WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT PRE-ELECTION POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: August 14, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Pre Election Politics in Pakistan
ON FRE COPY\
KETWd Tj 1E-6t
Secret
N2 666
14 August 1970
No. 0383/70A
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PRE-ELECTION POLITICS IN PAKISTAN
Twenty-three years after its inception, Pakistan may at last be moving toward truly
representative government. Ironically, it is also in the midst of one of its most unsettling and
precarious periods, with its continuation as a viable country seriously in question.
Pakistan is not unfamiliar with national instability. In its initial years, the country
experienced such chaos under a series of shaky coalition governments that army commander
Ayub Khan's take-over in 1958 brought a nationwide sigh of relief. In the next ten years,
Pakistan moved from military to civilian rule, but the latter eventually proved to be
essentially autocratic in nature, designed primarily to preserve President Ayub's supremacy.
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Ayub's gradual isolation from the opinions and needs of his people precipitated his
downfall and the renewal of martial law in March 1969
In contrast with Ayub and his entourage, President Yahya Khan and his senior
military colleagues apparently have no desire to continue governing. With a combination
of firmness and fairness, Yahya has moved deliberately toward basic reforms and toward
an orderly transfer of power to civilian leaders. Despite some skepticism, most observers
believe that elections for a national constituent assembly and for provincial assemblies
will take place by the end of the year. Subsequent developments-the negotiations
leading to a satisfactory constitution, the viability of a government run by squabbling
politicians long out of power, and the long-range outlook for a stable, united Pakistan-
are far more difficult to foresee or to regard with optimism.
A cursory survey of the present situation
generates a disquieting feeling of deja vu. In a
great many respects, Pakistan seems to be where
it was in 1958 with a military regime, surrounded
by all-too-familiar political faces and parties, is-
sues, and problems. A closer look, however, re-
veals that the approach of the current regime
toward the country's difficulties is considerably
25X6 more enlightened than Ayub Khan's. A
military man, not a politician.
The political system he
devised was based on indirect election and, in
effect, prevented the regular political parties from
operati.ig on a normal basis.
When Yahya Khan assumed control of the
country and declared martial law in March 1965,
he probably had no clear idea of where his regime
was headed. He recognized, however, that he
must avoid the mistakes that had ruined his
predecessor and plunged Pakistan into chaos. His
immediate task of restoring peace and order was
achieved quickly. He then settled down to the
troublesome job of sorting out Pakistan's myriad
problems and formulating policies to solve them.
The tedious process generated criticism: progres-
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President Yahya Khan
sives believed he was moving too slowly and in-
decisively, and conservatives considered that he
was moving much too fast.
From the beginning, Yahya insisted that his
would be simply an "interim" administration,
designed to prepare the proper conditions for a
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PAKISTAN
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Hyderabad
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transfer of power to duly-elected civilian officials.
His credibility as a caretaker president increased
as his efforts to carry out this transfer moved
steadily forward.
Constituent assembly elections, now sched-
uled for 5 October, will be based on a one man -
one vote formula that will give more populous
East Pakistan an assembly majority. Provincial
elections are to follow, not later than 22 October.
Prohibitions against political activity were re-
moved on 1 January, and the breakup of West
Pakistan into four etFinolinguistic provinces was
carried out as promised on 1 July.
Despite some political pressure to postpone
elections until after the fall monsoon floods
recede in East Pakistan, Yahya has so far stuck to
his original timetable lest any change be con-
strued as a weakening of his resolve to relinquish
power. In mid-August, however, he visited the
flood-ravaged eastern wing. His statement that
flooding had surmounted elections as his fore-
most concern, together with the government's
failure to release the election schedule on 10
August as expected, increased speculation that
Yahya might indeed postpone elections, probably
until December.
In the meantime, the country has remained
relatively quiet. The unrest and violence among
students and laborers that marked Ayub's final
days in office has virtually disappeared. The stu-
dents stopped protesting almost immediately
after Yahya took over, and their few public
demonstrations since then have occurred pri-
marily in East Pakistan. For the most part, these
have been incidents of infighting among rival stu-
dent groups rather than antigovernment agitation.
Laborers have been somewhat more active, havi,:g
been encouraged by the martial law regime's
initial lenient and conciliatory attitude.
In recent mcnths, however, strikes and other
labor difficulties-including violent internecine
clashes-have been dealt with firmly as Yahya
attempted to establish a "no-nonsense" image. A
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few communal disturbances in both East and
West Pakistan have also been handled satisfac-
torily, although the tensions remain. Thus far, the
electoral campaign has been relativel;' peaceful,
despite the disruption of a number of political
rallies and meetings by followers of rival poli-
ticians.
In outlining his election plan in November
1969, President Yahya made it clear that pre- and
post-election activity would have to follow cer-
tain rules and that violence would not be tol-
erated. Yahya stipulated, for example, that the
constituent assembly must formulate its constitu-
tion within 120 days or it would be dissolved and
another assembly elected to finish the job. He
also stated that the constitution would not go
into effect until he approved it, a provision
fiercely opposed by leading politicians who re-
sented this infringement of the assembly's sover-
eignty.
Despite discontent with some of the ground
rules, most of the parties decided to continue
their plans to contest the elections. Some political
leaders warned, however, that if the constituent
assembly were unable to resolve grievances con-
stitutionally, a mass movement would be initiated
to obtain satisfactory redress for the people.
The issues of primary concern to Pakistanis
today are problems that have troubled them since
the partition of the Indian subcontinent. These
stem from the artificial nature of the state
itself-its geographical division into two wings
separated not only by 1,000 miles of Indian ter-
ritory but also by )vast ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic differences. As in 1947, Pakistanis are
still united only by Islam and by the fear of
Hindu India.
In fact, regional antagonisms have increased
since independence as a direct result of various
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inequities, including discriminatory governmental
policy. The Bengalis of teeming East Pakistan
have suffered most under the political and eco-
nomic system, which has been dominated by West
Pakistanis, chiefly by the frequently arrogant
Punjabis. A regional confrontation, which has
been building for some years, is now imminent
because the East Pakistanis appear no longer will-
ing to accept what they regard as second-class
citizenship. Their stand has been buttressed by
spokesmen of some of the smaller reinstated prov-
inces in the western wing, who are also concerned
about provincial disparities and continued Punjabi
domination.
The key issue of the campaign, stimulated
by these regional rivalries, is the degree of pro-
vincial autonomy to be granted under the new
civilian government. East Pakistanis demand ex-
tensive authority to run their own affairs, while
the Punjabis advocate a powerful central admin-
istration, which they hope to control. A resolu-
tion of this basic controversy will entail the
sacrifice of important regional concerns and, thus
far, no spirit of compromise has emerged.
Compromise will be necessary, however, if
the constituent assembly is to hammer out a
national constitution. An early sign of the direc-
tion the constitutional deliberations may take
could be indicated by the internal voting formula
adopted by the assembly. A decision to vote by
simple majority would put the East Pakistanis in a
commanding position and represent a substantial
concession-and possibly a spirit of com-
promise-on the part of the Punjabis. On the
other hand, insistence on a heavily weighted vote,
such as a majority from each of the five provinces
could lead to an immediate and serious deadlock.
Other issues-all secondary to the autonomy
question-are also being debated. The Islam versus
socialism controversy has generated emotional
outbursts and some violence, especially in the
western wing of the country. Declarations of
intentions to nationalize certain businesses and
basic indus*,ries have raised worried eyebrows in
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already nervous commercial circles. Both the
fourth five-year plan and the annual budget have
produced heated exchanges, revolving chiefly
around the relative fund allocations for East
Pakistan and the western provinces. Some parties
have been charged with unethical campaign
practices and foreign financing, with the US
coming in for the lion's share of criticism for
alleged intervention. Foreign affairs issues have
generally been peripheral, but most parties have
jumped onto the anti-CENTO/anti-SEATO
bandwagon.
As the campaign moves deeper into the
important ph2se of candidate selection, these
broad national issues may slip into the back-
ground. A candidate's stature in his constituency
and his stand on purely local issues will become
more significant. Thus far, party spokesmen have
been flinging around slogans about socialism and
autonomy, but have not dealt with the bread-and-
butter issues that are of daily concern to the
people-hunger, poverty, flood control, prices,
wages. No party has put forward a detailed eco-
nomic program, and the politicians seemingly
have not looked beyond constitution-making to
governing. This does not augur well for eventual
stability or effective civilian government.
Against this rather sobering backdrop,
Pakistan's pol;ticians-old-timers and fledglings
alike-have taken to the hustings with vigor. With
less than two months to qo b sore the elections,
there is a plethora vi political parties of all
imaginable ideological bents. Few have indicated
any desire to form electoral alliances, however,
and only one commands significant nationwide
support. The recent break-up of West Pakistan has
increased the provincialization of the parties.
Nevertheless, many politicians have privately
revealed their awareness that this may be their
last opportunity to establish a democratic, civilian
government. Their overriding interest in achieving
this goal and of personally gaining political office
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may soon stimulate serious coalition negotiations,
Difficulties in finding attractive candidates to
contest the country's 313 constituencies may also
encourage interparty cooperation. Behind the
scenes, some talks have already begun, but recent
efforts among likeminded conservative parties to
form an Islamic United Front have apparently
ended inconclusively.
Although Yahya himself has remained dis-
creetly on the sidelines, recent weeks have
brought increasing rumors of governmental at-
tempts to influence the outcome. Some political
leaders suggest that the regime is not only backing
certain rightist parties but is also seeking a frag-
mented constituent assembly in order to impose a
constitution based on a strong central govern-
ment. At the heart of the matter is a growing
feeling that the martial law administration,
dominated by Punjabis, will be unwilling finally
to accept the degree of provincial autonomy
demanded by East Pakistani spokesmen.
11ru/ibur Rahnrrrn, charismatic leader of the
moderate-left Awami League, dominat9s the
political arena in East Pakistan. Extremely
popular throughout the province, 50-year-old
Mujib has become the acknowledged spokesman
of the East Pakistani autonomy movement and a
hero to "sons-of-the-soil" Bengalis for his relent-
less championing of their cause.
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His "Six Point Program"--a Bengali plan for
provincial autonomy-has broad appeal among
East Pakistan's 73 million people. Their enthusi-
astic response to his vigorous campaign through
the eastern wing has convinced Mujib that his
party will emerge from the elections with an
overwhelming majority of the seats from East
Pakistan-he boasts 80 percent, but most others
are more willing to concede only 50-60 percent.
His several forays into western Pakistan have at-
tracted a good deal of attention but have prob-
ably won him few votes in that alien territory.
Mujib's present worry is that if elections are
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Mujibur Rahman
preserving a united country. He is frequently
mentioned as the man likeliest to be designated
prime minister in a new civilian government.
Maulana Abdul Hamid Bliashani, a legend in
his own time, is the octogenarian leader of the
pro-Peking, Communist-infiltrated National
Awami Party/Left (NAP/L). Bhashani's life-long
battle for the rights of the peasantry has endeared
him to millions of Bengalis. Although he himself
is highly revered throughout East Pakistan, his
party is so seriously fragmented that its participa-
tion in the elections remains in question. In any
case, it would be surprising if the NAP/L could
pull itself together in time to make any significant
electoral showing, despite Bhashani's personal
appeal.
The NAP/L's calls for provincial autonomy
and nationalization of basic industries appear to
echo Awami League demands, but NAP/L sup-
porters have traditionally been more ready than
Awami Leaguers to use violence to accomplish
their goals. Some breakaway factions of the
NAP/L are still reportedly planning to sabotage
election activities but little organized disruption
has yet taken place.
postponed, his Awami League campaign may
peak too early and lose some of its support by
election day.
Mujib's ability to draw crowds and to hold
them spellbound is undeniable, but his potential
as a national policy maker and administrator is
less evident. He has never held a governing post,
Nevertheless, if he makes his
anticipated strong showing in the elections, Mujib
will be courted by all manner of West Pakistani
politicians.
Whether he will then be any more willing to
compromise on his "Six Points" and join a coali-
tion is difficult to say. It is generally believed,
however, that Mujib is extremely ambitious for
national office and therefore has a strong stake in
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East Pakistan has a numb :r of small parties
which, by comparison with the Awami League
and NAP/L, appear insignificant. The Pakistan
Democratic Party (PDP) deserves mention, how-
ever, because of its leader, Nurul Amin, a Bengali
eider statesman who headed the so-called parlia-
mentary opposition during ' hough
Nurul 25X6
Ain has been popular among Bengalis. His
party, an alliance among some long-time conser-
vative and rather lackluster politicians of both
East and West Pakistan advocates a strong central
government and lays great emphasis on Islam as
the basis for the state. A plus in the PDP column
is the support it enjoys from one of East Paki-
stan's most prestigious newspapers, the Pakistan
Observer. Nevertheless, the PDP is expected to
make only a meager showing.
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Politics in West Pakistan is far more frag-
mented than in the eastern wing, and innumerable
splinter groups exist. Even the significant parties
have a strong base in only one of the four prov-
inces-Punjab, Sind, Northwest Frontier, and
Baluchistan-and no more than marginal support
in the others; some have scattered support in East
Pakistan. Although some politicians have been
whistle-stopping outside their own strongholds,
most have not succeeded in substantially expand-
ing their support.
Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi's orthodox
Muslim party, the Jamaat-i-Islam (Jamaat), is at
the extreme right of the political spectrum. The
Jamaat is the only party that can legitimately
claim significant strength in both wings of the
country. Its members' rhetoric has stimulated
some of the most emotional issues of the cam-
paign and has helped polarize the political scene
into Islamic and socialist camps. Although well-
financed and well-organized, the Jamaat has been
unable to broaden its scattered support and is not
expected to do well in the elections. Nevertheless,
the Jamaat has announced that it plans to contest
a substantial number of seats including all of
those in the Sind. It is also negotiating with
several smaller right-wing, Islamic parties for pos-
sible joint support of other candidates.
Qaiyum Khan's Pakistan Muslim League
(PML/Qaiyum) is making itself heard among the
right-of-center parties. Although his home base is
the Northwest Frontier, the peripatetic Qaiyum
has also campaigned vigorously elsewhere, advo-
cating a strong central government and charging
rival politicians with willfully undermining the
solidarity and integrity of Pakistan.
Qaiyum attained his party leadership by
engineering a large-scale defection from the ranks
of former president Ayub Khan's badly shaken
Pakistan Muslim League. Those who remained
loyal to Ayub are continuing to struggle along
under the leadership of Ayub's chosen successor,
Fazlul Quader Chaudhury. Already damaged by
the exodus to Qaiyum, the PML/Quader's elec-
toral prospects, however small, have been prac-
tically destroyed by the government's decision to
freeze PML funds because of alleged misuse and
misappropriation. Although floundering, the
PML/Quader may still salvage something by al-
lying with other parties.
Mian Muntaz Daultana heads the Council
Muslim League (CML), which occupies the center
of the political spectrum in West Pakistan and
dominates the Punjab. With about 62 percent of
the western wing's population, the Punjab has
traditionally controlled West Pakistan's-and the
nation's-political, economic, and military life.
Although East Pakistan and the other provinces
of the western wing are finally rebelling against
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this domination, the Punjab and the CML con-
tinue to wield far-reaching influence and political
clout.
Daultana, a wily veteran politician, is ex-
pected to play an important part in any national
government. Recently there have been some in-
dications that he is trying to temper his rather
conservative image in order to reach an accom-
modation with Mujibur Rahman and the Awami
League. On paper, the programs advocated by the
two groups are strikingly similar, and a post-
election coalition appears possible.
CML forces were given a boost iii July when
Air Marshal Nur Khan, former commander of the
Pakistani Air Force, announced his decision to
join the party. He is among a, increasing number
of retired military men who have recently entered
the politicz' arena. Nur Khan played a significant
role in formulating the controversial labor and
education 'reforms in the early days of Yahya's
regime, but lie subsequently had a falling out with
the President. He is a dynamic-although some-
what unapproachable-personality who may be
called upon for leadership in future Pakistani gov-
ernments.
The National Awami Party/Requisitionist
(NAP/R), which broke with Bhashani's faction of
the NAP in 1968, is to the left of center on the
political spectrum. The party claims the North-
west Frontier as its stronghold, and is led by
Abdul Wali Khan, son of the legendary Pathan
leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "Frontier
Gandhi." Although locked in a political struggle
with Qaiyum Khan. Wali Khan's party appears to
be slightly ahead in the fight for the Northwest
Frontier seats. Initially also leading in sparsely
populated Baluchistan, the NAP/R now is facing
stiff competition for that province's five assembly
seats. the NAP/R's program of extensive pro-
vincin! autonomy and other progressive measures
makes it a potential postelection ally of Mujibur
Rahman's Awami League and perhaps of
Daultana's Council Muslim League.
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Zulficar All Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party
(PPP), a tenuous leftist group that revolves
around the fiery and controversial former foreign
minister, rounds out the list of important parties.
Bhutto's regional strength lies in the Sind, but
Sindhi politics is so factionalized that the PPP
may not gain any great number of seats there.
Elsewhere, Bhutto remains an extremely popular
figure with students and young people, who are
drawn to his program of "Islamic Socialism"--
with an emphasis on socialism-and close relations
with Communist China. He attracts large, en-
thusiastic crowds nearly everywhere he goes, but
observers doubt that his personal charisma can be
turned into many solid cotes or can be transferred
to other PPP candidates. Nevertheless, Bhutto is
young, opportunistic, and ambitious and he will
certainly be a familiar figure in Pakistan politics
for some time to come. Interestingly enough,
Bhutto continues to enjoy good personal relations
with many influential members of the establish-
ment of which he was once a part; these friends
generally believe that Bhutto has gone off the
deep end in politics, but they do not take his
activities very seriously.
Other Factors in the Campaign
With constituencies delimited and elections
approaching, all Pakistani political parties are
frantically searching their ranks for attractive
candidates. Having been out of power and
restricted in operation for many years, the parties
lack the local talent and organization on which
successful campaigns are built. Aggravating this
problem is the image of corruption and in-
competence associated with several of the tradi-
tional parties, which may be a factor encouraging
potential candidates to seek election as inde-
pendents.
The strength of the independents, of whom
there are likely to be a substantial number, is one
of the important unknowns that must be cranked
into any prediction of election results. Some of
them conceivably c'uld play an important role in
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the constituent assembly. The most notable of
the already-announced independent candidates is
another former commander of the Pakistani Air
Force, Asghar Khan, who first involved himself in
politics in the waning days of the Ayub regime.
Acahar Iis widely recnpriorl for his infanrifv h..+
A Polling Plare in the Punjab
Another unknown factor clouding the elec-
tion scene is the potentially enormous peasant
vote. It is widely believed that in East Pakistan,
Mujibur Rahman has successfully captured the
local peasantry under his popular banner of pro
vincial autonomy and "Bengal first." The situi;
tion is more complicated in the western wing.
Most observers are predicting that ideology will
have little influence on Punjabi and Sindhi
peasants, who will probably follow traditional
voting patterns, i.e., they will vote according to
landlord instructions. In other areas of West
Pakistan, caste, tribal affiliations, and local issues
are expected to be the detel?mining factors.
Should these observations be accurate, the tradi-
tional, regional parties will emerge victorious,
with the Council Muslim League the strongest
because it represents the Punjab.
Although no (late has been set for the con-
vening of the constituent assembly, it is unlikely
to precede the provincial elections. Disposing of
provincial elections before the first assembly
meeting will allow the members to devote full
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attention to constitution-making with no worries
about campaigning. Presumably, if Mujibur
Rahman and the Awami League receive a strong
East Pakistani majority, Mujib may be more will-
ing to negotiate his "Six Points" than if he were
still under political pressure to prove his creden-
tials as a loyal Bengali.
The newly elected members of the con-
stituent assembly will probably s,)end the interval
between the elections and their first meeting
jockeying for position and bargaining to form
alliances. Loose, temporary coalitions will prob-
ably be formed. In any case, it is generally
recognized that success for the constituent as-
sembly hinges on some compromise of East and
West Pakistani interests. An Awami League -
Council Muslim League axis appears to offer the
best hope of a satisfaddtory agreement. Should this
be achieved, a constitution, would have one final
hurtle: it must pass muster with Yahya and the
army.
The representatives, on the other hand, may
not be able to come up with a constitution
agreeable to a majority. Pakistan's first con-
stituent assembly deliberated nine years before
reaching an accord. Should the 120 days expire
without agreement, President Yahya will have sev-
eral options. He may do as he has already sug-
gested-dissolve the assembly and hold new elec-
tions. It seems just as likely, however, that he will
propose a constitution of his own and demand
acceptance. In fact, it is widely rumored that a
constitution has already been drafted by Yahya
and some of his closest advisers. Such a constitu-
tion, while providing for substantial provincial
autonomy, would certainly reserve sufficient
federal powers to ensure a strong central govern-
ment.
In any case, any new constitution will prob-
ably set up a federal republic of the parliamentary
type, with the president and prime minister
coming from different parts of the country, the
latter probably being a Bengali and the former a
Punjabi or a Pathan from the Northwest Frontier.
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Even if the political processes should pro-
gress this far, such a marriage of hostile regional
elements might fall apart within a few years if it
failed effectively to solve Pakistan's overwhelming
economic, political, and social problems. The
similar formula that was the basis of coalition
governments before Ayuh Khan failed to produce
stability, and the politicians do not appear to
have changed much in the meantime.
In the long run, then, regional interests and
cultural differences may prove stronger than the
ties of religion and common antipathy toward
India. Conceivably, the present Pakistan could
eventually dissolve into two sovereign states. If
secessionist tendencies do grow stronger, the
army probably would go only so far in an attempt
to counter them. During the chaos of Ayub
Khan's final days, the army fully recognized that
it would not be able to control a province-wide
uprising in East Pakistan. At this point, it would
probably not even be willing to pay the tre-
mendous cost of trying.
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