SOUTH KOREA: PAK AND THE STUDENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160080-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: November 3, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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 MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: South Korea: Pak and the Students
Small-scale demonstrations at one of Seoul's
major universities in early October revealed a de-
gree of organization among a hard core of activists
and a general level of student unrest not evident
for two years. Swift but moderate government action
prevented the immediate situation from getting out
of hand. But many, students remain strongly opposed
to the regime's repressive policies; expression of
their resentment could be stimulated by recent events
in Thailand or heavy-handed action by the regime,
such as the, recent "suicide" death of a university
professor while under government interrogation. The
possibility of any major student challenge to the
Pak regime is reduced, however, by the regime's ex-
perience in dealing with campus unrest and the reluc-
tance of the general population--whose support would
be necessary to bring the government down--to risk
the economic, political, and security disruptions
that would flow from a major itudent rebellion.
The increasing authoritarian character of the
Pak government will continue to feed campus unrest.
The government's handling of the current student
situation has, however, demonstrated Pak's continued
ability to meet such difficulties with measured force.
As long as he exercises restraint, the student prob-
lem is not likely to evolve into a direct threat to
the security of his government.
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Student Unrest
Unlike students in Thailand, students in Korea
have been highly politicized for generations. They
were in the forefront of the challenge to Japanese
colonial rule and played the key role in the down-
fall of the Rhee government in 1960. But the stu-
dents are hampered by the same endemic factionalism
that characterizes all Korean political life. Lack
of a national organization, coupled with parochial
school loyalties, tends to localize their impact on
all but major issues. All modern Korean governments
have respected their potential, however
The primary effect of student activism in recent
years has been to provide the regime with useful ex-
perience in manipulating and controlling campus dis-
sension--experience that the recently deposed Thai leader-
ship utterly lacked. Student efforts to frustrate
the 1964-65 normalization of relations with Japan
were firmly suppressed, and attempts in 1969 to block
the constitutional amendment permitting Pak to run
for a third term were unsuccessful. Student efforts
on behalf of New Democratic Party chief Kim Tae-chung,
Pak's opponent in the 1971 presidential election,
were equally ineffective. Through a series of campus
riots--ostensibly focused on campus military train-
ing--the students attempted without success to force
the government into heavy-handed action which would
have discredited the Pak regime and helped the oppo-
sition.
But Pak's victory over Kim Tae-chung was so mar-
ginal that the President was convinced that the rel-
atively free political atmosphere he had allowed
was threatening his control. In the summer of 1971,
in concert with the opening of the dialogue with the
North, Pak set in motion a wide range of authoritarian
measures and ?:eforms which culminated in the martial
law decree and constitutional revision of late 1972.
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A resumption of student protests over military
training in October 1971 strengthened the President's
determination to tighten his grip. After failing to
quell the demonstrators through a show of force, Pak
closed the universities, arrested or drafted student
leaders, and outlawed student publications and organ-
izations. The regime's swift and harsh action broke
the back of organized student protest. The lack of
any off-campus student demonstrations during the fol-
lowing academic year--the first such hiatus since 1948--
attested to the effectiveness of the government's
clampdown.
Aside from simple fear, student quiescence in
1972 can be explained in part by the President's
successful promotion of his new domestic programs.
Most students, like South Koreans in general, were
initially willing to accept martial law as the price
for meaningful and successful reform and an end to
corruption. This willingness to give Pak the bene-
fit of the doubt quickly vanished, however, in the
face of the government's heavy-handed intimidation
and manipulation of student leaders and professors.
The increasing role of'the South Korean CIA in sti-
fling all forms of political dissent, a phenomenon
recently and dramatically reflected by the CIA's ab-
duction of Kim Tae-chung, also fed student discontent.
By early 1973 a new racical student group--the Black
October Movement--had been organized, and some stu-
dent activists were supporting a movement of Chris-
tian ministers protesting the regime's repressive
activities.
Last Month's Trouble
Overt campus opposition has been limited to two
relatively small student demonstrations during the
first week in October sparked by the opening of
court proceedings against a group of students and
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professors arrested earlier. The larger demonstra-
tion involved about 300 students at Seoul National
University. The government's response reflected its
experience and confidence in dealing with student
dissent: the demonstration was allowed to continue
for several hours before being broken up by police;
students were confined to campus; the demonstrators
were isolated from the bulk of the student body;
and most of the activist leaders were arrested with-
out resort to violence. Then the government pressed
university officials to tighten campus control. This
quick but carefully modulated action rapidly brought
the situation under control. Although the level of
student unrest and resentment remains high, overt
protest activity is at present limited to a minor
boycoat of classes at various Seoul campuses. The
students have so far failed to respond with any vigor
to the alleged "suicide" last month of a Seoul Na-
tionaJt University professor under government deten-
tion In spite of widespread speculation that the
professor died as a result of torture by the CIA.
The Government's Reactions
The regime has reacted with surprise and con-
sternation to this latebc sign of student independ-
ence and opposition. The government received no
advance warning of the October demonstrations, an
alarming failure for a regime so heavily dependent
on its intelligence service to monitcr and control
students. But the regime's reaction to these unwel-
come developments, on balance, has been encouraging.
Since early October Pak has consulted frequently
with his chief advisers on the matter, in itself a
sign of the President's healthy respect for the po-
tential threat posed by student dissent. Pak has
moved quickly to avoid a confrontation. In recent
weeks, he has quietly arranged for the release of
many of the students arrested and the reinstatement
of those expelled. The regime has also publicly
pledged to take a conciliatory approach to the stu-
dents--a move obviously designed to prevent thn de-
velopment of popular sympathy for the students. Al-
though the recent and well-publicized release of Kim
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Tae-churg from house arrest was prompted'by the need
to reach a speedy resolution of the affair with Tokyo,
Kim's freedom has also conveniently served as a
pease offering to the students.
At the same time, Pak has been careful to avoid
giving the impression that the students have somehow
come out on top. The principal student agitators re-
main in jail and the regime is offering no excuses
for the alleged suicide of the Seoul National Univer-
sity professor. Pak has increased the police forces
assigned to quelling student disorders and has made
it clear that he will respond rorcefully to any fur-
ther trouble this academic year.
With winter vacations beginning soon on Seoul's
campuses, the government appears to have weathered
the immediate storm. The longer term prognosis for
student unrest in South Korea is somewhat less certain.
Is a massive and successful student uprising such
as that which occurred recently in Bangkok or during
the collapse of the Syngman Rhee regime in 1960 possi-
ble? Phe initial answer must be a cautious yes. At
least two key ingredients are present: a government
increasingly intolerant of any domestic opposition
and a student "movement" with a long history of ac-
tivism and political involvement. The regime's au-
thoritarian bent for action will almost certainly con-
tinue to provide issues open to student exploitation,
and campus unrest will probably remain the most sig-
nificant potential source of political and social
instability in South Korea.
In seeking to iontrol South Korea's students,
however, Pak can operate from a much stronger posi-
tion than either the recently deposed Thai leader-
ship or the former Syngman Rhee government. Unlike
Rhee, Pak has firm control over the military and
police forces in the country, and .iis subordinates
are capable, vigorous, and loyal. Pak has long rec-
ognized that control of the military is the key to
his survival and has aggressively cultivated a
fiercely loyal and a political military force. The
President has successfully prevented any of his key
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civilian or military subordinates from developing
sufficient support or stature to rival his own posi-
tion. Unlike the case in Thailand, there is no
General Krit in the military with authority to act
independently or to develop an independent base of
power and no sympathetic bureaucracy and king eager
to support a student challenge,,
The nation's flourishing econimy and security
are also in Pak's favor. Korea is still riding the
crest of an economic boom and the regime's imagina-
tive policies may well extend the period of rapid
economic growth to the end of the diecade. The nego-
tiations with North Korea have provided an element
of security which has not existed in the lifetime
of many Koreans. The regime constantly reminds the
nation of this and the fact that the strength and
stability of the regime deters North Korean aggres-
sion. There is no indication that significant num-
bers of the South Korean people would be wiling to
risk losing this strength and stability by encourag-
ing or supporting student rebellion.
Finally, the authoritarian character of the Pak
government is itself a strong factor in its perpetua-
tion. The majority of Korean people respect strong
leadership, and there is no comparable altern&tive
in sight to Pak's leadership. To be sure, ita re-
pressive aspects could nurture the dissent the regime
is trying to eliminate. But the main lesson of the
recent student demonstrations is that Pak is still
capable of tempering his tough policies with timely
moderation. As long as he exercises restraint, the
chances of a serious student challenge to his regime
will be greatly reduced.
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