WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SUHARTO'S INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: May 15, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DJRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Subarto'r Indonesia
DSB FILE COPY
RETURN TO 1E-6t
Secret
N9 665
15 May 1970
No. 0370/70A
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SUHARTO'S INDONESIA
Suharto, president of Indonesia for three years, will visit the United
States of`icially and for the first time from 26 May to 2 June. He is expected
to discuss the Cambodian situation and Southeast Asian affairs generally,
and probably hopes to reach agreement on a modest military acquisitions
program that has been under consideration for some weeks. He will express
his appreciation of past US economic assistance, and, as a means of m'in-
taining the so-far favorable climate in Was'iington toward aid to Indonesia,
will talk with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and speak to the
National Press Cl,ib.
The 49-year-old Suharto has placed his stamp of caution and prag-
matism on his administration. He has eased forward on a number of prob-
lems while consistently maintaining priority on economic improvement.
Indonesia under Suharto continues to make progress on the difficult tasks of
economic rehabilitation and is preparing for national elections in mid-1971.
The proscribed Communist Party, which remains under strong government
pressure, is scattered and ineffective.
Although ultimate government control is in the hands of the army,
civilian participation is considerable and effective, particularly in the eco-
nomic sector. The army considers it necessary to perpetuate its political role
at least until economic recovery has been achieved, and will seek to do so in
the coming elections and to reinforce its posiiicn with civilian alliances.
Although Indonesia follows a nonaligned foreign policy, its interna-
tional relations in recent years have been weighted toward the West, from
which it receives critically needed financial assistance. Largely because of
Indonesia's strongly anti-Communist domestic stance, relations with the
USSR and Eastern Europe have been correct but cool in the post-Sukarno
era; ties with China were suspended in 1967, and prospects for an early
resumption of diplomatic relations are poor.
Other than continuing negotiations for economic assistance with both
non-Communist and Communist nations, Indonesia's principal international
objective is to develop its influence in Southeast Asia. Major facets of this
policy have been the founding and subsequent support of the five-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Djakarta's recent initiative that
resulted in the scheduling of an Asian conference on Cambodia.
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SOLDIER TO PRESIDENT
Suharto's rise from poor boy to the top
ranks of army and political leadership is still fairly
unusual in Indonesia, yet not much attention is
paid to it. Suharto seems to be accepted for what
he is-a disciplined, reliable, capable individual.
He cannot inspire the colorful copy that former
president Sukarno did, but there seems to be
general satisfaction that he does not.
Suharto was born of humble parents in a
Central Java village in 1921 and spent a childhood
eventful chiefly for being shuttled from relative
to relative after his parents' separation. In June
1940, bored with his job as a bank clerk, Suharto
volunteered for the Dutch colonial army, and
remained in the armed forces under the Japanese.
He fought effectively against the Dutch, emerged
with the rank of lieutenant colonel, and then
began a steady and quietly distinguished rise in
independent Indonesia. By 1963 Suharto had
been appointed to the second most senior post in
the army as head of the Strategic Command, a
combat-ready strike force. It was logical that h
should assume temporary leadership of the army
when the Communists launched their abortive
coup on the morning of 1 October 1965, kid-
naping and later murdering army commander
General Yani and five other generals.
When President Sukarno, who had been in-
volved in planning the Communists' antiarmy ac-
tion, instructed army leaders to nominate three
candidates for the position of army commander,
they submitted only one name-Suharto. Al-
though Sukarno regarded Suharto as "too stub-
born and too anti-Communist," he had no
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alternative but to install him as army commander
and did so on 16 October 1965.
As head of the developing new Indonesian
leadership, Suharto believed that his major tasks
during the following year and a half were to
maintain the cohesiveness of the army, crush the
large Communist Party, and so reduce President
Sukarno's power and prestige that he could be
quietly and peacefully removed from office. Su-
harto accomplished all three objectives, the last in
an elaborately phased program, which at the time
was criticized by many of his supporters as need-
lessly slow. Perhaps it could have been done more
rapidly without disruptive consequences, but Su-
harto's schedule gave him and his military and
civilian colleagues time to sort out some of Indo-
nesia's economic and political complexities and to
ease the transition from the old order to the new.
On 12 March 1967, the Indonesian Congress
unanimously passed a decree declaring Sukarno
"no longer capable" of fulfilling his presidential
duties and naming General Suharto acting presi-
dent. A year later, on 27 March, Congress elected
25X6 him to a five-year term as full president.
severe economic deterioration and the threat of
Communist resurgence both demanded action,
and these urgent requirements provided both a
valid and a convenient rationale for imposing,
until recently, a partial moratorium on political
activity. Given the fragmented state of Indo-
nesia's political party system, the task of charting
the way toward a predominantly civilian govern-
ment that would be representative, non-Com-
Special Report
Suharto has made no effort to disguise the
fact that the army is the major political force in
Indonesia and his own chief support. He and his
colleagues feel strongly that it is the only organi-
zation capable of administering the country dur-
ing this period of economic rehabilitation and
political reorganization. It is the only cohesive,
nationally organized group in the country, its
loyalties are nationally focused, and with the
passing of time, it has increasingly avoided the
regional and ethnic divisions that afflict those
civilian organizations aspiring to a national role.
When General Suharto, then still commander
of the army, assumed the presidency in March
1967, the Indonesian Army achieved greater and
more effective participation in government than
ever before in its 25-year role of nation building.
Although Suharto has since relinquished com-
mand of the army, he remains the minister of
defense and as such is commander in chief of the
armed forces. In the 23-man cabinet the army
holds three other portfolios, and the navy and air
force hold one each. The military, particularly the
army, is well represented in all departments at
subministerial levels and in industrial and agricul-
tural state enterprises. Army officers serve as gov-
ernors in 14 of the nation's 26 provinces, and
junior officers and noncommissioned officers
hold a substantial proportion of subprovincial
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jobs down to the village level. Military appointees
constitute 18 percent of the membership of par-
liament and congress, and hold approximately
half of the nation's ambassadorial posts.
Suharto and the army uphold the doctrine
of the military's "dual function": the military
must participate actively in the nation's political
and economic life, as well as provide its defense
and security force. Politically, army leaders seek a
middle road between what they regard as the
"free-for-all" parliamentary democracy of the
1950s and former president Sukarno's subsequent
authoritarian rule. This middle way would permit
significant popular participation but would retain
a strong central leadership and a major political
role for the army.
In the economic sector, the army vigorously
argues that economic improvement is a prerequi-
site for political stability and a necessity in count-
ering a future renascent Communist Party. Su-
harto himself is an especially dedicated supporter
of this line, but he has entrusted the formulation
of economic policy not to the military but to a
group of talented and well-trained nonparty ci-
vilians.
From the beginning of his leadership role in
October 1965, Suharto has worked to develop a
united military team and to eliminate interservice
rivalries. Although the navy and air force are
much smaller than the army (army-250,000,
navy-48,000, air force-30,000), Suharto has con-
sistently included the two smaller services in the
military's national role.
A military reorganization announced in Oc-
tober 1969 and gradually being implemented pro-
vides for centralized Department of Defense auth-
ority over the three services and for an integrated
command down to the provincial level. The chain
of command runs from Suharto through six inte-
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grated theatre command;,. The change increases
Suharto's personal control over the armed forces
and should make for a more flexible andrespon-
sive instrument for carrying out the military's
functions.
In directing national life and interpreting the
role of the military, Suharto has insisted on the
observance of legal forms, has trie.: to listen to
the civilian voice-although this effort is some-
times obstructed by he military around him-and
has displayed sensitivity to civilian charges of
"creeping militarism" and corruption. These traits
have inclined
,u iar o to pursue a considerably more liberal
administration than could have developed under
more authoritarian military personalities on the
scene. Although he is unwilling to diminish the
army's ultimate authority-fearing any one of sev-
eral results such as political instability, a turn
toward an Islamic state, or Communist resur-
gence-he nevertheless strongly believes that the
military bears heavy responsibilitik. s not to misuse
its power and authority.
For example, when students demonstrated
against rising prices early this year, Suharto or-
dered that not a shot be fired and that cabinet
ministers meet with and answer the students'
questions. He has told military com-
manders-who, because of Indonesia's economic
predicament and budgeted funds. compelled
to engage in fund-raising activities for troop wel-
fare-that these activities must be truly directed
toward this purpose and ,iot be "obstacles to
national development." On th;' whole, his ap-
proach to government indicates a continuing in-
tention to avoid military authoritarianism yet to
maintain the ascendency of the military as it
guides the nation in achieving economic develop-
ment and politico', modernization.
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SUHARTO AND THE CIVILIANS
Although the army is clearly predominant,
civilians hold a number of important posts in the
cabinet, !ar aucracy, and legislature. Those hold-
ing the more responsible positions, however, are
nonparty technicians or individuals with little po-
litical support. Political party members, who had
hoped that the downfall of former president Su-
karno would restore the parties to greater influ-
ence, find that although they have a larger voice
than during the last years of Sukarno's rule, their
present position falls far short of aspirations.
There are seventeen civilians, eight of whom
are members of political parties, in the 23-man
cabinet, and civilians predominate in the ap-
pointed congress and parliament. Suharto has en-
couraged these two bodies to carry out their
constitutionally prescribed functions (congress
makes policy and parliament legislates), and they
have indeed from time to time provided a check
on the executive. Suharto has urged the army to
respect and support civilian officials in the prov-
inces.
Suharto shares the army's distrust of po-
litical parties in general and, in particular, of
Moslem parties, which account for a plurality of
the electorate. This distrust stt+ms from the na-
tion's experience with parliamentary democracy
(1949-1956), the parties' irresponsibility during
those years, their concern for acc,uiring greater
power rather than for achieving .rational goals,
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and the series of unstable coalition cabinets that
characterized that period. The military's par-
ticular negativism toward Moslems is rooted in its
memory of the fanatical Darul Islam movement,
which tried to establish a theocratic state by
armed force for more than ten years before it was
crushed. The army also remembers that the
Masjuni, the modernist Moslem party dissolved in
1960, supported the 1958 provincial revolt, an-
other crisis that the Djakarta government had to
settle by military force. Reinforcing these fears is
the suspicion that all faithful Moslems, militant or
not, want to replace Indonesia's secular society
with a Moslem state. Of the three major parties :n
Indonesia-the Moslem Scholars (the party of
traditional Moslems), the Indonesian Moslem
Party (modernist and successor to the Masjumi),
and the secular National Party, the army clearly
prefers the secular Nationalists.
The parties to a considerable extent have
earned the army's lack of confidence. As organi-
zations, they a:e poorly disciplined, indecisive,
and unable to formulate a national program. They
tend to be special-interest groups that are ethni-
cally or religiously based. Although within the
parties, particularly the Moslem Party, there are
individuals who have a strong sense of national
purpose, they have so far been unable to translate
this into a program of action. The army's exclu-
sion from leadership roles, of some of the very
individuals in both the Moslem and National par-
ties who might stimulate a healthier development,
however, merely perpetuates the present stagnant,
unproductive atmosphere pervading the parties.
The army is currently trying to develop an
organization of functional groups as another ci-
vilian vehicle for political support for the Suharto
regime. Functional groups (youth, intellectuals,
labor, women) have long been an element of the
Indonesian political scene, and the civilians in
parliament theoretically are about evenly divided
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