VENEZUELA: ELECTIONS '73

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160053-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: December 3, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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S E C R E T
C,rh / t9CE IT14 -175~L/73
OCI No. 1754/73
3 December 1973
Approximately 4.6 million voters will go to
the polls on 9 December to elect a president, con-
gress; state legislatures and municipal councils.
. Over 700,000 new voters have regis-
tered this year, a majority of the
11 million population is under 20
years of age.
Of the thirteen presidential candidates only
two, Democratic Action's Carlos Andres Perez and
the governing Social Christian party's Lorenzo
Fernandez, have any chance of winning.
Recent public opinion polls indicate
that the race is too close to all,
with only a few percentage points
separating the two. However, almost
a fifth of the voters remain undecided.
. The winner will head a minority
government and forming allia.ices
in the new congress will be his
big headache.
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S E C R E T
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S E C R L '].'
The presid.nt is elected for a five-year term
by a direct vote of the electorate; a plurality wins.
The Congress, on the other hand, is elected by the
d'Hondt system of proportional repres e.,tation employ-
ing the "highest average" rule used in many Western
European countries.
Domestic issues have largely dominated the
campaign. Polls have shown the electorate has little
interest in foreign policy.
As a result, COPEI, the governing Social
Christian party, has abandoned its. efforts to capit-
alize on the Caldera government's foreign policy
achievements and its'domestic pacification prog:.am.
It recently began concentrating on local issues.
The government has inaugurated a wide range of
industrial and public works projects to appeal to
the poor and give a boost to Fernandez.. The opposi-
tion Democratic Action Party has all along attacked
the government on bread-and-butter issues: inflation,
spiraling cost of living, and severe shortages in
basic commodities . Thus far, attacks on foreign
investment--largely represented by US oil companies---
have been muted. in fact, major candidates as well
as party elders have attempted to curb excessive
campaign rhetoric on this issue.
The Potential Problems
Most important in terms of political stability
will be the size of the combined vote obtained by
the two major parties.
.13oth parties predict a "polariza-
tion" betwet:n them, with the smaller
parties to the left and right re-
ceiving a smaller share of the votes
than in 1968.
. .The smaller parties on the other
hand expect the election to show
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a "polarization" between the
"establishment" prtrties---COPEI and
AD--and the "anti--establishment"
parties prominently represented by
the new marxist Movement to Social-
ism and the rightist Perezjimenista
Movement.
. . .Indeed, if the trend in election
results since 1958 holds true, AD
and COPEI will garner less than the
49.7 percent of the vote they. polled
in 1968, which would create an
unstable political situation. Main
beneficiaries would be the anti-
establishment parties of the left
and right.
. A larger than usual proportion of
null votes and abstentions would also
demonstrate a lack of confidence
by the electorate in the present party
system.
. Unless the two major parties together
can dominate the legislature, Vene-
zuela will be in for serious diffic-
ulties.
There are signs that the"polarization" claimed
by AD and COPEI may be an accurate reflection of the
present political situation. Several factors account
for this.
The conviction among Venezuelan
voters that this election will be a
"watershed" for the country's polit-
ical and economic future is expected
to cause many to decide not to
"waste their votes" by backing lost
causes or candidates with no chance
of winning.
The once highly touted New Force
leftist coalition is proving lack-
luster on the hustings; some for-
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mar backers of its dominant party--
the People's Electoral Movement
(MEP) ---are drifting back to AD or
turning to MAS.
. Former dictator Perez Jimenez's
refusal to endorse a surrogate
candidate and his request that his
followers abstain from voting for
president'has further fragmented
a movement that received almost 11
percent of the vote in 1968. It had
attracted the support of 20 percent
of the electorate this year.
The first few days after the election and while
the votes are counted may be the critical period.
.
Both parties fear that if either
wins by a close margin--perhaps
50,000 votes--the other would be
very likely to cry fraud and conspire
with their military supporters to
overt,irn the election results.
. . .
.Such a situation could result
serious disturbances by party
ants who already are building
in
milit-
them-
selves iip to a frenzy with rallies
and parades.
A narrow victory could cause months
of instability. Reports of military
plotting would intensify.
Party leaders are continuing to lobby
with the military to ensure that it
will remain impartial if it is called
on to keep order or ratify the elec-
tion results.
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S E C 12 T
The Principal Candidates
If Fernandez wins, he will need alliances with
other groups to pass legislation.
Deep divisions in the past within the
Democratic Action party over the issue
of collaboration with COPEI and the
deep conservatism of Perez will make
it difficult to accept COPEI's offer
of an alliance.
. COPEI may seek temporary deals with
the left--possibly MAS and the New
Force--and small rightist parties.
. .MAS and other leftists, however,
would exact quid-pro-quos for their
cooperation. This could include new
punitive legislation against the
oil companies and recognition of
Cuba and China.
. COPEI's flexibility in dealing with
the left will depend on the attitude
of the military. Armed forces leaders
are concerned over leftist tendencies
in the present government and are
opposed to any formal COPEI alliance
with MAS in the new Congress.
If Carlos Andres Perez wins, the post--electoral
situation is likely to be more stable. The military
and the upper classes probably prefer him to Fernan-
dez.
Moderate COPEI leaders would probably
urge cooperation with AD. Such coop-
eration would meet with a strong
disapproval from leftist elements
within COPEI, and could bring about
a split within the party.
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. . .In addition, the left in general
would feel outrage and would probably
begin an intensive campaign of
opposition. This could also include
reviving the insurgency movements
that plagued AD governments in the
1960s.
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