THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160039-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: March 8, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Argentine Elections
CIA
x:L,i:T SVES BRANCH
'1 7 ^"MY
GOV,
Secret
U cNOT DESTROY
8 March 1973
No. 1631/73
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The Argentine Elections
Summary
Two years ago the military set about to restore civilian government. As the
countdown to elections enters its final days, the armed forces are having second
thoughts. The possibility that the Peronists may regain power is a live one, and the
prospect has rekindled the old fears and hatreds that prompted the armed forces to
ban the followers of Juan Peron from full participation in the political process ever
since the ouster of their leader in 1955.
President Lanusse, who initiated the restoration process, has become the
strongest advocate of military action to prevent a Peronist victory, but he is opposed
by a majority of senior officers who fear a strong, possibly violent, public reaction if
the elections are canceled or the Peronists proscribed. Those officers who favor
elections appear to have won their point, and the first round will probably be held as
scheduled on 1 1 March.
The Peronists are almost certain to lead in the balloting in the first round, but
are unlikely to win a majority of the vote. This will require a presidential runoff on
8 April. The runoff will most likely pit Hector Campora, the Peronist candidate,
against Ricardo Balbin, the standard bearer of the Radical Civic Union.
Should the Peronists draw less than 40 percent of the vote in the first round,
Balbin will be in a good position to rally the anti-Peronists and win the runoff. A
Peronist vote in excess of 40 percent would give them the edge in the second round,
and the military would face the painful choice of accepting a probable Peronist
victory or taking preventive action that could stir strong public opposition. There is,
of course, still a considerable reservoir of anti-Peron feeling in the military establish-
ment, and the pressure to keep the Peronists out will be strong.
If the military does not step in and halt the process, a civilian government will
be inaugurated on 25 May. The Peronists and the Radicals reportedly have agreed
that whichever party wins will bring the other into the government. In any event, it
will be a transitional government and the military will continue to have a major
voice in the making of national policy. The real test will be whether the new
government will be able to break the pattern of the last 20 years, serve out its
four-year term, and transfer power peacefully to an elected successor.
25X1 Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may
be directed to of the Office of Current Intelligence, 25X1
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The elections to be held on 1 1 March will be the culmination of two
years of planning and maneuvering by Pr,.jident Lanusse, the armed forces,
civilian politicians, and the 77-year-old former dictator, Juan Peron. Since
Lanusse announced in March 1971 that he would turn power over to an
elected government, Argentine politics have taken some bizarre turns, and
the current situation bears little resemblance to what Lanusse and the
military had in mind when they started the process. In fact, President
Lanusse now doubts the wisdom of going through with the eNctions at all.
General Alejandro Lanusse seized power from President Levingston in
March 197 1 with the aim of accelerating the exit of the military from the
day-to-day chores of governing. The military establishment was tired of the
job after six years of trying without success to solve Argentina's deep-rooted
social, political, and economic problems. Lanusse was army commander,
chief of the military junta, and President of Argentina and was thus in a
stronger position than any of his predecessors. He set out with high hopes of
ending, or at least suppressing, the sharp political divisions that had dis-
rupted every administration since Peron was ousted in 1955.
President Lanusse set out to reintegrate the Peronists into the political
life of the nation without returning Peron to power. 1-Ie also wanted to
rejuvenate the country's political parties by eliminating the many small
parties and splinter groups and by providing an opportunity for new,
younger leadership. To these ends, Lanusse hoped to create what he termed
the Grand National Accord. As the designer of this vehicle for national
unity, Lanusse apparently expected that he would be named by public
acclaim to head a unity government.
Lanusse has failed to achieve most of his objectives. Nine candidates,
including a loyal Peronist, are running for the presidency, and 62 national
and provincial parties are contesting congressional, provincial, and local
elections across the country. There are, however, few new faces to be seen
among the candidates for important national and provincial offices. The
Peronists have continued to follow their own course, and their campaign
slogan calls for a Peron r,~,Wrn to power. Even those candidates known in the
past for their ties to the military are seeking to put distance between
themselves and the government, seeing a strong anti-government, anti-
Lanusse stance as the surest way of attracting votes.
Lanusse's biggest setback in his two-year effort to bring stable elected
government to his country was his failure to eliminate former dictator Juan
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Peron as the predominant Argentine political figure. The 77-year-old Peron
has lived outside the country since he was ousted by the armed forces in
1955, but despite his long absence from the scene and advanced age, he has
been able to thwart all efforts to cut him down to size or split him from his
followers.
President Lanusse sought to lessen the divisions between Peronist and
anti-Peronist, and at the same time reduce Peron's influence, by wooing the
large moderate Peronist labor sector. He did attract some labor support by
offering generous wage increases, but stumbled in his effort to ow-maneuver
the wily Peron. First he sought to buy off the former dictator with financial
incentives, then to placate him by upgrading his official place in Argentine
history and by returning to him Eva Pe:von's body, which the military had
spirited away from Argentina and buried in Italy after Peron's fall in 1955.
Peron readily accepted these offerings, but declined to take himself out of
the picture or to give his support to Lanusse's Grand National Accord.
These ploys having come to naught, Lanusse next tried to discredit the
old dictator in the eyes of his followers. He sought to brand Peron a coward
for sitting in Madrid and issuing orders to his lieutenants in Argentina. To
make the charge stick, the President and his military colleagues took a
calculated risk. They removed the legal bars to Peron's return to Argentina
and restored his political rights.
Peron did not take the bait at once. He sat in splendid exile in Spain,
but began to hint that he might accept the Peronist presidential nomination.
The mere threat of a Peron presidential candidacy was enough to worry the
military. Lanusse reacted by taking both himself and Peron out of the race.
The President decreed that all candidates had to be resident in the country
and out of the government by 25 August 1972. Lanusse stayed in govern-
ment, and Peron stayed in Spain. He feared an assassination attempt and
seemed reluctant to put his political strength to the test.
Peron's followers in Argentina, however, enthusiastically greeted
Lanusse's invitation to participate in the elections. They pressed Peron to do
more than just endorse Peronist participation; they strongly urged him to
return to his homeland to give his followers the lift that, they thought,
would carry them to power. In time it became apparent that the Peronists
would participate in the elections with or without his authorization and that
unless he kept his old promise to return, Lanusse's charges of cowardice and
lack of concern would undercut the base of Peronist support.
Lanusse had opened the way for Peron to return, confident that the
former dictator, comfortable in Madrid and fearful of personal attack by
enemies in Argentina, would not accept the challenge. Peron continued to
promise publicly that he would return because he was sure the armed forces
would intercede to keep him out of the country. In retrospect, it would
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ELECTION DATA
Electoral Calendar:
Election
11 March 1973
Runoff (If Needed)
8 April 1973
Inauguration
25 May 1973
Offices to be Filled
(All terms 4 Years)
President
Vice President
Senators
69
Deputies
243
Provincial Governors
23
Vice-Governors
18
Provincial Senators
226
Provincial Deputies
751
Municipal Authorities
7,137
Eligible to vote - All Argentine citizens over 18 years of age
Registered to vote - 14.1 million
Total population - 23.4 million
Electoral Districts
24 - (22 Provinces, 1 Federal Capital, 1 National Territor,/)
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seem that neither Lanusse nor Peron really expected the trip to take place,
but each called the other's bluff.
On 17 November 1972, Peron returned to Argentina after 17 years of
exile. He was not greeted as a returning hero by cheering throngs as he had
hoped and as the military had feared. Many ardent Peronists were dis-
appointed when Peron turned out to be just another politician, and an aging
one at that. They were even more disappointed when he declined to
challenge the government's ruling that lie was ineligible to run for president.
Lanusse's gamble seemed to have paid off when Peron returned to
Spain after organizing the Peronists and several small parties into the
Justicialista Liberation Front and naming his "loyal servant" Hector
Campora as the front's presidential candidate. Campora proved to be highly
unpopular with labor and other moderate Peronists and some important
leaders began to talk of bolting the front. When it appeared that Campora's
divisive effect would ensure a Peronist defeat, the government election board
ratified his candidacy.
The government was premature. Despite Campora's unpopularity, the
Peronist rank and file displayed once again its constant loyalty to Peron. At
least one Peronist labor leader, who publicly opposed Campora, was forced
out of his post and out of the country. Others were cajoled or threatened
into returning to the fold. By mid-January, Campora had gained effective
control of the movement and had even begun to generate some enthusiasm
for his candidacy.
When President Lanusse set the campaign in motion, he also established
study commissions to recommend changes in both the constitution and the
election law that would facilitate the formation of a stable government. The
constitutional reforms, which can be ratified or rejected by a constituent
assembly when the next government takes power, were adopted over the
objection of virtually all political parties and groups. The principal provisions
are:
? a reduction of the presidential term from six to four years, with a
limit of two terms;
? elimination of the electoral college, with the president and
vice-president elected directly;
? concurrent four-year terms for all major officials and legislators,
both national and provincial;
? expansion of the cabinet.
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PRESIDENTIAL TICKETS
Candidates
President/Vice President
Party or Coalition
Hector J. Campora
Vicente Solano Lima
Ricardo Balbin
Eduardo Gammond
Francisco Manrique
Rafael Martinez Raymonda
Oscar Alende
Horacio Sueldo
Julio Chamizo
Raul Ondars
Ezequiel Martinez
Leopoldo Bravo
Jorge Abelardo Ramos
Jorge Silvetti
Juan Carlos Coral
Nor Elba Sciappone
Americo Ghioldi
Rene Balestra
Justicialista Liberation Front
(Peronist)
Radical Civic Union
Popular Federalist Alliance
Popular Revolutionary Alliance
New Force
Federal Republican Alliance
Popular Leftist Front
Socialist Workers' Party
Democratic Socialist Party
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Reform of the election law was aimed at ending many years of frac-
tionalization and minority government. In the most recent presidential
election-10 years ago-the president elected had only 26 percent of the vote
and little support in congress. The Lanusse government devised a compli-
cated set of rules in an attempt to avoid a replay of that situation.
On 1 1 March the people will vote for a president, a vice president, 69
senators, 243 deputies, and for governors, legislators, and municipal officials
in 22 provinces, the federal capital, and the territory of Tierra del Fuego. To
avoid another Illillol'ity government, the new election law states that candi-
dates for president, vice-president, senator, and governor must receive an
absolute majority. In races where no candidate wins a majority, a runoff
between the two top candidates or slates will be held on 8 April. As an
additional guarantee, the law permits the two leading presidential candidates
to organize formal coalitions with any candidate who receives at least 15
percent of the vote in the first round.
The Players
Nine presidential candidates will have their names on the ballot on I I
March. Only the Peronist, Hector Campora, has an outside chance of winning
an absolute majority and thereby negating the need for a second round. Of
the other eight, three or four have a chance of qualifying to participate in
the runoff. None of the candidates has captured the imagination of the
Argentine people, partly because all are tainted in some way with the failures
of the past. Despite the government's efforts to encourage new political
leadership by holding party primaries and nominating conventions, the
Argentine political scene is still dominated by the old, and in many cases
discredited, politicians who rose to prominence during the Peron years or
immediately thereafter.
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Hector Campora
First there is Hector Campora, a
64-year-old dentist who first achiLwed
national recognition as Peron's president
of the Chamber of Dcputies from 1948 to
1953. Peron claims that Campora was
selected by the party congress, but there
is little; doubt that lie was handpicked by
Karon. Peron has consistently worked to
prevent the emergence of a rival to his
own authority, and Campora represented
the least threat. By selecting Campora,
Peron also was able to delay the time
when he must choose a successor or open
the movement to a battle for leadership.
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CalllpOra has managed to overcome Il1uIC11 of his negative image with an
energetic campaign and now has the support of groups which initially balked
at his nomination. His campaign slogan "Campora for President, Peron to
power" has been effective with the Pcronist masses; if elected, he will
undoubtedly be more his own man than the slogan indicates. Canlpora has
vigorously attacked the military government, making the most out of alleged
government efforts to block his candidacy. He has said little on substantive
issues, although other Peronists have focused attention on foreign "impe-
rialism"-meaning Brazil as often as the United States. Still, others have
spoken of the need to maintain real wages and monitor foreign investment.
In the Radical Civic Union, Arg.;n-
tina's seccr,d largest political party,
younger, reformist elements made a
serious challenge or leadership by sup-
porting 43-year-old Raul Alfonsin, but the
"traditionalists" managed to nominate
their Inng tinge leader, Ricardo Balbin.
Balbin, a 68-year-old lawyer, lost to Juan
Peron in the 1951 elections and to
Frondizi in 1958. This time out, he has
concentrated on issues much more than
his Peronist opponent, outlining a basi-
cally left-of-center course with national-
istic overtones. One of Balbin's proposals
is to force foreign bankers who have
recently acquired inter,sts in Argentine
financial institutions to give up their
holdings. He has also said that the petro-
leum industry should probably be nation-
alized and that relations with Cuba should
be studied.
The only relatively flesh face among
the leaders in the presidential race is
Francisco Manrique, Lanusse's former
social welfare minister who left the
administration to campaign. Manrique is
the only candidate with anything resem-
bling real appeal, but he has been hurt
both by a lack of organized support and
by the enmity of President L:ulusse.
Despite Manrique's energetic and well-
publicized efforts on behalf of welfare
recipients, he is generally considered right
of center and his chief support comes
from a group of conservative provincial
Francisco Manrique
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parties known as the Federalist Popular Alliance. He has made tougher
statements against terrorism than his principal opponents, but has declined
to spell out his economic programs. The indications are that, if elected, he
would be more favorable to business, both foreign and domestic, than either
the Peronists or Radicals, and his campaign coffers reportedly reflect busi-
ness approval.
The fourth candidate with a chance
of obtaining at least 15 percent of the
vote is Oscar Alende of the Popular Revo-
lutionary Alliance. The 63-year-old
Alende is an opportunist, best known for
his nationalistic, and occasionally anti-US,
rhetoric. A former Radical who formed
his own party for the 1963 presidential
race, Alende has moved to the left and has
the support of the illegal Communist
Party. His platform calls for a substantial
increase of state control of the economy,
including the nationalization of all private
banks and insurance companies and cons
pl,te state control of energy and mineral
resources. He favors the recovery of
national enterprises that have been the
"objects of the aggressive activities of
foreign capital."
None of the five remaining candidates appears likely to obtain five
percent of the vote. The poor showing of retired air ,once general Czequicl
Martinez is galling to President Lanusse, who pushed Martinez into the race
at the last moment in the hope of undercutting Manrique and giving the
military a voice in the negotiations that will precede a runoff. Most of the
votes received by these sure losers will probably go to the non-Peronist
candidate in the second round.
El, ction forecasting in Argentina is an uncertain art, and political
conditions have so changed that past performance is not a reliable gauge on
which to base expectations. The Peronists, for example, have not been tested
at the ballot box for some time; they have not run a presidential candidate
since Peron was ousted. They have supported candidates from other parties
in congressional elections, but such candidates got no more than 30-35
percent of the vote. The Peronists could do considerably better this time
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when there seems to be a real chance of their attaining power. The presence
of about 3 million youthful new voters further complicates attempts to
judge Peronist strength. Hector Campora has aimed his campaign at this
group, which apparently likes his criticism of the government and his refusal
to take a firm stand against terrorism.
Polling in Argentina is unsophisticated, and the results provide only the
roughest of guides to the political temper. All sources, however, do agree
that the Peronists are leading the pack going into the first round. Estimates
of their share of the vote range from about 35 percent to as high as 5 1
percent. Balbin and Manrique appear to believe that the Peronist total can be
kept below 40 percent.
The real contest thus will be for the second runoff slot. The Radicals
appeared to start from a base of at least 20 percent of the vote, but seem to
be attracting little additional support. Manrique, on the other hand, has
reportedly won the backing of a number of provincial caudillos and perhaps
a couple of the othercenter-right presidential candidates.He plans to orchestrate
the announcements of their support to build a band-wagon effect in the last
days before the election. Business money has been flowing into his
campaign, and this should help him to make a strong closing rush.
The Military-The Ultimate Scorekeeper
The improvement of Campora's chances in recent weeks has rekindled
the military's deep-seated dislike of the Peronists. Twice since 1955 the
armed forces have removed elected civilian presidents who were either
unwilling or unable to restrain Peronist political activity. Now the generals
themselves have opened the way for a possible resumption of power by the
Peronists and are having second thoughts. President Lanusse, the man
responsible for these elections, is said to be arguing in military councils for a
move to block a Peronist victory or even to postpone the elections. He has
failed to swing the majority of his top generals to his view, however, and for
the time being appears to be concentrating on discrediting the Peronists in
the eyes of the voters.
Criminal charges were brought against the Peronists in January for
campaign statements that allegedly incited political violence. The govern-
ment has formally called for the dissolution of the Justicialista Front. The
government's case is a thin one, and it has delayed the trial to allow police
and army units time to find a clear link between the Peronist candidates and
the increase in terrorist action. Even if no evidence is found that will hold up
in court, the government apparently hopes that the charges in themselves
will swing some voters, particularly women, away from the Peronists.
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President Lanusse and the military have entered into a five-point pact,
whir.h, while guaranteeing that the elections will take place, imposes condi-
tions on the new government. Principally, the agreement calls for a con-
tinued military role in the government. Commanding generals are to be
named by their respective services and will head the three service ministries.
The pact denivs the right of the next government to free convicted terrorists
or to interfere in counter-subversion campaigns, Lanusse believes that Such
"guarantees" are necessary to maintain military unity and the integrity of
the armed forces in case of a Peronist victory at the polls.
Lanusse may yet seek to use the Peronist link with terrorists and the
military's agreement to enforce certain minimum conditions to justify inter-
vention in the election process. Army chief-of-staff General Lopez Aufranc
opposes intervention now. Without his approval intervention would shatter
armed forces unity. One development that might cause the general to shift
his opposition would be an outbreak of violence during or immediately
following the election.
The Peronists have moderated their rhetoric in the last days of the
campaign and have avoided provocative actions. This means that the
balloting will probably be held as scheduled on 11 March. What happens
thereafter will depend in large part on how much Df the vote the Peronists
get. Barring a first round majority for Campora, there will be a runoff
election on 8 April, and the bargaining for the runoff slots will be intense.
While the Peronists are sure to lead the first round balloting, the
chances of the Radicals putting together a coalition that can beat Campora
in the second round would be improved immensely with every percentage
point the Ieronists fall below 40 percent. In the event Campora gets between
35 and 40 percent of the vote and the Radicals trail him by about 10 points,
each side would concentrate on woo::ig outside support. The Radicals would
then stand a good chance of gaining the edge in the runoff. If the Peronists
fall below 35 percent, they may well seek a coalition with the Radicals. A
runoff could then be avoided and the Peronists would share power in a
Radical government.
Should Campora top 40 percent in the first round, he will be in a good
position to win it all on 8 April. In these circumstances, a band-wagon
psychology could well be built up as opportunistic politicians seeking favors
throw their support to the Peronist candidate. The prospect of a Peronist
victory would put considerable pressure on the generals to intervene.
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In many respects Francisco Manrique is the Clark horse. He draws much
of his support from conservatives in the provinces, but also does well among
the urban poor. He may therefore cut into the vote of both the Radicals and
the Peronists. He is given an outside chance of upsetting 13aibin. t,ie Radical
standard bearer, for the second runoff slot; if he succeeded, he would still
encounter considerable difficulty in putting together a winning team for the
second round. The Radicals are ideologically much closer to the Peronists
than to the provincial conservatives and might well join the Peronists against
Manrique in exchange for important posts in the new adminir,tration. The
result, again, would be a government with so strong a Peronist flavor that the
military would be tempted to intervene.
A strong third place showing for Manrique is more likely and would
give him considerable leverage in the maneuvering that will precede the
runoff. Despite the fact that he is generally placed in the ranks of the
and-Peronists, Manrique is enough of an opportunist to be tempted by a deal
with Campora. He probably could not, however, deliver all the provincial
conservatives to the Peronists. Much the same thing can be said of Oscar
Alende, who is likely to have at least 10 percent of the vote to bargain with.
As suggested above, there are almost as many possible combinations for
;':e runoff as there are candidates; most of these would yield the presid ,icy
to either a Peronist or Radical. Peron has boasted for years that he has the
support of the majority of Argentines. This claim will now be tested. If he
comes up short, it is a near certainty that he will attribute his failure to the
machinations of the military government, which has barred him from re-
turning to his homeland again to campaign, and to the shortcomings of
Hector Campora.
A Look Beyond the Election
An elected government is scheduled to take power on 25 May 1973. If
that government is headed by Ricardo Balbin or Francisco Manrique, the
transition from the military junta to a civilian president should go relatively
smoothly. If, however, the election on I I March or the runoff on 8 April is
won by the Peronis~s, there will be considerable pressure on the military to
prevent the Peronists from taking over. Such a move would certainly be
greeted by a rise in terrorist activity and could set off a chain reaction of
civil violence. The armed forces would probably be able in time to reassert
their control, but would probably be less able than they are now to govern
effectively in the face of a hostile public and a weakening of military unity.
This would open the way to extremist solutions from inside or outside the
armed forces.
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It is still possible that the military would prefer to live with a 1eronist
resumption of power than to face the domestic consequences of denying the
Peronists. There would not be all that much difference in the orientation of
a government headed by a R'idical or a Peronist. The differences between the
two parties are mostly differences o: style. There reportedly is an agreement
between Balbin and Peron to share in the next government. Such a sharing of
power would add stability to the government and avoid many of the
problems with congress that have plagued other post-Peron administrations.
Under either a Radical or a Peronist administration, there will be a
move toward greater state control of the economy and a display of increased
economic nationalism. Peronist oratory would undoubtedly be more
extreme than that of the Radicals, but both parties have advocated the same
type of restrictions on foreign investment and are likely to move to na-
tionalize foreign holdings in the fields of banking and petroleum. Both have
stressed nationalism and "independence" in foreign affairs and this is
likely-among other things-to lead to a more eiierget.ic assertion of Argen-
tina's claim to a 200-mile territorial sea and an early move to restore
relations with Cuba.
Whoever ends up in the presidential palace, the next government will
be-as the military has stated-a transitional government. The military will
continue to play a significant role in the formation of policy, despite the
objections of all who ran for the presidency. The real test, as President
Lanusse has said, will be whether the government that is elected can rule
successfully and transfer power peacefully to an elected successor. In a
nation where no president in 20 years has served out his term, the attain-
mont of such a goal will be elusive.
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