WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT TANZANIA: ANATOMY OF A UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 31, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Tanzania: Anatomy of a Union
DCcUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE COPY
Secret
N! 609
31 March 1972
No.
013-42A
JL1ecNOLDESJIRUY PAICIA-RDP85TOO875 004003
25X1
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TANZANIA:
When Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba merged in
April 1964, President Julius Nyerere hailed the step as a victory for African
unity. On the other hand, critics, noting the rapid growth of Chinese and
East German influence on Zanzibar, scored the union as opening the way for
Communist penetration of east Africa. Since then Tanzania has become
neither a shining example of African solidarity nor a bridgehead for Com-
munist subversion. The Chinese have established a large presence on the
mainland as well as on the islands, but the merger did relatively little to
smooth the way for them, and their influence in Dar es Salaam is still much
less than on Zanzibar. Even on the island, the Chinese, although exercising
some influence, are not in a position to dictate policy.
FAR FT
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 As for the union, relations between the
mainland government and the nominally subor-
dinate Revolutionary Council, which governs the
islands, have often resembled a game of tug of
war. Dar es Salaam has taken over some common
administrative services in accordance with the
interim constitution of 1965 and now acts as the
official spokesman in foreign affairs. Otherwise,
the Revolutionary Council has stubbornly resisted
almost every effort to circumscribe itF authority
and integrate the islands into the mainland polit-
ical system. That the union has survived these
strains is attributable mainly to Nyerere's pa-
tience and political skill. Yet his inability and at
times unwillingness to exercise a restraining hand
over the erratic and oppressive Revolutionary
Council has done little to endear Zanzibar to
mainland Tanzanians and has left Nyerere open to
sharp and embarrassing criticism from abroad.
Indeed, although the association has shown re-
markable durability, the almost perennial diffi-
culties that have marked its history clearly dem-
onstrate that Tanzania remains a loose federation
of two virtually autonomous states.
Origins of Union
On 12 January 1964, the sultan of Zanzibar
and Pemba and his Arab-dominated government
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were swept aside in a short, bloody revolt. I n its
turbulent wake, the union of Tanganyika and the
islands was born.
Although the timing of the Zanzibar revolu-
tion caught many by surprise, its causes were
clearly evident. For well over a century the is-
land's African majority had been dominated by a
small Arab ruling class. After the British estab-
lished a protectorate over the Sultanate in 1890,
they did little to improve the African's lot but a
good deal to help perpetuate Arab supremacy.
With the introduction of representative govern-
ment and party politics in the 1950s, largely
dormant feelings of African discontent and re-
sentment of Arab rule quickly began to surface.
Nevertheless, because of divisions among the Afri-
cans themselves and gerrymandering before he
pre-independence elections, the Afro-Sharazi
Party, the rallying point for African nationalism,
was never quite able to translate its widespread
popular strength into a parliamentary majority.
As a result, by the time Britain finally grantee' the
isla-;ds independence in December 1933, racial
animosities were quite strong.
All of the Africans' pent-up frustrations and
bitterness were unleashed in the revolution, which
occurred only a month later. In the first few
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weeks, several hundred Arabs were killed or
placed in detention; many more fled the island.
The sultan's government was replaced by a Rev-
olutionary Council whose 32 members were
mostiy either Communist rained or uneducated
thugs. Abeid Karume, the popular demagogic
leader of the Afro-Sharazi Party who had close
ties with the mainland, became president of Zan-
zibar and chairman of the council. Pro-Commu-
nist radicals took over other key posts, and with
their help the Chinese, East Germans and, to a
lesser extent, the Soviets quickly began to estab-
lish themselves on the islands.
Although the mainland sympathized with
the aims of the revolution, Nyerere, whose secu-
rity had been badly shaken by an army mutiny in
late January 1964 became alarmed by the growth
of Communist influence on Zanzibar. Fearing
that the radicals would use the island as a center
for subversion against the mainland, Nyerere
undertook to persuade Karume to merge the
islands wi-Lh Tanganyika. In a union, he believed,
he could isolate the leaders of the pro-Communist
factions and nullify their influence by absorbing
them into the mainland government. To preserve
his own position and strengthen his hand over the
more unruly council members, Karume rammed
ratification of the merger through a resisting Rev-
olutionary Council; on 26 April 1964, three and a
half months after the revolution, the articles of
union were signed.
At the outset, Nyerere at least hoped that
the union would draw the islands closer into the
mainland orbit. In this he seriously misjudged the
determination of Karume to remain free of con-
trol from Dar es Salaam.
Because the merger was hastily arranged, a
constitution was not drawn up until over a year
later. This interim constitution was intended to
serve only until Zanzibar was ready to be fully
;n:^grated into the mainland's one-party political
system. The interim constitution has never been
fully implemented, let alone followed by a per-
manent document.
Under the interim constitution, the Revolu-
tionary Council was granted almost complete
executive and legislative authority over the is-
lands. As president of Zanzibar, Karume also
became vice president of Tanzania. To assuage the
Zanzibaris' fears of being swallowed up by their
larger partner, they were also allotted a dispro-
portionately large block of seats in the National
Assembly. It was agreed that the mainland would
gradually assume over-all responsibility for exter-
nal affairs, defense, police, citizenship, immigra-
tion, external trade, foreign exchange, and ex-
change controls; also to be taken over were in-
come tax and customs collection, harbors and
The 1964 Revolution: Settling old scores.
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DEM. REP. OF
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MALA\ I
Morogoro
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Projected route of
Tan?zam Railroad
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civil aviation, post and telegraph, civil service
administration, and currency and banking.
Since then, the Revolutionary Council has
stymied Nyerere's efforts to consolidate the two
governments. Although Zanzibar allows the main-
land to speak for it in foreign affairs, the council
continues to deal directly with foreign countries
on aid and trade. The islands' security forces have
also been formally subordinated to the mainland,
but amalgamation in this case is even less real
than in foreign affairs. The union government
pays their salaries, but most of the officers and
men are Zanzibaris, and the top posts in the army
and police are held by members of the Revolu-
tionary Council. Should any confrontation with
the mainland arise, their first loyalty would be to
the council.
Nyerere's most solid achievement has been
the integration of Zanzibar into the East African
Community. Daring 1967 and 1968, income and
customs collection, civil aviation (but not har-
bor), and post and telegraph services all passed
into the community's hands. These concessions
were extracted from a reluctant Revolutionary
Council only after months of negotiation, and for
a price-a generous $2 million yearly subsidy over
whi :h the Zanzibaris continue to bicker.
In almost every other respect, the Revolu-
tionary Council operates as if there were no in-
terim constitution. The administration cf the
islands' civil service, local economic affairs, for-
eign trade, and banking, for example, remain
firmly in the hands of the Revolutionary Council,
which continues to exercise authority over such
other union matters as immigration and citizen-
ship. The council in fact has shown little com-
punction about disregarding the constitution and
union authorities. Without consulting the main-
land, Karume has stripped some of Zanzibar's
minority groups of their citizenship, restricted
travel outside the islands (even to the mainland),
temporarily banned East African Community air
flights, and completely ignored East African cus-
toms to evade paying duties on such items as
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luxury cars for members of his council. The
council also handed the union a serious setback
three years ago when it replaced mainland-ap-
pointed judges on Zanzibar with home-grown
people's courts.
The council's disregard for law is even more
notorious in matters concerning only the Zanzi-
baris; and in these affairs it is even more of an
embarrassment to Nyerere. In sharp contrast with
the President's own commitment to humanistic
and democratic ideals, the Revolutionary Council
is deeply distrustful of the democratic process
and has no regard for individual liberty. Karume
has declared elections unnecessary because the
islands are "already governed by the people." In
truth, Zanzibar is a police state, governed by
decree and controlled by force.
THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS
SHOWN LITTLE COMPUNCTION ABOUT
DISREGARDING THE CONSTITUTION
AND UNION AUTHORITIES.
In the beginning, the Revolutionary Council,
as an African government bent on righting certain
social and economic injustices, could claim some
popularity. Soon after the revolution, it instituted
land reform, opened up the educational system to
the Africans and began to expand health facilities.
After eight years of corrupt, inefficient, and
tyrannical rule, however, the Revolutionary
Council has managed to erode whatever popular
support it once had. Political opponents, both
real and imagined, have been imprisoned without
trial and some have been executed. The populace
has been subjected to forced labor, and, because
of Karume's obsession with increasing the islands'
foreign exchange reserves, the government has
progressively reduced the flow of imports, causing
periodic food shortages. These shortages have be-
come particularly acute during the last six
months.
More than any other group, however, the
islands' Asians (Indians, Persians, and Pakistanis)
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who sided with the old regime, have suffered
from the Revolutionary Council's misrule and
brutality. Karume has carried on an almost per-
sonal vendetta against the small and dwindling
Asian communities. In the name of socialism and
egalitarianism, he has purged Asians from the civil
service, confiscated their businesses, tried to force
their daughters into unwanted marriages with
Africans, and driven Asians from the islands.
Many of tho.,e who have not already departed
secretly, or been deported, are now leaving as fast
as they can.
Nyerere's Albatross
As a result of these t;