WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020029-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: June 12, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special R epp o in
Afterjnath of Elections in the Dominican Republic
kla~:~i~ 1 1'61
Secret
N9 699
12 June 1970
No. 0374/70A
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AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
On 16 August a democratically elected administration in the Dominican
Republic will succeed another for the first time in history. Scarcely more
than four years after a near civil war shook the country, the Dominicans
returned incumbent Joaquin Balaguer to the presidency with a majority in a
peaceful and relatively honest election held on 16 May. Measured against the
chaos of 965, the holding of contested and free elections was in itself a
significant political stride forward. Balaguer's impressive victory in the five-
man race has reinforced his control of the government, at least in the short
run.
The victory, however, was a personal triumph for Balaguer; the fledg-
ling political system that emerged after the assassination of long-time dic-
tator Trujillo in 1961 is showing signs of strain. The major opposition party
and the only legitimate political representative of the left, the Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD), refused to participate formally in the. elections,
charging the government with repression. The bitter political aftertaste of
the 1965 revolution is still evident in its revolutionary mouthings. The PAD
has undergone some withering of its organizational base, and possibly of its
popular following, and has now forsaken even the semblance of a loyal
opposition. As evidenced during the campaign, other parties, even of the far
right, would be willing to cooperate with the PAD should they see an
opportunity to oust Balaguer. Under these circumstances, the President will
continue to rely on the armed forces as an essential political prop.
Because of his popular and military support, Balaguer is one of the few
Dominicans capable of achieving a modicum of political and economic
progress while maintaining stability. It is less than certain, however, that
even he will be able to cornnlete another fniir-ypar Ierm ci~fiilly N~
is convincing election win, and the consterna-
tion an disorganization it has caused his foes, probably will provide him
some respite from political attack after the inauguration in August. During
his term, however, lie is likely to be faced with continuing, and probably
increasingly violent, problems of public order. His programs, designed both
of necessity and political inclination to preserve order rather than to pro-
mote progress, will be under mounting attack. Not even the most ambitious
programs arc likely to stem the growing and massive unemployment in the
cities-a reservoir of disenchantment upon which the left hopes to feed.
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The elections themselves were practically
anticlimactic after a campaign during which all
opposition groups threatened to withdraw; Bala-
guer quit his office in an unprecedented move to
keep several parties in the race; the leader of the
left, former president Juan Bosch, returned ifter
three and a half years of self-imposed exile only
to reinforce his party's decision to abstain; and
one presidential candidate, Garcia-Godoy, died.
About 60 persons were killed as a result of cam-
paign violence.
The campaign centered on personalities
rather than on programs. The opposition attacked
Balaguer on grounds of "continuisrno," claiming
that his re-election, although constitutionally per-
missible, was morally repugnant to a majority of
the people. They charged that re-election repre-
sented a reversion to Trujilloism (Rafael Trujillo
had held the country in a dictatorial vise from
1930-1961 and Balaguer had served in his govern-
ment for many years). Balaguer, as is his custom,
accepted opposition charges without comment
and appealed to the people to renew his mandate
so that he might complete unfinished programs.
Military support for Balaguer, although pervasive,
stayed within the bounds of Dominican political
propriety-if only because the armed forces were
confident that he could win easily without arm
twisting.
Opposition efforts attracted headlines but
had limited public impact. The final electoral
tally gave Balaguer some 650,000 votes. His
closest competitor, Vice President Lora, lagged
400,000 votes behind. Lora benefited to some
extent from half-hearted support from the PRD.
Former General Wessin y Wessin, even farther to
the right than Balaguer or Lora, attracted only
150,000 votes. The two participating representa-
tives of the center and left, the Social Christians
(PRSC) and the National Conciliation Movement
(MCN), attracted only about 50,000 votes each.
None of these parties has a very bright future.
Both Lora's and Wessin's organizations repre-
sented personal campaign vehicles not designed
for longevity. Their fate is tied to the personal
fortunes of their leaders. The PRSC will continue
its dogged struggle to gain national prominence,
but it seems unlikely that the party will make any
startling gains. The MCN, with the death of Gar-
cia-Godoy, its only well-known leader, probably
will wither away.
Balaguer's personal victory was buttressed
by overwhelming congressional and municipal ma-
jorities. The President's supporters won 26 of 27
senate seats, 60 of 74 seats in the house of depu-
ties, and 75 of 77 mayoralties. On the basis of
percentages and elective seats, Balaguer's 56-
percent majority was an impressive victory and a
stunning disappointment for his foes; both Lora
and Wessin registered their public "surprise" at
the results. The contest clearly illustrated that
there is no individual on the center or right who
approaches Balaguer's national stature.
The total number of ballots cast, however,
fell about 200,000 votes short of the total in the
1966 elections despite a significant increase in the
number of eligible voters. The percentage of par-
ticipating voters (about 61 percent) contrasts
with that of 1966 (74 percent) and 1962 (67
percent), and Balaguer's 645,000 total was more
than 100,000 votes short of his 1966 tally.
The PRD has used thesa figures to calculate
an abstentionist vote of some 700,000-larger
than any individual candidate's total-which it
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Election Results by Party 1966 & 1970
I?eforrni;t I'arly
BnIafluer (PR)
1,700,000
1,340,570
? Congressional Results by Party
Senate -
Dorninician Revolutionary Pt,rty
Bosch (PRD)
Revolutionary Social Christian Party
(PRSC)
Democratic Integration Movement
Lora (MIDA)
Democratic Quisqueyan Party
Wessin (POD)
National Conciliation Movement
(MCN)
Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD)
Dernorratic Integr,ition Movement
(MIDA)
Hefonnist Party
(PR)
Revulutionaiy Party
(PRD)
Democratic Integration Muvernent
)MIDA)
Democrat lc 0uisquevan Pal ty
(POD)
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1,900,000
1,1W,541
Senate
26
House of Deputies
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claims is indicative of its con+inuod and growing
strength and of Balaguer's declining popularity.
For a number of reasons, such claims are not
persuasive. Popular interest in the recent elections
cannot compare with that generated in either of
the last two contests. In 1962, the country's first
free elections were being held after decades of
Trujillo dictatorship, and campaigning was
lengthy and extensive. In 1966, the elections took
place after a civil uprising had generated world-
wide interest and the contest had pitted the coun-
try's dominant political figures-Balaguer and
Bosch-head on in essentially a two-man race. A
comparatively small vote this year was consistent
with slow-starting campaigns and the widespread
expectation that Balaguer would win. PRA) ab-
stention, although significant, was only a con-
tributing factor to the low turnout.
The PRD stand is alsc somewhat undercut
by the election results in the capital, where its
strength is the greatest. The popular incumbent
mayor, a former member of Balaguer's Reformist
Party who broke with the President and ran on an
opposition ticket, received outright PRD support
but lost a close race to the President's mayoral
candidate. Balaguer himself amassed a surprising
plurality in the Santo Domingo environs, an area
where he lost badly in 1966.
The President's opponents are impugning the
results in a number of areas, but their charges are
pro forma. The Central Electoral Boarui is un-
likely to uphold the accusations, which would
not, in any event, alter the over-all picture of an
impressive Balaguer victory. Wessin's and Lora's
initial threats to retaliate for the "massiv3 fraud"
were also made for the record, as they lack the
political or military muscle to back their bluster-
ing. OAS observers present during the balloting
gave the elections a clean bill of health.
Given the relative stamp of approval ac-
corded Balaguer's administration by the elections,
no significant policy or personnel changes are
expected. Although the President may shuffle his
advisers somewhat, familiar faces will soon reap-
pear, and policy, centralized in the President's
hands, will remain essentially unaltered.
A new political party, the National Youth
Movement (MNJ), also backed the President for
re-election and contributed 47,000 votes to his
win. Some of its members, even though they
supported Balaguer as the only realistic choice to
lead the country, are younger and more idealistic
than the old guard in the President's Reformist
Party and are optimistic that they will be able to
effect policy changes in the new administration.
They probably will be disappointed. The MNJ
was in part a creature of Balaguer's own making,
to serve as an auxiliary campaign vehicle in case
the feuding that occurred last year in the Reform-
ist Party got out of hand. It is doubtful that
Balaguer regards it as much more than a tempo-
rary political expedient.
The President has announced that his new
administration will be a "government of concilia-
tion." This probably means that, as in 1966, he
will offer some government posts to opposition
party leaders. As was the case four years ago, it is
quite likely that some of his foes, once they have
finished licking their electoral wounds, will accept
the proffered positions. In addition, there has
been speculation that a new constitutional
amendment may be passed to provide congres-
sional seats to losing presidential and vice-presi-
dential candidates. Such a move would be in
keeping with Balaguer's "open-door" political
policies and would cost him little.
None of these gestures, however, is likely to
be translated into a meaningful role in the govern-
ment for the opposition. For the most part, Bala-
guer's opponents have evinced little interest in the
more constructive aspects of opposition leader-
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No major shake-up in the military seems
likely. Balaguer has every reason to be satisfied
with the armed forces' Performance, clesite the
25X6 political problems his secu-
rity forces occasionally cause him when their
more brutal acts are publicized. Balaguer has, in
any event, been relatively successful in side-
stepping responsibility for the acts of what he
terms "uncontrollables." Some of the military
commanders who blatantly interfered with politi-
cal campaigning in their areas were temporarily
removed after Balaguer stepped down from the
presidency, but they are once again in place. Any
military changes following the inauguration prob-
ably will be an extension of the President's policy
of using transfers to balance off . ival military
cliques.
Balaguer probably regards his policies as suc-
cessful and, viewed from his perspective after
years under Trujillo, progressive. His extensive
public works program, assailed by critics as a
piecemeal effort instead of the sweeping changes
necessary for "meaningful reform," has been a
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successful political expedient and has held down
discontent. Balaguer's modest land reform pro-
gram compares favorably with Bosch's efforts
early in his term in 1963, and Balaguer gets every
inch of political mileage from such efforts. Even
in the cities, where problems are insurmountable
over the short term (unemployment is now 25-30
percent), Balaguer's combined emasculation of
opposition unions and his promotion of business
and foreign investment have made for steady, if
unspectacular, economic growth uninterrupted by
costly strikes. Labor dissent has f( cused on the
administration's austerity program, but the Presi-
dent's pledge to ease controls and allow wage
increases may also give him further breathing
room in the urban areas.
Economic prospects over the short term are
favorable, with GNP expected to rise about six
percent annually over the next two years. US
assistance has played an important part in the
economic revival since the dislocation of 1965,
and continued high US import quotas for the
sugar crop will be necessary for substantial
growth. A good share of the credit for the im-
provement, however, belongs to the administra-
tion for establishing a stable political climate and
promoting investment opportunities. The ex-
pected economic progress will help to ease some
of the political pressure on Balaguer.
The voting made evident that the center and
right, including business interests and the mili-
tary, remain generally satisfied with Balaguer's
performance. The conservative dissenters, such as
Lora and Wessin, succeeded in demonstrating
only that they presently do not have the re-
sources necessary to undermine Balaguer. A se-
rious threat to the government would require the
participation of the right, but before the military
would consider an alternative to Balaguer, the left
would have to cause public order problems se-
rious enough to strain the armed forces' capa-
bilities. The forces on the left recognize this, and
their strategy is designed to galvanize the right
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 Pre-election PRD-supported rally in Santo Domingo
into action. Open dissent comes primarily from
labor, the Communists, and Bosch's PRD.
Labor violence, aggravated by slum pressures
in the capital, is a persistent danger. Minor work
stoppages by the transport unions, which are sub-
ject to significant leftist influence, have been a
handy political tool for Balaguer's foes. His ene-
mies, however, have not been able to move from
such walkouts to a more widespread strike. The
left, including the PRD, no longer can claim the
strength in union circles that it had a few years
ago. Balaguer has bought off some labor leader-
ship and, as he did early this year, is willing to use
the military to raid the headquarters of recal-
citrant union chiefs in order to head off antigov-
ernment activity.
The Communists suffer from a constantly
splintering leadership that prevents their move-
ment from achieving full effectiveness. An excep-
tion has been the recent activities of the Domini-
can Popular Movement (MPD), a violence-
oriented group nt'mbering about 300, which al-
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most certainly was responsible for the successful
kidnaping and ransoming of the US air attache in
March. It has also carried out most of the recent
military and police assassinations. The MPD and
other Communist groups, utilizing hard-core
cadres and calling on some student support, have
proved they can cause substantial public order
prob:e,ns and initiate bloody encounters with po-
lice. They will probably continue to do so, but
their capabilities limit them to hit-and-run tactics.
With Balaguer in power for another four years,
the Cornmunistc may find that a hardened atti-
tude on the part of the military, which is no
longer subject to the public scrutiny it received
during the campaign, will force them into a more
defensive posture. Balaguer has been able to close
off their student support on several occasions by
shutting schools without stimulating serious pro-
tests.
The PRD remains the major opposition po-
litical force, if only because of the other parties'
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poor electoral performances. It can still rely on
substantial support in the urban areas, which no
other opposition party can do. In the capital of
Santo Domingo, a PRD-supported rally attracted
the largest crowd of the entire campaign, even
though the party was not running. There was
some truth to PRD allegations that the govern-
ment refused to issue demonstration permits to
the party for fear of the crowds it might draw. So
long as the magnetic Bosch remains at the party's
helm, the PRD will continue to be a potentially
explosive force.
Juan Bosch-explaining
the "Dictatorship with
Popular Support" Thesis
The party has moved increasingly to the left
in recent years, a trend that is likely to continue.
Party policy at present is ill-defined and is drift-
ing toward Bosch's radical "Dictatorship with
Popular Support" thesis for want of a clear alter-
native. This thesis rejects representative democ-
racy as a failure in Latin America and promises
the establishment of a vague, popular dictatorship
that will represent the masses. The party now has
removed itself from the legitimate political arena
for at least the next four years; the realization
that the party probably could not have defeated
Balaguer under any circumstances undoubtedly
played a part in its decision to abstain. Publicly,
the party reasoned that its candidates would h?ve
been harassed by the military, probably de-
frauded of votes, and in any event not allowed to
take office if it had won. The military's antago-
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nism toward the PRD, however, has not changed
markedly since 1966, when the party ran candi-
dates, and the decision to withdraw is reflecl.ive
not of altered conditions but of the party's frus-
tration and drift to the left. The unrealistic ab-
stentionist policy, which seems to lead to a politi-
cal dead end, in conjunction with the return from
self-imposed exile of party leader Bosch, has
raised serious doubts about the party's ultimate
intentions.
Bosch's unexpected return has been at-
tributed both to a deal with the Communists to
help lead a revolution and to a bargain with
Balaguer to help him win re-election. Neither ex-
planation is convincing. More likely, the many
party appeals calling on him to return as the only
person capable of leading the party and the na-
tion in a time of crisis struck a responsive chord
in the egotistical Bosch. The PRD leader, how-
ever, found the Dominican situation considerably
less tense than the revolutionary fever pitch he
had been led to expect while in Europe.
Bosch's newly imposed leadership, like the
man, has been filled with contradictions, and the
party is still grcping for an answer to its internal
problems. The decision to abstain, a vacillating
affair that was not uniformly enforced, garnered
only questionable prestige for :he party, and re-
sulted in no patronage. Bosch's presence has to
some extent papered over the growing rift be-
tween party radicals and moderates, but only
temporarily. Soft liners, including many of the
party's prestigious members, must be decidedly
unhappy with PRD strategy. They may remain in
the party for want of any other place to go, but
they are likely to withdraw increasingly from
party activities. Younger radicals, also restive, are
dissatisfied with Bosch's long-term, theoretical ex-
planation of the coming revolution.
From a tactical point of view, it will be
increasingly difficult for the PRD to avoid close
contact with the Communists. Over the past 18
months there has been increased cooperation be-
tween the PRD and several Communist parties at
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almost all levels. Although Bosch has warned that
the party must not drift into the illegal Commu-
nist circle and fall victim to the political snare the
government has set, it seems likely that the trend
will continue. Like the Communists, the PRD
now lacks legitimate representation and will be
forced to try to incite and focus on popular
discontent in order to make political capital and
provide a forum. Other avenues are limited. The
party could attempt to revive its atrophied labor
bureaus and other pressure groups, but it is likely
to have little success in these areas because it now
lacks sources of patronage and finance. The
PRD's decision to abstain from municipal elec-
tions in 1968, along with its subsequent loss of
the municipal government in Santo Domingo and
its accompanying patronage, has been one of the
very reasons for its dwindling labor support.
If Bosch transfers his radical philosophizing
into formal PRD policy, he will hand the govern-
ment the excuse it needs to crack down on the
party. Balaguer has refrained from any open move
against the PRD, preferring to utilize his divide-
and-conquer tactics rather than risk unifying the
party and possibly stirring up its popular support
with an overt move. If he intends to step down in
1974, however, he will want to leave the PRD in
as weak a position as possible and with little
chance of winning an election. Given the pro-
clivity of many of the military chiefs to regard
the PRD as little better than Communist, the
party may find that its decision to operate out-
side the formal political arena has opened it to a
greater risk of repression.
Bosch remains one of the keys to PRD for-
tunes. Whether he will remain in the country is
w en -e -e ec ion ever p,3rmanen y su si es a
ter the August inauguration, he may once again
find the mundane task of running an out-of-
power party for four years a bit tedious. If he
again decides to leave the country, no matter
what the ostensible reasons, both his prestige and
that of the party will suffer. The PRD is not apt
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to disappear as long as it has the mystique of
Bosch and the revolutionary rhetoric of 1965 to
call upon; indeed, Dominican political parties
need little more than the name of a famous per-
sonality to survive. The party's prospects are
clouded, at best, however. The possibility of an
internal split has been enhanced by recent events,
and Bosch's departure could hasten a break be-
tween dissatis'ied younger radicals and some of
the party's old guard. Even if the party remains
intact, it is bound to lapse into organizational
disarray.
With the elections behind, Balaguer's frus-
trated opponents quickly turned their attention
to the OAS General Assembly meeting, which was
scheduled to be held in Santo Domingo in late
June. The left, led by Juan Bosch, kicked off the
protests against the conclave, and almost all polit-
ical groups outside the government joined in the
anti-OAS chorus. Student-led demonstrations re-
sulted in almost daily casualties and, in the face
of further violence, OAS representatives decided
to move the meeting to Washington. The decision
to shit t he site removed a sport-term irritant
from government-opposition relations and should
have a temporary calming effect. Over a longer
period, the left will be buoyed by what it regards
as an unqualified victory, arid it will be even more
prone to use civil disorder to exert pressure on
the administration.
Like the OAS meeting, Balaguer's inaugura-
tion on 16 August will be an almost inevitable
target of protests, but these are likely to be more
vocal than violent. With the international spot-
light now removed from Santo Domingo, the
Balaguer government will be less reluctant to deal
firmly with any further attempts to promote dis-
order.
Possibly the greatest threat to the adminis-
tration is the unorganized popular dissatisfaction
with the political system. The increased dis-
gruntlement has been most apparent among
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youth. Secondary school disturbances have been
mounting, and the level of student violence is
higher than at any time since the 1965 crisis. In
part, this has been due to the catalytic effect of
the elections, but it is also symptomatic of a
deeper trend. Cities in the interior, not normally
affected by the politicdl life centered on the capi-
tal, are being drawn into the political system.
Santiago, the nation's second largest city and
traditionally a quiet bastion of conservative busi-
ness interests, was the site of some of the most
serious military-civilian clashes during the cam-
paign. The trend is evident in the cci'ntryside as
well, highlighted by more frequent land seizures,
some increased activity on the part of the church,
and similarly an alienation of youth. This aliena-
tion probably also contributed to this year's low
voter turnout.
Thus far, nowever, dissatisfaction remains
organizationally adrift. There has been no wide-
spread flocking to the PRD banner in the cities,
and peasant unions remain small and ineffective.
Moreover, as long as the opposition concentrates
on personalities rather than programs and ex-
hausts is resources in revolutionary rhetoric, the
dissent probably w;'l remain disturbing but amor-
phous. As such, it eppears to be a manageable,
short-term problem.
Balaguer begins his new term with impressive
credits that should, at the very least, bring him
some respite from serious political attack. The
all-important military, if not ideologically com-
mitted to constitutional government, is nonethe-
less ready to stick with a winner. Balaguer will
not hesitate to use the security forces as a repres-
sive weapon, despite the probability of increased
civilian and military casualties, in order to control
the extreme left's expected attempts to incite
disorder. The President's popular mandate is im-
pressive under the circumstances. His opponents
on the right have been temporarily chastened by
their poor showing, and the leftist PRD will have
to solve its tactical problem of how to operate
while in political limbo before it will constitute a
serious threat. If the present divisiveness in party
ranks is any indication, much of the PRD's ener-
gies may be dissipated in internal feuding. Despite
these assets for the administration, the party's
decision to operate outside the legal political
framework means that the government's public
order problems, already significant, probabl will
increase during the next four-year term.
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