WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SWEDEN ENTERS THE UNICAMERAL ERA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: September 18, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Sweden Enters the Unicameral Era
no Nu i ~
DSB RI E COPY
RETU~~~i i~
Secret
Secret
N9 666
18 September 1970
No. 0388/70A
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
AilgICH
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
SWEDEN ENTERS THE UNICAMERAL ERA
After 16 years of controversy and compromise, the Swedes are about to
abandon more than a century of bicameral legislative rule and enter the brave new
world of unicameralism. As if to make the transition more exciting, some of the
political parties have changed leaders since the last election in 1968, while others are
bubbling with internal discontent following abortive attempts to dump their chair-
men. The burden of managing the reform has fallen to the Social Democrats, in
power for 38 years but under the leadership of Prime Minister Olof Palme for a little
less than one year. Political polls forecast little change in the existing balance of
power, but with the rules of the game almost entirely rewritten, no political observer
is willing to leave any bets unhedged.
On 20 September more than 5.6 million
Swedes will be able to take part in an historic
election to choose the 350 mombers of the
nation's first unicameral parliament. At the same
time they will pass judgment on nearly a year of
Social Democratic government under the leader-
ship of the controversial Olof Palme. The voters
will thereby signify whether they are willing to
grant his party the opportunity to celebrate 40
continuous years in office in 1972. Political
observers are inclined to believe that Palme and
his party will be returned to power, but they are
cautious in their forecasts because of their igno-
rance of how the new electoral system will work.
The Old and the New Systems
Under the o;d system the 233-seat Second
Chamber (lower house) was elected every four
years, most -ecently in 1968, with each party
gaining rear, ;entation on a strict proportional
basis within each of the nation's 28 electoral
districts. The 151-seat First Chamber (upper
house) was chosen by provincial and local coun-
cils, one eighth of its membership coming up for
election each year. During most of the postwar
period, the balance of power between the Sociai
Democrats on the one hand and the three
bourgeois parties-the Conservatives,* the Center,
and the Liberals**--on the other has been fairly
even. Only in 1968 did the Social Democrats gain
a clear majority in the lower house, but this was
wholly attributable to the national sense of shock
at the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia less than
a month earlier and a desire to avoid experiments
in a critical time. Under the skilled leadership of
Tage Erlander, the Social Democrats did not need
a majority of the lower house to rule, because the
prolonged squabbling among the bourgeois parties
prevented the formation of a cohesive non-
socialist coalition. At times the Social Democrats
were able to lure the Center Party into coalition
with them; at other tines they were able to
operate with the silent support of the Com-
munists*** under the thoroughly revisionist lead-
ership of Carl-Henrik Hermansson. In addition,
Social Democratic control of a disproportionate
number of provincial and local councils meant
that the party was usually overrepresented in the
upper house, and in the postwar years it enjoyed
an uninterrupted majority over all the other
parties. Because of the bicameral system's rule
that both chambers act jointly in "economic
questions," the Social Democrats could usually
*Literally, the Moderate Coalition Party
**Literally, the People's Party
***Literally, the Left Party-Communists
Special Report
18 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Sweden
Parliamentary Seats
by Electoral Districts, 1970
Ih foflEonO\_ A \
JTOCKHOLM
wsedNC -JC-.
DENMA
N
LA
D
(NORTH) \~' \
p \ 9
Special Report
18 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
act as a majority government regardless of the
fact that they might have only a plurality in the
lower house.
Under the new system, the 350-seat parlia-
ment will be elected every three years, and the
voting age will be lowered from 20 to 19. Parties
will gain representation on a proportional basis
within all of the nation's 28 electoral districts if
they win at least 4 percent of the total national
vote. Those parties that receive less than 4 per-
cent of the national vote but more than 12 per-
cent in one electoral district, however, may
receive their proportionate number of seats in
that district. Of the 350 seats, 310 will be dis-
tributed among the 28 election districts and 40
will be considered as having the whole nation as
their constituency. Unlike members of the lower
house in the old system, members of parliament
from specific election districts will no longer have
to be resident in their districts. Furthermore, the
number of representatives per district will be de-
cided according to the number of persons eligible
to vote io each district instead of the district's
total population, as was the case in the old sys-
tem. If the 1968 lower house elections had been
held according to the new system, the Social
Democrats would have received 184 seats and the
bourgeois parties 166, (Conservatives 51, Center
61, Liberals 55), a closer balance than was
achieved under the old system. The Communists,
with only three percent of the total national vote
and less than 12 percent in any single district,
would have been shut out altogether.
Complicating the picture further in com-
paring the old and new electoral systems is the
fact that henceforth, parliamentary, provincial,
and local elections will be held simultaneously.
Previously provincial and local elections were held
midway through the parliamentary term, and as
Sweden had no parliamentary by-elections, these
served as a fairly reliable index of the state of
voter opinion. Even so, certain distortions crept
in, as voters tended to make up their minds on
the basis of the appeal of local personalities and
Composition of Lower House
1968-1910
Center
Party
Liberal
Party
Social
Democratic
Party
Conservative
Party
Special Report
Communist
Party
3
18 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
compelling everyday issues unrelated to ideo-
logical considerations. For these reasons skillful
splinter parties could from time to time eke out
isolated marginal victories. In national elections
the voters tended to adhere to their traditional
ideological loyalties, regardless of the personali-
ties or issues involved. The ultimate effect that
simultaneous, across-the-board elections will have
on the outcome of the national elections cannot
be foreseen.
skillful political controversialist with a sharp
instinct for the jugular.
The Swedish election commission may have
been somewhat relieved to learn that at least cne
part of its added responsibilities in administering
the new system could be postponed. The original
intention of the law was to introduce machine
voting to replace paper ballots in 1970. Late in
1969, however, the Facit company, an interna-
tionally known Swedish business machines con-
cern, announced that it could not possibly coma
up in time with a device comprehensive enough to
handle the large number of options available to
the voter and also simple enough for him to
ope; -,te. Therefore, the commission prepared
hundreds of thousands of yellow ballots for
parliamentary contests, blue ballots for provincial
slates, and white ballots for local contests. Yet
when delivery was made to local polling places in
early August, the ballots of the different parties
were mixed together in some localities, while
correctly labeled and packaged ballots were sent
to the wrong districts. One Stockholm newspaper
commented half-ironically that "this election
could well become really exciting."
Developments within the Political Parties, 1968-1970
Many of the principal players, as well as the
rules of the game, have been changed since the
last election. Outstanding in this respect was the
departure in October 1969 of the widely re-
spected Tage Erlander from the positions of
Social Democratic party chairman and prime
minister, after nearly a quarter of a century in
both jobs. His successor in these positions was Olof
Palme, then only 42 years old, but with 15 years'
experience as Erlander's right-hand man and as a
Special Report
Even within his party there is a
certain uneasiness. Despite his unanimous election 25X6
as party chairman, there was some concern
expressed sotto voce that while P91me had dis-
played a consistent tendency to espouse fashion-
able causes with remarkable ease and alacrity, no
one really could say where he actually stood.
After he became prime minister, the national
press editoralized that never before in Swedish
history had a man whose principles were so little
known entered such high office.
Until 1964 Palme preferred to play a be-
hind-the-scenes role in policy matters. As a result
of radio and television debates in the parlia-
mentary election campaign that year, however, he
came to be regarded as a key party spokesman.
The following year the expansion of the Ameri-
can military effort in Vietnam provided Palme
with a perfect issue to attract the support of the
young radicals, both in the party and on its
fringes. In July 1965 he assailed US policies in
Southeast Asia, condemning "the use of military
means against the demands for social justice." In
1966 he called on the United States to end the
bombing in Vietnam and recognize the National
Liberation Front. In 1968 he took part in a mass
march l; ' to ling the war, accompanied by Ameri-
can deserters and North Vietnamese diplomats,
and at this point Washington called its ambassa-
dor home for extended "consultations."
Despite the official American reaction, the
leadership in the party and government backed
Palme's actions, as there was no question of his
success in winning support among heretofore
- 4 . 18 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
uncommitted segments of the electorate. Besides,
the party had grown concerned that its own left
wing would succumb in the 1968 elections to the
very attractive revisionist siren song of the Com-
munists under Hermansson. Ironically, the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia put an end to any
appeal Hermansson and his party may have had,
and the disaffected trooped back into the Social
Democratic ranks in record numbers.
Following the Social Democratic victory in
the 1968 elections and Palme's election to high
party and national office a year later, the Swedish
leadership decided that the time had come to
cultivate an image of reason and responsibility.
Palme monopolized the radio and television
broadcast schedules explaining himself and his
ideas, demonstrating that he was indeed not the
devil incarnate. In the spring of 1970 he traveled
to Bonn, London, and Paris to introduce himself
and explain how a neutral Sweden would fit into
an enlarged European Community. Following
these trips, which received considerable favorable
publicity in Sweden, Palme attempted to repair
his relations with the i_** ed States. Encouraged
by the arrival of a new American ambassador to
fill the Stockholm post that had been vacant for
15 months, Palme arranged a private trip to the
US, ostensibly to receive an honorary degree at
his American alma mater, Kenyon College, but
actually to make unofficial contact with Ameri-
can political leaders. Despite a long conversation
with Secretary of State Roger;. P2!me was re-
ceived coolly in Washington. After some criticism
at home that he was neither making any break-
throughs nor adhering to his self-professed atti-
tude of independent criticism of the transgres-
sions of great powers, Palme became a little more
forthright in describing the Swedish official atti-
tude, thereby satisfying his domestic critics to
some extent. The trip to the United States was
followed almost immediately by a journey to
Moscow, where Palme attempted to persuade the
Soviets of the importance of Swedish entry into
an enlarged European Community. Although the
Soviets were willing to lavish kind words on
Swedish neutrality, they remained unmoved in
their opposition to "closed blocs."
Special Report - 5 -
Within a few months after the departure of
Tage Erlander from the leadership of the Social
Democratic Party, the Liberal Party replaced its
leader, Sven Weden, in office for only throe years,
with Gunnar Helen, a prominent party figure who
had been on the 'sidelines since the mid-1960s
because of illness. Helen took over a deeply di-
vided party whose leadership was anxious to draw
closer to the other bourgeois parties while its
youth organization sought to radicalize the party.
After doing quite well in the 1966 provincial and
local elections, the liberals suffered a sharp set-
back in 1968 because of this division. The party
believed that Helen, with his skill as a political
debater and conciliator, could improve its for-
tunes.
Helen went about his repair work cautiously,
;,od by the end of 1969 he could point to rising
confidence among the membership in his abilities
as a leader and to renewed efforis to patch up
differences with the other bourgeois parties,
notably with the Center Part' led by Gunnar
Hedlund. As a concession to the youth wing of
the party, he encouraged internal debate, raised
several junior members to higher positions of
responsibility, and perhaps most important of all,
announced the party's intention to stop receiving
contributions from business and industrial circles.
I n contrast to the relatively secure financial
position of the Liberals, the Conservatives under-
went a severe financial crisis in the fall of 1969,
and there was considerable sentiment to dump
party leader Yngve Holmberg, in office only since
1965. Many of the party's more conservative
circles in the south and west had resented the
change of the Swedish name of their organization
from "the Right Party" to the characterless
"Moderate Coalition Party," and the news that
Holmberg had nearly bankrupted the party in the
1968 ."lections was a little too much for them to
bear. Using the tactic that the best defense is a
strong offense, Holmberg succeeded in getting
re-elected as party chairman, but even so, nearly a
year after the last congress, roughly one third of
the Conservative members still persist in their
belief that he is not doing a good job.
18 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Under the leadership of Gunnar Hedlund,
now in his third decade as party chairman, the
Center Party has pursued a serene course. After
its experience in coalition with the Social Demo-
crats from 1951 to 1957, the Center decided that
its political future lay in de-emphasizing its identi-
fication with agrarian interests and in promoting
cooperation with the other bourgeois parties in
order to develop a viable alternative to socialist
rule. Taking a leaf from the Norwegian experience
in 1965 and the Danish experience in 1968, the
Center Party initiated joint discussions with the
other bourgeois parties on parliamentary tactics,
policy coordination, and election techniques. Par-
ticularly close ties were formed with the Liberals,
the two parties being commonly lumped together
as the "Middle Parties," and there has been some
speculation that the eventual aim is a merger of
the two. During Sven Weden's chairmanship of
the Liberal Party, cooperative efforts were toned
down somewhat, but the Social Democrats' suc-
cess in exploiting bourgeois differences in the
1968 elections pointed up to the Center the need
for a resumption of closer cooperation.
Hedlund, even while pursuing this course,
has not forgotten to leave other doors open. His
relations with Erlander were particularly friendly,
and while his regard for Palme is somewhat more
qualified, he has not forgotten the advantages
derived from coalition with the Socialists. He
therefore has not been as sharp as his bourgeois
colleagues in criticizing the government's policies
and programs. The Center Party is swift to ad-
vance compromises on given issues in parliament,
and since the departure of Erlar der and Bertil
Ohlin, a prominant Liberal politician, Hedlund
has assumed the mantle of the leading active elder
statesman of the nation.
The situation in the Communist Party has
been stormier. Party chairman Carl-Henrik Her-
mansson came into office in 1964 as the leader of
the modernizing, reformist segment of the party.
His revisionist policies, to the great dissatisfaction
of both old-line party stalwarts centered in the far
north, and Maoist activists in Goteborg and
Special Report -6
CONFIDENTIAL
Stockholm, had succeeded in attracting votes in
the 1964 and 1966 electoral contests. Hermans-
son advocated democratization of the economy
and completion of the welfare state, using the
peaceful means suitable for Swedish conditions
and independent of direction from Moscow. All
this success came to naught in 1968, however,
when the voters deserted the party in droves after
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, despite
Hermansson's explicit condemnation of the act
and his call for a break in Swedish relations with
Moscow. The party conservatives in the north
took the opportunity to express their support for
international Communist solidarity and con-
demned Hermansson's policies as bankrupt. By
late 1969, the northerners could muster enough
strength at the party congress to return some of
their men to leadership positions and modify
some party policies, but not enough to topple
Hermansson.
Once the congress was over, the Communists
found themselves under attack from a new
quarter. The Maoist fringe decided to form a
completely separate political party, the Com-
munist League of Marxist-Leninists (KFML), to
struggle for an armed revolution and against the
revisionist policies of the "bankrupt Hermansson
clique." At a time when the Communist Pa-Vty is
attempting to pull itself together to attract
enough votes to cross the 4-percent threshold, the
KFML has succeeded in drawing away up to 10
percent of the party's potential supporters.
Following their congresses in late 1969 and
early 1970, the parties began to reduce their
lengthy programs to election manifestoes and
catchy slogans. The Social Democrats seized on
"Increased Equality" and "The Strong Society,"
the Center advocated "Equality" and "Decentrali-
zation," the Liberals called for "Grass-Roots
Democracy" and "A More Humane Society," and
the Conservatives announced ,for "Cooperation-
Justice-Responsibility." The Communists were
more specific, calling for lower prices and taxes,
18 September 1970
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL,
Apropos the ideological differences between the
democratic parties
(S-Social Democrats FP-Liberals
C--Center M-Conservatives)
changes in collective bargaining procedures, and
international solidarity with oppressed peoples.
Closer inspection of the positions of the r:on-
Communist parties revealed that there was little
to distinguish one from the other. The various
party leaders were not eager to clarify their posi-
tions in an election campaign before the adjourn-
ment of the old parliament in June. Furthermore,
in order to preserve the sacrosanct, month-long
July holiday, the political parties agreed to re-
strict the election campaign to a mere 30 days,
beginning in mid-August.
Such an agreement did not rule out exten-
sive press interviews and articles detailing the dif-
ferent party positions. The Social Democrats were
particularly concerned at the lack of response to
their platform. Their proposal to place govern-
ment representatives on the boards of directors of
major banks and industrial firms had been ac-
cepted calmly by the bourgeois parties, reassured
by a veneration of close cooperation between big
business and Social Democracy. Their advocacy
of a tax reform granting greater relief to low-
income persons also had been received positively
Special Report
by the bourgeois parties. In fact the bourgeois
parties were ready to accept nearly every reform
suggested by the Social Democrats, because in
their opinion the big issue was not the need for
innovations but thr need to put Sweden's eco-
nomic house in order.
The Swedish ecoromy has been showing all
the traditional signs of overheating since late
1969. There is a serious labor shortage. Factories
are producing at or above normal capacity and are
unable to fill orders. Wages are rising at a rapid
rate, and the concomitant rise of consumer de-
mand is reflected in the rapid increase in imports,
worsening Sweden's traditional negative balance
of trade and leading the country into a serious
balance of payments situation. By the summer of
1969, the consumer price index was rising at an
annual rate of 8 percent; food products led the
way with a 10 percent increase, and there were
constant rumors that the Swedish krona (5.18
Swedish kronor equal one US dollar) would be
devalued to give a boost to Swedish exports,
make imports more expensive, and cool off the
economy.
The government has been reluctant to take
any stern measures to control the boom by in-
creasing Sweden's already high taxes, fearing that
the public reaction to such an unpopular step
would find expression in the 1970 elections. In-
stead, a harsh program of credit restrictions was
instituted, leading to a substantial downturn in
construction activity including housing, and the
rate of industrial capital expansion. Soon there-
after rents in the already-tight housing market
began skyrocketing. The bourgeois parties have
demanded that effective steps be taken to bring
the economy under control, at the same time
attacking the government's recent and proposed
steps for nationalizing additional sectors of the
economy as undermining foreign confidence in
Sweden. They have also deplored the spread of
the official economic bureaucracy as an obstacle
to the development of the market economy and
free competition.
CONFIDENTIAL
18 September 1970
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
The Social Democrats retorted that the
people had never had it so good-wages were at all
time highs, unemployment was virtually non-
existent, social welfare benefits were greatly ex-
panded, and so on. To protect these gains the
trade unions insistently reminded their members
of their duty to ypte socialist. The party even
resorted to raising the specter of economic col-
lapse if the bourgeois parties were to come to
power. Palme consistently harped on the theme
that although the three parties were free in their
criticism of the Social Democrats, they failed to
publish an alternative program that would come
into effect in the event of their victory. The
Center and Liberal parties replied that their joint
program worked out in May was sufficient basis
for a nonsocialist government, and if the Con-
servatives were unwilling to subscribe to it, the
two parties could furm a minority government,
confident of receiving Conservative acquiescence
in parliament. In addition, there was adequate
precedent in Norway and Denmark for not pub-
lishing an all-bourgeois program betore the elec-
tion outcome.
This debate, replete with minor points
scored on each side, was not sufficient to stimu-
late public attention. It was at this point that the
Social Democrats' political experience came to
the rescue. First, they obtained Vie galley proofs
of a book by Gosta Bohman, a leading Conserva-
tive, that heatedly attacked Paline for his use of
foreign policy questions, particularly Vietnam,
for internal political purposes. Palme ripped sev-
eral extensive passages out of context to demon-
strate that this was really a veiled Conservative
attack on Swedish neutrality. Alarmed, Gunnar
Hedlund of the Center Party called for further
clarifications from Bohman and defended the of-
ficial concept of Swedish neutrality. Liberal
leader Gunnar Helen was swift to announce that
no Conservative would serve as prime minister or
foreign minister in any bourgeois coalition, thus
opening the same Pandora's box that contributed
to the bourgeois defeat in 1968. Palme, delighted
at this crack in the unified bourgeois facade,
swiftly exploited the underlying lack of confi-
Special Report
Olof Palme: "and thank you for Gosta Bohman's book
end Gunnar Helen's statement on the posts of prime
minister and foreign minister."
dente between the middle parties and the right.
Even the Conservatives momentarily shed the fig
leaf covering their divisions. Party leader Yngve
Holmberg first announced that the book con-
tained only Bohman's personal opinions, but after
hurried consultations, corrected hi...self several
days later to say that the party backed the sub-
stance of Bohman's argument. The Social Demo-
crats, having already written off the Conservatives
as a feeble political opponent, did not choose to
exploit their embarrassment.
Shortly thereafter, the Social Democrats
turned the argument about rising prices to their
advantage. They had been very concerned about
the popularity of the opposition's main issue and
were aware that the same issue had beaten the
ostensibly leading British Labor Party several
months earlier. When the national price and wages
commission submitted an emergency report that
the economy was about to endure a siege of
sharply increased prices, Finance Minister ar'
Social Democratic Party elder Gunnar Strang, as
18 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
Finance Minister Strang and Prime Minister Palme
(priserna-prices prisstopp-price freeze skatterna-taxes)
well as other leading socialist economists, decided
to reverse themselves and pe suaded the govern-
ment to impose an immediate price freeze on
certain basic food products,
The opposition questioned whether this de-
parture from 14 years' reliance on the forces of
free competition was legal. According to the 1957
Exceptional Powers Law, under whose terms the
price freeze was enforced, such steps could he
taken only in case of war, danger of war, or
"ot:ier causes leading to serious increases in the
general price level." If the government were to
establish that it had used its powers legally, then
the economic situation was fay worse than the
government had led the people to believe earlier.
Otherwise the government seemed to be resorting
to its exceptional powers just to perpetuate itself
in office. Unfortunately for the opposition, the
popular reaction was not to criticize the Social
Democrats for the means they used to cope with
their own mismanagement, but to express grati-
tude for relief in a time of galloping inflation. The
Social Democrats, meanwhile, advertised them-
selves as resolute and experienced in Mmes of
Special Report
crisis, white Strang, who was responsible for the
crisis more than any other individual, received
bouquets of roses wherever he went.
If the old electoral system were still in ef-
fect, one could predict with reasonable certainty
that the Social Democrats would be returned to
rower, thot."^ih probably.with a minority of seats,
to rule with the silent support of the Commu-
nists. Under the new system, however, there are
many imponderables. Such ,ninor parties as the
Progressive Party, the Christian Democratic Party,
and the Communist League of Marxist-Leninists
have no chance to pass either the 4-percent or
12-percent thresholds, and it seems likely that the
Communist Party will also be excluded. Yet all
the splinter groups could between them pull
dow:i as much as 6 percent of the total vote,
making it possible for the bourgeois parties to
capture control of parliament with only 47 per-
cent, a not impossible achievement in the light of
the most recent polls.
SUPPORT (BY PERCENT) OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 1968 - 1970
Parliamentary Opinion Opinion
Elections Poll Poll
7168 9/69 8/70
Social Democratic Party 511.1 54.0 49.3
Center Party 16.1 18.0 17.7
Liberal Party 15.0 13.5 16.2
Conservative ?arty '3.9 11.5 11.0
Communist Party 1.0 2.0 2.4
Christian Democratic Party 4.5 1.0 2.6
Other 0.4 - 0.8
An additional problem facing the Social
Democrats is the bourgeois insistence that a
socialist victory is in the bag. Obviously the three
parties hcpe to be so persuasive that bourgeois
voters will come out in force to support them,
while overconfident Social Democratic voters will
stay at home. Furthermore, the impact of the
CONFIDENTIAL
18 September 1970
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9
CONFIDENTIAL
large number of first-time voters on the outcome
is an unknown, as they tend not to have any
party identification and do nut turn out at the
polls in such large percentages as the older v,iters.
The addition of local and provincial contests to
the national elections has also st;mulated the
growth of ad hoc political coalitions and greater
stress on individuals than on ideology. Com-
pounding all these uncertainties is the fact that
the complicated system for deciding which man
won which seat may delay the announcement of
the final outcome for some 10 days after the polls
have dosed.
There is no doubt that the transition to a
directly elected unicameral parliament will make
Swedish politii.s more exciting and more dramatic
in the 1970s than ever before. Aside from the
elections themselves, the shorter, three-year term
of office means that governments will be con-
stantly campaigning for public support, while the
more even balance between the socialist and bour-
geois parties will probably encourage efforts to
bring down the government by votes of confi-
dence and other parliamentary devices.
For all the uncertainties about the outcome
and the shape of future Swedish politics, it would
seem that Olof Palme has the best chance to
continue in power, though as the head of a mi-
nority government. This does not rule out a re-
vived coalition between the Social Democrats and
Center, but there is serious question whether
Gunnar Hedlund coi'id agree to accept Palme's
leadership. If the bourgeois parties were to be the
victors, a three-party coalitio.n led by Hedlund
would probably take shape, though recalcitrants
within the middle parties might force a center-
liberal minority governmcot, dependent on Con-
servative sympathy.
Whoever wins, there wi~l be little freedom of
movement for striking new policy initiatives. All
Special Report
fou. parties are unanimous on the central foreign
and security policy questions. Despite their dif-
ferences in the election campaign on economic
issues, the four parties are in fundamental agree-
ment in this area, too. Thus, for exarriplk, there is
little likelihood of change in the nirr- *Lo-one ratio
of private to state and cooperative enterprise. The
four parties also agree on the broad lines of labor
market and social welfare policies. Only in
nuances and minor details would one be able to
distinguish a post-1970 Social Democratic govern-
ment from a future bourgeois coalition.
As for personalities, not much is known
about the likely cabinet makeup in a post-1970
bourgeois government. On the other hand, a
post-1970 Social DemocraL;^ government would
probably approximate its immediate predecessor.
Palme is a subscriber to Erlander's policy of gra-
dual renewal of thq cabinet, rather than complete
shakeups. There has already been a hint that
Commerce Minister Gunnar Lange will retire later
in 1970, and Finance Minister Gunnar Strang and
"Disarmament" Minister Alva Myrdal may refire
within a few years .fter the election. There are
also one or two other cabinet members whose
future is uncertain, but they do not occupy major
posts.
The end result of the reforms is to inject
new life into the Swedish parliamentary system,
anesthetized by years of one-party dominance. If
a pdrty shift occurs, there will also be an auto-
matic rejuvenation of the losing party and an
increased sensitivity to political considerations
within the government bureaucracy. Should the
reforms prove successfui in Sweden, the tradi-
tional pacesetter in the Nordic area, there is even
the possibility that similar changes will be in-
troduced into neighboring Denmark, Norwa
Finland, and even more remote Icelan
18 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020047-9