THE ISRAELI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 31 DECEMBER 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100160084-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: December 6, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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~ 1f Confidential
Intelligence Memorandum
The Israeli Parliamentary Elections,
31 December 1973
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
Fitt COPY
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Confidential
6 Deco rrer 1973
No. 2470/73
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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
6 December 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Israeli Parliamentary Elections, 31 December 1973
Summary
Although many political leaders would prefer
to postpone Israel's parliamentary elections, they
are now firmly scheduled for 31 Decc-xmber. The elec-
tions had earlier been set for 30 October, but were
postponed during the second week of the fourth Arab-
Israeli war. Had it not been for the Yom Kippur War,
the elections would have been held in a fairly com-
fortable, relaxed atmosphere. The main issues would
have been economic and social, with some debate about
how fast and to what extent Israel should develop the
occupied Arab territories. The political shifts that
had developed since the last elections were not ex-
pected to alter the present parliamentary line-up
significantly. In the aftermath of the war, however,
the political climate is acrimonious. Mrs. Meir and
Defense Minister Dayan are under fire, and the out-
come is no longer automatic. Nevertheless, the pros-
pect at the beginning of December is very strong that
Mrs. Meir's Labor-MAPAM Alignment will form the core
of the next Israeli coalition government. The main
concern is whether or not there will be a voting
shift to the right-wing Likud grouping of sufficient
proportions to limit Mrs. Meir's negotiating flexi-
bility and deny her the mandate she needs to try for
a realistic peace settlement.
Note: Comments and queries on the content of this
Publication are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office of Current Intelligence,
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The Parties
Twenty-one separate party lists have been entered
in the proportional-representation balloting. Ten of
them are brand new. Most of the new ones, except for
the Black Panthers--an Oriental Jewish youth group
protesting the Orientals' economic, social and politi-
cal status--are not expected to win the one percent
of the vote necessary to earn seats in parliament.
The main contest will be between Mrs. Meir's
Labor-MAPAM Alignment and its main critic, the right-
ist Likud (National-Liberal Union). The Likud is a
recently formed alliance of GAHAL (itself an alli-
ance) and two smaller splinter parties, the Free Cen-
ter and the State List. (The Likud is supported by
the annexationist Land of Israel Movement, which is
not a political party.) Altogether, the Likud holds
31 seats. Mrs. Meir's Labor-MAPAM Alignment holds
57 seats and counts 4 more seats from the "tame"
Arab parties which vote with it. Mrs. Meir's Align-
ment and the Arabs are in coalition with the National
Religious Party (NRP), with 12 seats, and the small
Independent Liberal Party, which has 4 seats. The
coalition counts a total of 77 seats out of the 120
seats in the Knesset. The 43 seats outside the coali-
tion are held by the Likud, two ultra-conservative
religious groups, two Communist parties, and a few
independents.
Pre-war Election Prospects
Before. the Yom Kippur War, most observers es-
timated that Mrs. Meir's Labor Alignment would at
most lose a half-dozen seats and was certain to re-
tain control of the next government. The projected
loss of Alignment seats was based on signs of eco-
nomic and social discontent stemming from inflation,
heavy taxes, widespread strikes, housing shortages
and from the economically disenfranchised Oriental
Jewish community., Her main coalition partner, the
NRP, was expected to retain its present strength.
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Mrs. Meir was planning to campaign on a platform of
programs to alleviate these domestic problems; her
main opposition--the new right-wing grouping, Likud--
was rent with internecine wars and personality clashes,
and there were doubts that it would hold together past
the elections. Even though the Likud includes in its
ranks the formidable Menahem Begin--the anti-British
terrorist chief and unchallenged leader of GAHAL--and
three popular retired generals, Ezer Weizman, Arik
Sharon, and Avraham Yoffe, it was expected at best
to make only slight gains, perhaps four or five seats,
and to present no threat to Labor's 25-year monopoly
of power.
Elections held in the Histadrut (Israel's giant
federation of labor which covers 90 percent of Is-
rael's organized labor) on 11 September seemed to
confirm the view that major changes in the Israeli
voting pattern were not in sight. Mrs. Meir's Labor
Alignment did drop from 62% to 58% of the federation
vote, but the Likud made no gains, maintaining 22%
of the vote. Most of the Alignment's loss was to
several small oriental parties, notably the Black
Panthers, and to two labor allied groups, the In-'
dependent Liberals and the Religious Workers.
Impact of the War
The Yom Kippur War introduced several new fac-
tors into the election campaign. It clearly shifted
the focus from economic and social issues to the
larger questions of war and peace. The mere out-
break of war had a negative impact on the ruling
Alignment's election prospects. Subsequent criticism
of the government's failure to anticipate the Arab
attack, its handling of the war, the enormous cost
in lives and equipment, and Israel's supposed knuckling
under to US pressure almost certainly have eroded popu-
lar support of the coalition.
On the other hand, +`or the first time in 25
years there is a good possibility of serious peace
negotiations with the Arabs. This prospect should
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offset some of the issues raised by the government's
conduct of the war, even though it resurrects all
the arguments between "hawks" and "doves" about
which territories to hold on to, how far to trust
the Arabs, what is a viable peace, etc. These is-
sues had appeared to be settled in favor of the
"hawks" at the beginning of the election campaign
in September. Now the heavy costs of the war have
produced strong new pressures for peace in Israel.
These rising domestic pressures to reach an
accommodation with the Arabs are of course rein-
forced by heavy external pressures on Tel Aviv:
the world-wide impact of the Arab oil embargo, Is-
rael's almost total diplomatic isolation and sole
reliance on the US for diplomatic, financial and
material support during the war, and the knowl-
edge that US support of Ysrael, while strong, is
not unlimited. These developments should aid Is-
raeli political elements advocating a flexible
program. Thus, the Labor Alignment has recently
taken steps, at the urging of party doves, to soften
its election platform. The new platform emphasizes
that Israel's "central aim is to achieve peace."
It speaks of "territorial compromise," and insists
that Israel must mainta:.n its Jewish character, which
means, in effect, that it cannot annex areas with
heavy Arab popu~.ation such as the West Bank or Gaza
Strip, At the same time, the platform holds to
some long-standing Israeli demands: that Israel
must have defensible borders and will not return
to the lines of 4 June 1967, that a united Jerusalem
will remain the capital of Israel, and that Is-
rael opposes the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state on Jordan's West Bank. While
softening its platform, the Alignment had to seek
to refute Likud's anticipated charge that Israel is
embarked on a "give-away" program. The party cen-
tral committee confirmed the new platform on 6 De-
cember by a solid affirmative vote of 291 to 33.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Mrs. Meir probably will seek to play down the
alleged military bungling while emphasizing that she
must try for a peace settlement and needs a "mandate."
She will make it clear that she is not ready to re-
linquish anything vital to Israel's security. Al-
though her government would undoubtedly be more flexi-
ble in peace talks than the rival. Likud, there are
clear limits beyond which Mrs. Meir cannot go. The
Labor Alignment has never won a majority, and coalition
government is a fact of Israeli political life.. The
Alignment's-most important coalition partner, the
National Religious Party, is conservative on the
territories question--insisting on retention of
Jerusalem and other holy sites on the West Sank.
If concessions on Jerusalem are made or advertised,
NRP support for the government will evaporate and in
all likelihood most of the NRP Knesset members would
defect to the Likud. The NRP will be in a kind of
fulcrum position with its influence enlarging in di-
rect proportion to Labor's loss of strength to Likud.
Substantial gains for Likud would also provide Min-
ister of Defense Dayan with greater influence within
the Israeli Labor Party.
Likud, the Alignment's main antagonist, has es-
sentially a negative program. Its main component,
GAHAL, has consistently resisted any idea that Is-
rael would withdraw from the occupied territories
and has been generally hostile toward compromise
with the Arabs. While Likud-supporting ;generals
like Arik Sharon have emerged as new military heroes,
no major segment of the Israeli electorate is inclined
to respond with votes to a platform based on no more
than criticism of the government's failure to antici-
pate the Arab attack, charges of errors in military
judgment, and a "not-one-inch" stand on territorial
compromise.
The election, therefore, may produce considera-
ble heat, but is not likely to result .a any marked
shift to the right. Likud has no present prospect
of winning enough seats to form the main core of a
new governing coalition replacing (and breaking up)
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the Labor-MAPAM Alignment. The danger is that if
Likud does well enough--if it wins, say, close to
40 seats--Mrs. Meir may be pressed to take them
into a "national unity" government. There it could
team up with other hawks to dominate policy and
destroy any flexibility Mrs. Meir has for nego-
tiating a peace settlement.
Conclusions
Reports of a sharp drop in Mrs. Meir's popu-
larity continue to circulate in Israel. There are
a number of factors, however, which indicate that
Mrs. Meir and the Labor Alignment will continue to
lead a coalition government--perhaps with fewer
seats--in spite of dissatisfaction with their han-
dling of the war, the ache of heavy casualties, and
continuing economic and social problems at home.
The Yom Kippur War has caused some fundamental
changes in Israeli thinking about the merits in
the supposed security of the status quo and the
risks of trying for a peace settlement. These
derive from the following factors:
--the Arabs fought better and were more
united than in previous wars, and would
be more capable, militarily and politi
cally, in the future;
--the cost to Israel in lives and equipment
(in Israeli terms) was enormous, and new
wars could be even more costly;
--the war raised the question of whether
territory alone is worth the price of
repeated warfare;
--the war underscored Israel's virtual iso-
lation in the world, its dependence on
Washington, and, ultimately, its subjec-
tion to the requirements of US vital in-
terests;
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--the Soviet Union demonstrated its will-
ingness to provide strong political and
military support to the Arabs and to act
vigorously to avert a clear-cut Israeli
victory.
--the Arab oil strategy proved to be an
extremely effective weapon capable of
forcing the West to accommodate Arab
demands.
One other indication of the outcome of the elec-
tions is the remarkable consistency and persistence of
the Israeli voting patterns formed during the first
elections in 1949. Political parties are part of the
fiber of life in Israel, and party discipline is strong.
It seems unlikely that the Israeli voter, in a time
of great uncertainty about the future, will radically
change that pattern now. A mass vote for Likud--an-
anti-socialist, free-enterprise party--would require
the Israeli voter to close his eyes to pressing in-.
ternational and regional issues and, more important,
to abandon his support for the liberal socialist
policies Israel has followed since its inception.
The tantalizing prospect for peace in the Mid-
dle East that has been held out to the world and
the Israeli citizen would evaporate with a Likud-
dominated government, which would have nothing to
discuss with the Arabs. The concessions made to
the Labor Party's own so-called doves, as reflected
in the outcome of the party leadership's conclave
in the last week of November, suggest that Israel's
politicians read the mood of the electorate as pre-
ferring the risks of negotiation by a strong Labor
government to the prospect of renewed war under an
unstable right-wing coalition.
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Present Line-up of the Israeli Political
Parties in the'Seventh Knesset
Government Coalition:
Number
Seats
Labor-MAPAM Alignment* (Israeli Labor
57
Party ((Mapai, Ahdut, Rafi)); MAPAM)
Alignment Minorities Party (Arab parties)
4
National Religious Party (NRP)
12
Independent Liberal Party (Moderate
4
non-socialist)
77
Outside Coalition:
**GAHAL (Herut-Liberal Bloc)--right
26
**State List (dissident RAFI)--center right
3
**Free Center (Split-off from Herut--right
2
Agudat Israel (Ultra-orthodox religious)
4
Poali Agudat Israel (Religious; labor
2
arm of Agudat)
Haolem Hazeh (New Force) (maverick: Uri 1
Avneri)--left
RAKAH (Arab
Communists) 3
MAKI (Jewish
Communists) 1
Independents
(individuals) 1
*Make-up of Labor Alignment: 57 seal-s:
MA PA I.
34
Ahdut
8
Rafi
8
50
7
57
**Likud (National-Liberal Union)
-7-
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PERCENTAGE TALLY OF KNESSET
ELECTION VOTE, OCTOBER 1969
Percentage
Alignment
46.22.
GAHAL
21.67
National Religious Party
9.74
Alignment-affiliated Arab
and Druse lists
3.51
Agudat Israel
3.22
Independent Liberals
3.21
State List
3.11
Arab Communists (RAKAH)
2.84'
Poali Agudat Israel
1.83
Haolam Hazeh
1.23
Free Centre
1.20
Jewish Communists (MAKI)
1.15
Land of. Israel
0.55
Peace List
0.37
Yung Israel (PAZ)
0.15
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