DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100180001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 12, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations
NRO REVIEW
COMPLETED
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12 January 1973
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Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
12 January 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations
Relations between Moscow and Peking have sunk
to their lowest point, since open fighting broke
out on the frontier in 1969. Faced with China's
apparently inexorable political offensive, the
Soviet leaders seem to have concluded that there
is little point in turning the other cheek. They
have responded in kind, saying things they had not
brought up since the border talks began.
There have been rumors of minor incidents
along the frontier, but both sides are still de-
termined to avoid an outbreak of serious fighting.
Trade continues at a modest level, and the recent
increase in political tension has not been accom-
panied by any unusual military moves.
Note: This memorandum is one in a series of re-
ports on Sino-Soviet: relations. It was prepared
by the Office of Current InteZZigence, with con-
tributions from the Office of Strategic Research
and the Office of Econcmic Research.
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Soviets Take Off the Gloves
Over the past few weeks the Soviets have raised
their polemics against. China to the top leadership
level. On two recent occasions--in Budapest on 30
November and at. the USSR's 50th anniversary celebra-
tion on 21. December--General Secretary Brezhnev con-
demned the Chinese with unusual stridency. His
criticism was by far the harshest he has made since
the Sino-Soviet border talks began more than three
years ago.
The Soviet party chief's speech in Hungary
showed how much the Kremlin is smarting from China's
diplomatic and propaganda offensive against the So-
viet Union. Homing in on what seems to hurt most,
Brezhnev denounced as "absurd" Peking's allegations
that the USSR is preparing to attack China. He
charged that the Chinese do not "seriously believe"
this themselves. His remarks were largely a reac-
tion to Peking's attacks on the Soviet non-use-of-
force proposal at the UN and Chinese efforts to
focus attention on Soviet military strength along
the Sino-Soviet border as proof of Soviet "hypocrisy."
The day before Brezhnev spoke, China's ambassador
at the UN, Huang Hua, had produced a particularly
florid variation on this theme. Branding the So-
viet proposal a fraud, Huang claimed that although
the Soviets have "honey on their lips," they har-
bor "murderous intent behind their smiles."
The Chinese sent no delegation to the S')viet
Union's anniversary celebration, but they were far
from forgotten. In his keynote address, Brezhnev
lashed out against what. he called Chinese efforts
"to do the greatest possible damage to the USSR."
He again derided Peking's allegations of a Soviet
threat to China. In an effort to prove that the
Soviets have gone the last mile in trying to smooth
relations, he revealed a few details of Moscow's
proposal for a bilateral treaty renouncing the use
of force. Brezhnev claimed that on 15 January 1971
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the Soviet.s gave the Chinese a draft treaty banning
the use of military force, specifically including
conven.ti.onal, missile, and nuclear arms, but that
Peking had rejected i.t.
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There was nothing in Brezhnev's recent remarks
to indicate that the Soviets expect any forward
movement soon on the issues dividing the two coun-
tries. The tone of his anniversary speech was im-
placable. For the first time in recent memory, he
avoided the usual bromide that the Soviets would
continue their efforts to norm,?lize relations with
China. in an even more significant departure from
past practice, Brezhnev brought up the sensitive
frontier question and denounced Peking's claims
to Soviet soil as "absurd."
The Frontier: Not Completely Quiet
Brezhnev's remarks on the frontier dispute
have been accompanied by rumors of fresh trouble
on the border and signs of continuing difficulties
at the talks in Peking. Two days before Brezhnev
spoke, the Soviets chose to publish an account of
a border skirmish in late 1971, during which one
Soviet border guard was apparently killed. This
is the first time since the fighting of 1969 that
the USSR has given official publicity to such an
incident. There is no other information on it.
Earlier last month, the Western press carried
reports that in late November Chinese intruders
crossed into Kazakhstan and killed more than five
Soviets. The information was said to have come
from an official Soviet document. In response
to questions from newsmen, however, a Soviet For-
eign Ministry spokesman disclaimed any knowledge
of the incident. Chinese officials dismissed the
press accounts as groundless and "sheer malicious
fabrication." The Chinese probably suspect--and
with good reason--that by leaking such stories
Moscow wants not only to disparage China, but to
keep it off balance and worried about Soviet in-
tentions. Sporadic, officially inspired rumors
of Chinese border violations have not been con-
firmed in the past, and there is no hard evidence
of recent trouble in that border area.
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The information made available to the foreign
press in Moscow, however, was unusually specific
and detailed, which suggests it may have some basis
in fact. For example, one of the alleged intruders
was said to have been captured and later disowned
as a "bandit" by the Chinese. The Soviets could
choose to produce him and propagandize his capture
at some Liter date if public recriminations on bor-
der troubles break out again. In any case, the
absence of authoritative word on the incident from
Moscow suggests that, whatever may have taken place
in Kazakhstan; the Soviets did not deem it a se-
rious provocation planned by Peking. When fight-
ing broke out on the border in 1969, Moscow was
quick to publicize its case, and charges and coun-
tercharges were traded in the open.
Given the history of trouble along the lengthy
frontier, minor incidents can occur at any time,
and the potential for escalation always exists.
There has been no sign from any source, however,
of any recent major clashes anywhere along the bor-
der, and the bulk of the evidence suggests that
both sides want to avoid renewed fighting. The
head of a division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
N. M. Lunkov, told that
there had been no serious trouble on the frontier
for three years. He conceded there had been small
incidents, but said that these usually involved
people who crossed the border without intending
to engage in hostilities.
Lunkov credited the border negotiations in
Peking with helping to prevent more serious con-
frontations. In this sense, he said, the talks
had helped bring about a somewhat more relaxed
atmosphere between the two countries. With unusual
candor, he added that this was "about all there was
to show for the negotiations."
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The following vignette de.?
scribes a Soviet and East European walkout From a reception
after the
Chinese foreign minister had Whsle a routine remark about
"social inlperialism."
"...the group known here is Tolstikov and the Seven Dwar:!s chi/t'
walked out foNowcd b.v their minions. The Hungarian militurv attache,
however, who was clearly errjo.ving /rhnself over a glass of champagne,
was seen not to more. An aide was dispatched to lap him on the
shoulder and point out to him that his masters had walked out, but
when the aide approached, the Hungarian turned to hire and said in a
load voice, "I am not a social imperialist: nits corn trt' has not irrveded
an,t'bocly else t; / am staring. " I/owercr, this bolt! display of inde-
pendence was short-lived: when the aide had failed to more him, a
somctt'hat heavier gentleman was sent toward him, rind the !lungarian
was seen to more with alacrity from the hall. "
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Soviets Tighten Up In Peking
The Soviets have been trying to improve the
performance of their embassy in China and to
tighten their control over East European diplo-
mats there,
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Manifestations of closer cooperation between
Soviet and East European diplomats have already
been seen. For example, East Europeans have joined
their Soviet counterparts in walking out from Chi-
nese speeches at the slightest provocation. This
is symptomatic of a larger and more serious Soviet
effort to line up the East Europeans squarely behind
Moscow in the dispute with China. That Brezhnev
chose to condemn Peking with unusual harshness dur-
ing his speech in Hungary was no accident. He went
out of his way to note "with satisfaction" that
Hungary and other Socialist countries "fully agree"
with Moscow's China policy--a passage intended pri-
marily for East European ears. At the Soviet an-
niversary celebrations last month, most of the East
European party chiefs followed Brezhnev's lead in
criticizing Peking.
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New Year, Old Hos ti l.i t
Most of Peking's recent propaganda has not
zeroed in on Moscow to the degree it did in Oc-
tober and. November, when. it reached a pitch not
seen since the border clashes of 1969. Chinese
leaders seemed to be sitting back and monitoring
Moscow's response to their earlier offensive.
Peking's basic concerns have not changed.
Although China's New Year's day editorial devoted
very little attention to foreign affairs, it did
take a swipe at "Soviet. revisionism" for having
"further exposed itself as social imperialism
before the people of the world." Of more inter-
est was the inclusion of a new instruction from
Chairman. Mao to "dig tunnels deep, store grain
everywhere, and never seek hegemony" and a re-
iteration of Mao' s "be-prepared-f or-war" line.
In the same vein, foreign visitors over the past
few months have been shown the extensive air raid
tunnels being constructed by the Chinese with the
obvious intention of demonstrating China's vigi-
lance against the Soviet Union.
The old hostility was also clearly evident
in a New China News Agency feature story of early
January.. Stung by reports in the Soviet press
that. China was engaging in the opium traffic,
NCNA vehemently denied these "fantastic rumors"
and charged that "the Soviet revisionist clique
has resorted to every base and despicable trick
to damage China's prestige." in the course of
this diatribe, Peking quoted N?.lson Gross, US
special coordinator for narcotics, to bolster
its case. This is the first time US officials
have been quoted in this context and perhaps is
an indication the Chinese recognize the sensi-
tivity Washington attaches to the drug problem.
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Yankee Don,' t Go Home
The step-up in the Sino-Soviet rivalry has
produced a radical shift in the attitude of both
countries toward, the US military presence in Asia.
For opposite reasons, the USSR and China have come
to see advantages in a continued US presence there,
and each has become more open in revealing its
views in private conversations with foreigners.
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The Chinese have also tol recent
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A Soviet of-
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visitors-that the US military presence elsewhere
in Asia does not unduly trouble them.
and called possible US disengagement from the Far
East "unwise and incomprehensible."
ficial in Western Europe voiced the same concern
Talks on River Navigation Under Way
These annual talks
normally deal with technicalities such as dredging
border rivers and maintaining navigation markers.
At the conclusion of the commission's 17th regular
meeting, which ran from 6 December 1971 to 21
March 1972, Peking publicly announced that no
agreement had been reached on substantive issues,
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but that both sides had agreed to hold the 18th
session in China. Prospects for significant prog-
ress are no better this year.
Economic Relations
Chinese purchases of Soviet aircraft and elec-
tric power equipment highlight the modest improve-
ment in Sino-Soviet trade relations over the past
year and a half. Although the Chinese rely on the
West to supply most of the high-performance air-
craft for anticipated international commercial
operations, they are buying some passenger planes
from the USSR for both domestic and selected inter-
national routes. China has taken delivery of at
between the Chinese Air Force and civil air fleet,
reportedly dissatisfied with them and probably
will buy no more. The Chinese have received the
15 MI-8, heavy-duty helicopters they bought for
$30 million; these will probably be apportioned
ina has also purchased six
ong-range IL-62s worth about $42 million, but is
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least eight short-range turboprop AN-24s from
the USSR
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About half of the fi150 million China spent
abroad for power plants in the past year or so
went to the USSR. China is also looking to the
West for power plants and is negotiating for some
very large ones from Japan and France. The USSR
will probably continue to be an important supplier,
however, because of its expertise in the field and
the compatability of its equipment with that al-
ready in China.
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