WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE ITALIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030040-5
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: November 12, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Italian Presidential Election
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12 November 1971
No. 0396/71A
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Balloting in the sixth election to the Italian presidency begins formally
on 9 December and may last more than a week. The informal campaign has
been under way for months. Senate President Fanfani and Foreign Minister
Moro have been the principal unannounced contenders. Nonetheless, the
Electoral College, composed primarily of members of Parliament, is as likely
to choose one of its more obscure members. One of the clich?about Italian
presidential elections is that "the front-runner never wins." The post is
prized. It has more political bite than is normal for the job of chief of state
in a parliamentary system, and the limits of presidential power seem fluid.
The election takes place at a time when economic growth has reached a
postwar low, neo-fascism is showl. -I new strength, and a proposed refer-
endum on divorce threatens to stir up hostility over religion all over again.
One of the president's problems will be to weigh the pros and cons of calling
early parliamentary elections.
The Electors and the Candidates
Over the past year, the approach ?f the
presidential election has been a key factor in
Italian political life. The president is nc,t elected
by all the people but by an Electoral College
made up of members of Parliament and regional
representatives. Leaders of the four center-left
parties, all ambitious for the presidency, have
been designing their activities with an eye to the
Electoral College. Neither far-left nor far-right
candidates have any hope of winning. Because the
election is essentially parliamentary, the victor
could be a politicians' politician almost as easily
as one of the country's best-known leaders.
The Electoral College numbers 1,010. A
two-thirds majority, or 672 votes, is required for
election in the first three rounds of balloting.
Thereafter, an absolute majority, or 506 votes, is
sufficient. Over the years the election has been
increasingly hard fought. In 1964, it took 13
days. Any Italian citizen over 50 who is qualified
to vote may be elected to the seven-year office.
If the Christian Democratic Party were
united, it could easily elect its own choice, ac-
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cepting either Socialist or Social Democratic and
Liberal votes to make up the required total of
506. The president would then owe nothing to
either Communist or neo-fascist votes. In fact, the
vote is secret, and the party has never been able
to maintain complete unity. Only two of the five
presidents have been Christian Democrats. One of
these was elected in 1955 with Communist help;
the other, in 1962, had aid from the neo-fascists.
The Christian Democrats this time seem to
be in agreement on almost nothing, although they
all say the new president should come from their
party. One month before the balloting begins, the
leading hopefuls of this party alone number
seven. In addition, the Republicans have one, the
Socialists have two or three, and the Social Demo-
crats hope to re-elect incumbent President Sara-
gat. All observers agree that the leading candi-
dates are Christian Democrats. Senate President
Amintore Fanfani is most prominently mentioned
and Foreign Minister Aldo Moro is regarded as his
chief rival. But they may cancel each other out,
the reasoning goes, thus opening the way for a
compromise candidate.
Fanfani, "the man to beat," is often de-
scribed as unpredictable, and his crit]cs call him
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Italy: The Presidential Electoral College
Parliament Representatives*
Communists (PCI)
242
17
Proletarian Socialists (PSIUP)
34
1
Independent Leftists
12
?
Socialists (PSI)
99
13
Social Democrats (PSDI)
40
1
Christian Democrats (DC)
401
24
Republicans (PRI)
9
?
Liberals (PLI)
47
1
Monarchists (PDIUM)
5
?
Neo-Fascists (MSI)
38
?
Splinter Groups
25
1
*expected distribution
Splinter
Groups-
26
PSIUP? 35
Independent
Leftists? 12
The College comprises 630 deputies, 322 senators, and 58 representatives
of the 20 geographic regions (1 for the small Aosta Valley and 3 each for the
other 19 regions). The regions choose their own delegates with a variety of
systems but are required to give representation to opposition parties.
552088 11-71 CIA
unreliable. Everyone agrees that he is a highly
skilled politician, but his authoritarian ways in
past years have raised fears that as chief of state
he would adapt the Republic to a presidency on
the model of Gaullist France. Recently he has
made an effort to show that he is not only a
politician by stressing his not inconsiderable tal-
ents as a painter and a writer.
Fanfani has been a power in the Christian
Democratic Party since the mid-1950s and has
been a key figure in the last three presidential
elections. Since consolidating his hold on the
party machinery this fall, he is effectively the
leader of the center z.?nd right of the party.
When he ran for the presidency in 1964, he
had the support of the more revolutionary wing
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3
25X1
of the Communist Party, but this time he is
looking to the far-right parties for the needed
votes. Fanfani is likely to be named official candi-
date of his own party on the eve of the balloting,
but other political leaders believe that he will get
only 280-300 Christian Democratic votes at his
peak. In this event, he cannot win even with the
support of the entire right of the political spec-
trum and the Republicans and Social Democrats
as well. The votes from the left that he would
need do not at this moment seem in prospect.
Moro is Fanfani's chief rival for the presi-
dency, as he has been for control of the Christian
Democratic Party. A veteran prime minister,
Moro demonstrated political skill, serving in that
post three times, as Fanfani has also done.
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In contrast to the ebullient Senate president,
Moro is "like the slow rain of autumn." As a
speaker, he is "cold, piercing, insinuating, and
interminable." One of his chief assets in the con-
test is his reputation as an enemy of activism. A
party colleague has said, "He knows everything,
he understands everything, but he decides noth-
ing."
Moro's faction, one of nine in the Christian
Democratic Party, was formerly located in the
center of the party spectrum. But right-left orien-
tation in Italian political parties is often tactical
rather than ideological. Now, with Fanfani gen-
erally controlling the center and right, Moro has
become the most important leader of the left.
Calculations of Moro's potential in the Elec-
toral College give him perhaps 90 Christian Demo-
cratic votes, with a somewhat better chance than
Fanfani of capturing the Socialist and extreme
left votes. The foreign minister may also do better
than his chief rival with the Social Democrats.
Thus, Moro's election is a mathematical possibil-
ity. But any one of the parties or of the strong
factions within them may vote in the initial bal-
loting for one of its own members. One of the
candidacies thus posed, perhaps originating as a
temporizing measure, may survive and finally win
while seemingly stronger candidates fall at unex-
pected hurdles.
Incumbent President Saragat at 73 could be
re-elected. He apparently has supporters in every
Data of Election 28 June 1946
Winner
Party
Winning Ballot
Percent of Vote
Major Rivals
Principal
Previous Posts
PREVIOUS ITALIAN PRESIDENTS
10-11 May 1948 28 April 1955
VA A
Enrico De Nicola (59)
(Liberal Democratic)
First
80
None
President Chamber
Deputies 1920-23
2-6 May 1962
16-28 December 1964
Luigi Einaudi (74)
Giovanni Gronchi (68)
Antonio Segni (71)
Giuseppe Saragat (66)
(Liberal)
(Christian Democrat)
(official Christian
(Social Democrat)
Democratic candidate)
Fourth
Fourth
Ninth
21st
57.5
78.8
51.8
67
Carlo Sforza (official
Cesare Merzagora (official
Giuseppe Saragat
Giovanni Leone (official
Christian Democratic
Christian Democratic
(Social Democrat)
Christian Democratic
candidate)
candidate)
candidate)
V. E. Orlando (Liberal)
Luigi Einaudi (Liberal)
Amintore Fanfani
(Christian Democrat)
Pietro Nonni (Socialist)
Governor Bank of Italy
President Chamber
Deputies 1948-53
Prime arid foreign
minister
Foreign minister
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major party. Saragat's record in office allays fears
that he would try to wield undue power.
Among other possibilities, Sandro Pertini, a
75-year-old Socialist, is president of the Chamber
of Deputies, a post that Presidents De Nicola and
Gronchi also held. Republican Ugo La MaIfa is
much mentioned but seems too conservative and
business oriented to win. Other Christian Demo-
crats, such as the centrist Paolo Taviani, Mariano
Rumor, who leads the International Organization
of Christian Democrats, or Giulio Andreotti, the
leader of the Christian Democrats in the
Chamber of Deputies, have their hopes too.
Special Interests
There is a suspicion among Italians that par-
ticular interest groups, some foreign, have an in-
fluence in the choice of the Italian president. For
example, some candidates have shown concern
for Washington's views. On the other hand, a
reputation for being the candidate having the
closest rapport with US political leaders has never
provided Italian presidential candidates with the
margin of victory. In 1948, for example, Foreign
Minister Carlo Sforza was the loser although he
was described as the pro-US candidate and was
the official candidate of the Christian Democrats.
In 1955, Giovanni Gronchi, the winner, was seen
to be one of the candidates having the worst
relations with Washington.
There is also little evidence to support the
view, frequently held in Italy, that the Vatican
has an effective veto over the choice of president.
The first two presidents, although Catholic, were
linked to anticlerical Liberal parties and the third
was Communist-supported and therefore an im-
probable Vatican choice. While the victor in
1962, Antonio Segni, was strongly religious, the
currcrit president, Giuseppe Saragat, renounced
church-going at an early age. The Vatican, none-
theless, is sometimes able to sway individuals. In
1964, Christian Democrat Fanfani maintained his
candidacy against the official Christian Demo-
cratic candidate until the Vatican newspaper
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called publicly for his withdrawal in an effort to
eliminate the split of Christian Democratic votes.
Fanfani then withdrew quickly, although he had
previously ref u:ed requests from fellow party
leaders to do so.
Presidential aspirants have naturally sought
support among functional sectors of the Italian
populace just as they have among the political
parties. Their campaigning with management,
labor, and farmers' organizations, however, has
been largely out of the public view, and it is
difficult to ascertain what direct influence these
groups may have had on the members of the
Electoral College. The business interests of the
country have tended to avoid open engagement in
the presidential contests. Just the same, their sup-
port may have been decisive the victory in
1962 of Luigi Einaudi, who was then governor of
the Bank of Italy, the most influential economic
post in the country. In 1955, on the other hand,
the big economic interests failed when they sup-
ported Cesare Merzagora, a former director gen-
eral of the Pirelli rubber complex and a defender
of the interests of north Italian industry.
The Italian Communist Party is another mat-
ter. Presidential candidates of the party or its
friends have never received serious consideration,
but the party has supported the winning candi-
date in three of the five contests. Its vote was
probably not decisive in the first presidentia' elec-
tion which was almost unanimous. But in 1955
Gronchi's basic support came from the left half of
the political spectrum with the Communist role
essential. Relatively conservative elements jumped
on the band wagon at the last moment. In 1964
the Communists played an even more dramatic
part. For 12 ballots the party voted for a favorite
son and for eight ballots for the hopeless candi-
dacy of a veteran Socialist. Behind the scenes,
leaders of the Communist Party's right and left
wings argued the relative merits of Christian
Democrat Fanfani and Social Democrat Saragat.
The leader of the party's right wing, Giorgio
Amendola, finally triumphed, giving victory to
Saragat on the 21st ballot. Almost all presidential
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candidates today openly court Communist
Party backing.
Presidential Powers
Whether the president ought to be a figure-
head, subservient to the cabinet, or a person exer-
cising substantive executive powers has been a
subject of controversy since the establishment of
the Republic. The five men who have occupied
the presidential office over the past 25 years have
themselves had different concepts ot the office,
with some tending toward the exercise of consid-
erable power and others disdaining an activist
role.
The intention of the constitution makers
seems to have been to make the president a bal-
ance wheel, a role in which he would not deter-
mine policy or intervene in day-to-day govern-
mental activities. Instead, he would represent the
country in a formal sense, put the final seal of
approval on legislation, and maintain the proper
balance between the branches of government. For
this last purpose, the constitution gave more
power:, to the president in the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial fields than is normal in West
European parliamentary governments.
In' a ministerial crisis, the president selects
the man who will form the next government,
although his choice must later be approved by
Pafflament. This power is considerably meat(
than that of the British monarch, because Italian
party structure produces a number of possible
prime ministers - designate while British parties
normally have only one. The chief of state's com-
mand of the armed forces is a normal attribute
under the parliamentary system. In Italy he is also
president of the Supreme Defense Council. This is
a policy-making body that includes the prime
minister, the chief of staff, and the ministers of
foreign affairs, defense, industry, commerce, and
treasury.
The president promulgates the laws as in
other parliamentary systems, but the Italian presi-
Special Report
-6
dent may refuse to do so and ask Parliament to
reconsider. He must then promulgate the law in
question only if the chambers reapprove it. As in
other systems he can call Parliament into special
session, dissolve it, and call for new elections, or
refuse to dissolve it when requested. The implicit
threat of such actions has in the past contributed
greatly to the personal power of the post.
In addition, the president has the potential
for extensive power in the scandal-ridden area of
the administration of justice. He is president of
the Supreme Court of Justice and under certain
circumstances has the right of amnesty and par-
don.
The specific constitutional grant of powers
to the president is substantial and no incumbent
thus far has used this grant in its totality. The
first and second presidents in retrospect seem to
have been self-denying. The third and fourth pres-
idents were the most expansive, while incumbent
President Saragat has followed a moderate line.
Several who have held the office have demon-
strated that certain power-building techniques not
growing directly out of constitutional powers are
available to the president.
The first pi esident, Enrico De Nicola, was
intent on emphasizing the symbolic nature of the
presidency. He felt that he had an obligation to
see justice done but that he must avoid open
polemics. Consequently, he threatened to resign
"for reasons of health" several times during his
short tenure when his views were being disre-
garded. Since his resignation was considered un-
desirable, he succeeded in increasing the weight
given to his political opinions.
The second president, Luigi Einaudi, was less
self-effacing than De Nicola. He was not only
inclined to greater pomp and ceremony but used
his constitutional powers more fully as well. On
three occasions in 1949-50 he refused to promul-
gate legislation and sent it back to Parliament for
review. Einaudi's broader interpretation was made
easier when the dominant political figure of the
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postwar period, Alcide De Gaspari, left the scene
in 1953. In appointing the successor to De Gas-
pari, Einaudi omitted the customary consulta-
tions with political party chiefs and announced
his choice to the press, stating, "The Constitution
does not speak of consultations and trusts the
judgment of the Chief of State."
It remained for Giovanni Gronchi to awaken
Italian politicians to the considerable power po-
tential of the presidential office. At the outset of
his term, Gronchi announced a new concept of
the presidency?one that would lend greater em-
phasis to the prerogatives of the post. His in-
augural address, unlike the short, ritualistic
speech delivered by Einaudi, was a dramatic pro-
nouncement of views on future government
policy, both domestic and foreign. It had wide
impact and was interpreted as an indication that
Gronchi intended to participate in the administra-
tive and political machinery of Italy to the fullest
extent allowed him under the Constitution.
He did not, in fact, go that far, although he
assumed a principal role as spokesman in foreign
affairs. He also took a more active role than his
predecessor in the legislative process. Whereas an
intermediary had presented bills to Einaudi for
promulgation, Gronchi insisted that they be
brought to him personally by the responsible min-
isters for discussion, and he set aside several days
each week for the purpose.
Gronchi's development of presidential
powers reached its peak during a prolonged minis-
terial crisis in early 1960. His decisions in connec-
tion with the crisis were given much of the blame
for serioul put:Ai- rioting at the time. Some critics
accused the president of favoring a pro-fascist
orientation for the government, while others ac-
cused him of moving the country to the left
under cover of a rightist-oriented cabinet. In any
case, at a critical moment for Italian democracy
all observers agreed for the first time that the
occupant of the Quirinale was one of the coun-
try's key political figures. But in the aftermath of
the crisis, it became clear that his activism had
spoiled his chances for re-election.
The fourth president, Antonio Segni, had
the most expansive view of presidential power. He
intervened in every branch of the administration,
always with a pessimistic view of the stability of
the Republic and an apparent sense of his own
indispensability. Gradually he became sick, physi-
cally and perhaps mentally. The report of a parlia-
mentary commission of inquiry, published this
year, has denied that Segni was preparing a coup
d'etat in June-July 1964, but concern was wide-
spread at that time because he consulted daily
with the .chief of the carabinieri, the strong man
of the period. Full development of the fourth
president's concept of his office was cut short
when Segni suffered a stroke on 8 August 1964.
He resigned in December, making way for Presi-
dent Saragat.
In the aftermath of concern over Segni s
possible plotting, political leaders questioned the
propriety of presidential consultations with the
military. Most concluded that the president has a
right to keep himself informed but that he should
do so in a balanced and temperate way. There was
general agreement that the president's rights as an
Italian citizen included his right to express him-
self and that he is therefore free to comment
politically.
The fifth president, incumbent Giuseppe
Saragat, has made extensive use of his freedom to
comment. Few days of his seven-year term have
passed without some public expression from the
Quirinale. In general, Saragat's political activity
has been influential and moderating, particularly
during ministerial crises. He has been subject to
considerably less criticism than either Segni or
Gronchi. This is partly because of his realism,
which led him to comment earlier this year that
the power to dissolve Parliament was one that
might be employed for modest polidcal advantage
in other countries but which he could use only in
extreme circumstances.
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The Backdrop of Gamut Issues
Whatever his predisposition toward a mini-
mum or maximum exercise of his prerogatives,
the new president will take office at a time when
three issues in particular are roiling the constantly
changing surface of Italian public affairs. The
economy is in a decline, the neo-fdscists have
been getting sttorger, and a referendum is sched-
uled next year on the divorce law recently passcd
by Parliament.
The country's annual rate of real economic
growth averaged 5.6 percent annually in the years
following immediate postwar reconstruction, i.e.,
1952-1970. Even southern Italy, long an area of
notorious poverty, saw its per capita income rise
from $200 to $1,000. Economic growth has been
a strong stabilizing factor in the political area.
This year's precipitous decline in the growth rate
was caused by the low level cf over-all demand
combined with strike-induced production disrup-
tion. It has startled and frightened Italian leaders.
Every month that the slowdown continues will
po:-,e increasingly strong pressures on the govern-
ment.
Italy's neo-fascists are a small party but
they are disturbing to Italian leaders because of
the memories thcw evoke of the Mussolini era.
The party made gains on a law-and-order platform
in off-year local elections in sou-Li:ern Italy last
June. Uncertainty as to the cause of the stronger
showing increases uneasiness among the center-
left leaders. The gains are variously attributed to
the drive and skill of a new neo-fascist chief,
Giorgio Almirante, a craving for law and order,
dissatisfaction with the Christian Democratic
record in the particular areas involved, and nos-
talgia for the world of 30 years ago.
The referendum scheduled for the first half
of next year on divorce is a matter of concern to
the leader: of all the political parties, even to the
Christian Democrats, who alone with the neo-
fascists opposed the legislation. All other parties
favored it. The Christian Democrats did not want
Special Report
to take ..- public stance in opposition to the Vati-
can's condemnation of the proposed law as im-
moral. For this reason, the Christian Democrats
did not participate in debates over the bill. Mod-
ifications that would have made the bill more
dcceptable to them, including certain protection
for the children of the divorced, were not in-
cluded in the law. The Christian Democrats do
not want a referendum because they do not want
to campaign side by side with the neo-fascists in
opposition to their colleagues of the center-left.
This would be especially true if parliamentary
elections were impending.
The other parties do not want the refer-
endum because they fear the work of passing a
divorce law that has already consumed an inordi-
nate amount of legislative time might have to be
started again. On top of the other problems con-
nected with the referendum is the fact that the
Communists want to establish a precedent of
working with the Christian Democrats in back-
stage give-and-take on major legislation. They
would like to discuss various modifications in the
law with the idea of negotiating a compromise
that the two parties could pass in Parliament
without regard for other parties of the left or
right. Some say the Communists would support
for the presidency the Christian Democrat who
would agree to such discussions. The Socialists as
well as the Social Democrats and Republicans are
particularly concerned at this possibility.
ihe new president is likely to be under con-
siderable pressure to call early parliamentary elec-
tions in ot der to postpone the referendum on
divorce. The elections do not have to be held by
law until 1973. All operations connected with a
referendum are suspended automatically when
the chief of state calls elections for Parliament. A
referendum cannot be held until one year after
the proclamation of the new legislature. Such a
postponement may seem very attractive to the
government.
-9-
At the same time, the new president would
have to weigh the possible effect of early
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elections on the strength of the neo-fascists as
well as the electoral impact of the oconomic slow-
down. The elections last spring were not in areas
representative of the whole nation, but tha Chris-
tian Democrats, who lost almost one percent on
the mainland and close to eight percent in Sicily,
are conzerned that a nationwide trend may be
running against them. As the chief party in
power, they could expect to suffer additional
losses because of the worsening of the economic
situation. In any case, the neo-fascist gains last
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spring, which were mostly at the expense of the
Liberals arid Monarchists, would almost certainly
find an echo n national parliamentary elections.
The new president will not lack problems,
nor popular anxieties that could push him toward
assuming greater responsibility. If he is inclined to
use his constitutional powers, he can turn out to
be one of Italy's most prominent and influential
figures.
25X1
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