WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT INDIA: THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY TO GO TO THE POLLS IN MARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 19, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
India: The World's Largest.Democracy
To Go To The Polls In March DO FILE COPY
M I RETURN TO I E-61
% W%
Secret
NB 663
DO
19 February 1971
No. 0358/71A
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CONFIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has called parliamentary elections a year before the
constitution requires then, calculating that the chances of boosting her party's seats in the
lower house are better now than they will be in 1972.
Mrs. Gandhi is publicly attributing her government's mediocre performance to her
party's loss of its parliamentary majority following the split in the Congress Party in late
1969. She is presuming that the elec-
torate will be more sympathetic to
this argument now than it might be
nL-?t year should an insufficient rain-
fall result in poor crops, and unem-
ployment and inflation continue to
mount. Furthermore, she fears that
another year of political instability at
both state and national levels would
serve to assist opposing parties in their
struggle to forge a viable opposition.
To chal!enge her at the polls, a four-
party opposition alliance was formed
last month, but it lacks a common
program and is held together only by
antipathy toward the prime minister.
Despite her party's customary stress on "radical socialism" as the best means of
accelerating much-needed economic and social development, Mrs. Gandhi is basically a
centrist, and the party's election manifesto is restrained. Mrs. Gandhi has established a solid
footing as the leader of India's largest party and has no rivals on a national scale. If she
substantially improves her parliamentary position and thereby reduces her dependence on
support from numerous minority parties, the prospects for a stronger central government
are enhanced. If she suffers a reverse or makes only slight gains, indecisiveness and
instability will continue to prevail. In either case, Mrs. Gandhi's future policies are not likely
to deviate far from past emphasis on an independent foreign policy and relatively mild
socialism at home.
Background ship and age 21 by 1 January 1970. (The 10-12
million becoming 21 after this date will be disen-
Indian vote-s will go to the polls between 1 franchised because of the lack of time to update
and 10 March t( , elect India's fifth lower house of electoral rolls.) Approximately 60 percent of the
parliament (Lok Sabha) in 23 years of inde- electorate are expected to cast valid votes-58
pendence. About half the nation's 560 million percent exercised their franchise it 1967, and the
people meet the suffrage requirements-citizen- percentage voting has been rising since the first
general election in 1952.
Special Report
CONFIDENTIAL
19 February 1971
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CONFIDENTIAL
Distribution of Elective Seats
by
State and Union Territory
Dial DA/IM -
r~1 N n A
GOA
ArvolirI
MY?. i.? R E.I F'HAF) Fly
I 1 ~,
LA CCA DIVE,
MINICOY AND
AMINOI VI
I LANDS
Special Report
STATES
UNION TERRITORIES
Andhra Pradesh
41
Delhi 7
Assam
14
Goa, Damao and Diu 2
Bihar
53
Manipur 2
Gujarat
24
Tripura 2
Haryana
9
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 1
Himachal Pradesh
4
Chandigarh I
Jammu and Kashmir
6
Dadra and Nagar?Aveli 1
Kerala
19
Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi
Madhya Pradesh
37
Islands 1
Maharashtra
45
2
Pondicherry 1
Nagaland
1
Orissa
20
Punjab
13
Rajasthan
23
Tamil Nadu
39
Uttar Pradesh
05
West Bengal
40
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19 February 1971
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CONFIDENTIAL
The new Lok Sabha will consist of 518 elec-
tive seats apportioned among India's 18 states*
and nine union territories on the basis of popula-
tion. Because state boundaries are fixed largely
along linguistic lines, there is considerable dispar-
ity in the size of the states. Thus, the two most
populous states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, to-
gether claim more than 25 percent of the Lok
Sabha seats.
Voting will be staggered over the ten-day
period, and in the larger states or where there
may be difficulty in maintaining order, the ballot-
ing will extend over several days. There will be
more polling booths than ever before, and the
government claims no voter will have to walk
more than 1.2 miles to cast his vote. Ballot count-
ing will begin only after all polling is completed,
and final results are expected on 13 March. The
new parliament will convene in late March in time
to ratify the budget for fiscal year 1972, which
begins on 1 April 1971.
Lok Sabha candidates run from single-
mcinber constituencies, and they need not be
residents of the state in which they run. Constitu-
encies are too big for effective representation-the
average consists of about one million people.
Furthermore, India's multiparty system produces
aberrations in the electoral results; more than
three candidates run in most constituencies, ,end a
plurality of 35 to 40 percent or less can produce a
winner.
One hundred fourteen (or 22 percent) of the
elective seats in the Lok Sabha are reserved for
the so-called Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes-the Untouchables who rank at the bottom
of the socioeconomic order and the tribes who
live outside the mainstream of Hindu society.
Although this provision ensures these underpriv-
ileged qroups a parliamentary representation
proportioiiate to their percentage of the over-all
population, in 23 years it has failed to do much
to alleviate the disadvantage of being born into
these groups. In addition, a special constitutional
provision empowers the president to appoint two
members from the Anglo-Indian community and
one from the isolated North East Frontier
Agency.
India's four previous parliamentary elections
have been relatively peaceful and well organized.
Under the scrutiny of a permanent, autonomous
Election Commission, the election machinery ap-
pears to operate honestly, and charges of malfea-
sance against election officials are rare. Nonethe-
less, some ballots are tampered with, and there
are estimates that, in the past, up to 10 percent of
the votes have been bought. Other election irregu-
larities-stuffed boxes, intimidation, bogus voters,
voting "early and often"-can be expected in
some constituencies, particularly in those tight
contests where money is available. Despite this, it
is generally believed that India's national elections
are a valid index of popular sentiment.
Early Election-Why?
For the first time India's parliament has
been dissolved one year in advance of its regular
five-year term. Prime Minister Gandhi apparently
has decided that her chances of winning a parlia-
mentary majority of at least 262 seats are
stronger now than they will be in 1972. When the
Lok Sabha was dissolved in December, Mrs.
Gandhi's party held 228 seats.
Indian politics experienced a major shake-up
during the last year and a half. From indepen-
dence in 1947 to November 1969, the centrist
Congress Party had dominated Indian politics,
sheltering a wide range of political factions under
a single roof. Following the death of Prime Minis-
ter Nehru in 1964 and the succession of his
daughter to the prime ministership in 1966,
*The former union territory of Uimachal Pradesh was elevated to full statehood on 25 January 1971.
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19 February 1971
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Ruling Cungrnss Party .. .. ... . . 228
Frequent supporters of Dravida Munnetra Kathagam (DMK) . 24
Prime Minister Gandhi Coins unisl Party of India (CPO . . . . 24
Opposition's Coro
of Support
Organl/atlon Congress Party . .. . . . 65
Swalant a Party . . ..... .. . . . 35
Jana Sangh Party ......... . . 33
Ctan :waist Party of Indio/Marxist (CPM) 19
Sarnyukta Socialist Party (SSP) . . . , 17
Praia Socialist Party (PSFI .. . .. . . 15
United Indepi iident Group .... . . 25
Unattached Independents .... . . . 24
Indian Revolutionary Party (8KD) . . 10
Vacancies ... . . . ...... . . . 3
Nonpartisan speaker . .. .. .. .. . 1
Total membership 523
(New Lok Sctlrn wili rontLt oJS18 elerriee dell S appui, :. d-521- se,ro)
however, the party met increasing difficulty in
withstanding the challenge from smaller opposi-
tion parties with specific regional, religious, or
communal appeals.
In contrast with the declining popular sup-
port for her party, Indira Gandhi, now 53, has
grown in power, self-confidence, and determina-
tion. In late 1969 she precipitated a split in the
Congress Party that severed her faction of center-
left "progressives"-the Ruling Congress Party-
from the center-right old guard-the Organization
Congress. Personal rivalries, however, rather than
ideological differences were a major factor in the
split.
Throughout 1970 Mrs. Gandhi's Ruling Con-
gress Party maintained a working majority only
through heavy reliance on the pro-Soviet Commu-
nist Party of India (CPI), the small South Indian
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), and various
independents. She hopes to dispense with the
inhibition this imposes by increasing the number
of Ruling Congress seats to more than the 262
required for an absolute parliamentary majority.
The Ruling Congress' detailed analysis of its
country-wide strength in late 1970 indicated
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troublesome organizational weaknesses, par-
ticularly in heavily populated north and central
India. Yet, party officials were encouraged both
by the loss of strength suffered by the rival Or-
ganization Congress (OC)-especially in the two
states under OC control-Mysore and Gujarat--
and by Mrs. Gandhi's apparent mounting popu-
larity. If, however, the 1971 rainfall is insuffi-
cient, unemployment spirals, and inflation con-
tinues, Mrs. Gandhi would face an even more
dissatisfied electorate in 1972. Thus, early elec-
tions are clearly a gamble, but calculated risk has
become a familiar feature of Mrs. Gandhi's poli-
tical style.
The Opposition
Mrs. Gandhi's decision for early elections,
announced on 27 December, climaxed weeks of
speculation and some preparatory efforts by op-
position parties. In early January a four-party
opposition alliance was formed by the Organiza-
tion Congress and three other parties: the Hindu
nationalist Jana Sangh, the radical socialist
Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), and the conserva-
tive Swatantra.
The alliance represents a mixed bag of con-
flicting ideologies, ranging from the conservative
right to militant socialism. Its main purpose is to
prevent a splintering of the opposition vote, and
its only unifying goal is to deny power to Mrs.
Gandhi. The partners' original intent was to sup-
port a common candidate in most constituencies,
but in many areas their competing aspirations
could not be reconciled.
The Organization Congress is the senior part-
ner of the alliance. Since it split away from the
Congress, it has not fared well, mainly because it
lacks rank and file and has been weighed down by
aging leaders whose principal activity following
the split seemed to be debating the morality of
aligning with parties holding incompatible views.
Expediency won out when it became evident that
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19 February 1971
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CONFIDENTIAL
such electoral arrangements were the only means
of winning even minimal representation in the
next parliament.
The Swatantra Party was reluctant to join
the alliance and briefly held out for a common
platform, which it argued would enhance the al-
liance's credibility anr+ obviate disagreements if
the partners were to participate later in a coali-
tion government. Swatantra relented, however,
because of the prospect that, with its power
largely confined to three states, it would be hard
pressed even to retain the 35 seats it won in 1967.
Additionally, its identification with private enter-
prise, laissez-faire, and the vested interests of for-
mer princes and prominent industrialists runs
counter to the leftist, antiestablishment trend
that has recently been evident in elections in
Ceylon and Pakistan, as well as in scattered state
contests in India.
The most dynamic of the four partners is the
Jana Sangh, which won slightly less than 10 per-
cent of the popular vote in 1967 and is the only
party that has regularly increased its vote in re-
cent elections. Its staunchly nationalistic platform
has the greatest appeal to conservative, orthodox
Hindus, and thus the urban middle-class, salaried
workers, tradesmen, and small landowners form
the core of its support. A dedicated cadre has
helped it to prosper. Although the Jana Sangh
may increase the number of seats it holds, it is
unlikely to expand its base beyond the northern
Hindi-speaking states.
The Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) is the
more radical of India's two main socialist parties,
and its leadership is noted for opportunism-as
illustrated by its willingness to join the rightist-or-
iented alliance. The SSP now heads its first coali-
tion government, in Bihar State, but it is beset by
internal wrangling and its prospects on the na-
tional scene are bleak.
The Marxist Communists (CPM) will com-
pete independently and expect to improve their
positions in Kerala and West Bengal, where they
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are already entrenched. The CPM continues to
call for abandonment of the constitution, but
ironically its policy still favors working within the
system the party seeks to destroy. This incon-
sistency has provoked sharp attacks from extrem-
ists on the left as well as from the moderate
Communist Party of India (CPI) on the right.
Ruling Congress
Mrs. Gandhi made it clear that her party will
not form a country-wide electoral alliance with
any party in contesting about 450 of the Lok
Sabha's 518 seats. The pro-Soviet CPI, which has
been her most ardent supporter since the Con-
gress split, had hoped to extract an alliance com-
mitment that would enable it after elections to
press for more leftist-oriented programs. Nonethe-
less, the Ruling Congress and the CPI have formed
electoral agreements in several states, repeating
the cooperative strategy that worked successfully
for them in elections in Kerala last September. In
other states Ruling Congress leaders refused to
defer to the CPI, and the two parties will com-
pete.
Electoral agreements have also been worked
out with Mrs. Gandhi's other chief supporter, the
DMK, a regional party with strength only in south
India, principally in Tamil Nadu. The DMK has
modified its earlier demand for outright separa-
tism for Tamil Nadu. It now requests a maximum
degree of autonomy for the states, but maintains
its opposition to Hindi as the national language.
Its generally reliable support in parliament has
earned special favors, including New Delhi's more
relaxed attitude on the language issue.
Efforts to reach an understanding between
the Ruling Congress and the more moderate of
the socialist parties, the Praja Socialist Party
(PSP). were fruitless. The Bharatiya Kranti Dal
(BKD), another spin-off from the old united Con-
gress Party, has opted against any national coali-
tion, but has empowered most of its state units to
forge local alliances.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Mrs. Gandhi is campaigning vigorously to
project an image as champion of the common
man. As the campaign has progressed, her style
has moderated somewhat, assuming a tone of
reassuring persuasion in contrast with an earlier
emphasis on "radicalism." The party's manifesto,
too, is a relatively sober document that avoids
specific promises and unrealistic goals. It restates
well-known proposals for nationalization of gen-
eral insurance, financial assistance to the rural
poor, an expanded public sector, greater govern-
ment participation in the import and export
trade, and a nonaligned foreign policy. The em-
phasis on practical goals and Mrs. Gandhi's recent
assurances that her party does not advocate the
abolition of private property rights are clearly
aimed at winning the essentially centrist elector-
ate.
Mrs. Gandhi's speeches attempt to get maxi-
mum mileage from her government's short and
relatively insignificant list of recent accomplish-
ments, including nationalization of the 14 largest
Indian-owned banks and passage of a Monopolies
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Control Act. She has also obtained some credit
for her attempt to abolish the privileges and an-
nual subsidies granted when the British departed
India in 1947 to some 300 former rulers of
princely states. When a constitutional amendment
bill to terminate the princes' special treatment
failed to pass parliament last September, Mrs.
Gandhi backed a presidential order removing their
privileges. In mid-December this move was in-
validated by the Supreme Court. The privy purses
constitute only a minor expense to the govern-
ment, but the issue has given Mrs. Gandhi wide-
spread publicity as a promoter of an egalitarian
society.
The Gandhi government is particularly vul-
nerable on its record in economic matters. Un-
employment is endemic in India, but in recent
years it has developed into a potentially explosive
political issue. Increasing numbers of educated
unemployed are involved in urban violence and
are potential recruits for the pro-Maoist Naxali;a
movement and other extremist groups that have
seriously strained stability in parts of India. In
rural areas, little effort has been made to alleviate
the plight of the growing mass of landless labor-
ers. The government has taken some limited,
short-term measures to moderate inflationary
pressures, but it has also contributed to increases
in demand by liberalizing credit policies of the
nationalized banks and by increasing wages of
government employees when faced by actual or
potential strikes. On balance, the lack of a parlia-
mentary majority does not justify the govern-
ment's failure to effect a number of policy
changes that could have alleviated the generally
stagnant investment climate in the private sector
and stimulated activity in the lagging public sector.
In addition to exploiting economic issues,
the opposition has accused Mrs. Gandhi of exces-
sive partiality toward the USSR, the domestic
Communists, and the Muslims. Mrs. Gandhi re-
taliates with charges that the opposition has no
program of its own. The opposition parties are
vulnerable on this score; in fact their individual
election manifestoes reveal the difficulty they
would have in working together. The opposition
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campaign is essentially negative, stressing a need
to prevent the country from proceeding further in
"an authoritarian and antidemocratic direction"
under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership.
There are a number of places where Mrs.
Gandhi faces special problems. In some cases po-
tential trouble has been defused by direct action
from New Delhi, but where regional parties or
opposition leaders are particularly strong, the
Ruling Congress has been less. successful, and the
electoral outcome is impossible to predict.
The governments of these two large states
that span the heavily populated Hindi-speaking
belt fell into opposition hands last fall. Although
this development would appear to have made an
early election risky for Mrs. Gandhi, it does allow
her to try to reaffirm her presumed strength
among the conservative, rural populace. Caste,
factional, and community forces, rather than poli-
tical ideology, have largely determined the com-
position of this vital bloc of 138 seats in the past.
The outcome in Uttar Pradesh will be partirularly
importart to Mrs. Gandhi because it is her home
state, and it has been a major battleground be-
tween the two Congress Party factions. She hopes
to carry the Muslim and Untouchable minorities,
which formed the backbone of the once-united
Congress Party's electorate.
Madhya Pradesh
This is one of India's most backward states,
and Mrs. Gandhi's strategy of attacking the right
might backfire here. I ler strongest opposition is
from the rightist-oriented alliance of princes-who
still have substantial political influence-and the
Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh Party. Her state
party organization is badly split, and this is one of
the few states in which the Ruling Congress runs a
clear risk of suffering defeat.
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West Bengal
The problem of restoring stability to this
key industrial state appears to defy solution.
More than 30 parties will contest simultaneous
national and state elections on 10 March-unless a
further deterioration in public order compels the
government to postpone them. For the first time
since independence, the government has been
forced to call in the Indian Army to try to ensure
relatively peaceful conditions for campaigning
and balloting. The military is not trained to per-
form this civic function, and its abi ity to stem
the wave of murders and terrorist acts by rival
extremist groups is questionable. Postponement
of elections, however, would be considered a vic-
tory for the terrorist Naxalites, who have vowed
not to allow them, and would evoke a noisy
protest from the CPM, the most powerful con-
tender at the polls.
This large south Indian state, under a Ruling
Congress government, has long been troubled by a
separatist movement in the underdeveloped in-
terior region of Telengana. Mrs. Gandhi offered
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the region a formula that would postpone a deci-
sion on statehood until 1977, but the offer was
rejected. The residents have organized their own
political party and will contest the 14 seats from
the area.
This state also will hold simultaneous state
assembly elections in which the ruling DMK
hopes to regain its slowly ebbing power. One of
Mrs. Gandhi's ablest strategists, C. Subramanian,
has been working to establish a Ruling Congress
foothold in the state. The DMK, which has co-
operated with Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi, was
reluctant to surrender seats in its own homeland,
but it eventually acquiesced.
Kashmir has only six seats in the Lok Sabha,
but activity in the state s of great concern to
New Delhi. Over the last several years the political
atmosphere in Kashmir has been more peaceful
than at any time since the state acceded to India
in 1947. The local government operates in har-
mony with New Delhi, and until recently political
activity among Kashmiris opposed to the state's
incorporation into India did not exceed tolerable
limits. The Plebiscite Front, however, had not
abandoned its position that the future status of
Kashmir should be determined by a referendum.
When the front announced that it would run
candidates in the election for the first time, New
Delhi began to worry that the vote would reveal
considerable support for the front. During Mrs.
Gandhi's visit to the state last December, she
warned that the secessionist advocates would be
stopped and insisted that Kashmir's accession to
India was a closed chapter. Shortly thereafter the
front was declared illegal under the 1967 Un-
lawful Activities Act, and its members were pro-
hibited from participating in elections as front
candidates. Addit;onally, the most prominent
Kashmiri, Sheikh Abdullah, has been barred from
Kashmir for three months, and hundreds of front
activists have been arrested. New Delhi is now
confident that most of Kashmir's seats will be
Special Report - 8 -
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retained by Mrs. Gandhi, but at the cost of
abruptly halting a three-year experiment in the
gradual liberalization of Kashmiri politics.
In Communist-ruled Kerala, a CPI/Ruling
Congress alliance is confidently awaiting the poll.
Inveterate leftist V. K. Krishna Menon, who won
a parliamentary seat in the last West Bengal by-
election, will seek election from his native Kerala
for the first time. His chances of winning the seat
are fair.
Mrs. Gandhi expects the Ruling Congress to
do well in Maharashtra-home base of a key politi-
cal figure, Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan. In the
Bombay region, however, gains may be made by
the Shiv Sena. Since its founding in 1966, this
nationalistic, anti-Communist organization, which
stands midway between a movement and a party,
has made considerable gains by seeking to pre-
serve the interests of Maharashtrians over south
Indian immigrants, who are said to enjoy a dispro-
portionate share of jobs in the state.
Although Gujarat and Mysore are Organiza-
tion Congress Party strongholds, the Ruling Con-
gress may pick up some seats, in part because of
the personal popularity of Mrs. Gandhi as well as
because of the dissatisfaction of Organization
Congress units over their party's decision to join
forces with the rightists. The Ruling Congress did
well in a recent series of by-elections in Mysore.
A slight gain is also possible in the Punjab.
The governing Sikh Akali Party generally sup-
ported Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi, but efforts to
formulate a joint strategy in the state were unsuc-
cessful. In neighboring Haryana, the predomi-
nantly Hindu section of the formerly united
Punjab, the Ruling Congress is expected to retain
its majority despite well-organized Jana Sangh
opposition. In the isolated northeastern state of
Assam, the Ruling Congress is also expected to
pick up a few seats, largely because opposition
parties are so ineffective. Although Mrs. Gandhi
inherited Rajasthan's Congress Party bloc
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Two New Election Symbols
for the Now-Split Congress Party
Old United Congress
Symbol
in 1967 Election
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following the split, it is questionable whether she
can make gains there against an opposition that
includes a number of princes and prominent busi-
nessmen.
Orissa is one of three states to hold concur-
rent state and national elections. In early January
the four-year-old Swatantra-Jana-Congress coali-
tion government fell, and both parties pressed
New Delhi for simultaneous state assembly elec-
tions. The Ruling Congress and the locally ori-
ented Jana Congress have discussed possible col-
laboration-thus far inconclusively-and Mrs.
Gandhi's prospects for increasing her representa-
tion in this state are not bright.
As for the races in India's generally small
union territories, the Jana Sangh is likely to retain
its hold in Delhi-the most important-while Mrs.
Gandhi should hold her own in the others.
Prospects Are for a Unique Election
The separation of national and state elec-
tions (except in three states) challenges the basis
on which the united Congress Party and other
major parties have operated since independence.
Confronted with the rise of numerous non-
Congress state governments following the setback
of the still-united Congress Party in the 1967
elections and a weakened Ruling Congress govern-
ment in New Delhi in 1970, Mrs. Gandhi con-
cluded that the old style of patronage politics
built around dual elections could no longer ensure
success. She is now betting that national issues are
capable of swaying substantial portions of the
electorate. By asking the electorate to vote almost
solely on national issues, she is hoping to bypass
locally dominant, traditional groups who for-
merly played the most important role.
In the past, a candidate's .stand on state and
national issues was almost irrelevant, and he was
elected largely because of his proven or potential
ability to provide his constituency with ample
government largesse in terms of agricultural
credit, fertilizer, seeds, irrigation facilities, wells,
Special Report
roads, and schools. With almost 4,000 seats being
contested in the past in the two simultaneous
races, tale, linguistic, factional, and religious
groups enydged in highly complex bargaining ar-
rangements, swapping support for their various
candidates. Until the 1971 results are in, one can
only ponder whether the "new" politics has really
taken hold.
To win a majority Mrs. Gandhi must do well
in the major cities where she has held few seats
and among young people who are voting for the
first time, and she must regain that segment of
the Muslim minority that defected from Congress
in the 1967 national election. The fight will be
particularly stiff in those states where her party's
organization is weak at the grass-roots level. The
princes, who are smarting from her policy on the
privy purse issue, could pose a serious threat in
some 40 constituencies where they still retain
power.
Mrs. Gandhi has considerable advantages,
however. She has better material resources than
the opposition, including air transport for coun-
try-wide campaigning, and she receives wide-
spread m?dia coverage. Although a Supreme
Court ruling denied both Congress Party factions
the use of the traditional symbol of yoked bul-
locks, the Ruling Congress has the edge because
of Mrs. Gandhi's national image as Nehru's daugh-
ter and as prime minister during the last five
years.
There is no means of surveying pre-election
trends among the mass electorate of 225 million
rural, predominantly illiterate, tradition-oriented
Indians who will determine the electoral out-
come. Less obscure are the 50 million urban
voters who are more or less modernized. This
group appears to be increasingly dissatisfied with
the government's performance in all spheres and
is demanding relief from the confusion, petty
maneuvering, and bureaucratic inertia that have
characterized India's first experiment in coalition
government. Despite the radical rhetoric from the
podium and in India's free press, however, it
_10- 19 February 1971
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CONFIDENTIAL
appears that the vast majority of Indians are
moderate centrists.
Many objective observers expect Mrs.
Gandhi at least to hold her own and possibly to
win a few additional seats though falling short of
an absolute majority. If the increase is large
enough, she can lessen her dependence on as-
sorted leftists, regionalists, and independents, and
a stronger, more effective government-with cen-
ter-left leanings-might emerge. If not, Mrs.
Gandhi will continue to head the largest single
party, but the government will lack the stability
and decisiveness needed to grapple with India's
overwhelming problems.
Special Report - 11 -
CONFIDENTIAL
19 February 1971
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