military
force along its northern frontiers uppermost in mind, the Chinese were
anxious to "deactivate" their southern borders with South and Southeast
Asia. Nevertheless, the Chinese said they would be normalizing relations witn
India only after New Delhi had improved its ties with Pakistan. They would
not recognize Dacca until Bhutto assured them his position in Islamabad was
stable, and lie had taken the lead. In the meantime, they would oppose
Dacca's bid for UN membership until Pakistani prisoners had been re-
patriated and foreign troops pulled out of Bangladesh.
he Chinese are talking as though they intend to
stick by Bhutto and await a settlement before normalizing relations with
India. Given its limited choices, Peking may find this course attractive for
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several reasons, India's ties with Moscow apparently have cooled over the
past several months, and New Dclhi seems to have mellowed toward I'eking,
though the Chinese have done nothing. At time same time, Bhutto has
somewhat strengthened his hold In Islamabad, and Bangladesh's future is
uncertain. Peking may read these signs as vindication of its basically passive
course. If this is the case, it helps explain why the Chinese have taken a hard
line In private conversations and why there has been no visible response from
Peking to several recent Indian gestures.
There Is some evidence, however, that with an eye toward eventual
detente with India, Peking has subtly shifted the emphasis of its diplomacy
and is quietly pressing Bhutto for a settlement. Directly following Peking's
veto in the UN and at a time when implementation of the Simla agreements
was at an impasse, Chiao Kuan-hua flew to Islamabad without advance
public notice for talks with Bhutto and other officials. Although neither the
Pakistanis nor Chinese provided specifics about Chiao's visit, he does rank
near the top of China's foreign policy hierarchy and ordinarily undertakes
only missions of unusual sensitivity and substance. The timing and cir-
cumstances of Chiao's visit and subsequent events on the subcontinent
suggest that Chiao had a mandate to nudge Bhutto toward a settlement.
In any event, some movement in Indo-Pakistani relations was evident
following Chiao's trip. Progress was made in Indo-Pakistani negotiations over
mutual troop withdrawals, and in late November, Bhutto announced that he
would release all Indian soldiers held prisoner since the 1971 war; in early
December, both Islamabad and New Delhi gave ground and fashioned a
compromise on the disputed territory, which, in effect, isolated the Kashmir
dispute from implementation of the Simla agreements.
These steps, which moved the situation on the subcontinent a trifle
closer to settlement, required significant shifts in position, particularly on
Bhutto's part. To suggest that Chinese prodding played a role is not to deny
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that other forces were at work. It seems more than coincidence, however,
that progress In directions apparently desired by Poking should take place In
a relatively short period after China's talks in Islamabad.
There has also been visible movement on the Indian leg of the triangle.
Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, in a speech before Parliament on 30 Novem-
ber, strongly indicated New Delhi's Interest in improving relations with
Washington. A week later, Singh indicated publicly that India was favorably
disposed toward establishing more normal relations with China. Peking
almost certainly read Singh's remarks as signals that India was looking for
ways to loosen its ties with Moscow and for a realignment of big power
interests on the subcontinent. Despite these unmistakable overtures from
Delhi, there is no evidence that China has responded, either privately or
publicly. China has placed itself' in a position that requires Pakistani move-
ment before China can itself move. In Peking, the ball is in Islamabad's
court, and Bhutto has indicated he will take ne initiative before elections in
Bangladesh in early March.
Nevertheless, it seems a safe proposition that both Peking and New
Delhi see merit in detente and, by whatever means and at whatever speed,
some sort of closer relationship is almost certain to evolve. The disputed
Sinn-Indian border does not appear an insolvable problem. New Delhi
indicated a willingness to give ground on this giyestion over a year ago. A
compromise is likely to center on Chinese concessions in the eastern portion
of the disputed frontier and Indian concessions in the west. The inclination
of both countries over the years not to exacerbate each other's insurgency
and ethnic problems suggests that questions, such as Chinese support for
Naga and Mizo rebels and the role of the Dalai Lama in India, are easily
surmountable. The level of the new relationship will probably be condi-
tioned, at least initially, by China's obvious reluctance to abandon the
Pakistanis after having conic all these miles with them.
Elsewhere in South Asia, Peking probably is saisficd with its efforts to
cultivate smaller "Third World" countries. These relatively weak nations
cannot play much of a role in the larger currents of South Asian politics, Ind
they offer Peking little advantage vis-a-vis Moscow and New Delhi. Moreover,
the Chinese have gone about as far as they can in building their influence in
thest countries.
Peking seems wary of deeper involvement in Sri Lanka and is almost
certainly not about to stretch China's own resources to bail Colombo out of
its chronic economic woes nor to crawl further out on the limb for the
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lJandaranolkc government should its political position be seriously threat.
cncd-unless tlse threat should appear to Poking to have originated In
Moscow. With eespect to Nepal and Bhutan, Peking is mindful of India's
interest in these buffer states and will probably take care not to overplay its
hand and unduly aggravate New Delhi. In Afghanistan, Peking seems satisfied
merely to maintain a foot in the door.
Sonic degree of Sino-Indian rapprochement could well trigger an adjust-
,nent of big power Interests in South Asia. Obviously, Peking is in no
position to replace the economic, technological and military aid provided
India by the Soviets, The Chinese will therefore almost certainly promote
Indian self-sufficiency and, in the interim, encourage New Delhi to shop lit
Western Europe, Japan, and the US for assistance. At the same time, Peking
probably expects that its ties with the Pakistanis will loosen. Peking prob-
ably also anticipates a continuing and perhaps larger American role in South
Asia. For some time the Chinese have been aware of a growing Sino-
American mutuality of interests in the region, and, Indeed, they found it
comfortable, if not rewarding, during the late stages of the Indo-Ptkistani
war. For Peking, however, the overriding consideration is that a realignment
on the subcontinent means decreased Soviet influence on China's southern
flank and an expanded Chinese role.
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