WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT URUGUAY'S ELECTIONS: TRADITION VS. THE LEFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030041-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: November 12, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Uruguay's Elections: Tradition vs. the Left
OSIR FRE COPY
ilETUrill TO 1E-61
Secret
N?. 642
12 November 1971
No. 0396/71B
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Political placidity and a practically uninterrupted tradition of democratic
practices have typified 20th century Uruguay. Today, however, the country finds
itself grappling with Latin America's most formidable terrorist movement and a
third-force political coalition, the Frente Amplio, that hopes to emulate Allende's
victory in Chile. The 28 November presidential election pits the incumbent Colorado
Party, headed by the hard-lining rightist Presideni Pacheco, against its traditional
rivals, the Blancos, and the new leftist coalition. After more than 100 years of
Colorado and Blanco rule, the Frente is attempting what would literally be, in
Uruguayan terms, the upset of the century.
The government's stumbling record has given the left cause for optimism. The
administration has lost ground to the Tupamaro guerrillas, and the moderate
economic growth of the past two years has been bought at considerable political
cost. Further, Uruguay's political system has institutionalized factional politics, and
the strong-willed President has added to the disarray by seeking a constitutional
amendment that would permit him a second consecutive term. With the Blancos
fielding no odds-on favorite candidate, the specter is raised of a tight three-way race
of the type that allowed Chile's Allende to squeeze to victory. The Frente, sup-
ported by the terrorist Tupamaros, is hoping that, by offering an alternative to the
traditional parties, it will be able to take advantage of the general disgruntlement
with the country's lack of direction.
The Frente, is likely to fall considerably short in its first bid to overturn the
establishment. The complex electoral system heavily favors the two major parties,
and the Frente is not likely to woo voters from Bianco and Colorado strongholds in
the interior where party ties are strong. This should again allow the Colorados and
Blancos to dominate the national vote, with the incumbent Colorados being con-
ceded a slight edge over their traditional rival's. The Frente bid, which will be
stronger in the important contests in the capital, makes it apparent that the
country's long-term economic decline is edging toward a political crisis which must
be confronted with new attitudes and new policies. The Communist-backed Frente
should be able to establish itself as a viable third force that?like te terrorist
activities of the formidable Tupamaro guerrilla organization?will serve as a reminder
that reliance upon custom and tradition will no longer be sufficient to meet a
growing challenge.
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The Setting
Uruguay, with a proud heritage of a prosper-
ous and thriving economy and a smoothly func-
tioning two-party political system, has fallen
upon hard times. The difficulties began to appear
during the 1950s, when the cost of a massive
public welfare system began to overburden an
essentially pastoral economy. Earnings began to
fall as meat and wool, the principal export com-
modities, suffered from fluctuating prices, dwin-
dling world markets, and an overvalued exchange
rate. Inefficient government enterprises and the
failure to increase productivity commensurate
with higher levels of spending contributed to the
pinch. Successive administrations found it more
expedient to pay 'need to politics rather than
economics and opted for continued spending
rather than fiscal responsibility. Budget deficits, a
spiraling cost of living, and stagnating per capita
gross domestic product characterized the eco-
nomic picture in the 1960s. Inflation picked up
speed and prices rose 1,600 percent between
1963 and 1969, peaking at an annual rate of 165
percent in the first half of 1968.
The economic distress inevitably gave rise to
political unease. Many Uruguayans yearned for
the peace and prosperity of yesteryear. Dis-
satisfied youth began to question whether
progress would ever come via the creaking
Uruguayan machinery. The startling anj dramatic
rise of the Tupamaros in the late 1960s gave
further urgency to re-examination of traditional
practices.
Early in this century, the father of Uru-
guay's modern political institutions and architect
of its social reforms, Jose Bathe y Ordonez, lob-
bied vigorously in favor of a system of shared
executive power via a plural presidency. From
1918 onward, the country experimented with
varieties of a curtailed executive system or "rule
by committee." In periods of calm and prosperity
the system functioned?tolerably if not effi-
Special Report
3
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ciently?but it proved unable to cope with crises.
In the 1950s the foundering prompted a search
for new solutions. A nine-man Council of Govern-
ment system was adopted in 1951, but it pro-
vided little relief. In 1958 and again in 1962 the
voters turned from the Colorados, who had held
power for 93 consecutive years, to their tradi-
tional rivals, the Blancos. The Blancos fared no
better, and in 1966 the voters scrapped the coun-
cil and adopted a single presidential system,
returning the Colorados to power at the same
time.
While the voters experimented with specific
mechanisms for governing the country, the
unique system designed to ensure the dominance
of the Colorado and Blanco parties continued to
function. The system recognizes the legal and
separate existence of factions within a party and
allows them to field candidates and gain repre-
sentation while remaining officially under the
party banner. The presidential election combines
both a primary and general contest in which the
most-voted candidate of the most-voted party
wins. In 1966 the victorious Gestido-Pacheco
ticket was one of several slates of differing ideo-
logical persuasions fielded by the Colorados.
Pacheco 's Troubled Presidency
Jorge Pacheco Areco succeeded to the presi-
dency in 1967 on the death of retired General
Oscar Gestido. Pacheco was generlIly considered
to be a dull, colorless, and mediocre running mate
for Gestido, but he approached his inherited post
with determination and dedication. As President
he moved forcefully in both tho economic and
political spheres, and recorded several midterm
successes.
By the use of restrictive controls his admin-
istration slowed the near-ruinous inflation that
raged during much of the period from 1955
through 1967. Efforts in 1968 to trim wage
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12 November 1971
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150
Uruguay: Cost of Living
Real GDP Per Capita
1960 =100
100
50t
1965 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70
increases and a subsequent devaluation were fol-
lowed by more stringent wage and price freezes
distasteful to both labor unions and the general
public. The cost-of-living index was held down to
a 14-percent rise in 1969 and to 20 percent in
1970, but Pacheco got little mileage out of it. He
failed to publicize the positive aspects of the
program or to consult with other political leaders
so as to emphasize the national, bipartisan aspects
of the administration's policies.
This has been a continuing weakness during
Pacheco's tenure. His term has been a one-man
show. Political compromise has been an all but
alien art. The cabinet has had no continuity;
ministerial changes have averaged at least iwo a
month and totaled more than 60 since 1967. The
administration is identifiable not by a coherent
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1960 =100
1965 '66
3,600
3.200
2,800
2,400
2,000
1,600
1,200
800
I i i 1400
'67 '68 '69 '70
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program, but by the personal policies of its
President.
Relations with the legislature, which has
opposed many of these policies, have been
stormy. The congress, accustomed to deference
and a position almost coequal with the president,
reacted defensively to Pacheco's rough tactics.
Matters nearly reached the breaking point on sev-
eral occasions although the legislature usually
backed off at the implied threat that Pacheco,
supported by the military, might close the con-
gress and rule by decree. The ill-feeling gave rise
to an abortive congressional attempt this year to
impeach the President for allegedly overstepping
his constitutional authority in ignoring legislative
wishes and imposing emergency security meas-
ures.
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The President's obstinacy, as defined by his
critics, or his determination, according to his sup-
porters, has been put to its severest test over his
public-order policies. In this area, Pacheco has
suffered his most serious setbacks, yet he has
made and staked a political reputation on the
issue of law and order.
The government's reaction to unrest, and
specifically to the terrorism of the Tupamaros,
has been vigorous but woefully inadequate to the
task. Bypassing the legislature, Pacheco has made
liberal use of emergency security measures that
suspend certain constitutional provisions. When
the wave of spectacular Tupamaro kidnapings
began in 1968, Pacheco became the first Latin
American leader to refuse to negotiate. He has
not budged from this public stance. The govern-
ment, however, has failed to wrest the initiative
from the guerrillas and has suffered frequent pub-
lic embarrassment at their hands. Most recently,
in September, the terrorists staged a mass jail-
break of 106 of their fellows, including all of the
top leaders imprisoned by the government over
the last three years. As an additional insult, the
guerrillas freed their hostage of eight months,
British Ambassador Jackson, saying there were
"no longer any prisoners whose safety his deten-
tion had guaranteed." The Tupamaros still hold
four Uruguayan captives, including a close adviser
to the President whom they have senhnced to
"life imprisonment."
The President's reaction to the September
debacle was characteristic of his hard line.
Pledging his own life in the battle, Pacheco trans-
ferred responsibility for dealing with the terrorists
from the police to the army, but the measures
adopted have not yet had encouraging results.
Nonetheless, Pacheco's unyielding deter-
mination in the face of adversity has won him a
degree of respect from the electorate and a meas-
ure of popular support. Most of the blame for the
reverses suffered by the administration in its
counterterrorism campaign have been attributed
to the inefficiency and corruption of the govern-
ment machine rather than to him personally.
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If necessary at the cost of my own life, I will lift this
country out of the situation it is currently facing.
From now on, more than ever, the administration,
the decision making, and the responsibility for the
state will be mine and mine alone.
President Pacheco, 11 Sept. 1971,
following Tuparmaro mass jail break.
12 November 1971
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In sum, Pacheco's inflexibility has been both
strength and weakness. Persistent efforts in the
economic sphere brought Uruguay back from the
brink of economic chaos in 1968, but no early
end is predicted for the financial squeeze. The
stabilization program has been a political mill-
stone. The respect occasioned by Pacheco's tough
stand on terrorism is balanced off by the absence
of sorely needed national political leadership.
The Colorados?On the Right
Pacheco's close-to-the-vest style and his re-
luctance to consider or consult others have gov-
erned his relations with his own party as well. For
example, only in the closing months of the cur-
rent campaign did he reveal his decision to seek
re-election. That decision and his choice of a
running mate were made without party consulta-
tions.
The re-election effort, via a constitutional
amendment permitting a second consecutive
term, is sponsored by the Unity and Reform
faction, probably the strongest single group in the
Colorado Party. The theme of its campaign,
"Pacheco or Chaos," accurately reflects Pacheco's
presidential philosophy. To take account of the
possibility that the amendment may fail, Pacheco
has named a stand-in candidate, Agriculture Min-
ister Bordaberry. A citizen will vote yes or no on
a constitutional amendment, mark one ballot that
will include Pacheco, and a second Flate that will
list Bordaberry instead. The second will be valid if
the amendment fails.
The President's last-minute unilateral
decision to tap Bordaberry for the alternate slot
triggered several high-level defections, including
Vice President Abdala and several cabinet offi-
cials. Those in opposition to Bordaberry cited his
former membership in the Blanco Party and his
lack of real Colorado credentials. Here again, the
President's brusque style cost him an opportunity
to capitalize fully on both his and an alternate's
strength.
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The tuincoats are likely to take the bulk of
their supporters into other Colorado groups
rather than to the Blancos or Frente. The Colora-
dos will be fielding four other candidates. Jorge
Bathe, head of the long-prominent Bathe political
clan and a well-known newspaper publisher of
moderate political persuasion, is Pacheco's prin-
cipal Colorado rival. He has a strong base of
support in his powerful List-15 faction and is
running with another widely respected Colorado
politician in the vice-presidential slot. Previously,
his presidential aspirations have been foiled by an
inability to expand his appeal beyond this solid
base. In the final weeks of the campaign, Bathe's
strategy will be to attempt to convince Colorados
who name Pacheco on their primary ballot to
choose him rather than the officially anointed
Bordaberry as a second choice.
The Vasconcellos' "third-front" ticket can-
not compete with the Bathe or Pacheco machines.
The Vasconcellos' slate opposes the Pacheco
administration policies across the board and,
therefore, furnishes an important escape valve for
liberal Colorado votes that might otherwise be
lost to Blanco and Frente appeals. The final
Colorado candidate, retired General Juan Ribas,
has made a big publicity splash but is unlikely to
score heavily with the voters. He is competing
with better known names for the law and order
vote.
The New Left Frente Amplio
With the Colorados staked out on the right
of the political spectrum in this election, the
Frente Amplio (Broad Front) has emerged as a
counterforce on the left. Opposing Pacheco at
every turn, the Frente contends that the blame
for the country's ills rests with the sterile, cor-
rupt, and inefficient system that has given the
voters only a choice between do-nothing look
a I i kes, the tweedledum Colorados and the
tweedledee Blancos.
The left, principally the Communists,
recognized the growing manifestations of
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uneasiness?the search for new governing mechan-
isms, the turn to the Blancos in 1958, and the
dramatic rise of the Tupamaro organization since
1968. Especially in its earlier years, that terrorist
organization skillfully parlayed vague disgruntle-
ment into popular sympathy in the battle against
what was portrayed as government corruption.
The fledgling Frente effort hopes to harness that
same frustration and disenchantment.
Efforts by the left to effect election coali-
tions date back to the 1950s but have gained only
minimal _success. In 1966 the Communist Leftist
Liberation Front (FIDEL) attracted only six per-
cent of the vote. The Communists failed to
expand their role beyond a limited ideological
following, and "front" ploys were generally rec-
ognized as tactical smoke screens. Respectable
groups on the left, such as the Christian Demo-
crats, shied away from such alliances, fearful of
Communist contamination and domination.
This apprehension was eased by the victory
of Allende's united front in Chile. The Commu-
nist Party of Uruguay held out the prospect of a
coalition including "Marxists and non-Marxists
alike," and an independent group of intellectuals
took the lead in calling for unity late last year.
The Christian Democrats were also outspoken
advocates of the need for a coalition. Thus, the
Frente Amplio came into being in February. The
coalition includes the Communists, Christian
Democrats, Socialists, Independents, the Revolu-
tionary Movement of Uruguay, and several rene-
gade factions from the Blancos and Colorados.
Sony, dissidents left the major parties more
because of oppnrtunism than any other factor.
Ex-Colorado Senator Michelini joined the Frente
as his weight within Colorado Party councils was
diminishing, partly as a result of the drop in his
vote between the 1962 and 1966 elections. He
envisions a role for himself as the foremost leader
of the non-Communist elements of the Frente,
but when he bolted he suffered defections from
his group. Others shed their party labels more
from ideological conviction and distress at
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Pacheco's brand of leadership. They, too, did not
pull major segments from the traditional parties.
Even the Christian Democrats were not able to
lure all of their adherents into the Frente fold,
and their offshoot Radical Christian Union is
fielding its own presidential candidate. The
Frente, however, is counting on a huge protest
vote to swell its following.
The Communists, although maintaining a
low public profile, are supplying the money,
drive, and organization for the Frente. Although
the former independent groups and major party
dissidents optimistically claim that the election
results will allow the democratic forces in the
Frente to emerge as the controlling force, their
confidence is contradicted by such examples as
the formation of the Frente's central and coor-
dinating committees earlier this year which
showed that only the Communist Party was capa-
ble of stocking all of the committees with per-
sonnel. The party's large organization?aboui
40,000 members in one of South America's small-
est nations?its financial resources, and its na-
tional political network make its domination of
leftist groupings very likely.
The various factions of the Frente are run-
ning separate slates for the Senate and the Cham-
ber of Deputies, and the squabbling over potential
political spoils, added to the differences natural in
such a mixed ideological bag, have put a strain on
unity. Nothing however, currently threatens the
breakup of the Frente. To foster the unity image,
the Frente is putting up a single presidential can-
didate, the left-leaning, retired General Liber
Seregni. Seregni was a capable soldier, sometimes
described as brilliant, whose rumored "pro-Com-
munist" political beliefs and political aspirations
led to his retirement from the military. He filled
the Frente need for a non-Communist com-
promise candidate.
Seregni has handled himself well in public,
and the Frente has concentrated on attacking
Pacheco's policies. It contends that it can halt the
terrorist violence and emphasizes that the country
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