WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CAMEROON: TEN YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL INDEPENDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 9, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
pct P f. COPY
~
oETE. rsL 61
Cameroon: Ten Years of Successful Independence
bOCUM11T 1 BRANCH
thiSTROY
Secret
N2 675.
9 January 1970
No. 0352/70B
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 CAMEROON: TEN YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL INDEPENDENCE
Cameroon, a former UN trust territory and the first of 17 black African
countries to become independent during 1960, will mark its tenth anniversary with
major observances from 10 to 12 January. UN Secretary General Thant will be
among the many foreign dignitaries in Yaounde for the occasion. Although less wel I
known than many of its sister states, Cameroon's record establishes it as one of the
more successful and promising of the new African members of the world com-
munity.
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From shaky beginnings, Cameroon has fashioned an increasingly stable political
structure. It has int"grated two territories with different colonial backgrounds into a
workable federal system, although its many ethnic groups have a long way to go
before they meld into a true nation. Economically, it has steadily improved its status
despite the problems stemming from underdevelopment. In addition. a Communist-
backed insurgency that plagued the country in the years immediately before and
after independence has been virtually eliminated. In foreign affairs, Cameroon has
established itself as a respected, moderate state whose voice in African councils has
grown progressively more influential.
Among the factors responsible for these achievements, much weight must be
given to the political acumen and determination of Cameroon's still youthful
president, Ahmadou Ahidjo. A quiet person who appears to be the very antithesis of
such flamboyant African leaders as Guinea's Sekou Toure, Ahidjo has nonetheless
proved to be an effective organizer whose accomplishments have been impressive. As
long as Ahidjo remains in office, Cameroon probably will maintain its stability and
will continue its economic and political growth.
PROBLEMS AT INDEPENDENCE
Ten years ago, Cameroon faced a future that
was uncertain at best. The common African
scourge of tribalism was particularly acute there.
Divided among some 200 ethnic groups, the
population had different cultural heritages and
languages, and a long history of rivalry and war-
fare. Deep religious divisions had also long existed
in the country. Muslim Fulanis dominated the
tradition-bound north, and Christians and ani-
mists predominated in the more progressive
southern and coastal areas.
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The first and most urgent challenge that
President Ahidjo's administration faced was insur-
gent activity by the Union of the Cameroon
Peoples (UPC), a Communist supported nation-
alist political organization that had spearheaded
the drive for independence in the 1950s. As early
as 1955, the UPC had resorted to terrorism and
violence in the hope of touching off a nationwide
insurrection. Although the attempt failed, insur-
gency nevertheless remained very much alive in
the southwestern area of French Cameroon
throughout the remainder of the trusteeship era.
On the eve of independence, some 3,000 armed
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The present Federal Republic of
Cameroon has developed from a complicated
colonial history. From 1884 to 1915, the
.entire area was administered by Germany
under the name Kamerun. During World War
I, French and British armies invaded and over-
threw the German protectorate. The Allies
then divided Kamerun in 1916; France got
four fifths of the area, and the UK took the
remainder. French (later East) Cameroon and
British (later West) Cameroons passed through
phases as League of Nations mandates and as
UN trusteeships. For administrative purposes,
British Cameroons was further subdivided
into northern and southern sections and
grouped with the British colony of Nigeria.
On 1 January 1960, the anniversary now
being commemorated, the French trusteeship
terminated, and the Republic of Cameroon
became a fully sovereign country under the
leadership of President Ahidjo. The Federal
Republic of Cameroon came into being in
October 1961 following two UN-controlled
plebiscites in British Camerooris in which the
inhabitants of each section had the choice of
uniting with the Cameroon Republic or defin-
iti-'ely joining Nigeria, which had also become
independent in 1960. The voting in Southern
Cameroons was overwhelmingly in favor of
reunification with the former French ter-
ritory, and in Northern Cameroons it pro-
duced a sizable margin for staying with Ni-
geria.
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guerrillas-whose primary aim had by then be-
come the overthrow of Ahidjo, head of the colo-
nial government since 1958-were severely taxing
the capabilities of both the French and the newly
organized Cameroonian security forces.
Another major preoccupation of the new
government was the proceedings then under way
to end the trusteeship in British Cameroons. To
many Cameroonians, reunification of the former
French and British territories was the most im-
portant goal after independence, so that the out-
come of the UN-recommended plebiscites was of
vital concern. Victory would give President
Ahidjo the challenging problem of reintegrating
two areas that had been administered by different
colonial powers for over 40 years. Defeat, on the
other hand, especially in the larger and more
populous southern sector, would dangerously
weaken the President's none-too-secure position.
Ahidjo himself appeared to have at least two
strikes against him. At 32, he was the youngest
and least experienced of the leaders of the many
new black African states that had come into exist-
ence by the end of 1960. Moreover, he was a
northerner who had been selected by the French
in 1958 to head the government of a country
traditionally dominated by southerners. Although
he had successfully negotiated the final stages of
French Cameroon's independence, he was still
widely regarded both inside and outside the coun-
try as a French stooge.
A serious inherent weakness contributed fur-
ther to the uncertainty that surrounded the new
government. Unlike the administrations in Ghana
and Guinea at independence, Ahidjo's govern-
ment lacked a strong, country-wide political or-
ganization based on broad nationalist support.
Indeed, the only real nationalist organization, the
UPC, was actively opposing the President.
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Ahidjo scored some rapid successes in the
first years after independence that not only in-
creased his political stature but allowed him time
to consolidate his power. By mid-1962, for exam-
ple, the UPC rebellion had been brought under
control, the hard-fought plebiscite in the vital
southern sector of British Cameroons had been
won, and the reunification negotiations had been
successfully concluded.
President Ahmadou Ahidjo
To end the insurgency, Ahidjo's government
relied on a program that combined aggressive mili-
tary counterinsurgency, offers of amnesty, and
propaganda campaigns to discredit the insurgents
on their home territory. The UPC, its original
nationalist appeal undermined first by indepen-
dence and then by reunifi' kr i, was reduced to
feeding on less-inflammatory economic and social
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grievances, principally in the Bamileke-inhabited
western party of the country. Violence declined
markedly after 1962.
With the aid of the radical regime in Congo
(Brazzaville), the UPC rebels established bases
along the two countries' mutual border in 1965.
Operating from these Congolese bases, the insur-
gents mounted sporadic, but unsuccessful, raids
into southeastern Cameroon. The Cameroon
Army crossed the border to destroy the bases in
January 1968, conducting the maneuver so ef-
ficiently that the Brazzaville government with-
drew further support from the rebels.
Formal reunification of the former French
and British colonies was realized in the second
year of Ahidjo's presidency. After extensive bi-
lateral negotiations with native leaders of British
Southern Cameroons, a constitution was finally
agreed on. Although both sides made concessions
to secure the merger, Ahidjo and his more popu-
lous state dominated the resulting federation.
The establishment of a national political
party was a goal toward which Ahidjo worked for
more than eight years. Since 1958, when lie be-
came premier of the French trust territory,
Ahidjo has moved steadily and skillfully to disarm
political opposition and then to absorb it. Begin-
ning with the solid backing of northern poli-
ticians, Ahidjo gradually won over southern
opposition leaders and their parties. As a result of
his maneuvering in the early years of indepen-
dence, Ahidjo's political organization became first
the dominant and then the sole party in the area
of the former French territory. Finally, in 1966,
through a me gc; with three parties from the
former British Cameroons, lie established the
present Cameroonian National Union.
What is probably Ahidjo's strongest weapon
for political unity and continued stability,
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however, is his knack for maintaining an ethnic,
regional, and religious balance within his govern-
ment. Although many Cameroonians consider
that his regime is dominated by northerners-
especially because Ahidjo himself is a Fulani from
Garoua-positions are actually carefully distri-
buted among all major groups. The President
encourages widespread participation in govern-
ment, but he guards against the seizing of decisive
power by any one faction, such as the Bamilekes.
Ahidjo has been similarly careful to ensure a
tribal mix in the army, one of the more effective
military forces in Africa and a major factor con-
tributing to Cameroonian stability. Counterin-
surgency campaigns have kept the army occupied
in various parts of the country, affording military
leaders little opportunity to become involved in
political intrigue. Moreover,'the minister of armed
forces and the army commander are close as-
sociates of Ahidjo, and are considered loyal to
him.
Ahidjo has also encouraged, as part of his
program for national unity and stability, the es-
tablishment of other national organizations in
addition to his political party. A new nationwide
federation of labor unions formed in the fall of
1969, for example, helps consolidate power more
effectively within the President's control.
CAMEROON TODAY: PROGRESS AND
PROBLEMS
Cameroon's federation is dominated by
French-speaking East Cameroon, with its popula-
tion of 4.4 million as against that of 1.3 million in
ex-British West Cameroon. Nevertheless, Ahidjo
has taken pains to elevate West Cameroon's posi-
tion and to integrate the areas economically and
culturally. A network of tarred roads now links
major towns in the two states. Increases in civil-
service wages have accorded West Cameroonians
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comparability with East Cameroon federal em-
ployees, and the unification of currency and tax
structures in the two states has measurably im-
proved West Cameroon's economy. Bilingualism is
being promoted in the schools by teaching both
French and English in each state. In addition,
bonuses are given to civil servants capable of
transacting business in both languages.
Today, tribal and regional discontent poses
much more serious problems for Cameroonian
stability than do the vestiges of UPC insurgency.
The UPC in Cameroon has been reduced to less
than 150 guerrillas, armed mostly with locally
manufactured shotguns and dependent upon
banditry for survival.
The Bamileke tribe, an assertive and politi-
cally cohesive ethnic group, looms as the most
significant potential adversary to Ahidjo's regime.
No longer confined to their overpopulated home
region Straddling the East-West Cameroon border,
the Bamilekes wield influence extending to the
population centers of Yaounde, the capital, and
Douala, Cameroon's largest city and commercial
center.
The largest single tribe, and the most adapt-
able to change, the Bamilekes have repeatedly
expressed dissatisfaction with their share of the
political pie. Albert Ndongmo, a Bamileke and
the Roman Catholic bishop of Nkongsamba,
serves as spokesman for the tribe. As the coun-
try's leading critic of Ahidjo, he represents the
undercurrent of unrest that has yet to become a
unified opposition.
FOREIGN POLICY
Cameroon's foreign policy understandably is
keyed more to Africa than to other parts of the
world. Regional association with neighboring
African countries serves at least two of
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ESTIMATED GROWTH INDICATORS
Per Capita
$116 Income
GDP
498 III (million
dollars)
1968
Major Crop Production (thousand metric tons)
Cocoa
Coffee
84.4 Imports
96.9 ';. Exports
2881 Railroad
7,200. Roadway
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Cameroon's objectives: further development of its
economy and broader cooperation among African
states. Recently, Ahidjo has allowed himself to be
drawn from his concentration on domestic priori-
ties into accepting a broader role on the African
scene. Last September, he was elected president
of the 41-member Organization of African Unity,
and in that capacity addressed the UN General
Assembly. Ahidjo will also host this year's sum-
mit conference of the African and Malagasy Com-
mon Organization-the grouping of N. French-
speaking African states-which is scheduled to
convene in Yaounde later this month.
Of economic necessity, ties with France
remain paramount. French support, which was
the mainstay of Cameroon during its critical first
years, has taken many forms. These have included
important capital contributions to development
projects and a variety of services, equipment, and
personnel. Until 1966, Paris also provided a large
direct budget subsidy. In the early 1960s, annual
French assistance of all kinds totaled $40-50
million; it still amounts to about $10 million
yearly.
Nevertheless, one of the most noteworthy
aspects of Ahidjo's success story is the fact that
Cameroon has moved significantly away from its
former near-total dependence on France. At
about the time that Cameroon no longer needed
the French subsidy to balance its budget, other
signs of lessening dependence also became evi-
dent, French export subsidies, for example, gave
way to the progressive tariff equalizations of the
European Economic Community. More impor-
tant, Cameroonians gradually began to assume
supervisory and technical positions in the admin-
istration and in the security forces, although a
number of French advisers remained in key posts.
Even before the budget subsidy ended in 1966,
France had withdrawn its tactical military troops,
leaving less than 100 French personnel attached
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to Cameroonian forces. Only three former French
African territories-the others are Guinea and
Mauritania-have survived the withdrawal of
French troops without suffering a coup.
Cameroon's posture toward the major world
powers can be characterized as "pro-Western non-
alignment." Like many other developing black
African countries, Cameroon is anxious to strad-
dle the political fence, so as to be in a position to
accept economic, technical, and military aid from
all sources. On most international issues, however,
the nation's position is close to that of the free
world.
Ahidjo, moreover, is suspicious of the strings
attached to seemingly generous Communist of-
fers. He seeks to control implementation closely,
and presses for the use of Cameroonians instead
of Communist nationals wherever possible. For
this reason, protracted negotiations with the So-
viet Union for the construction of a 100-kilowatt
short-wave radio transmitter outside Yaounde
broke down last month. It is likely" that the whole
project will be dropped because Cameroon ob-
jects to the proposed assignment of 30 Soviet
technicians along with their families to the in-
stallation.
In the economic sphere, Cameroon has regis-
tered progress since 1960 which, if not spectacu-
lar, has been impressive for an underdeveloped
country. This progress has been particularly note-
worthy because it has been accomplished with
considerably less foreign assistance than some
more heralded "success stories"-notably that of
the Ivory Coast.
Overall, the economy has grown steadily at
about 4 percent a year (in real terms). Agricul-
ture, the main sector, has shown substantial gains
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in both food and export crops. Production of
cocoa and coffee, the two major commodities,
has about doubled during the past decade. These
two crops account for some 52 percent of agricul-
tural exports.
The most dramatic progress, however, has
been made in manufacturing. This sector, the
most dynamic since the mid-1960s, has grown at
an average annual rate of 1 1 percent. One of the
more significant indications of the increasing im-
portance of manufacturing is its performance as
compared with that of agriculture. Despite agri-
culture's steady growth, its relative contribution
to the gross domestic product (GDP) has steadily
declined. Agriculture now contributes only 37
percent to GDP, a rate much lower than that of
most other African countries.
In addition to cocoa and coffee, Cameroon
exports timber, cotton, rubber, bpnanas, palm
products, peanuts, tobacco, tea, and some manu-
factured items.. This diversity, most unusual in
Africa, has freed Cameroon from dependence on
a single commodity. As a result, the country has
enjoyed a rising national income as well as a
steady accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves
and predictable government revenues.
OUTLOOK
The prospects for Cameroon's continued
development are good as long as Ahidjo remains
in office. There is no reason to believe that his
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methods of tribally and regionally balancing the
government will be any less effective in the near
future than they have been in the past. Ahidjo
should, therefore, be able to maintain the coun-
try's present stability and to prevent any one
faction from becoming too powerful. Economic
progress, especially industrial development, is also
expected to continue at its steady, if notspectac-
ular, rate.
President Ahidjo should easily win re-elec-
tion when his second term expires early this year.
The voting pattern will probably be similar to
that of his victory in 1965 when, running unop-
posed, he drew an overwhelming number of votes.
Inasmuch as he is both the leader of the only
national party and the incumbent chief executive,
it is hard to imagine another candidate even at-
tempting to wage a campaign against him. Noth-
ing short of assassination or coup, therefore, is
likely to prevent Ahidjo from continuing as
president for at least another five-year term.
As for the possibility of violent overthrow,
there is at present no organized intelligentsia,
labor group, or religious organization that could
serve as a focal point for dissent; nor is there any
evidence that the army constitutes a danger to the
government. The Bamileke threat is potentially
the most serious, because that tribe is not only
large but aggressive and politically cohesive.
Ahidjo has proved himself' a skillful and alert
politician, however, who should be able to sense
any political maneuverings and turn them to his
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