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May 8, 1970
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Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report Cuba and Subversion: Old Strategy, New Tactics DSO np F copy RED Jg I 1E.61 DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH FILE COPY DO NOT DESTRPFY Secret ' N2 665 8 May 1970 No. 0369/70A Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 SECRET . CUBA AND SUBVERSION: OLD STRATEGY, NEW TACTICS Fidel Castro has been involved in subversion and armed struggle in varying degrees ever since the Cayo Confites expedition in 1947. Almost every Latin American Republic has felt his interference at least once. His involvement has taken many different forms ranging from direct personal participation, as in the abortive Cayo Confites adventure against dictator Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, to the supplying of tons of arms and ammunition, as in Venezuela in 1963. His efforts.have consistently met with failure, with the single exception of his war against former Cuban president Fulgencio Batista. Even then it took two attempts before Batista was ousted. Despite his many setbacks, he has adopted revolution as a .'lay of life, and there are no signs that he plans to reject it as a basic tenet of his personal philosophy. His tactics might change because of the circumstances peculiar to a particular situation, but the fundamental precept seems immutable. Castro's predilection for armed struggle as the main road to political power has brought him into conflict with many of the Moscow-oriented Communist parties of Latin America and even with some orthodox Communists in Cuba. His domestic critics are too timid and too few to constitute a serious problem; they are handled in typical Castro steamroller fashion through public denunciation followed by various forms of banishment. The foreign parties, however, have the ear of the Soviet Union, Cuba's most important benefactor, and are less easy to silence. Party leaders, many of whom were well-established disciples of Marx and Lenin long before Castro began dabbling in politics, view the Cuban dictator as a latecomer to the Communist movement and as an arrogant, self-appointed oracle of revolutionary doctrine. Castro in turn thinks of them as ossified theoreticians corrupted by the soft life and blind to political reality. On occasion, Castro has beery willing to accommodate Soviet reaction to complaints from Latin American party officials by agreeing, as he did in 1963 and 1964, to allow the local Communist party leaders to determine the road-peaceful or nonpeaceful-to power in their respective countries. Such agreements, however, have been honored only for relatively brief periods of time and Castro invariably has returned to cramming his guerrilla tactics down their throats. When Castro's most carefully conceived guerrilla venture-Che Guevara's operation in Bolivia-met disaster in late 1967, party leaders throughout the hemisphere could scarcely restrain an audible sigh of relief. In their eyes, Castro's theories of violent revolution had at last been proved wrong. A toning-down of propaganda and a hiatus in Havana's support of guerrilla warfare operations suggested that Castro had finally recognized his folly and was adopting a change of strategy. This hope, however, has proved to be false. Evidence of the past two years shows clearly that Castro clings as strongly as ever to his thsories of armed stw,uggle and violence. His tactics have changed, but his strategy remains the same. Moreover, armed struggle and violent revolution seem to be such basic elements in Castro's psychological make-up that they will probably remain Cuban policy for as long as he is in power. But whatever Castro's theories, a variety of factors will tend to make him selective in his support of revolutionary groups. Special Report - 1 SECRET 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 . SECRET BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO REFLECTION The capture and execution of Che Guevara in October 1967 and the subsequent destruction of his guerrilla group in Bolivia caused Fidel Cas- tro to pause and reflect at length on his policy of exporting revolution. The Bolivian fiasco, which was merely another in a long string of fruitless and costly Cuban adventures in subversion, was a particularly disastrous setback because the nu- cleus of the guerrilla group consisted of 16 vet- eran Cuban combatants-three of them members of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Commit- tee-who were hand-picked and led by the man whom Castro considered the most experienced and daring guerrilla warfare tactician in Latin America. The group was theoretically the best team that Havana could field. The startling lack of success in Bolivia be- came apparent to Castro when he finally gained access to Cuevara's campaign diary in the spring of 1968. Castro found out that, far from estab- lishing a viable guerilla front, Guevara's band was constantly on the run, was barely able to survive the harsh terrain, and was unable to recruit Boliv- ians through his highly touted tactic of "armed propaganda." The circumstances of the defeat indicated to Castro that a rethinking of Cuba's strategy was in order. Special Report -2 SECRET Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 IMPROVING THE SUBVERSIVE APPARATUS In addition, a hard look was taken at the Interior Ministry (MININT), which is charged with carrying out foreign intelligence operations such as the Bolivian affair. A reorganization of MININT was initiated in mid or late 1968 at the same time a similar process was set in motion in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), another government branch deeply involved in subversion. That this shake-up was long overdue became even more apparent when a series of defections of key personnel sho MININT in 1968 and 1969. The revamping of MININT included both personnel and structural changes. In July 1968, the first vice minister of the armed forces, Major Sergio del Valle Jimenez, replaced Major Ramiro Valdes Menendez as interior minister. (Valdes, who had directed the ministry since 1961, was not in disfavor, however; after completing a lengthy high-level course of politico-military stud- ies, he assumed in January 1970 the position that del Valle had previously vacated.) Major Eddy Sunol Ricardo, a member of the party's Central Committee, who had often been used by Raul Castro as a trouble shooter, was named to the newly created post of MININT vice minister for political work. The first vice minister, Major 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 SECRET Manuel Pineiro Losada, who also functioned as the chief of the foreign intelligence apparatus (DGI), retained the DGI under his general com- mand but turned over direct responsibility for its management to Major Joaquin Mendez Com- inches, a former comrade-in-arms of Raul Castro. Pineiro's title is now first vice minister and techni- cal vice minister. Major Jose Abrantes Fernandez, who as chief of the Department of State Security (DSE) was charged with counterintelligence and security responsibilities, apparently was "kicked upstairs" and has been identified since last Sep- tember as vice minister and chief of the general staff. Like Pineiro, Abrantes presumably still has the DSE under his command but may have turned over direct control to an as yet unidentified in- dividual. room for doubt concerning Cuba's continued ad- herence to armed struggle and violent revolution. At the conference of the Economic Commission for Latin America held in Lima in April 1969, Rodriguez answered Venezuelan charges that Cuba was still supporting guerrillas by saying that "Cuba has the conception that for the develop- ment of the revolutionary p cess of most of the countries of Latin America, armed struggle is the fundamental instrument. We continue to hold to that conception." To those delegates who talked of resuming relations with Cuba if the Castro regime would publicly reject export of the revolu- tion, Rodriguez replied: "Cuba is not going to change its position to enter into relations with any Latin American government." Both the reorganization of MININT and the reassessment of Cuba's policy of subversion were probably completed by late 1969 or early 1970. There apparently never was any intention of dis- carding armed struggle; the reappraisal seems to have addressed only the problem of how and when to employ it. With Fidel Castro's almost total preoccupa- tion with domestic problems, Minister without Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez emerged as a key spokesman for the regime on foreign policy matters after late 1968. His statements leave no Special Report The new MININT hierarchy consists of (from left to right) Majors Pineiro, Abrantes, Mendez Cominches, and Leyva and Captains Pupo, Aguilera, and Franco. In an interview published in a leftist Chilean magazine in September 1969, Rodriguez sought to clarify "Cuba's position with respect to the revolutionary struggle in Latin America," which he said had "often been the object of inexact interpretations.... He said: "Cuba conceives of a 'continentalization' of strategy. That strategy is based fundamentally on the use of armed struggle and, in particular, guerrilla warfare in the major part of the countries of Latin America, but it does not exclude other forms of revolutionary violence or even of nonviolent political struggle." He characterized as remote and difficult, How- ever, the possibility of attaining power without violence or previous armed struggle. Regarding 8 May 1970 SECRET Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 . SECRET the situation in Chile, he derided the decision by leftist political parties to attempt to achieve power through democratic elections and said that "Chilean revolutionaries must be prepared for a struggle in which violence will be the decisive element, even in the case of their obtaining power by the nonviolent electoral road." More recently, the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina reported that, in conversations with newsmen at the United Nations in New York in March, Rodriguez said that "Cuba supports the liberation movements in Latin America ... ti-Lis is not only our right but our duty." (Cuba's appearance of "mo eration"' in its support of subversion should not be mistaken for a basic switch in policy. He claimed that "where we used to support rural guerrillas we are now more interested in urban guerrillas." He also noted some "promising" ele- ments in both the clergy and the armed forces and further implied that wherever an opening should arise, Cuba would not hesitate to try to exploit it. Finally, on 22 April, on the 100th anniver- sary of the birth of Lenin, Castro himself staunchly reaffirmed in definitive terms his com- mitment to support the subversion of other gov- ernments by violence: "Cuba has never nor will it ever deny support to the revolutionary move- ment. This is not to be confused with support of any fake just because he is using the name of revolutionary .... That type of pseudorevolutionary can expect no aid from Cuba, of course. But revolutionaries like Che, willing to struggle to the final consequences, willing to fight, willing to die-they will always be able to count on Cuba's help .... But one must not worry about our posi- Special Report tion toward the revolutionary movement. So long as there is imperialism, so long as there are people struggling, willing to fight for their people's lib- eration from that imperialism, the Cuban revolu- tion will support them." UNSUCCESSFUL REBELS LOSE SUPPORT It is the Cuban subversive effort in Latin American countries that has been the most affected by Castro's policy reassessment. One re- sult was the reduction or complete withdrawal of support from groups-such as those in Venezuela and Colombia-that have demonstrated incom- petence and leadership weaknesses culminating in Venezuelan guerrilla chieftain Douglas Bravo lost Castro's support. SECRET 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 SECRET a splintering of the local revolutionary movement. By early 1969, for example, all Cuban guerrilla advisers in Venezuela had been recalled to Havana and material support had been reduced so much that several guerrilla leaders complained publicly. In his speech of 22 April, Castro admitted that Cuban support had been withdrawn from groups that had constantly performed poorly, but lie made it quite clear that he would back those that produce concrete results. REVOLUTIONARY THEORY REVISED Another outcome of the reassessment was a fundamental change in revolutionary theory. Previously, the Cubans had maintained that the guerrilla unit in the rural areas, basing its support on the Peasants, was the focal point of the revolu- tionary movement. Units in urban areas func- tioned only in support of the rural guerrillas. In revising this concept, Castro seems to have real- ized-probably as a result of Guevara's experience in Bolivia-that the peasant in the countryside is basically a conservative individual with a rela- tively low degree of political consciousness and therefore a poor prospect for recruitment. Castro thus has apparently adopted a more flexible doc- trine in which the students and workers of the cities-who have a greater political awareness and a more liberal bent-initiate the revolutionary process by means of urban terrorism, later moving to the rural areas to start the second-or guerrilla warfare-stage. Carlos Fonseca Amador, president of the pro-Cuban Sandino Front of National Liberation (FSLN) in Nicaragua, described the new theory in early 1969 in a critique of previous FSLN opera- tions: "Under conditions in Nicaragua-more or less the same as Latin American countries gen- erally-the center of action of the revolutionary war has to be the countryside. However, the role that the city should play also has particular im- portance, since in the first stage of the struggle Special Report - 5 - SECRET the city must provide the countryside with the most developed cadres in order to direct the or- ganization of the political and military.,detach- ment. Generally, the urban revolutionary cells can be developed more easily in the first stage. Such elements include the revolutionary sector of the workers, the students, and a certain strata of the petit bourgeoisie." Havana, which described Fonseca Amador as "one of Nicaragua's finest sons," gave its imprimatur by publishing the cri- tique in Tricontinental magazine in late 1969. The same theory appeared again in Tricon- tinental in April 1970 when Carlos Marighella's 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 SECRET "When you are very close to the prospective target, the 'Molotov' cocktail is an extremely effective weapon. If you are not close enough to throw it, it is possible to adapt hunting rifles equipped with a special device. The weapon which we christened the M-16 during the war, is a sawed-off, 16-gauge shotgun to which a fork is attached in such a way as to form a tripod with the stock. The weapon thus prepared has a firing angle of about 45 degrees which can be modified by moving the fork backwards or forwards. It is loaded with an open cartridge from which the shot has been removed. You can attach it to a wooden, cylindrical stick which then becomes a projectile and comes out of the barrel of the weapon. To the projecting end, we add a tin attachment with a rubber shock absorber at the base, and a bottle of gasoline. This device can throw incendiary bottles 100 meters or more which makes it possible to aim with sufficient precision at places where the enemy has wood structures or inflammable mate- rial, or even to attack armored cars on sloping terrain." (Che Guevara: Guerrilla Warfare) I It is also useful in urban guerrilla warfare when fired from a terrace, a balcony, inside courts, and other locations. Special Report As these illustrations indicate, Tricontinental's main theme is violence. -6- SECRET 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 SECRET . "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" was pub- lished. Marighella, the Brazilian terrorist reader who was killed in a police ambush in Sao Paulo on 4 November last year, originally wrote the "minimanual" last June but apparently had for- mulated his ideas of the revolution in Brazil two years prior when he made his break with the Brazilian Communist Party. Although Triconti- nental acknowledged that Marighel.la had written his article with the specific case of Brazil in mind, it claimed that the "minimanual" has a "special importance" and that it "will become one of the principal books of every man who, as a conse- quence of the inevitable battle against the bour- geoisie and imperialism, takes the road of armed rebellion."* Marighella himself had explained his thesis in an interview granted last September to a repre- sentative of a French publication. "Under the present conditions of dictatorship in this country (i.e., Brazil)," he said, "propaganda and educa- tional work is possible, a priori, only in the cities. A number of mass movements, particularly those organized by students, intellectuals, and certain groups of militant unionists, have established a climate politically favorable for a tougher strug- gle, by which I mean armed actions. All the antidemocratic measures taken by the govern- ment ...have created a climate of revol.t....The city contains all the objective and subjective condi- tions necessary for a successful guerrilla war. But out in the countryside the situation is markedly less favorable. This means that the war in the rural districts will have to come after the war in the cities, which will play a distinctly tactical role. Besides, the comrades who go out to fight in the countryside will already have undergone their baptism of fire in the urban struggle. The very bravest of them will be sent out into the coun- try." Marighella, Fonseca Amador, 4nd other rev- olutionaries a. e unanimous in support of Castro's conviction that the local Communist parties have failed to recognize the validity of armed struggle and have been reluctant to put it into practice. The footdragging and sometimes outright treach- ery of the local Communist parties on this point have long been a sensitive issue with Castro. He is particularly bitter toward the Venezuelan Com- munist Party, which he believes sabotaged the guerrilla effort in the mid-1960s, and the Bolivian Communist Party, which he largely blames for Guevara's downfall. Although his last major state- ment on the subject was made almost two years ago on the occasion of the publication of Gue- vara's diary in Havana, there is ample evidence that his sentiments have not changed as a result of the policy reappraisal. At the Moscow conference of Communist parties in June 1969, for example, the Cuban observer, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, ac- curately reflected Fidel's views when he chal- lenged a portion of the proposed conference re- solution that stated that "the Communist and Workers Parties head the democratic forces and maintain on high the banners on the anti-im- perialist struggle, fight selflessly and courageously for the demands of the masses and for the attain- ment of revolutionary changes...." Rodriguez acidly charged that "in our opinion, that image does not correspond to reality with regard to certain Communist parties in Latin America" and then chastised parties that "underestimate the dangers of imperialism" and "bourgeois reform- ism." Although Rodriguez' criticism of the Latin American Communist parties was rather mild when compared to some of Castro's bitter dia- tribes, the forum in which Rodriguez delivered the rebuke indicates clearly that the so-called "thaw" in relations between the parties and SECRET 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 , SECRET Havana is pure fiction. Castro withdrew aid from certain guerrilla groups not to placate the local Communist party chieftains but because the guer- rilla groups were so ineffective for so long that Castro lost faith in their ability and desire "to make revolution." To use Castro's own words: "They had the opportunity to start and conduct a revolution; they did indeed have the opportunity and they fumbled it." Furthermore, he has flatly stated that he plans to continue support for "rev- olutionaries like Che," which is just the type of activity that earned him the condemnation of the parties. The new importance given to armed struggle in urban areas as a result of Castro's policy reassessment raised questions in the minds of many revolutionaries because it seemed to con- flict with the theories expounded by Jules Regis Debray in Revolution Within the Revolution? In this treatise-much publicized by Havana-Debray discussed at length basic guerrilla warfare doctrine as he understood it after a year of study in Cuba. Although Debray wrote the essay, its concepts are generally accepted as being those of Castro and Guevara. Thus, the high value now placed on urban struggle compared to the low value place on it in Revolution Within the Revolution? leaves Castro vulnerable to charges of inconsistency in a matter of life-and-death importance to revolu- tionaries who are putting his theories into prac- tice. Juan Antonio Blanco, an instructor in the Department of Philosophy at Havana University, for example, admits, in the October 1969 issue of the Cuban theoretical journal Pensamiento Critico, that "Debray, for reasons very well known, is closely tied to our country and our ideas about the problems of Latin America. A criticism of his essay Revolution Within the Rev- olution? is in part, a criticism of our own ideas." Special Report SECRET Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 To absolve Guevara, Castro, and even Debray himself of any inconsistency, however, Blanco explained further: "Despite the fact that Debray tries to summarize the basic ideas of Ma- jor Guevara and Fidel Castro, this does not pre- vent certain personal viewpoints, or a poor or simply brief statement of some aspects, from causing different interpretations which do not always have to coincide with Debray's own thought." When it was first published is 1966 in Havana, Debray's essay was highly touted by the Cubans as an important work "for those wlx know that `the duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.' " Blanco claimed three years later, however, that "Debray was not trying to write a manual of guerrilla warfare or a socio- logical treatise on the Latin American revolu- tion." In a further effort to disabuse the revolu- tionary faithful of any misconceptions about the theories in Debray's book, Havana published in Pensamiento Critico in August 1969 a preface that Debray had written more than two years earlier for the French edition of the book. Debray wrote that the purpose of his book was "to seek a maximum of revolutionary efficiency," and he then warned the reader to avoid "any definitive conflict between theory and practice.... Let the combatants figure out for themselves the theory of their fight..." An article in the January 1969 issue of Tri- continental also tried to disentangle Debray from the results of his writings. The "acritical mechan- ical application" of Debray's theses by some Latin American revolutionary circles, said the ar- ticle, was "something Debray himself did not intend to happen." The article then goes on to explain why the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement in Uruguay is so successful in waging armed struggle in spite of the fact that Debray claims in his book that in Uruguay "there are no 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 SECRE'T' immediate prospects for armed struggle." So, in the fashion of George Orwell, Debray wrote what he didn't mean and his manual on revolution is not a manual after all. SETBACKS CAUSE PAUSE IN AID The de-emphasis of Debray's theories means that Havana has become more flexible in its ideas on how the armed struggle should be applied and not that the importance of the basic doctrine has dwindled. The de-emphasis happens to come at the same time that Havana has decided to with- hold support from lackluster guerrilla groups and when a series of disasters involving pro-Castro revolutionaries has caused the Cubans to slacken the flow of support until the situations of various leaderless groups clarify. These disasters include: the jailing of Nicaraguan FSLN chief Carlos Fonseca Amador in Costa Rica last September for bank robbery; the killing of Carlos Mar?hella-a most promising guerrilla prospect-by Sao Paulo police last November; the death in prison last November of the pro-Castro secretary general of Panama's Revolutionary Unity Movement, Floyd Britton; the death last September of Guido "Inti" Perero Leigue, the survivor of the Guevara de- bacle who succeeded in regrouping Che's National Liberation Army (ELN) in Bolivia; and the killing of Gerald Brisson and many other leaders of the Cuban-supported Unified Party of Haitian Com- muiiists. Assistance to rebel groups continued even during the period of policy reassessment. Several of Marighella's followers had been trained in Cuba, for example, and about 50 Cuban-trained guerrilla fighters were sent to Bolivia in the spring of 1969 to be incorporated into "Inti" Peredo's ELN. Another group of 30 was to have been infiltrated into Bolivia in March 1970, but this Special Report plan may have been upset by several successes scored by the police against the ELN in the latter half of last year. In addition, the period following the death of Peredo was marked by considerable in0rision in the ELN leadership, and it was not until early this year that some semblance of order seemed to be restored to the organization under the direction of Peredo's younger brother "Chato." Although tb' three Cubans who survived Guevara's defeat in 1967 eventually went back to Havana, and the Cubans serving with guerrillas in Venezuela had returned home by early 1969, Havana is apparently still willing to send Cubans to Latin America for special operations under certain circumstances. Several, for example, were to have been sent to Bolivia in July or August 1969 to join the ELN's jungle campaign. An ad- ditional tlire, or four Cuban advisers are also believed to be in Guatemala working with the guerrillas of the Rebel Armed Forces. Evidence of Cuban support in the form of arms or money is extremely difficult to produce, particularly in view of Havana's exhortation to guerrilla groups to demonstrate their in.lepend- ence by robbing banks or other businesses and by buying or stealing arms locally. Marighella found this to be a successful tactic and claimed that he had never received arms or financial aid ficrn 'Ile Cuban support of subversion is not confined to Latin America. Although Havana's involvement SECRET 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 , SECRET 25X1 he u an guerria experts were in ongo (Brazzaville) in 1969 training guerrillas of the Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA). in addition to the instructors, the Cubans had given the MPLA a small quantity of supplies. Havana's support of the MPLA has been kept to its current low level, however, because of the restrictions imposed by the government of Congo (Brazzaville) following the dabbling in domestic Congolese politics by the Cubans and the MPLA. 25X1 Actions of both the MPLA and the PAIGC receive prominent play in the Cuban press, and red carpet treatment is extended to any leaders of the movements that visit Cuba. For propaganda support, PAIGC war communiques are regularly for publication in the party newspaper. in clandestine activities in Africa has declined considerably since the mid-1960s, Castro has sought to maintain contact with Marxist-oriented guerrilla organizations targeted against white Af,-i- can governments. In a speech at the UN General Assembly on 8 October 1969, Cuban ambassador Ricardo Alarcon said: "Cuba reaffirms her com- plete support for the struggle of the African peoples for their full national independence and proclaims her militant solidarity with the libera- tion movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, and with the oppressed African peoples in South Africa, Namibia, and Zim- to became evident the following month when Portuguese military units in Portuguese Guinea captured a Cuban army officer serving with an African guerrilla band operating out of the neigh- boring Republic of Guinea. The officer reportedly admitted that he was only one of several Cuban officers who had been on active duty with the guerrillas of the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cap Verde (PAIGC) since ntid-1969. -babwe." What type of support Alarcon referred late African guerrilla units such as this MPLA detachment pictured in Havana's Party newspaper. Special Report 25X1 25X1 The MPLA maintains a permanent repre- sentative in Havana for close liaison. Cuba also maintains loose contact with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), but this tenuous relationship seems to have cooled somewhat since the assassination early last year of FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane. URBAN TERRORISM The new em phasis on urban terrorism has an important side benefit for Cuba. Bank robberies, SECRET Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 SECRET payroll holdups, raids on gun shops, and attacks on small police or military posts have provided various guerrilla groups with more than enough money and weapons for their operations. Kid- napings for ransom have also proved richly re- warding for guerrilla groups in Guatemala, Colom- bia, and Uruguay. Demanding the release of polit- ical prisoners in exchange for kidnaped diplomats or other high-level political figures is another pop- ular tactic of terrorist organizations. Although Castro is undoubtedly aware that his own diplomats serving abroad are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, he has made no attempt to renounce publicly the kidnaping or assassination of foreign service officials. In fact, when 13 of the 15 prisoners released by Brazil in exchange for US Ambassador Elbrick chose to travel to Cuba for asylum, Castro was on hand at the airport and saw to it that they got red carpet treatment upon arrival. A warm welcome was also given to four of the five prisoners freed in exchange for the Jap- an'bse consul general in Sao Paulo and to 19 of the 20 Dominicans freed in a trade for an attache of the US Embassy when both groups sought refuge in Cuba. The Cuban press has been outspoken on the subject. A radio commentator in Havana, for ex- ample, called the kidnaping o? Ambassador El- brick "the most brilliant action carried out re- cently," while Tricontinental of December 1968 characterized the assassination by pro-Castro re- bels of US Ambassador Mein in Guatemala City as "punishmen.t well deserved." Similarly, Verde O1ivu, the Cuban military weekly, reported the assassination by the same retel group of.two US military officers in Guatemala ;n January 1968 as being "the only language that the native oligarchs and their patrons, the Yankee imperialists, under- stand." The Cubans until 1969 had always under- played the importance of urban terrorism in the Special Report revolution of 1957-58. The guerrilla war in the mountains had always dominated accounts of the overthrow of Batista. Last August, however, Pensamiento Critico published the text of a talk given in closed session to Latin American journal- ists in 1967 by Major Fatistino Perez, the man who directed Castro's urban apparatus during the war. Perez' remarks were probably released be- cause by 1969 the policy reassessment had indi- cated that added importance was to be given to url-an terrorism in the revised revolutionary theory. Perez' historical review closely paralleled the theses expounded by Fonseca Amador and Marighella. His reason for employing terrorist tactics is simple: urban terrorism creates a "situa- tion of insecurity in the so-called economic classes. ..who are going to feel that their base is shaky and are themselves going to be thinking of the necessity of change, the necessity that this situation cannot Continue.... A state of general opinion in the people favorable to change will be created. In other words, even those who are not revolutionaries realize that this cannot continue and will assume an attitude favorable to change." Perez laid great stress, as did Marighella and Fonseca Amador, on the participation of students in the revolutionary process. Students have a de- veloped political consciousness, a certain lack of caution, and have the fitness of youth. The vio- lence that students have precipitated throughout both North and South America in the past few years has apparently impressed Castro with re- spect to revolutionary possibilities. In late 1969, he 'initiated plans to resurrect his old student- front group, the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE), which was formed in Havana in 1966 to act as a suppor' apparatus for the Guevara adventure in Bolivia.. OCLAE has lain dormant since Guevara's failure, but last December its permanent secretariat in- vited to Havana a select group of student leaders 8 May 1970 SFC.R FT Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 SECRET in several Latin American countries who favor the Cuban position on armed struggle. During this secret "consultative" meeting, a critique of the organization was held that resulted in structural changes in OCLAE to make it "more dynamic and effective, based on concrete actions against North American imperialism." Castro him- self talked with the students, and Perez also chatted with them about the Cuban experience in urban terrorism. A similar meeting is schedule) for late 1970 when plans will be drawn up for the Fifth Latin American Student Congress. What was meant by "concrete actions" be- came evident when one of the delegates from Chile, Jorge Fuentes Alarcon, returned home and assumed one of the three vice presidential posi- tions on the newly formed Committee of Support for the Bolivian People and the ELN, the rebel group of Guevara and "Inti" Peredo. Fuentes, a leader of the terrorist-prone Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), clearly stated his be- liefs: "We must launch armed conflict to do away with the power of the oligarchy and build a new society and the new man in Latin America... .The place of the student in Latin America would be to join the armed struggle wherever it is being waged-either in the city or the countryside-to develop that war and to carry it to the cities, to give the guerrillas increased fighting capacity and to supply them a means to keep fighting." It can safely be assumed that the other delegates to the meeting in Havana harbor similar sentiments and that Latin American students in general will re- ceive increasing attention from Havana as suitable material for subversive operations. The Cubans are also favorably impressed by the growing tide of sentiment within the Catholic Church for revolutionary social and economic changes. Havana's propaganda contains heavy doses of material on members of the clergy such as Camilo Torres, the Colombian priest who joined the LEN and srrved under arms with the guerrillas until killed in combat in 1966. Another Colombian and former priest, German Guzman Campos, who maintains that "revolution is the only way," so impressed the Cubans that lie was invited to the Havana Cultural Congress held in January 1969. In January 1970, Radio Havana characterized as "one of the most significant phenomena in Latin America in recent times" the "growing participation of some of the progressi f Catholic clergy in the struggle of the peoples." A month later, the Cubans, apparently searching for another Camilo Torres, gave considerable press Carrillo Torres is Castro's example of the ideal rebel priest. Special Report -12- SECRET 8 May 1970 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020024-4 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4 SECRET play to the reported arrival in the ranks of the Colombian ELN of Father Domingo Lain, a Spanish priest who was expelled from Colombia a year ago for interfering in the country's internal affairs. Castro has commented favorably on the revolutionary clergy several times in his speeches and probably looks on cassocked rebels as having excellent potential for guerrilla support activities such as those carried out by various religious orders in Brazil in conjunction with Marighella's terrorists. Castro will continue to support subversion abroad but is now being much more cautious as to whom he should support and what type of support is to be supplied. If the situation were particularly promising, he would not hesitate to send money, arms, or even Cuban advisers, but th? rewards would have to be commensurate with the risks. He seems to have learned that exporting Cubans to lead a foreign revolutionary movement is counterproductive, and he will probably de- pend on foreign nationals who have the charisma and aggressiveness of a Carlos Marighella to pro- vide the necessary leadership. He will not insist, as he did with disastrous results in Bolivia in 1967, that he control the revolutionary movement, and he will probably be satisfied to confine Cuban participation to support and advice. He is showing signs of being parsimonious with financial and material assistance, urging revolutionaries to svu- tain themselves by means of holdups, bank rob- beries, and similar actions that have become so prevalent in Latin America in the past year. He will exert special care in situations like that in Peru where military officers seem to be making a genuine effort to institute fundamental economic and social changes by means of na- tionalization and agrarian reform. In such cases, he will soft-pedal violent revolution to avoid up- setting the applecart. He considers the case of Bolivia a special one, however, and will oppose the Ovando government no matter what changes are instituted. Castro blames Ovando for the exe- cution of Guevara and seems to be intent on exacting revenge. Honorato Rojas, the Bolivian who led Guevara's rear guard into a fatal ambush in August 1967, has already been liquidated by the ELN, and the same fate has apparently been decreed for Mario Monje, the now-imprisoned Bolivian Communist Party official who refused to aid Guevara, and for Ovando himself. The bulk of Castro's support for revolution- aries will probably consist of propaganda and the training of recruits in guerrilla warfare and special operations techniques. Candidates for training will probably be screened much more closely than in the past, and this policy may result in a drop in quantity but an improvement in quality. Castro will establish and maintain liaison with, and support, those groups that are willing to engage in armed struggle for the overthrow of their native governments but will be less dogmatic when it comes to the fine points of revolutionary theory. He now recognizes that each country has its peculiarities and that the Cuban experience cannot be repeated in other countries unless his general theories on revolution undergo consider- able revision. He will continue to scorn most of the established Communist parties in Latin Amer- ica and will seek out those revolutionary leaders who are willing to apply in their respective coun- tries the general guidelines of urban terrorism (to create the proper revolutionary climate), guerrilla warfare (to provide a combat nucleus for con- fronting the forces of repression), and the people's army (to overthrow the government, seize power, and continue the revolution's eco- nomic and social phases). Castro is a compulsive rebel and will probably remain committed to vio- lent revolution, Special Report 8 May 1970 SECRET Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020024-4