WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT TANZANIA: ANATOMY OF A UNION

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4
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RIPPUB
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S
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12
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December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 13, 2004
Sequence Number: 
13
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Publication Date: 
March 31, 1972
Content Type: 
REPORT
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Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report Tanzania: Anatomy of a Union DCcUMENT SERVICES BRANCH FILE COPY Secret N! 609 31 March 1972 No. 013-42A JL1ecNOLDESJIRUY PAICIA-RDP85TOO875 004003 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4 Approved For Release 20 TANZANIA: When Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba merged in April 1964, President Julius Nyerere hailed the step as a victory for African unity. On the other hand, critics, noting the rapid growth of Chinese and East German influence on Zanzibar, scored the union as opening the way for Communist penetration of east Africa. Since then Tanzania has become neither a shining example of African solidarity nor a bridgehead for Com- munist subversion. The Chinese have established a large presence on the mainland as well as on the islands, but the merger did relatively little to smooth the way for them, and their influence in Dar es Salaam is still much less than on Zanzibar. Even on the island, the Chinese, although exercising some influence, are not in a position to dictate policy. FAR FT Approved For Release 2005/0 t1` .`iClia(-kDP85T00875R As for the union, relations between the mainland government and the nominally subor- dinate Revolutionary Council, which governs the islands, have often resembled a game of tug of war. Dar es Salaam has taken over some common administrative services in accordance with the interim constitution of 1965 and now acts as the official spokesman in foreign affairs. Otherwise, the Revolutionary Council has stubbornly resisted almost every effort to circumscribe itF authority and integrate the islands into the mainland polit- ical system. That the union has survived these strains is attributable mainly to Nyerere's pa- tience and political skill. Yet his inability and at times unwillingness to exercise a restraining hand over the erratic and oppressive Revolutionary Council has done little to endear Zanzibar to mainland Tanzanians and has left Nyerere open to sharp and embarrassing criticism from abroad. Indeed, although the association has shown re- markable durability, the almost perennial diffi- culties that have marked its history clearly dem- onstrate that Tanzania remains a loose federation of two virtually autonomous states. Origins of Union On 12 January 1964, the sultan of Zanzibar and Pemba and his Arab-dominated government Special Report were swept aside in a short, bloody revolt. I n its turbulent wake, the union of Tanganyika and the islands was born. Although the timing of the Zanzibar revolu- tion caught many by surprise, its causes were clearly evident. For well over a century the is- land's African majority had been dominated by a small Arab ruling class. After the British estab- lished a protectorate over the Sultanate in 1890, they did little to improve the African's lot but a good deal to help perpetuate Arab supremacy. With the introduction of representative govern- ment and party politics in the 1950s, largely dormant feelings of African discontent and re- sentment of Arab rule quickly began to surface. Nevertheless, because of divisions among the Afri- cans themselves and gerrymandering before he pre-independence elections, the Afro-Sharazi Party, the rallying point for African nationalism, was never quite able to translate its widespread popular strength into a parliamentary majority. As a result, by the time Britain finally grantee' the isla-;ds independence in December 1933, racial animosities were quite strong. All of the Africans' pent-up frustrations and bitterness were unleashed in the revolution, which occurred only a month later. In the first few Approved For Release 2005/01 RI P85T00875R001500040013-4 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4 SECRET weeks, several hundred Arabs were killed or placed in detention; many more fled the island. The sultan's government was replaced by a Rev- olutionary Council whose 32 members were mostiy either Communist rained or uneducated thugs. Abeid Karume, the popular demagogic leader of the Afro-Sharazi Party who had close ties with the mainland, became president of Zan- zibar and chairman of the council. Pro-Commu- nist radicals took over other key posts, and with their help the Chinese, East Germans and, to a lesser extent, the Soviets quickly began to estab- lish themselves on the islands. Although the mainland sympathized with the aims of the revolution, Nyerere, whose secu- rity had been badly shaken by an army mutiny in late January 1964 became alarmed by the growth of Communist influence on Zanzibar. Fearing that the radicals would use the island as a center for subversion against the mainland, Nyerere undertook to persuade Karume to merge the islands wi-Lh Tanganyika. In a union, he believed, he could isolate the leaders of the pro-Communist factions and nullify their influence by absorbing them into the mainland government. To preserve his own position and strengthen his hand over the more unruly council members, Karume rammed ratification of the merger through a resisting Rev- olutionary Council; on 26 April 1964, three and a half months after the revolution, the articles of union were signed. At the outset, Nyerere at least hoped that the union would draw the islands closer into the mainland orbit. In this he seriously misjudged the determination of Karume to remain free of con- trol from Dar es Salaam. Because the merger was hastily arranged, a constitution was not drawn up until over a year later. This interim constitution was intended to serve only until Zanzibar was ready to be fully ;n:^grated into the mainland's one-party political system. The interim constitution has never been fully implemented, let alone followed by a per- manent document. Under the interim constitution, the Revolu- tionary Council was granted almost complete executive and legislative authority over the is- lands. As president of Zanzibar, Karume also became vice president of Tanzania. To assuage the Zanzibaris' fears of being swallowed up by their larger partner, they were also allotted a dispro- portionately large block of seats in the National Assembly. It was agreed that the mainland would gradually assume over-all responsibility for exter- nal affairs, defense, police, citizenship, immigra- tion, external trade, foreign exchange, and ex- change controls; also to be taken over were in- come tax and customs collection, harbors and The 1964 Revolution: Settling old scores. 001500040013-4 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4 SECRET I.A. p~ C T'olunshn J )-,NAIROBI KENYA MagadI. .r" Lake M trop 1P0 Mombasa DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO LK yr.4s,l DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO Special Report MALA\ I Morogoro Mlkuml ,(Idatu Ilakara Projected route of Tan?zam Railroad Approved For Release 2005/01/' CGItdP85T00875R001500040013-4 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 S~Ia.I,$5T00875R001500040013-4 civil aviation, post and telegraph, civil service administration, and currency and banking. Since then, the Revolutionary Council has stymied Nyerere's efforts to consolidate the two governments. Although Zanzibar allows the main- land to speak for it in foreign affairs, the council continues to deal directly with foreign countries on aid and trade. The islands' security forces have also been formally subordinated to the mainland, but amalgamation in this case is even less real than in foreign affairs. The union government pays their salaries, but most of the officers and men are Zanzibaris, and the top posts in the army and police are held by members of the Revolu- tionary Council. Should any confrontation with the mainland arise, their first loyalty would be to the council. Nyerere's most solid achievement has been the integration of Zanzibar into the East African Community. Daring 1967 and 1968, income and customs collection, civil aviation (but not har- bor), and post and telegraph services all passed into the community's hands. These concessions were extracted from a reluctant Revolutionary Council only after months of negotiation, and for a price-a generous $2 million yearly subsidy over whi :h the Zanzibaris continue to bicker. In almost every other respect, the Revolu- tionary Council operates as if there were no in- terim constitution. The administration cf the islands' civil service, local economic affairs, for- eign trade, and banking, for example, remain firmly in the hands of the Revolutionary Council, which continues to exercise authority over such other union matters as immigration and citizen- ship. The council in fact has shown little com- punction about disregarding the constitution and union authorities. Without consulting the main- land, Karume has stripped some of Zanzibar's minority groups of their citizenship, restricted travel outside the islands (even to the mainland), temporarily banned East African Community air flights, and completely ignored East African cus- toms to evade paying duties on such items as Special Report luxury cars for members of his council. The council also handed the union a serious setback three years ago when it replaced mainland-ap- pointed judges on Zanzibar with home-grown people's courts. The council's disregard for law is even more notorious in matters concerning only the Zanzi- baris; and in these affairs it is even more of an embarrassment to Nyerere. In sharp contrast with the President's own commitment to humanistic and democratic ideals, the Revolutionary Council is deeply distrustful of the democratic process and has no regard for individual liberty. Karume has declared elections unnecessary because the islands are "already governed by the people." In truth, Zanzibar is a police state, governed by decree and controlled by force. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS SHOWN LITTLE COMPUNCTION ABOUT DISREGARDING THE CONSTITUTION AND UNION AUTHORITIES. In the beginning, the Revolutionary Council, as an African government bent on righting certain social and economic injustices, could claim some popularity. Soon after the revolution, it instituted land reform, opened up the educational system to the Africans and began to expand health facilities. After eight years of corrupt, inefficient, and tyrannical rule, however, the Revolutionary Council has managed to erode whatever popular support it once had. Political opponents, both real and imagined, have been imprisoned without trial and some have been executed. The populace has been subjected to forced labor, and, because of Karume's obsession with increasing the islands' foreign exchange reserves, the government has progressively reduced the flow of imports, causing periodic food shortages. These shortages have be- come particularly acute during the last six months. More than any other group, however, the islands' Asians (Indians, Persians, and Pakistanis) Approved For Release 2005/01/1- qtA WP85T00875R001500040013-4 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4 SECRET who sided with the old regime, have suffered from the Revolutionary Council's misrule and brutality. Karume has carried on an almost per- sonal vendetta against the small and dwindling Asian communities. In the name of socialism and egalitarianism, he has purged Asians from the civil service, confiscated their businesses, tried to force their daughters into unwanted marriages with Africans, and driven Asians from the islands. Many of tho.,e who have not already departed secretly, or been deported, are now leaving as fast as they can. Nyerere's Albatross As a result of these t;