WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CUBA REDUCES ITS ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030029-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: August 20, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Cuba Reduces Its Armed Forces
DSB RE COPY
OHM TO 1E-61
Secret
N2 669
20 August 1971
No. 0384/71A
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Cuba Reduces Its Armed Forces
Since Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1959, he has succeeded in molding the
Cuban armed forces into the most modern and effective fighting force in Latin
America. During this time Castro has acquired sufficient modern jet fighters, naval
combat units, tactical missiles, tanks, artillery pieces, electronic gear, and other
assorted equipment from the Soviet Union to enable his military establishment to
defend the island against anything short of a major invasion.
Tho role of the military establishment began to change in 1967. Although
national defense and maintenance of public order have remained the primary
mission, the armed forces have become increasingly involved in activity normally
considered outside the realm of military affairs. Many nonmilitary responsibilities
such as cane cutting, road building, land clearing, construction, and other tasks
geared to aid the economy were shifted to the armed forces, and military officers
were placed in charge of a growing number of government entities ranging frorn
ministries and autonomous agencies to state farms.
There now is mounting evidence that another significant change is in progress
in the armed forces. Castro is reducing the amount of manpower, materiel, and
resources that is normally devoted to maintaining the sizable military establishment.
Although he is apparently willing to sacrifice part of his armed might in order to
meet economic needs, even a massive diversion of manpower and resources from the
armed forces?a step Castro is not prepared to take?would do little to change the
economic situation. The over-all effect that reductions will have on the combat
capability of Cuba's armed forces will hardly be favorable, but it is still too early to
attempt to assess their full impact.
Present Level of Armed Forces
Cuba's military establishment, which con-
sists of some 140,000 men and an additional
71,000 reservists, is the best trained and best
equipped in Latin America. Untested in combat
since the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, it is still
widely presumed to be the most effective fighting
force in Latin America. The basic mission of the
armed forces is to maintain internal order and
guard against external attack, and this it has done
quite efficiently ever since Castro assumed power.
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The military comprises the Air/Air Defense
Force (DAAFAR), the Revolutionary Navy
(MGR), and the ground forces. DAAFAR is
divided into two main branches consisting of the
Revolutionary Air Force (FAR) and the Air
Defens3 Force, which is responsible for the sur-
face-to-air (SAM) missile and antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) units.
The Revolutionary Air Force has an inven-
tory of approximately 160 jet fighter aircraft
consisting of MIG-15s, MIG-17s, MIG-19s, and
20 August 1971
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MIG-21s. The ten MIG-19s, however, have been
nonoperational since April 1967, and the MIG-
15s are being phased out of operation. As a result
Cuba relies primarily on its complement of 91
MIG-17s and MIG-21s, which are strategically
located in the three air defense zones?western,
central and eastern. Approximatcly half of the
MIG-21s are located at the San Antonio de Los
Banos Air Base near Havana.
The Air Defense Force operates scores of
AAA emplacements and directs Cuba's SA-2 sur-
face-to-air missile (SAM) system. The 17 opera-
tional SAM sites are situated to protect the mili-
tary installations in and near Havana and in the
Cienfuegos - Santa Clara area of Las Villas Prov-
ince. There is no evidence that Cuba has received
a more advanced air defense missile system than
the SA-2. An SA-3 site under construction at
Punta Ballenatos just west of Havana in mid-1967
was reconfigured for the conventional SA-2
system before construction was completed.
The navy is a relatively small but potent
force. The backbone of the MGR consists of 18
KOMAR patrol boats armed with two STYX
cruise missiles each. The KOMARs are backed up
by six KRONSTADT and 12 50-1 class sub-
marine chasers, which are used primarily for off-
shore patrolling, and two dozen P-4 and P-6 class
motor torpedo boats. A small force of coastal
radar surveillance posts, reduced in number in the
past year, is also a part of the MGR.
The ground forces are made up of an esti-
mated 119,000 men on active duty backed up by
71,000 ready reservists. The main items of equip-
ment are 700 to 800 tanks and self-propelled
guns, several hundred other armored vehicles, and
more than 1,300 artillery pieces and antitank
guns of various sizes. A recent innovation in the
ground forces is the formation of at least one
company-sized paratroop unit.
The primary source of manpower for the
armed forces is the compulsory military service
(SMO) draft. All Cuban mies between the ages of
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16 and 45 are subject to military service. Stu-
dents, however, are usually exempt. The general
educational level of the armed forces?about six
years of formal education?is significantly higher
than in the early 1960s.
Militarization
Since 1967 the Cuban military establishment
has become increasingly involved in activities
normally considered outside the realm of national
defense. The Ministry of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces (MINFAR), under the tight control
of Raul Castro, has gradually assumed a major
role in the areas formerly delegated to the minis-
tries of Education, Sugar Industry, and Construc-
tion? as well as other governmental agencies,
primarily because it is a source of highly mobile,
disciplined labor and because ifs officers provide
the only real cadre of competent administrators
in the country.
Fidel Castro's use of the armed forces as a
source of labor has broadened gradually; in 1970
some 100,000 military personnel were used in the
sugar harvest. In addition, troops were employed
in road building, dam construction, land clearing,
and other domestic tasks. Furthermore, officers
were placed in many top administrative positions
throughout the government, and the military
establishment even began to absorb portions of
the educational system. By 1970, for example, all
technological institutes and some secondary
schools had been shifted from the Education
Ministry to MINFAR'S vice ministry for military
technological training. The practice of naming
military men to key administrative posts has also
continued. A former chief of the general staff was
named education minister in mid-1970, an army
supply officer was appointed minister of internal
trade, and when the new Ministry of Merchant
Marine and Ports was formed in August 1970,
Major Angel Joel Chaveco Hernandez was ap-
pointed to head it. As of mid-1971, 11 of the
government's 22 ministerial posts were held by
military officers.
20 August 1971
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Armed Forces Ott backs
One of the first indications of the current
trend in reducing the size of the armed forces
appeared last year in the Frontier Brigade, the
ground forces unit responsible for guarding the
area surrounding the US naval base at Guan-
tanamo Bay in eastern Cuba. The Frontier Bri-
gade underwent a major reorganization and re-
duction in force when four of its ten infantry
companies were transferred to other units. In
addition, the staffs of the brigade's two battalions
reportedly were eliminated and the brigade is
apparently now under the control of the Interior
Ministry rather than MIN FAR.
To permit the cutback in the brigade's
strength and reduce the need for manpower in
patrolling the perimeter of the US naval base, the
Cubans constructed a security barrier approxi-
mately 3,200 feet beyond and in most parts paral-
lel to the fenceline around the base. The barrier
consists of a series of three eight-foot barbed-wire
fences about 80 feet apart extending 18 miles
around the western, northern, and eastern sides of
the base. A single-lane road for vehicle and foot
patrols has been built between the middle fence
and one farthest from the base. In addition, ele-
vated observation posts are spotted at key points
along the barrier, and explosive devices and trip
flares have been planted between the fences. The
barrier has been very effective not only in allow-
ing a reduction in the brigade's st?ength but also
in reducing the number of refugees who seek
political asylum inside the US naval base.
Deactivation of SAM Sites
Concurrent with the barrier construction
and the reduction of the Frontier Brigade, the
only two SAM brigades in eastern Cuba were
deactivated. The removal of SAM-associated
equipment from the sites at Holguin Airfield and
San Pedro de Cacocum was noted in aerial photog-
raphy
\the sites at Santiago de Cuba and
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Holguin (west) had also been vacated. Two
months later, the Palma Soriano and La Maya
sites, the only ones remaining on the eastern end
of the island, were vacated.'
construc-
tion of permanent buildings is taking place at the
Santiago de Cuba SAM site and that the site's
easternmost missile launch position has been de-
molished?solid evidence that the deactivation is
permanent. Support facilities that formerly served
the two SAM brigades have also been vacated, and
at one location one of the buildings has been
dismantled. To fill the gap in the air defense
system created by the deactivation of the SAM
brigades, a contingent of MIG-21s was shifted
from western Cuba to Holguin to supplement the
MIG-15s stationed there.
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Closing an Officers School
In May 1971, the General Ignacio Agra-
monte Officers School in Mantanzas was closed
permanently after 11 years of operation. The
school was established in April 1961 to train
cadres for the militia, and later concentrated on
educating men on active duty who were already
serving as unit chiefs in positions normally filled
by lieutenants or captains. The functions of the
school, which graduated more than 8,000 officers
during its existence, have been transferred to the
larger General Antonio Maceo Interserv ice Cadets
School at Ceiba del Aqua, near Havana.
The closing of the school, according to
Verde Olivo, the Cuban armed forces magazine,
came about because the "timely aid of the Soviet
Union" and the "great organization and combat
ability" of the Cuban armed forces "have pro-
vided us with the chance to reduce the use of
human resources and materials which are so
needed to support the economic plans of the
country." There are now only five schools for
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providing the armed forces with regular officers:
the school at Ceiba del Agua; the Military Tech-
nological Institute in Havana; the Naval Academy
at Mariel; the Captain Carlos Ulloa Aviation
Cadets School at San Julian; and the Camilo Cien-
fuegos Artillery Cadet School ct La Cabana For-
tress in Havana. Reserve officers continue to be
supplied by the universities.
Castro Confirms Cutbacks
Fidel Castro, who is commander in chief of
the armed forces in addition to functioning as
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head of the party and government, first hinted of
reductions in the military establishment a year
ago. In addressing the Cuban Women's Federation
on 23 August 1970, he spoke of reducing "the
mass of permanent fighters" in the armed forces
by developing highly trained and efficient cadres
who could be called upon to lead the masses "in
case of aggression." Although he warned against
being careless of the country's defenses, he im-
plied that regular units on active duty would be
replaced by reserve units. These units maintain a
skeleton cadre on permanent active status with
the rank and file capable of reporting for duty
within 24 hours of call-up.
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security
barrier
L TA YBEEtEety_A:b:
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Western Section
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1 Perimeter fence
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2 New security construction consisting of
3 parallel barbed-wire fences 0 feet high
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20 August 1971
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Castro was more specific in his May Day
speech this year. In describing the manner in
which the government would meet the increasing
demand for labor, he said: "We are also working
on manpower savings in the Revolutionary Armed
Forces and the Ministry of the Interior. For more
than a year now the comrades of the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces have been hard at work
reducing the number of permanent personnel and
at the same time maintaining and even increasing
the combat readiness of our armed forces." He
acknowledged that 70-80,000 soldiers had
worked in the 1970 sugar harvest on a permanent
basis, but indicated that the cutbacks would go
even beyond that in contributing to the national
work force. He estimated the reduction in the
armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior
would be over 100,000 men and pointed out that
they would be involved in productive activity in
industry, agriculture, and elsewhere throughout
the entire year and not just duringthe harvesting
season.
Reserve Militia
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Greater Reliance on the Reserves
The grounds forces will suffer the greatest
reduction in permanent personnel because they
are by far the largest component of the armed
forces and thus have the greatest amount of "fat"
that can be safely cut. In addition, the ground
forces lend themselves more readily to the ready
reserve system than do the other services, which
in general require personnel with a higher level of
technical skills. Unfortunately, personnel levels in
the ground force are also the most difficult to
monitor and the extent of cutbacks cannot now
be assessed.
So far, the only cuts noted in the navy took
place in the radar surveillance units in eastern
Cuba. All units afloat seem to be in active status,
and manpower reductions have apparently been
confined to personnel ashore. DAAFAR has
experienced reductions in both its AAA com-
ponent and the SAM system, which was reduced
by about 25 percent.
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It is doubtful that the Revolutionary Air
Force has suffered much from manpower cuts; no
significant changes have been observed in the
number of air force personnel. Reductions in this
branch will probably be confined to operations
rather than personnel or equipment.
Coirclusious
Cuba's economic problems are far too com-
plex and profound to be altered significantly
either by streamlining the military or by other
moves the regime has instituted thus far. Castro's
single-handed effort over the past 12 years to
guide and improve the economy has been basi-
cally a futile one. Per capita output has declined
and shortages of consumer goods exist through-
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out the entire island. In addition, this year's sugar
harvest fell more than one million tons short of
the seven-million-ton goal. Much of Cuba's do-
mestic difficulties stems from low morale and
lack of incentive, but the primary problems result
directly from Castro's poor management.
Inasmuch as Castro continues to stress the
threat of US military intervention, he will never
permit his armed forces to be weakened to the
point of becoming ineffective. In addition to de-
fending his regime from external attack, the
armed forces constitute his main source of power
in the domestic political field. Castro will con-
tinue military exercises involving the ground forces,
artillery, navy, and air force; behind the scenes
military manpower will continue to play a signifi-
cant role in domestic chores.'
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