WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ARGENTINA: A LOOK AT THE NEW GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020041-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: August 21, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Argentina: A Look at the New Government
DSO FILE COPY
RTDRN TO IE-61
Secret
N2 667
21 August 1970
No. 0384/70A
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SI4,C,R 14",1'
ARGENTINA: A Look at the Now Government
Brigadier General (Retired) Roberto Levingston is the second military leader to
govern Argentina since 1966, when the armed forces overthrew the elected govern-
ment and declared that a national "revolution" had begun. In structure his adminis-
tration appears to differ little from that of his predecessor, Lieutenant General Juan
Carlos Ongania. Whereas Ongania wielded a great deal of personal power, the present
system involves a committee composed of Levingston and the commanders in chief
of the armed forces. The new administration is expected to continue most of the
policies of the OnganiH government. Some reordering of priorities in the economic
sphere apparently is taking place, however.
Structure of the Government
The new Argentine Government, like its
forerunner, is a military dictatorship supported
by a cabinet composed largely of civilian tech-
nicians. Legislative power has been lodged in the
executive branch ever since the dismissal of the
National Congress in 1966, but the judicial
branch of government remains independent.
President Roberto Levingston shares power
with the commanders in chief of the armed
forces, whc installed him as Chief Executive on 8
June 1970. Although not a mere figurehead,
Levingston has far less authority than did his
predecessor, Lieutenant General Juan Carlos
Ongania, who was able to establish a virtual one-
man rule during most of his three and a half years
in office. The strong man of the present regime is
the commander in chief of the army, Alejandro
Lanusse: the imprint of his political philosophy is
evident in most of the government's policy state-
ments to date.
General Lanusse professes to be a supporter
of constitutional government, and is considered a
conservative in economic matters. In his most
recent statements, however, he has stressed the
need for accelerated economic development and
implied that "criteria of efficiency and compati-
bility" should be subordinated to that goal. La-
nusse's most significant political characteristic is
his intense opposition to former dictator Juan
Peron, who imprisoned him, and to Peron's fol-
lowers. Lanusse claims not to believe in total
repression of the Peronists, but he has always
advocated control of their activities.
The new cabinet is composed of seven minis-
tries and a number of subordinate secretariats,
and its members represent a wide range of politi-
cal views. The heterogeneous character of the
Roberto Levingston (light) being sworn in as
Argentine president.
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cabinet apparently resulted from a deliberate at-
tempt on the part of the military chiefs to
broaden the base of the government by including
civilians from most of the major political factions.
General Lanusse reportedly hopes that this tactic
will allow the government to woo some of these
people away from their traditional political loyal-
ties and perhaps to buy time to accomplish the
goals it has set for itself.
Having pledged itself to an early return to
constitutional government, the Levingston admin-
istration, according to General Lanusse, has as its
first priority to prepare the nation for free elec-
tions. The regime does not plan to permit existing
political parties to reorganize but hopes to create
a broad-based party similar to one of the major
parties in the United States.
In approaching this task, however, the new
leadership faces a dilemma that has plagued every
Argentine goverr ment since 1955. The strongest
political force ;n the nation is composed of fol-
lowers of fo'iner dictator Juan Peron, who was
ousted in tiiat year and now is exiled to Spain.
The current military leaders are adamantly op-
posed to any return to power by the Peronists as
long as the aging 'Jirtator lives. General Lanusse
reportedly has stated flatly that the army is not
prepared to accept a Peronist victory at this time
and that elections cannot be held until the move-
ment is splintered, either by the death of Peron or
by a realignment of political forces. The govern-
ment apparently hopes to dilute Peronist power
by submerging the movement in a newly created
political organization. Well aware that structuring
a new party will take a long time, the regime has
begun to hedge on a timetable for elections. Ac-
cording to a recent report, no elections are
planned for at least three years and no prepara-
tions will begin before that time. To date there
has been little public reaction to the delay.
Special Report - 2 -
General Alejandro Lanusse,
Commander in Chief of the Army
There has been considerable anxiety within
the government over economic policies. Pro-
ponents of stabilization fear that he Levingston
administration will adopt measures leading to an
accelerated inflationary spiral, wiping out gains
made under the Ongania government.
President Levingston has sought to reassure
the supporters of stabilization by stating publicly
that Ongania's policies will be continued. Goals
that he detailed in a nationwide broadcast on 25
June differed little from the most recent aims of
the Ongania administration: rapid and sustained
growth, a more equitable distribution of income,
and development of basic industries and infra-
structure. The over-all tenor of the speech, how-
ever, suggested that the new regime was reorder-
ing priorities, and that increased real wages and
social welfare needs would no longer be second-
ary to price stability.
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The government devalued the peso shortly
after taking office. The minister of economy justi-
fied the move by arguing that an undervalued
peso would protect exchange reserves and pre-
serve the nation's economic autonomy by making
it unnecessary to subordinate economic policy to
the need to satisfy foreign financial centers. Most
Argentine businessmen, bankers, and economists,
however, consider this move premature ana even
unnecessary. In spite of countervailing tariff and
tax measures, the devaluation will probably add
to inflationary pressures and weaken investor con-
fidence. The vague and sometimes contradictory
statements of the new minister of economy have
done little to allay the fears of the business com-
munity.
Despite the Levingston administration's
antipathy toward the Peronists, it has been ac-
tively courting the powerful, Peron ist-dominated
General Confederat`on of Labor (CGT) in an
effort to ensure social peace. A Peronist has been
appointed secretary of labor, and negotiations
for a wage increase and a return to the collective
bargaining system outlawed by Ongania are being
considered.
Long splintered into warring factions, the
trade union movement recently achieved a some-
what shaky unity at a CGT congress when repre-
sentatives of the five major factions won seats on
the governing board. The net effect of the con-
gress was to gloss over the deep political and
economic differences that have long divided the
movement, and union leaders apparently were
encouraged to renew demands on the government
that had been abandoned in 1969 because of
dissension within the CGT.
The fragility of this recently achieved unity
will probably cause the labor movement to oper-
ate in a low key fashion in the short run. The
immediate goal of the CGT leaders appears to be
participation in planning the nation's economic
policies. Should the Levingston government fail
Special Report -3-
3 -
to heed their demands on wage/price issues, how-
to
ever, they are likely to present a more combative
posture in the future.
The Levingston government is currently
faced with the threat of growing guerrilla and
terrorist activities in urban areas, carried out for
the most part by roving bands of leftist youths.
During the first four months of this year,
terrorist attacks, main;y on military and police
guard posts, were generally executed by groups of
four or five individuals who left markings indi-
cating membership in revolutionary Peronist or
pro-Communist organizations. During this period
many bank robberies were also committed by
small groups.
Since President Levingston came to power,
however, several larger scale raids, which appear
to have been coordinated, have been carried out.
On I July a 15-man commando group of left-wing
Peronist orientation cut telephone lines, occupied
the police station, and robbed a bank in a small
town near Cordoba. The group called themselves
the "Montoneros," as did the terrorists who kid-
naped and murdered former president Pedro
Aramburu. Four weeks later, a similar raid was
conducted on a town near Buenos Aires by a
group calling itself the Revolutionary Armed
Forces that may be connected with the left-wing
Peronist Armed Forces.
The insurgency situation is exacerbated by
the involvement of dissident Roman Catholic
priests of the Third World Movement who are
dedicated to bringing about a socialist form of
government in Argentina. As part of a stepped-up
police and military effort to counter the in-ur-
gency, the Levingston government has attempted
to launch a campaign to discredit the movement.
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The government is being aided by the church
hierarchy, which has denounced the activities of
the Third World priests as a deviation from doc-
trinal orthodoxy.
The Levingston government is pro-Western
and strongly anti-Communist, but it plans to
maintain diplomatic relations with all nations. It
dreams of playing an influential role as an inter-
mediary between the "great powers" and the less
developed nations of the world.
With respect to neighboring countries, the
administration is actively attempting to cultivate
better relations with Chide, which it sees as the
country closest to Argentina in terms of eco-
nomic development and human resources. It is
somewhat concerned that a leftist regime may
come to power in Chile following the September
presidential election there, but it reportedly has
no plans to intervene militarily if that should
occur.
Argentina
Buenos*
Aires
The government is also concerned that
Bolivia may become more leftist. A recent visit
there by the Argentine foreign minister was de-
scribed as an attempt to strengthen the political
center in Bolivia. Argentina has also expressed an
interest in helping Bolivia to develop the prov-
inces contiguous to its own territory.
President Levingston plans to meet with
President Pacheco of Uruguay soon in a continu-
ation of the personal diplomacy instituted by
Ongania.
Because both Argentina and Brazil have mili-
tary governments, their concert of interest has
tended to mitigate somewhat the rivalries and
suspicions that have existed historically between
the two nations. The Levingston government does
not appear to have made any special overtures to
Brazil, however.
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As an interim government, the Levingston
administration probably will concentrate on
domestic problems. I n the face of increased inter-
nal instability due to terrorist and guerrilla activi-
ties, it probably will try to buy social peace with
concessions to other potential troublemakers.
Among these, the labor unions are the most likely
antagonists. The government may therefore sacri-
fice the economic stabilization program in order
to buy the support of lower and middle-class
workers.
The government probably will drag its feet
with respect to political normalization. Given the
apathy with which the public has greeted the
delay in setting up a timetable for elections, the
announced three-year moratorium on political ac-
tivity may be stretched to five or more.
Special Report
When elections are held, they will probably
be staged by the military with handpicked candi-
dates, as there is no training ground for fledgling
politicians under the present governmental sys-
tem. Participation in the trade union movement
could conceivably provide the necessary exposure
for emerging leaders, but they would probably be
Peronists and consequently unacceptable to the
military.
The Argentine public, although disillusioned
by the ineptitude of the old political groupings, is
not likely to respond enthusiastically to a fabri-
cated party. Participation in elections will prob-
ably therefore be minimal, and the majority of
Argentine citizens will remain estranged
political mainstream in their country
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