WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SADAT'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS -- THE DE-NASIRIZATION OF EGYPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Sadat's Domestic Programs-- The De-Nasirization of Egypt
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Secret
N9 604
7 January 1972
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Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO08
Sadat's
Domestic
Programs
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Former War Minister Fawzi, a Victim of Sadat's May Purge
When Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency
of Egypt in October 1970, he inherited a govern-
ment that had been shaped by the overwhelming
personality of Nasir during the 16 years he served
as Egypt's leader. The government and party ap-
paratus reflected Nasir's thinking and style; it was
composed of persons installed by him and loyal
to him. Sadat, in the early months of his rule, was
preoccupied with shoring up his position and was
too weak to effect radical changes in government
or party.
Changes in governing style were quickly ap-
parent, however. Nasir's unquestioned control
over the activities of the government and party
had been reflected in the many roles he played-
president, prime minister, commander in chief of
the armed forces, and head of Egypt's sole legal
political organization, the Arab Socialist Union.
After his death, responsibility was parceled out to
the fallen leader's principal heirs and no single
individual was able to speak with Nasir's author-
ity. Greater use of official consultative arrange-
ments was made, and Sadat frequently conferred
with both the cabinet and the Socialist Union.
This collegial arrangement was relative!y
short-lived. The "conspiracy" of April-May 1971
Special Report
resulted in the purge of virtually all those indi-
viduals with whom Sadat had been by force of
circumstance sharing authority. Although firm
evidence of a coup attempt against the President
has never been produced, there apparently was a
move to restrict Sadat's growing tendency toward
unilateral decision-making and to reaffirm the
principle of collegial rule. The challenge was
thwarted, however.
Those implicated included a number of the
most powerful members of the government, the
Socialist Union, and the public media. They were
arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison terms of
up to life at hard labor. Sadat used the opportu-
nity to implement even more far-reaching
changes. Under the banner of eliminating the
"center of power," he proceeded with a wide-
ranging restructuring of the government and party
apparatus. Many of the changes were radical de-
partures from the Nasir era, and they marked the
beginning in earnest of the de-Nasirization of
Egypt.
Policy Changes
Nasir paid lip service to democratic princi-
ples, but the repressive nature of his regime was
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Sadat Burning Telephone Tap Files in May 1971
apparent to all and caused much unhappiness.
Sadat has sought to broaden his popular appeal
by repudiating many of the totalitarian controls
common under Nasir. He makes frequent refer-
ence to the rule of law and the safeguarding of
individual rights. He has declared sequestration-
government seizure of private property, widely
practiced by Nasir-illegal without a court order.
Egypt's judiciary has been given a new measure of
independence. Most political prisoners detained
during the Nasir era have been released. Travel
restrictions have been eased. A dramatic public
burning of the files derived from tapes made by
government eavesdroppers was staged to under-
score Sadat's commitment to a society free from
some of the repressions of the past. These
measures have struck a responsive chord among
Egyptians and have given a discernible boost to
Sadat's popularity. Sadat's pledges of increased
civil liberties are, however, tempered by his prac-
tice of "paternalistic authority." Many individual
civil rights are still far from secure. As illustrated
by his crackdown on those implicated in the May
"conspiracy," Sadat is alert to any challenge to
his authority. He dealt firmly with an unauthor-
ized workers strike at the Helwan industrial
complex in August and cracked down hard on a
strike by taxi drivers in November.
Special Report
Sadat's new order is apparent in the way he
has addressed Egypt's econ-mic problems. He an-
nounced a "Plan of National Action," one goal of
which is to dcuble the national income within ten
years. In September he issued a series of decrees
which, in sharp contrast to Nasirist practice, are
designed to attract foreign private capital. Foreign
investment was made more attractive by the crea-
tion of "free zones" for industrial development
where many of the multitudinous financial regula-
tions in force elsewhere will not apply. A new
foreign trade and development hank was formed
and has already attracted some foreign funds.
Other features of the economic program envision
decentralization of the state's industrial bureauc-
racy and a system of incentive payments. Raises
in pay, allowances, and pensions are also planned.
There is an obvious attempt to reap political
capital involved here, but Sadat doubtless sin-
cerely hopes that these actions will stimulate
Egypt's economic development[
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During his later years, Nasir appeared to lack
the interest to deal effectively with Egypt's mani-
fold social problems. Sadat has focused attention
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Nasir to People's Assembly, 21 January 1969
"I want you to know that the military front must
be our main preoccupation. Everything else can
wait."
Sadat to Arab Socialist Union, 23 July 1971
"While we are thinking about the battle we must
develop education. While we are living in the battle
we must develop our services.... The military battle
should not hamper our construction in every field."
on i:ie need to correct the nation's social ills. One
aspect of his National Action program is a broad
offensive against the problems facing rural
Egyptians. Improvements in health, education,
and social welfare are envisaged in order to bring
the country's vill~ages into the mainstream of
Egyptian life. To date, little has been accom-
plished in spite of Sadat's increased attention to
these problems, and effective solutions will be
difficult to develop.
In addition to policy changes, Sadat has
made a number of revisions in the political frame-
work of the country. Nasir had frequently prom-
ised the Egyptian people a permanent constitu-
tion but had deferred its promulgation until, as he
put it, the adverse effects of the 1967 conflict
with Israel had been eliminated. President Sadat
viewed the promulgation of such a document as a
useful element in his campaign to win popular
support and strengthen his domestic position.
Therefore, following the purge of May 1971, he
declared himself in favor of drafting such a
document. The resulting constitution was ap-
proved by popular referendum on 11 September.
Special Report
Sadat's public repudiations of the totali-
tarian excesses prevalent during the Nasir era are
codified in the new constitution. The new docu-
ment emphasizes the rule of law and the safe-
guarding of individual rights, and in those areas it
differs substantially from the provisional constitu-
tion that had been in effect since 1964. Even so,
loopholes remain and the full development of
personal liberties in Egypt is still some way off.
Although freedom of religion is guaranteed in one
constitutional article, others stipulz,te that Islam
is the religion of the state. Religious (i.e., Islamic)
education is a required subject in the nation's
school system, and the Islamic Sharia (body of
laws) is a main source of legislation. Citizens are
entitled to form societies, but only in the pre-
scribed manner. The new national code also
provides for a nominal balance of powers between
the judicial legislative, and executive branches,
but the balance appears weighted in favor of the
president. The many presidential prerogatives in-
clude the appointment and removal of vice presi-
dents. cabinet members, civil se;-vants, and mili-
tary personnel. Under special circumstances, the
president may issue decisions having the fore of
law. Nevertheless, the incease in theoretical
power that the constitution grants to the nation's
parliament, plus its greater emphasis on civil
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liberties, marks it as a generally more positive
document.
Government Apparatus Restructured
In his efforts to rid the government of ele-
ments associated with those implicated in the
May "conspiracy" and to shape it more closely to
his own ruling style, Sadat has made a series of
changes in the machinery of government. The role
of tine presidency in governmental supervision was
strengthened by the creation of six presidential
advisory bodies, staffed by trusted associates of
Sadat. The precise power relationship between
the advisers, the cabinet, and the other organs of
government is not yet clear. It is probably in-
tended that the advisers will assist Sadat in formu-
lating policies that will then be carried out by the
cabinet. Four different cabinets were formed
during Sadat's first year in office as he consoli-
dated his grip on the presidency and as his con-
cept of government continued to develop. The
first two cabinet shifts came shortly after Nasir's
death, while the third and fourth were imple-
mented following the May purge. The latter two
resulted in the formation of cabinets the most
notable feature of which was allegiance to Presi-
dent Sadat.
Special Report
An anecdote currently delighting Egyptians has
Sadat's chauffeur arriving at a crossroads and asking
the President for instructions. "Which way did Nasir
usually go?" asked Sadat. "He always went to the
left," replied the driver. "Well," answered Sadat,
"signal that you are going to the left and turn im-
mediately to the right."
Egypt's legislative body was included in
Sadat's p.-ogram to revamp the government. The
National Assembly, renamed the People's As-
sembly in mid-1971 to underscore its theoretical
responsiveness t,) the dictates of the people, was
reformed through new elections during October
and November. Egypt's new constitution grants
the 360-member assembly fairly broad preroga-
tives through which it could dominate a weak
chief executive. In theory, the assembly has the
power to investigate the activities of the executive
branch and can withdraw its confidence from a
prime minister or his deputy. It is also able, in
principle, to impeach the president and can over-
ride a presidential veto. The assembly, in practice,
has never seriously challenged the executive on
any important issue. The new powers granted the
assembly have yet to be exercised, and under the
strong leadership of Sadat, the People's Assembly
is likely to remain a center for discussion rather
than decision. The constitution stipulates that in
the event the president is permanently incapaci-
tated, the president of the People's Assembly
instead of the vice president temporarily assumes
presidential duties.
Sadat's efforts to displr y concern for a
greater degree of popular control over the
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Crowd of Supporters at Sadat's Home
workings of the government have also led to
changes in the structure of local government.
Giving widespread publicity to the idea of trans-
ferring authority to the people, Sadat announced
the creation of two new sets of councils at the
provincial level. The People's Councils, which
Sadat has portrayed as miniature legislatures, are
to be constituted from members of the Socialist
Union apparatus, The councils will be charged
with overseeing the implementation of programs
passed by the People's Assembly at the national
level. Similarly, the provincial Executive Councils,
described as diminutive cabinets, are composed of
provincial officials whose job it is to administer
the programs !aid down by the central govern-
ment. Neither of the bodies is expected to do
more than provide an illusion of democratic
process, although Sadat may genuinely hope that
they will somehow stimulate a greater degree of
initiative and responsibility at the provincial level.
He ha:: publicly decried "the terrible centralism"
that characterizes the Egyptian Government and
has expressed the hope that "not every grievance
and complaint will come to Cairo." This charac-
teristic lack of bureaucratic initiative is noted in
the Egyptian proverb, "When a jar is broken in
the province, the minister in Cairo is asked to
approve the breakage."
Special Report
Changes in the Arab Socialist Union
The challenge to Sadat's authority that pre-
cipitated the May purge was mounted from
within the Arab Socialist Union, and the majority
of the union's leadership was subsequently impli-
cated. As a consequence, the organization was
one of the first targets of Sadat's postpurge refor-
mation. Aithough unhappy with the role of the
union, Sadat elected to retain the basic frame-
work of the organization as the "formula on
which all of us must continue to rely in main-
taining the alliance of the people's forces and
practicing our political democracy." New elec-
tions were decreed for all levels of the o'-ganiz3-
tion. In these elections those elements whose
loyalty to Sadat was suspect were skillfully elimi-
nated. The elections, although eliciting more in-
terest than past referendums, were marked by
general indifference. They resulted in little more
than a perfunctory re-establishment of the party
machinery, now bearing Sadat's stamp instead of
Nasir's. Sadat's appointment to the central com-
mittee of 30 members who owe fealty to no one
but Sadat underscores his lack of faith in even a
predetermined election. In addition, Sadat's re-
tention of the post of chairman of the Socialist
Union emphasized his determination to prevent
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the distribution of responsibilities from producing
a ly checks and balances on him.
President Sadat's domestic initiatives have
been hailed in the Egyptian media as "revolu-
tionary," as the signal for launching a modern
Egypt. Far-reaching changes have, in ft(-t, taken
place in a variety of fields since Nasir's death. The
nation's institutions and domestic policies have
been reformed and now accurately reflect the
ideas and aspirations of President Sadat. The aver-
age Egyptian probably does enjoy a greater degree
of civil liberty than he did undar Nasir z.id there
is little doubt that Sadat has creatccd, a freer and
more open atmosphere in Egypt. The paternalistic
authority of the Sadat regime is still there, how.
ever, and the development of a truly democratic
political system is distant. Nasir's legacy in Egypt
remains, hut Sadat's ideas and policies are making
an impact.
Sadat's initiatives have been successful to a
great extent in winning for him the wide support
he was seeking and in helping to divert public
attention from the intractable problem of con-
tinued Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory.
His commitment to end some c the arbitrary
actions of his predecessor is a sou. _a of satisfac-
Special Report
tion to Egypt's moderates. Sadat's moves to en-
courage foreign capital investment have given
hope to those who resented Nasir's policy of
extending state control over the economy. The
moderate image that Sadat projects has won him
the favor of conservative: outside Egypt. One
local businessman in Cairo was recently quoted as
saying, "We have not been so happy for years.
More than 70,000 Saudi Arabians and Kuwaitis
came to spend their money here in Egypt this
summer rather than in Lebanon." In the longer
term the success of Sadat's domestic initiatives
will depend to a great extent on a favorable
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and on the
resources and effort subsequently diverted t
mestic programs. 1_U A
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