WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SOVIET OCEAN SHIPPING: HALF - SPEED AHEAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 21, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040003. &>,
? Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
special Report
Soviet Ocearr Shipping Half-Speed Ahead
Secret
N? 606
21 January n~~1 1972
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SOVIET OCEAN SHIPPING
Half-Speed Ahead
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SOVIET OCEAN SHIPPING: HALF-SPEED AHEAD
The US-Soviet maritime talks commencing in late January highlight the expanding role
of the USSR's foreign shipping activities. Soviet cargo liners are currently servicing most of
the world except the US east coast and Central America. The size and operations of Soviet
shipping have grown steadily over the past decade, reflecting a clear-cut policy decision by
Moscow. The growth has been based on the output of domestic yards and purchases from
foreign suppliers. As a result, the Soviet merchant fleet amounts to about 12 million tons
(deadweight tons, i.e., maximum carrying capacity) and is seventh among world fleets with
nearly four percent of total world tonnage. Although more than two thirds of the ships are
less than ten years old, the Soviet merchant fleet lags far behind the major non-Communist
fleets in both the size and speed of its ships. In addition, much of the Soviet fleet remains
heavily involved in the logistical support of Cuba, North Vietnam, and Egypt, and the
closure of the Suez Canal has diverted tonnage that otherwi'n Would be used to broaden the
USSR's shipping services throughout the world.
During the last decade, the tonnage of the
Soviet fleet tripled with the most rapid growth
taking place in the 1960-65 period. Since that
upsurge, the rate of growth has been halved, and
the 1971-75 plan projects a further reduction in
the rate of increase. Nevertheless, Soviet tonnage
will be more than four times that of 1960 if the
1975 target of 16 million tons is reached.
Deliveries to the fleet during the last plan
(1966-70) were only 90 percent of the target.
"Budget allocations did not permit expansion of
the fleet at the speed d ire
e Movie mer
chant fleet as ranked sevent among maritime
nations since 1964. The USSR may well move
into sixth place by 1975, but there is little pros-
pect for the Soviet fleet to increase its share of
world tonnage in the foreseeable future.
Special Report
21 January 1972
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A 23,000 DWT Zvenigorod-class bulk dry cargo ship
About one third of the new tonnage ac-
quired during the past decade was built in Soviet
yards. Most of the remainder came from Poland,
Yugoslavia, Finland, and East Germany. Of
greater significance is the fact that during the past
five years there has been little change in the size
of the ships delivered to the fleet. The largest
ships now in the Soviet fleet are 50,000-ton tank-
ers and 23,000-ton dry-cargo ships compared with
ships of 370,000 and 165,000 tons respectively in
non-Communist fleets. The size of the USSR's
ships is limited because they are designed pri-
marily to service Soviet ports, few of which cao
handle ships with drafts greater than 32 feet. A
370,000-ton tanker, by way of comparison, re-
quires port facilities with depths exceeding 87
feet.
Special Report
A 50,000 DWT Sofiya-class tanker
Additional limiting factors on the versatility
of the Soviet maritime fleet are comparatively
slow speeds and the lack of advanced container-
ships that the leading maritime nations have had
in service since 1967. No Soviet ships are faster
than 19 knots whereas cargo liners in the US and
Japanese fleets, for example, are operating as fast
as 24 knots, and some containerships being added
to non-Communist fleets have speeds of up to 26
knots. Moscow's containerization program has
lagged consistently, both in terms of ships and
terminals, and until 1971 it had no ships especially
built to carry the small numbers of 20-foot stand-
ard containers moving in Soviet seaborne trade.
Such containers were carried as deck cargo on
conventional dry-cargo ships.
21 January 1972
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A longitudinal view. 8. Plan of the 3rd and 4th floors, (1) 2nd
light deck operations hall. (2+ Service room (3) 2nd light deck
hall, (4) Snack bar (5) Dispatcher's office (b) Roadstead
Service (7) Apparatus storage too n. (8) Radio signal office.
(9) Announcing system, (10) Nursery room (11) Station office
(12) Administrative office (13) Upper tight desk waitinr; hall
(14) Technical office (15) Subsidiary bar space (16) Rostau
rant office. (17) Far (18) 2nd light deck restaurant
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SECRET
Fleet Tonnage
Million Tons
Total
3.9
8.0
11.9
16.0
Absolute Increase
4.1
3.9
4.1
Percentage Increase
109
49
35
Fleet Performance
Billion Ton-milesg/
Total
71.0
209.9
353.8
495.3
Absolute Increase
138.9
143.9
141.5
Percentage Increase
196
69
40
Miliion Tons Carried
Total
75.9
119.3
162.0
204.9
Absolute Increase
43.4
42.7
42.9
Percentage Increase
57
36
26
Average Length of Haul A/
Nautical Miles
Total
935
1,759
2,184
2,417
Absolute increase
824
425
233
Percentage Increase
88
24
11
J Equals tonnage carried multiplied by miles covered.
f Equals ton-miles divided by tannage carried
The performance: of the Soviet fleet in terms
of ton-miles (i.e., tonnage carriea multiplied by
miles covered) increased significantly faster than
fleet capacity during 1966-70. Capacity during
this period grew by almost 50 percent, but the
tons-tniles indicator rose by close to 70 percent.
At tho same time, the volume of cargo carried
increased by only 36 percent. Both of the latter
indicators were below target, however, chiefly
because of the fzilure to meet planned additions
to the fleet.
A major cause of the wide discrepancy be-
tween the rates of increase of ton miles and cargo
volume was the closure of the Suez Canal in
1967. Since then, round-trip sailing time from the
Black Sea to North Vietnam, for example, has
almost doubled-it is now 72 days-and voyages
to other Soviet trading partners east of Suez have
been lengthened similarly. The cumulative effect
of these reroutings has forced the diversion c,f
Special Report
about five percent of total Soviet capacity from
other uses to meet commitments east of Suez.
As recently as 1965, over half of the volume
of cargo carried by the Soviet fleet was in domes-
tic trade. Since that time, however, the handling
of foreign trade cargoes has become predominant,
accounting for 56 percent of total cargo volume
at the end of 1970. In 1970, the volume of cargo
in foreign trade handled by the Soviet fleet was
more than 90 million tons compareG with less
than 60 million tons in 1965. Over-a!I Soviet
seaborne foreign trade, however, increased even
faster during 1956-70-from 100 million tons to
140 million tons. The result was that foreign ships
carried about 13 million more tons of Soviet
cargo in 1970 than in 1965. During the same
period, the Soviet fleet almost doubled the
amount of cargo it carried for overseas clients
between foreign ports. Of the 14 million tons of
foreign cargo carried in 1970, the underdeveloped
countries accounted fol- about 40 percent, the
Communist countries and the industrial West
roughly 30 percent each.
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Soviet Cargo L.i. r Services
Scheduled international cargo liner services
'increased slightly between 1966 and 1970 to a
total of 33. These services reach practically all
parts of the world; at least three more lines were
added last year. The coverage of this type of
servi;_e has also been affected by closure of the
Suez Canal, which forced the USSR to modify or
cancel a number of lines then operative.
The Soviets began trial voyages to the US
west coast in 1969, thus marking the resumption
of commercial shipping between the US and the
USSR for the first time since the Korean war.
Calls by Soviet ships at US east coast and gulf
ports have not been resumed, however, because of
the threat of boycotts by longshoremen. Develop-
ments last year indicate that this policy may be
relaxed soon.
Special Report
The growing role of the Soviet fleet in for-
eigri trade and 0oscow's search for increased rec-
ognition as a world shipping power have led to
several new moves outside the sphere of fleet
operations. In 1967, for example, the Soviets
began entering into bilateral shipping agreements
,vith some of their major trading partners in West
Europe. In the same year, the USSR stareed to
establish joint shipping agencies, primarily with
Far East countries, to handle the business of
Soviet ships calling at these ports and to solicit
-argo.
Another facet in the USSR's effort to win
acceptability among maritime nations has been
Soviet membership in many of the shipping con-
ferences that set rates and other regulations gov-
erning the carrying of freight on particular lines.
On other routes, the Soviets charge about 15
percent less than conference rates, the discount
typically offered by other independent lines.
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The targets of the current five-year plan in-
dicate that Moscow envisages a further slowing in
the growth rate of its maritime fleet. Although
the composition of ship deliveries to the fleet will
change during 1971-75, the USSR will still lag
behind other maritime powers in terms of the size
and speed of its ships and its utilization of con-
tainerships. The Soviets are planning to build
150,000-ton tankers and 120,000-ton ships de-
signed to carry bulk oil or dry cargo, with deliv-
eries beginning after 1973. Ships of these sizes
will require deep-water ports, and plans are in
train to construct such facilities near Odessa on
the Black Sea and at Vrangel in the Soviet Far
East. Most of the new ships, however, will be
relatively small as in the decade of the 1960s, and
only a few of the new ships will be faster than
those now in the fleet.
At least four classes of dry-cargo ships
planned for dalivery during 1971-75 will be full
or part containerships, but at best they will be
only one fourth the size of containerships now
operating on Western lines. These ships will move
between Soviet European ports and West Europe
as well as between the Soviet Far East and Ja-
pan.
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Special Report
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