WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT URUGUAY'S TUPAMAROS: THE NEW BREED OF REVOLUTIONARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030016-2
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 14, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Uruguay's Tupainaro : The New Breed of Revolutionary
DSO FILE CgPY
RETURN TO 1EE61.
Secret
N! 697
14 May 1971
No. 0370/71A
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URUGUAY'S TUPAMAROS: THE NEW BREED OF REVOLUTIONARY
In the last 15 years Uruguay has degenerated from an economically
thriving democracy into an aimless, drifting nation. Nothing has exemplified
its recent troubles so dramatically as the rise of the terrorist National
Liberation Movement, popularly known as the Tupamaros.
The Tupamaros are representative of the new breed of terrorist in Latin
America. During the past few years the organization's successes have been
the most spectacular on the continent, and the group has influenced terror-
ists in other countries. Disregarding the guidelines laid down by such ro-
mantic revolutionaries as Che Guevara and Regis Debray, the Tupamaros
have concentrated their operations in the city rather than in the countryside,
and they typify the flexible approach to revolution currently in vogue in
Latin America. Taking maximum advantage of a generally permissive society
and of security forces unaccustomed to anything except political tranquility,
the terrorists have grown from a political curiosity into a major problem for
the Pacheco government. Imaginative and daring, they continue to recruit
successfully, and the government's efforts against them, though becoming
more effective, have yet to curb their attacks.
The guerrillas are currently in the second phase of their planned
revolutionary offensive. Having concentrated on attracting public support
and building their organizational network, they now aim to sow fear and
confusion in the government before moving Zo total confrontation. In earlier
years the terrorists' tactics emphasized expose and political embarrassment
of the government, but intimidation and assassination, are now more impor-
tant parts of their strategy. A tactical objective is to force the government to
depart from the democratic principles that have governed Uruguayan politi-
cal life for more than a century, a goal that is being pursued with some
success. The scheduled presidential and congressional elections in November
furnish the group with another opportunity to disrupt society.
Barring a major overreaction by the government, the guerrillas are not a
major threat to stability under the present circumstances. Nevertheless, the
administration has shown that it cannot eradicate the organization with
present methods, ana the group is likely to be a disruptive facet of the
Uruguayan political scene for the next several years. It has become a symbol
of the government's drift and of scciety's resulting frustration.
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Until the mid-1950s, Uruguay was touted as
the "Switzerland of Latin America," a seeming
anomaly in the political chaos that often swept
the continent. The country was a showcase of
social reform as a result of the progressive labor
and welfare statutes adopted early in this century.
The two-party governmental system functioned
smoothly; during the years 1952-67 the country
adopted a plural executive system patterned on
the Swiss model. The population, basically of
European descent, was highly iiteri:.te and nearly
fully employed.
The system, however, extracted a price. The
burgeoning welfare network was laudable in
theory. But it became a staggering economic bur-
den,for a government caught in a financial pinch
precipitated by fal',ing export earnings and pro-
longed economic stagnation that helped bring on
an inflationary spiral. The essentially pastoral
economy fell further behind the times with each
passing year. The plural executive, and the senti-
ment that led to its creation, acted as an effective
brake on the much needed exercise of strong
executive leadership. The rolls of government em-
ployees became t:'oated, and administration was
inefficient. Neithe, the Colorados, who ruled for
93 years. nor the Blancos, who served from
1959-67, were able to halt the decline, and the
country's complex political system operated to
discourage the emergence of an alternative. Older
Uruguayans were mildly disaffected by the recol-
lection of beer times, and the educated youth
were dissatisfied with a system that they regarded
as an anachronism. Thus, Uruguay was ripe for
exploitation by a determined group of dissidents.
Although the National Liberation Movement
(MLN) did not emerge as an organizational entity
until 1966, its origins date back to the early
1960s and center around the activities of Raul
Sendic, one of the founders of the group. Sendic
was a law-school dropout and a member of the
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Socialist Party of Uruguay (PSU). By 1962 he had
become a well-known peasant leader in the north-
ern part of the country. He organized dramatic
marches on the capital to emphasize demands for
better treatment of rural workers, but despite his
success as an organizer, his efforts had limited
practical results. At the same time, the PSU suf-
fered a serious setback in the 1962 elections. The
lack of success at the polls and mounting dissatis-
faction with the soft-line leadership of the party
prompted Sendic and others to leave the Socialist
organization, and they soon abandoned the parlia-
mentary process for good. Sendic became a fugi-
tive after he led a raid on a gun club in 1963, and
he moved his base of operations from the rural
northwest to the capital soon after this incident.
Sendic and other Marxist dissidents from the
PSU, along with some members of the peasant
groups he had organized; formed the core of the
MLN. They were probably joined by several an-
archists, whose own movement had faded from
the prominence it enjoyed in earlier decades, and
by a few radical independents. The entire group
numbered no more than a few dozen. During the
period 1963-66 the group, or its members, carried
out isolated terrorist acts such as robberies. They
won considerable publicity at Christmastime in
1963 with the theft and redistribution of meat in
a poor section of the capital.
Another example of the group's flair for
public relations that was later to bedevil the gov-
ernment was the terrorists' christening of the
movement as the MLN-Tupamaros. Tupamaro is a
shortened form of Tupac Amaru, the name
adopted by an Inca descendant who led a major
uprising against the Spanish crown in the vice-
royalty of Peru in 1781. Although the revolt was
bloodily crushed, Tupamaro has become synony-
mous with a call to revolution against the oppres-
sor. Artigas, the father of Uruguayan inde-
pendence, and his gaucho followers were also
known as Tupamaros during their guerrilla war
against foreign forces in the 19th century.
The organizational structure of the MLN be-
gan to emerge in 1966, when the first National
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Convention, attended by about 20 members, was
held. The organization's statutes call for the con-
vocation of a national convention at least once
every 18 months, circumstances permitting, but
except for a second meeting in 1967 and perhaps
a third in 1968, no conclaves are known to have
been held. In any event, the group does not place
heavy reliance on formal structure. Central leader-
ship, to the extent that it is exercised, is vested in
an Executive Committee, which has full powers
between meetings of the National Convention.
Sendic apparently was a member of this direc-
torate.
The basic unit of the organization is the cell,
which can be set up with only two people. Con-
siderable autonomy is granted to the cell leader.
The MLN "constitution" specifically notes the
need for strategic centralism to be superseded at
times by tactical autonomy. Cells are divided into
political.and military commands, both of which
must approve projects based on their political
advantage and military feasibility. The member-
ship is organized into legal, semilegal, and clandes-
tine categories, depending upon the extent of
identification with the organization. The "consti-
tution" also provides for the formation of periph-
eral cells by individuals who are not members of
the organization nor subject to the bylaws, but
who can be utilized for support tasks of a finan-
cial, intelligence, or general nature.
Compartmentalization and clandestinity
have been the case in fact as well as in theory. An
emphasis on self-sufficiency has held down the
need for communications; when couriers are nec-
essary both high and low level members are
utilized, and their identities are often unknown to
their contacts. MLN documents scrupulously
avoid the mention of members' names and num-
bers. As a result, police raids on one cell have
only rarely led to the discovery of others.
Revolutionary Philosophy-A Flexible Approach
MLN documents pay lip service to the tradi-
tional Marxist-Leninist concept: destruction of
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the state apparatus, dictatorship of the prole-
tariat, and the socialization of all means of pro-
duction. For the most part, however, MLN work-
ing papers studiously avoid getting bogged down
in philosophical verbiage and detailed analysis.
They concentrate instead on the examination of
operational techniques and strategic concepts.
The emphasis stems in part from the movement's
conviction that the revolution is subject to un-
predictable events (such as economic downturns
or foreign intervention) over which the MLN has
no control and that strategy and tactics are in a
constant state of flux. They also reveal a pervasive
anarchistic sentiment.
From its inception, the Tupamaros' organi-
zation has concentrated the revolutionary struggle
in the cities, ignoring the more traditional rural
activity popularized by Castro, Guevara, and
Debray. Uruguay lacks the conditions necessary
for prolonged guerrilla struggle in the country-
side. The rural terrain is predominantly flat and
offers little protection. Eighty-two percent of the
people live in urban areas, and political activity is
concentrated in Montevideo, the capital, which
contains half the population. The city supplies
the movement with recruits, and communications
and logistical problems are minimized in urban
areas.
Nonetheless, the movement has not com-
pletely disavowed traditional concepts. It envi-
sions a continent-wide struggle, with the develop-
ment of "many Vietnams" in which Uruguay may
act as a supply zone for the guerrilla struggle in
other countries. During the national stage of the
struggle, Tupamaro documents contemplate the
use of rural areas to establish diversionary fronts.
Practicality, however, has forced them to concen-
trate most of their activities in Montevideo.
A pamphlet signed by the Tupamaros was
found after a bombing incident in mid-1965, but
the organization did not begin to receive real
public attention until December 1966, when a
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Uruguay's relatively small land area and general lack of forests or mountains, in conjunction with its pre-
dominantly urban population (82%) which is distributed throughout the country, make it unsuited for a prolonged
rural guerrilla insurgency.
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police investigation of a stolen vehicle erupted
into a gunfight and the first MLN member was
killed. He was one of the few casualties on either
side during this preliminary stage of activity. Sub-
sequent investigations revealed the locations of
three MLN operational sites, and police began to
devote more attention to the fledgling group.
During these years, the Tupamaros concen-
trated their energies on a Madison Avenue ap-
proach to revolution: popularizing the struggle
and selling their revolutionary line to the people.
Violence was shunned for the most part, and
operations were designed to embarrass the gov-
ernment while at the same time building the or-
ganization's prestige and attracting recruits. Be-
tween the end of 1966 and mid-1969, only one
guerrilla and two policemen were killed.
During this period, the Tupamaros' strategy
had considerable impact. In addition to robberies
and bombings, they mounted many spectacular
and publicity-grabbing operations. In mid-1968,
they kidnaped a generally unpopular administra-
tion official who was a personal friend and adviser
to the president and released him unharmed after
a five-day detention. In early 1969 they robbed a
finance company and turned over the company's
books to judicial authorities, charging high gov-
ernment officials with questionable financial
deals. A cabinet minister resigned shortly there-
after. During a five-month period later in the
year, the terrorists seized control of several radio
stations and broadcast propaganda appeals. In ad-
dition, they used their own portable transmitter
both to take over the frequencies of local radio
programs . nd to broadcast on their own fre-
quency. The police were unable to locate the
transmitter. To mark the visit of Governor Rocke-
feller in 1969, the terrorists burned the offices of
General Motors, causing damages estimated at $1
million. After several of the more spectacular
thefts, the Tupamaros offered to return the
money and valuables that were the property of
the "common man."
The group's choice of targets, its nonviolent
approach to revolution, and its unbroken string of
successes made it a household word in Uruguay.
Magazine and newspaper articles touted its rnem-
bers as modern Robin Hoods. By early 1969, a
local opinion poll reported that 40 percent of the
people surveyed believed that the MLN was a
group of well-intentioned revolutionaries. In tacit
recognition of the success of its strategy, Presi-
dent Pacheco imposed censorship laws in mid-
1969 that forbade any mention of the MLN or
publication of the word Tupamaros.
A captured MLN document dated mid-1969
discussed the end of the period of construction of
the "minimum strategic revolutionary organiza-
tion" and focused on the beginning of a period of
broadened objectives, including a "systematic
confrontation with the regime." From mid-1969
onward, it became increasingly apparent that the
terrorists had decided to abandon their Robin
Hood role and to place increasing emphasis on
violence. In half a dozen simultaneous attacks on
police in early July, five policemen were disarmed
and one was killed.
In October, the guerrillas commemorated
the death of Che Guevara with their boldest oper-
ation to date. About 40 or 50 terrorists, disguised
as members of a funeral procession, raided the
town of Pando, about 15 miles from the capital,
robbed three banks, and took over the local po-
lice and fire stations. Police and riot control
forces from Montevideo converged quickly on the
town, howevier; gun battles resulted in the death
of three MLN members and one bystander and
the wounding of three policemen. Twenty of the
terrorists were captured, and the money taken
frorr the banks was recovered. In addition to
causing significant personnel losses, the Pando
raid destroyed the MLN's aura of invincibility and
drained away public support. This operation may
have been a maximum effort for the MLN at the
time.
the or-
ganization had been forced to use a number of
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high-level members in the effort because of the
inexperience of some members of the raiding
party.
Despite such reverses, the Tupamaros have
actively pressed their violent strategy. Early in
1970, the police formed a new counterterrorist
unit to deal with the MLN; the chief of the unit
was assassinated soon after his appointment. In
May, the Tupamaros pulled a surprise raid on the
naval training center in Montevideo and carried
off about 400 weapons and significant quantities
of ammunition without firing a shot. During the
subsequent search operations by security forces,
the Tupamaros again attacked individual police-
men, killing one and wounding three others.
From a public relations standpoint, the ter-
rorists' most serious gaffe occurred as a result of
their multiple kidnap operations in July and Au-
gust of 1970. I n the space of a week, the terror-
ists took three hostages and narrowly missed on
three other attempts. When the government re-
fused their demand that it release all "political
prisoners" in exchange for US AID adviser Dan
Mitrione, he was murdered. Subsequent reporting
has raised some doubt as to whether the murder
of Mitrionec resulted from a high-level policy deci-
sion or from panic when the massive police search
operations under way brought the arrest of sev-
eral high-level MLN figures. The fact that
Raul Sendic Antonaccio,
imprisoned MLN leader
"A country for all-or no country
at all. "(Tupamaro slogan)
Special Report
Mitrione's case was the only example among the
ten kidnapings credited to the MLN where the
group's demands were backed by the threat to
execute the hostage favors the argument that his
murder was a calculated policy decision.
Mitrione's murder caused the first wide-
spread public outcry against the terrorists and
increased the public's support for the sc-curity
forces. Because of the general sense of revulsion
created by the killing, the populace was more
prone to furnish the police with anonymous
leads.
The Government's Counteicampaign
The arrest of Sendic and eight other MLN
activists in a raid in August 1970 was one of the
first major police successes against the terrorists.
Before mid-1970, the guerrillas for the most part
had been successful in seizing and holding the
initiative against security forces. The police re-
sponse to Tupamaro operations was often slow
and investigations sloppy. Coordination between
branches of the government was at times quite
poor; intelligence was inadequate. The entire
security system suffered from careless operation.
The prisons, for example, were administered by
the Ministry of Culture rather than by the Minis-
try of Interior or by the security forces-:! reflec-
tion of the Uruguayan emphasis on rehabilitation
President Jorge Pacheco Areco
"I refuse to serve merely as Urviguay 's
undcrtaker,7 I will be President. "
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The intensive use of city-wide sweep patrolling in the capital has resulted in numerous arrests of terrorists.
rather than detention. When the terrorists staged
a "spectacular" prison break in March of 1970
and freed 13 imprisortad female members of the
band, the women were reportedly being guarded
by one unarmed sentry and a group of nuns. The
minister of culture resigned after the incident.
Steps have been taken to correct some of the
more obvious government failings. Responsibility
for the prison system was transferred to the Min-
istry of Interior in January 1971. The adminis-
tration also is considering building a new high-
security prison facility to house the more impor-
tant Tupamaro prisoners. The reaction time of
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the Montevideo police has improved measurably,
and there has been a serious effort to establish an
intelligence network. Intensive sweep patrolling in
the capital and constant raids have res~ultt in the
imprisonment of large numbers of terrori ts: by
the end of 1970, 344 Tupamaros had been ar-
rested and more than 250 remained jailed.
The police roundup especially has h,-,d an
impact on the guerrillas. In 1970, thins terrorists
began to place greater emphasis an relatively
low-level harassment of police a',cl prominent
citizens-a reflection net only of a change in
tactics but possibly of a lack of experienced
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militants as well. Some of their operations re-
sembled training missions. The clocklike precision
that had characterized earlier efforts gave way to
a greater number of incidents more amateurish in
nature. Several operations in September were il-
lustrative. Two MLN members were killed in the
poorly timed bombing of a bowling alley. A seem-
ingly ill-conceived operation involving the multi-
million-dollar burning of a textile warehouse,
which robbed Uruguayans of jobs and profits, was
unpopular with the general populace. Similarly,
Tupamaro documents first claimed and later dis-
owned operation "hot summer," a plan designed
to scare off the country's lucrative tourist trade.
In fact, the latent terrorist threat, combined with
poor weather, resulted in a drop in tour ism earn-
ings from nearly $40 million in 1970 to about
$20 million this year. The denial of authorship of
the plan was another effort to evade respons;-
bility for an action that adversely affected the
average Uruguayan.
From the outset of the terrorist problem,
President Pacheco has taken a tough stand. He
was the first Latin American leader to refuse any
dealings with kidnapers, and he has shown little
disposition to change this policy. Nonetheless, the
government's over-all record of achievement
against the terrorists remains mixed.
Despite the large number of terrorists im-
prisoned, the group remains capable of mounting
fairly large scale operations. The kidnaping of
British Ambassador Jackson in January was an
elaborately staged affair that involved an esti-
mated 40 to 50 people. In addition, the jailed
MLN members still enjoy considerable freedom of
action. Messages from the prison clearly indicate
that these leaders play a role in determining
strategy and objectives.
The President's shuffling of ministers has at
times borne the mark of a clumsy political opera-
tion that has done little to increase government
effectiveness. The competent undersecretary of
defense, Carlos Piran, who appeared to be as-
suming a major role in the organization of an
Special Report -8
intelligence apparatus resigned from the govern-
ment in April. The President's closure of leftist
publications by execut've order has earned him
enmity from a legislature accustomed to consulta-
tion and responsibility and concerned about the
abridgement of press freedom. Although Pacheco
has been granted unprecedented suspensions of
constitutional guarantees on two occasions, simi-
lar requests to Congress have been rebuffed dur-
ing the last few months.
Who Are the 714pamaros?
The Tupamaros have a professional organiza-
tional image with limited emphasis on hidividual
leaders. Sendic, by personal inclination, was op-
posed to any personality cult and seemed to make
a real effort to subordinate hip identity to that of
the organization. The eiop;iasis on clandestinity
and autonomy aided the effort. The group has
survived the imprisonment of almost all its early
key leaders, and others have replaced them in the
decision-making apparatus. The Tupamaros'
growth from a nucleus of about two dozen people
into a group still capable of a high level of activity
despite the imprisonment of several hundred of
its members is the result of several factors.
Prior to the appearance of the Tupamaros,
the Uruguayan political scene had no leftist or-
ganization whose revolu':ionary fervor went much
beyond a sterile ideological exercise. The large,
legal Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) with a
membership of about 40,000 is a soft-line, pro-
Moscow party and an established part of the
political process. Therefore, when the pro-Castro
congressional deputy Arie;l Collazo established his
Revolutionary Movement of Uruguay (MRO) in
the early 1960s, it grew quickly to a membership
of nearly 1,000 with about 5,000 sympathizers, a
number of whom were probably drawn from the
PCU. It too, however, proved to be largely an
exercise in polemics. The Tupamaros, who both
preached and practiced an activist line, probably
siphoned off a significant number of converts
from organizations such as the MRO, PCU, and
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other minor splinter group:, on Uruguay's far left.
Not surprisingly, the MRO has since faded to the
point where it now commands no more than
about three to four dozen activists.
In 1968, the police estimated that the MLN
terrorists numbered 50 activists and about 1,000
supporters or peripheral members. By the end of
1970, official police estimates had climbed to
1,000 activists and 3,000 collaborators Und sup-
porters-probably an overestimation. The terror-
ists had conclusively demonstrated that with
about 200 active militants, they were a formi-
dable opponent for the security forces. At pres-
ent, despite the arrests, they probably still have
that number of active militants at large.
As several of the Tupamaros' operations
have made evident, the organization possesses a
significant technical capability. Priests; politi-
cians, doctors, and lawyers have been discovered
in guerrilla ranks. Despite the presence of such
talent, the list of those arrested makes it apparent
that the majority of the rank-and-file activists are
disaffected youth. The median age is only about
25 years, too young for the individual to be
established in a profession. Some of the terrorists
used in harassing attacks against private residences
have been in the 17 to 21 age group.
Despite their tarnished
image with the public at large,
the Tupmaros command a sub-
stantial following at the univer-
sity, and their exploits have
earned them public plaudits
from both students and faculty.
Sympathy-and radicalism-
extends into secondary school
ranks as well. The terrorists have
made some effort to organize
support committees in high
schools, and outbreaks of vio-
lence last year prompted Pres-
ident Pacheco to close down sec-
ondary institutions until he
could reopen them under
strengthened govern-rent con-
trol.
Special Report
The schools thus present a ready pool of
educated, middle-class youth who see the Tupa-
maros as the only viable alternative to a decaying
system. The University of the Republic in Monte-
video has more than 18,000 students, and it prob-
ably will not require a major recruitment effort
for the Tupamaros to continue to attract enough
people to sustain their operations at or around
the present level for the near future. Their appar-
ent use of raw recruits in recent operations, al-
though indicative of police successes, also attests
to their continued attractiveness to youth.
Youths have gravitated to the MLN from all
points of the political spectrum. The son of Car-
los Quijano, a noted leftist intellectual and news.
paper publisher, is a Tupamaro. Raul Bidegain, a
high-level MI_N activist arrested last August, is the
son of a former police chief. Both sons of a
Blanco party senator who was a member of the
ruling National Council in 1959-60 were members
of the terrorist band; one was killed during the
Pando raid and the other is currently in prison.
The Tupamaros are presumed to have access
to low-level information in many of the govern-
ment agencies, and there have also been several
disquieting instances of Tupamaro penetrations at
a higher level. It is likely that there are MLN
Duuy
guerrilla raid on Pando. Ecuadorean Magazine lrstazo, September 1970
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symp4thizers, and probably active collaborators,
in some of the ministries. Part of the explanation
lies in the fact that Uruguayans enter the lethargic
government bureaucracy at the earliest age possi-
ble. Of the 18,000 university students, 50 percent
work; government employment accounts for the
largest sector of the active labor force.
former member of the police directorate of intel-
ligence and information also admitted supplying
the MLN with information. Raids on Tupamaro
hideouts have uncovered extensive biographic
data and other information on security officials.
making it probable that the Tupamaros have con-
tinuw7 access to some police files.
The MLN has a close ideological kinship
with the Cuban revolution, but internal docu-
ments stress the group's. self-reliance, and avail-
able evidence supports this implicit claim of in-
dependence. About two dozen MLN members are
known or suspected to have traveled to Cuba, but
several were members of other organizations at
the time. Beyond this, there is no evidence of
Cuban aid or any significant support from abroad.
Moscow supports the soft-line PCU in preference
to the terrorist MLN.
Circumstantial evidence also sugges+s the
group is free from foreign support. Although
MLN upkeep requires a substantial monthly
budget, the terrorists have become adopt thieves,
and the inputs from robberies and ransoms have
matched estimated operational expenses. In addi-
tion, raids have netted the organization a sizable
arsenal, with no need for a foreign arms supply.
The group's urban base also allows members to
earn money by day to ease the potential financial
strain.
The Tupamaros have for several years carried
on a dialogue with other revolutionary groups,
and in scattered instances have extended aid. Dur-
ing the MLN's formative years, the group actively
collaborated with the Argentine Tacuara Move-
ment, furnishing shelter in Montevideo to exiles
and engaging in combined armed assaults. Several
Argentines who traveled to Communist China
subsequently passed on their military and polit-
ical training to their MLN colleagues in 1965.
Cooperation between the Argentine and Uru-
guayan movements apparently contirues.F
The MLN has a long-range, grandiose objec-
tive of bringing about the unification of revolu-
tionary groups in the southern cone of Latin
America and eventually on the entire continent.
Uruguayans are less parochial and nationalistic
than inany of their Latin American brethren, and
the Tupamaros will continue to foster coopera.
tion among revolutionary groups and lend aid to
the extent permitted by their resources. In addi-
tion, Montevideo is a well-known transit point for
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South American revolutionaries and, given the
Tupamaros' proven skill at providing documen-
tation and cover, it is reasonable to assume that
they have extended aid to other guerrillas as well.
Within Uruguay, the Tupamaros have con-
sulted with several other extremist groups but
have shied away from any merger. The MLN has
sapped much of the strength from several of its
sister organizations and it is confident that they
will eventually be caught up in the revolutionary
groundswell and have no choice but to meld with
+'1e Tupamaro organization.
The Tupamaros and the large Communist
Party have eyed each other warily for several
years, both conscious that they will eventually be
competing for the allegiance of the same indi-
viduals. Thus far, however, their common objec-
tives have overcome their mutual suspicions. The
Tupamaros now command widespread sympathy
in the student sector, and the PCU controls labor.
Neither has made a major effort to undercut the
inrluence of the other. The Tupamaros have, how-
ever, made a few limited forays into the trade-
union field. The Tupamaro strategy attaches con-
siderable importance to the control of labor, and
it seems that the MLN threat to the PCU's treas-
ured labor hegemony eventually will put the
groups at loggerheads. At present, however, many
of their activities are complementary and mutu-
ally beneficial.
future Policy and Prospects
The MLN has parted with its Robin Hood
mystique and lost much of the popular appeal it
once claimed, but it sacrificed these assets in a
calculated effort to advance its revolutionary
strategy through an escalation of violence. Tupa-
maro documents suggest that despite the in-
creased losses, its members feel that their tactics
are achieving results.
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Although they have failed to force the gov-
ernment to grant any concessions in exchange for
hostages, they show no signs of abandoning kid-
naping as a tactic. For the moment, they are
satisfied with the publicity they gain from a suc-
cessful kidnaping and with the enhanced reputa-
tion resulting from their demonstrated ability to
hold hostages for lengthy periods. Both American
agronomist Fly and Brazilian consul Gomide were
detained for six months in the MLN's so-called
"peoples' prisons" before being released early this
year. Fly, set free after he suffered a heart attack,
had received professional medical treatment in
one of several "peoples' hospitals." The Tupa-
maros' current tactics toward kidnap victims, in-
cluding trials and sentences for crimes against the
people, are designed to emphasize a muckraking
image and to lend the organization a quasi-legal
facade. The income from ransoms is also a lucra-
tive and attractive side benefit. The terrorists have
successfully carried out ten kidnapings and at
present hold three hostages. Until the police can
break this string of successes, further attempts are
a near certainty, and diplomatic personnel will
remain prime targets.
Propaganda activities, although no longer the
primary focus of the Tupamaros, have not been
neglected. The terrorists are well aware that their
efforts to expose corruption in government ranks,
even through the use of kidnapings, have won
generally broad public acceptance. Such actions
are likely to continue. During the past year, the
Tupamaros on numerous occasions have taken
control of downtown movie theaters and factories
and held audiences at gunpoint while publicizing
the party line. The tactic is of questionable
utility, and the improved police response has
sometimes made it a costly one. This is likely to
be increasingly the case and could prompt the
terrorists to abandon the practice. Intimidation
efforts such as raids on private residences and
similar operations, which entail minimal risk, will
continue. The incidence of robberies and bomb-
ings is likely to proceed at the pace that has
become "normal" for Montevideo in the last two
years.
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TUPAMARO KIDNAPINGS 1968-I971
Ulysns Pereira Reverbel
Head of State Utilities
Company and adviser
to the President
Caetano Pellegrini Giampietro
Prominent Banker
Daniel Pereira Manelli
Judge who had sentenced
several Tupamaros
Aloisio Gomide
Brazilian consul in
Montevideo
Daniel Mitrione
(IS AID adviser
Claude Fly
US agronomist
Geoffery Jackson
British ambassador
in Montevideo
Guido Berro Oribe
Uruguayan Attorney
General
Ricardo Ferres
Uruguayan financier
and businessman
7 August 1968
9 September 1969
28 July 1170
31 July 1970
31 July 1970
7 August 1970
8 January 1971
10 March 1971
13 April 1971
Released on 11 August 19(58
but kidnaped again on 13
April 1971 and remains hos-
tage.
Released on 21 November
1969 after personal friends
made a donation to charity.
Heleased on 4 August 1970
Released on 21 February 1971
in e,,change for $250,000 rt i-
soul paid by his wife.
Murdered after Uruguayan
Government refused to release
"political prisoners"; his body
was discovered on 10 August
1970.
Released on 2 March 1971 at-
ter having sot(ered heart at-
tack.
Remains a hostage.
Released on 2;3 March 1971
Remains a hostage.
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The MLN has given a lukewarm and quali-
fied endorsement to the efforts of the now Broad
Front-a leftist coalition that could become the
first major throat to the two-party dominance of
the Colorados and Blancos in more than a cen-
tury. Although the Tupamaros recognize that a
strong Front showing probably will work to their
advantage, their primary objective presumably is
still to attempt to force the cancellation of elec-
tions. Thus chances for the assassination of a
prominent public figure or for a major terrorist
raid will rewain high through the 28 November
presidential election. The MLN would choose to
hold down the level of violence only if it became
convinced that the Front had a reasonable chance
to win the elections-an unlikely development at
this point.
Police successes and the terrorists' own fail-
ings have altered the sit cation of a year ago, when
the initiative threatened to pass into the hands of
the Tupamaros. The disruption in the terrorists'
ranks has not, however, significantly lessened
their over-all capabilities, in part because of their
continued ab city to replace imprisoned members
with new recr its. Other factors continue to work
to the guerrio,,.;' advantage as well, such as the
still-inefficien' ?nal --,'stem and a judiciary that
metes out le A sentences. Continued police
problems, such as the legal restraints that hinder
Special Report
effective interrogation, are contributing factors
pointing toward a prolonged period during which
the guerrillas will be able to maintain a high level
of activity. That level of activity is likely to
embarrass the government on occasion and some-
times strain the capability of security forces. As
the Tupamaros' strategy makes clear, it is aimLd
not at a near-term overthrow of the government
but designed to prepare a "revolutionary con-
sciousness." The Tupamaros recognize that their
ultimate objective is dependent on factors outside
their control. I n concert with a Communist Party
driven underground or into op, )n rebellion by
harshly repressive government measures, the
Tupamaros could constitute a major thre;f to
stabi!ity. Such a situation would be precipitated,
however, only by a major government overreac-
tion.
After decades of tranquility, the Tupamaro
guerrillas are a disquieting reminder of mounting
dissatisfaction with the Uruguayan system, but
t'ie government has the resources to 'withstand a
buffeting from terrorist tactics. The government's
viability will depend largely on its reaction to the
growing challenge centered in the legitimate polit-
ical arena. The Tupamaros are a highly visible,
vocal, and violent part of the over-all challenge,
but they are a catalyst for, rather than the focus
of, dissent.
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