WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT COLOMBIA TO HOLD ITS LAST ELECTION UNDER THE NATIONAL FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 23, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
DcR F![E COPY
RETURN TO I E-61
Colombia to Hold Its Last Election Under the National Front
bOCUMIT BR!NCII
tEtc ~~9~'Y
'Up"a NO DESTROY
Secret
N2 676
23 January 1970
No. 0354/70B
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
SECRET
COLOMBIA TO HOLD ITS LAST ELECTION UNDER THE NATIONAL FRONT
On 19 April Colombia will hold general elections for the last time under the
National Front system of government. As the election date draws nearer, the
Liberal and Conservative parties, the two major political organizations that make
up the Front, are becoming increasingly disunited, principally over what dissident
politicians consider the imposition of Misael Pastrana as the official Front candi-
date. It is the Conservatives' turn to occupy the presidency, and although Pastrana
is a Conservative, he was handpicked by Liberal President Lleras. Many Conserva-
tive politicians believe he will make a weak president, thus opening the way for a
Liberal victory in 1974. The serious schisms in these two parties may add to the
growing dissatisfaction among the population, which has become weary with an
artificial arrangement that often only allows them to approve a candidate, not
choose him. Political stability probably will deteriorate as election day approaches.
The "Grand Coalition," as the National
Front is often called, will end in 1974, 16 years
after its establishment. It has been a unique insti-
tution foi Colombia and, indeed, for the world. It
was designed in 1957 to force the country's two
largest and bitterly antagonistic political parties,
the Liberals and the Conservatives, to stop their
politically motivated violence and to share power
and office. The experiment was viewed by its
formulators as a means to educate Colombians in
the art of political compromise and to inculcate
in the people the most difficult aspect of demo-
cratic political culture-the acceptance of the
legitimacy of opposition. The coalition was also
viewed as a means to retain real power in the
hands of the social and economic elite while
furthering Colombia's economic development.
The major feature of the Front, as set forth
in constitutional amendments, was that the presi-
dency would alternate between the two parties
and that there would be parity for both in all
public elective bodies, executive departments, and
Special Report
administrative posts. One of the advantages of
alternating the presidency purportedly was that
over a 16-year period it would serie to educate
the populace in democracy by accustoming
Colombians to seeing the presidency shift peace-
fully between political parties. Decisions made by
the legislative bodies required a two-thirds vote
(recently changed to a simple majority) for pas-
sage, thus presumably forcing bipartisan coopera-
tion on all legislation.
Over the years the coalition has succeeded in
many of its aims. Most importantly, it has
brought political peace, no small accomplishment
in view of the fact that perhaps 100,000 or more
people lost their lives in politically inspired vio-
lence from 1948 to 1958. Moreover, the Front
has helped to build political consensus and sta-
bility, and has restored a large measure of politi-
cal liberty. Economic progress has been favorable,
especially since late 1960, and in the past two
years President Llcras has been able to bring bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties under control and
to reduce inflationary pressures. The country has
entered a period of political stability and
23 January 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
23 January 1970
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
SECRET
economic growth (around six percent in the past
two years) under the National Front system.
A price has been paid for these accomplish-
ments, however. An increasingly high rate of
voter abstention has meant that the government's
claim to a solid popular base has become less and
less credible. Factionalism among the political
parties has also been a serious and persistent prob-
lem. Elections have made it obvious that there are
important segments of the party faithful who do
not subscribe wholeheartedly to the idea of join-
ing forces with ancient enemies but who instead
long for predominance.
Under the Front, only the two major parties
can legally participate in the elections. These par-
ties, however, are composed of various factions
that are in effect separate parties. For example,
the Conservative Party is divided into two major
factions, the Ospinistas (named after former presi-
dent Mariano Ospina Perez), and the Lauro-
Alzatistas (made tip of the followers of ex-
president Laureano Gomez and Gilberto Alzate).
In addition, other parties such as the National
Popular Alliance and the Liberal Revolutionary
Movement of the People-MRL del Pueblo-(the
Communist Front) can run slates by calling them-
selves Conservatives or Liberals. It has always
been legally possible for a group that is opposed
to the concept of the National Front to will a
majority in a general election. Such an outcome
would call into question not only the particular
composition of the government, but also the fate
of programs formulated by both parties. As a
result, the main issue in past elections has cen-
tered on the continuation of the Front.
Until last summer, former ambassador to the
US Misael Pastrana was the favorite presidential
candidate of the two major parties and enjoyed
Special Report
the firm backing of most of the party leaders.
After he returned to Colombia in mid-September,
however, Pastrana's political image suffered from
a series of faux pas made by him and his backers.
For example, Pastrana's prestige dropped along
with that of President Lleras, his sponsor, when
Lleras misjudged the degree of public interest in
charges of influence-peddling made by dissident
Liberal Senator Vives against two key members of
the Lleras administration. Although the President
put his full prestige behind the two men, subse-
quent investigations forced both to resign.
Mariano Ospina, the leader of the majority
faction of the Conservative Party, also miscalcu-
lated. He concealed his preference for Pastrana in
hopes of holding a free convention that would
merge all factions and arouse interest in the selec-
tion of a candidate. But in the process, Ospina
allowed several men with regional strength to rue,
as favorite sons, fully expecting that they would
later rally to Pastrana at Ospina's request. Ospina,
however, lost control of the convention, which
was held in early November. Five minor candi-
dates formed a "syndicate" to stop Pastrana, and
on the first ballot, Atlantic Coast favorite
Evaristo Sourdis won more votes than Pastrana
but fewer than the required two-thirds majority.
In a second ballot Pastrana and Sourdis tied.
Conservative leaders were unable to compro-
mise, so both names were proposed to the Liberal
convention, which also had to approve the candi-
date. On 5 December the Liberals finally chose
Pastrana as the official candidate, but almost 100
of the 600 delegates to the convention walked
out in protest against this prearranged selection.
The dissidents threatened to organize a "popular"
convention to pick their own candidate, but this
convention has not yet materialized. Many of the
dissidents favored maverick Conservative Belisario
Betancur, who had been selected by his own
"popular" convention in late October.
23 January 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
SECRET
25X1
23 January 1970
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020004-6
SECRET
Pastrana has emerged as a rather unimpres-
sive candidate. He has been guilty of many serious
errors in his effort to win the support of party
leaders and of the general public, and he does not
have a regional base of political support. He has
never been elected to any office, and he looks
more like a middle-of-the-road bureaucrat than a
dynamic political leader. Many view him as a
"puppet" of the establishment.
At least three candidates other than Pastrana
will participate in the coming elections, all tinder
the Conservative Party label, as required. The
most formidable is ex-dictator General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla, leader of the National Popular Alli-
ance (ANAPO), a rightist political grouping that
opposes the National Front system. The dema-
gogic ANAPO, which was formally organized in
1961, has participated in presidential and congres-
sional elections since 1962, aiming its appeal at
the middle and lower classes. Rojas' supporters
are mainly from certain sectors of the urban poor,
retired military personnel and government
employees, segments of the rural population, and
other groups that benefited from Rojas' presi-
dency from 1953 to 1957. More recently, Rojas
reportedly has picked up the support of various
political groups, including the Communists and
other leftists.
There are indications that dissident Senator
Vives and his followers are forming a new politi-
cal movement to support Rojas' presidential
ambitions. Th:; group reportedly is already organ-
ized in the Atlantic Coast area. An accomplished
demagogue, Vives will be a valuable addition to
the Rojas camp and will draw voters who oppose
the government's Front candidate. Rojas has also
been told by some of his followers that he has the
almost unanimous support of retired non-
Special Report
commissioned officers-a not at all unlikely de-
velopment.
Evaristo Sourdis was not a real presidential
contender before the Conservative convention. He
does not have as much political support as the
convention vote would indicate because his
strength is based primarily on the anti-Pastrana
vote. Nevertheless, Sourdis can count on votes
from Atlantic Coast areas, and a group of over
100 Conservative leaders recently issued a declar-
ation of support for his candidacy. Most of them
are from the coastal departments and represent
the majority of the syndicate that supported him
during the abortive Conservative convention, but
he has picked up support in other areas as well.
Belisario Betancur could be Pastrana's most
dangerous opponent. His "popular" convention in
late October was an indication of mounting dis-
content within Conservative ranks, especial],, re-
garding the long domination of the party by the
Ospina family. He enjoys the support of the
Union of Colombian Workers, the country's
largest labor organization. This is significant in
itself because the democratic labor movement has
never before become involved in a presidential
election. Betancur also has the support of the
small Social Christian Democratic Party and its
youth group and of former President Valencia.
Although Betancur was not successful in his drive
to become the Front's official candidate, he has
accepted the platform for the next administration
agreed to by the leadership of both parties. Betan-
cur has run a much more professional campaign
than has the Front's standard-bearer, and he ap-
pears to have more genuine popular appeal. In his
campaign appearances, his charisma has gained
him widespread support from the middle classes
and the labor elements.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020004-6
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
SECRET
The political turmoil that surrounded the
selection of a presidential candidate is more than
just a protest against the National Front. It is
symptomatic of a political system that has been
led by a small number of wealthy, powerful men
for more than a generation. The obs-rvance of the
20th anniversary of the Bogotazo (when popular
Liberal leader Jorge Gaitan was killed, on 9 April
1948, and the bloody political violence began)
brot:ght home to some the realization that most
of the names in the news on that infamous day
still dominate Colombian politics-Ospina, Lleras,
and others. New and fresh faces in the traditional
parties are a rarity, not because the "grand old
men" have won out against challenges, but be-
cause such challenges have rarely occurred. The
traditional parties have no mechanism for training
and pushing promising young leaders. This situa-
tion drains the parties of their vitality and reduces
their appeal to the young.
Electoral patticipation has decreased steadily
since the plebiscite in 1957, when the National
Front system was approved. In the congressional
elections of 1968, the most recent, only about 34
percent of the eligible voters exercised their right.
1?
go
E
? Plehiscite l; f'T Congressional
1966 1968
Liberal
Registered ? E ;!? Actual
voters voters
Special Report
SECRET
23 January 1970
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020004-6
Voter abstention is indicative of the apathy
exhibited by a majority of Colombians toward
the political process that keeps them from exer-
cising a free choice. Part of the explanation for
this apathy can be found in the narrow confines
in which political activity is conducted. The two
traditional parties historically have been elitist
and personalistic in character, and the loyalties of
the masses of ordinary Colombians who call
themselves Liberals or Conservatives have usually
been toward the parties regardless of specific poli-
cies.
There are indicatlwls already that leftist
extremist students are forming nationwide com-
mittees to encourage even more abstentionism in
protest of the "establishment." Another group
made up of dissident Roman Catholic priests
wants its followers to boycott the elections be-
cause it considers them a fraud perpetrated by the
country's ruling oligarchy in order to maintain
the status quo and to continue exploiting the
poor and oppressed.
On the other hand, because of the lively
competition, voter participation may increase.
The political infighting and the wide choice of
candidates make the election attractive to those
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020004-6
SECRET
that have complained in the past that the presi-
dent was preselected. Furthermore, both the
presidential and legislative elections will be held
on the same day, which has not been the case in
the past.
The small Colombi,.-rL Communist Party is
already marshaling its F::pporters to vote, inas-
much as this is the first election in which other
than the two major parties could participate at
the municipal and departmental levels.
The circumstances surrounding the election
make it clear that a strong president will be of
paramount importance if the National Front is to
be kept intact until it must be disbanded in 1974.
Certain Conservative politicians believe that the
country is not ready to retuni to full democratic
processes and are urging that the Front be ex-
tended. Liberal Party leaders oppose such a sug-
gestion because their party is the largest in the
country and they stand to gain the most in open
elections.
The plethora of presidential aspirants may
well keep any one of them from receiving a large
popular mandate. Even more so than in the past
few years, however, the new president will be
faced with a hostile or often noncooperative
congress and coalition because the losing candi-
dates will have large numbers of supporters in
elective legislative positions.
Only a strong president will be able to en-
sure Coic mbia's continued economic develop-
ment and political stability. Renewed political
activity by all parties at the municipal and depart-
mental levels in the April election will result. in an
increase in anti-Front activity? Moreover, during
the next four years, elements of the Liberal and
Conservative parties will desert the Front and will
resume normal political activity, which could lead
to a renewal of politically inspired violence.
If the new president is unwilling or unable to
deal forcefully with such a development, there
may be mounting pressure within the military for
a take-over of the government. The military prob-
ably would rule until another arrangement such as
the Front could be established in any event, it
appears that whoever emerges victorious will have
a difficult presidency. Should Pastrana win, he
would govern with the full support of the Na-
tional Front machinery, but even so, his presi-
dency probably would be the most difficult in the
Front's history.
Special Report -7
23 January 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020004-6