WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ROMANIA: A MAVERICK MARCHES ON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: September 29, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Romania, A Maverick Marches On
State Dept. review completed
CIA
1,jr ~~ Secret
DOCJMhT SERVCcS ILL u 29 September 1972
ok" No. 0389/72A
Tel
TI : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040033-2
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ROMANIAN
A Maverick Marches On
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Romanian party and state chief Nicolae
Ceausescu gives every indication that he is in firm
control of the country. Despite a flurry of vague
reports that he faced serious problems earlier this
year, Ceausescu emerged from a national party
conference in July stronger than ever. There is no
evidence that he is under challenge by any
cohesive group, and it is indeed doubtful that
anyone could present a viable alternative to his
leadership at this time.
Ceausescu, who in the summer of 1971
angered his Warsaw Pact allies by a trip to China
and who is confronted with foreign trade prob-
lems, has softened the tone and style of Roma-
nian foreign policy. He has become more openly
cooperative with his allies, particularly the Rus-
sians, though not at the price of compromising
the basic principles of his regime's independent
course in world affairs. Even when he has seemed
to bend most, he has either gained satisfactory
safeguards or has balanced his stance with actions
calculated to displease Moscow.
As he ap, -oaches his eighth anniversary as
party secretary general, Ceausescu is not without
his points of potential vulnerability. Romania's
economic situation, and particularly its indebted-
ness to the West, already seems to be affecting his
freedom for maneuver. He has tried to buy time
by promising that the country will have achieved
a more favorable foreign exchange position by
1974, and he has tried to create the managerial
efficiency he will need to achieve this by
"recycling" personnel between the party and the
state in an effort to arrive at a correct mix of
political and economic expertise. His vulnerability
will, of course, be increased if he fails in either of
these immense tasks. Another point of potential
vulnerability is the personality cult that is
growing up around him.
As Ceausescu looks to the future, he projects
confidenc(z. He is convinced that he has Romania
on the correct domestic and foreign courses and
that he personally controls all the major levers of
power. Although this carries with it a high degree
of personal accountability-a fact increasingly
stressed within party and state ranks-Ceausescu
ap,1 Bars to believe he and the Romanians have the
answer.
Special Report
The Party Leadership
The policy differences that have long
troubled Romanian-Soviet relations were dram-
atized during the late summer and early fall of
1971, when Romania found itself caught in a
sudden crossfire of criticism from its Warsaw Pact
allies. Not only had Ceausescu gone off to Peking
in June, but while there he had failed to defend
Moscow against Premier Chou's slashing attacks
on the Soviet Union. Bucharest aroused addi-
tional ire in Moscow by refusing to participate in
joint maneuvers )f Warsaw Pact forces in Bul-
gara.
By late September, however, charges of a
looming "anti-Soviet, pro-Peking" axis in the
Balkans had all but died out, and the Warsaw Pact
maneuvers had degenerated into a Bulgarian na-
tional exercise. Brezhnev's subsequent visit to
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Belgrade seemed to signal the gradual adoption by
the pact of a more forthcoming stance toward
both Bucharest and Belgrade. For their part, the
Romanians pulled in their horns a bit, but the
shifts were more in style than in substance.
At this time, reports of differences in the
Romanian hierarchy began to make the rounds.
The reports were vague and contradictory and
there is no evidence of any cohesive or iden-
tifiable faction challenging Ceausescu's firm con-
trol. Indeed, the Roranian party hierarchy has
not been troubled by factionalism since 1957.
While top party and government leaders may
now express more differences of opinion than in
the past, these are not crucial, but rather seem to
reflect conflicting judgments on tactics and
timing with respect to various problems. More-
over, individuals who express dissenting opinions
vary from issue to issue. To the extent that differ-
ences exist, they probably limit Ceausescu's
maneuverability on economic questions more
than on foreign policy.
The cult of personality gathering around
Ceausescu has heen cited as prompting differences
within the leadership. Though not now of serious
dimension, the cult could become an explosive
issue. A vain man, puritan in his personal habits,
Ceausescu is, on the evidence, unwilling or unable
to resist having himself put forward as the "fairest
of them all." With the possible exception of the
Western-educated and highly able Premier Maurer
and the politically shrewd deputy premier,
Niculescu-Mizil, Ceausescu towers over all other
members of the leadership. In some respects, he
resembles Michael the Brave, a Wallachian prince
of the 16th century widely remembered for his
political and military acumen.
There have been a number of personnel
reshuffles in recent years and this has added fuel
to speculation about disunity at the top.
When he came to power in March 1965,
Ceausescu was, at 47, the youngest party first
secretary in Eastern Europe, and he still is. The
leadership he inherited from hiz. predecessor,
Gheorghiu-Dej, was composed not only of men
Special Report
nearly ten years older than Ceausescu, but one
that he had had only a sliqht role in selecting.
Since then, Ceausescu has gradually but
insistently been consolidating his power. He has
retained a few officials such as Maurer who al-
though nearly 70 and close to retirement remains
Bucharest's most effective and knowledgeable
specialist in foreign affairs. He has also kept on 68
year-old Emil Bodnaras, knowledgeable in mili-
tary affairs, a trouble shooter, and a 'iaison man
with parties as dissimilar as the Chinese and the
Yugoslav. Otherwise, the composition of the hi-
erarchy has changed considerably since the party
congress of July 1965, Ceausescu's first as top
man. Of the nine-member party secretariat
elected at that time, only Manea Manescu re-
mains, while Bodnaras and Maurer are the sole
holdovers on the nine-man Permanent Presidium
(Politburo). Only seven of 25 original full mem-
bers remain on the Executive Committee estab-
lished by the 1965 congress.
If any pattern is discernible from these per-
sonnel shifts, it is that they reflect Ceausescu's
desire to control the levers of power and to be
surrounded by people of his own choice. At the
same time he is looking for the best "mix" of
political and economic expertise. Last April, he
advised: "The comrades should go through dif-
ferent offices. In this way, leading cadres will take
shape who are able to understand and solve the
more and more complex problems raised by life
and by the government of today's society."
This view-repeated at the recent party con-
ference-is in part an effort to keep his colleagues
off balance, but it is considerably more than that.
Ceausescu has managed to "recycle" personnel
between party and state agencies without in-
curring visible resentment. He has succeeded
mainly by easing older comrades out of their
posts, a practice he is expected to continue. In
their places, he has generally appointed younger,
better educated individuals who have technical
skills but little political clout.
Prior to the party conference, Ceausescu
called for completion of the current five-year
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Faces in the Future Leadership
Janos Fazekas
Age: 46
Title: Deputy Premier
Member: Executive Committee
Responsibility: National Minorities and special as-
signments
Remarks: An ethnic Hungarian, who is con-
sidered one of Ceausescu's closest
advisers, Fazekas is energetic and
clever and has a sense of humor. He
also shows obvious goodwill toward
the US.
Age: 43
Title: Minister of Internal Affairs
Member: Alternate member of the Executive
Committee
Responsibility: Although he was not involved in
intelligence work until 1967,
Stanescu became head of the re-
vamped Ministry of Internal Affairs
in April 1972.
Remarks: His manner suggests both power
and energy.
Age: 41
Member: Secretariat
Responsibility: A former Minister of Foreign
Trade, Burtica reportedly now is
responsible for press information.
He also takes on special assign-
ments.
Remarks: Burtica has traveled widely and is a
loyal exponent of Ceausescu's
policy of econorr.:^ independence.
He also appears well-Disposed to the
West.
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plan in "four and one-half years." Speculation
about disunity, however, emerreu when his con-
ference address hedged his position by calling for
fulfillment of the current plan "in less than five
years." Some claim that this semantic variation
was a concession to strong internal opposition,
but available evidence suggests that external
rather than internal considerations were influ-
ential.
Both the British and American embassies in
Bucharest have commented that Moscow believed
Ceausescu's desire to fulfill the plan in four and
one-half years would have a disruptive effect on
CEMA and the plans of CEMA members. The
British ambassador reported in early July that
Soviet diplomats were saying they found it dif-
ficult to understand how the Romanians would
be able to fulfill their plan ahead of schedule in
view of their dependence on Soviet iron ore and
coke. The Soviets pointed out that they saw no
reason to succumb to Romanian pressure to
deliver five years' supply in four and one-half
years-something they could only accomplish by
reducing supplies to other CEMA members or by
disrupting their own production schedule.
After the CEMA session in Moscow in early
July, the American Embassy in Bucharest heard
reports that the other CEMA members had se-
verely criticized Bucharest's proposal to revise its
plan. They pointed out that all plans are coordi-
nated and that Romania could not expect its
CEMA suppliers to accelerate their production
requirements to satisfy shifting Romanian raw
material needs.
It was against this background that the na-
tional party conference-the most important
political event since the party congress in August
1969-met in Bucharest on 19-21 July. The con-
ference confirmed such Ceausescu policies as
rapid industrialization, economic self-sufficiency,
and closer trading links with the West. The con-
ference approved his program for socio-economic
development for the next two decades.
Special Report
Nothing in the program is new, except for
structural changes in several party and state
economic bodies, but Ceausescu did call for a
number of economic measures-such as higher
pensions, modest salary increases, and expand
consumer services-suggesting that he is sensitive
to the irritants behind Gomulka's demise and
interested in broadening his base of popular sup-
port. These measures were balanced by emphasis
on increasing productivity and exports.
When he stressed the need to increase ex-
ports so that Romania can achieve "foreign ex-
change equilibrium at least by 1974," Ceausescu
addressed a problem that is not only serious for
the country but one that gives Moscow leverage
on Bucharest. Ceausescu's freedom of maneuver
in domestic and foreign affairs already appears to
have been affected, as he has begun to feel the
pinch of growing hard-currency indebtedness.
That indebtedness, about $900 million in 1970,
exceeds that of any other Eastern European coun-
try. Servicing of the debt-in repayments and
interest-already eats up a large share of Roma-
nian exports to the industrial West (about two
fifths of the total during 1968-70).
Ceausescu has not been happy about the
performance of the economy since the first of the
year and has fired a few officials accused of
corruption. Despite hi: attacks on inefficiency,
one important contradiction remains: more effi-
ciency would seem to require more individual
responsibility; this in turn demands greater power
and freedom of action-which in a planned econ-
omy conflicts with the party's over-all control. If
anything, the recent party conference called for
an even greater party role.
An "Unreformed" Economic System
Unlike its Eastern European allies, Romania
has not promulgated an economic reform, largely
because Ceausescu is alive to the political con-
notations of these "reforms." He has preferred to
operate through a set of directives for the "per-
fection" of management and planning. These
directives, first approved in 1969, tried to grapple
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Romania: Changes in Leading Party Bodies Since Ninth Party Congress, July 1965
Permanent Presidium (Established July 1965)
July 1965
Age
September 1972
Age
Date Estimated
elected career status
47
CEAUSESCU, N., Chmn. 54
CEAUSESCU, N.
52
APOSTOL, G. 43
PANA, G.
8.69
id+
54
BIRLADEANU, A. 58
RADULESCU, G.
8.69
>~-+
61
BODNARAS, E. 68
SODNARAS, E.
7-65
a~+
52
DRAGHICI, A. 46
TROFIN, V.
4-68
sae
63
MAURER, I.G. 70
MAURER, I.G.
7.65
ma
57
STOICA, C. 51
VERDET, I.
6-66
49
NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.
6-66
yv^'
56
MANESCU, M.
2-71
47
CEAUSESCU, N., Gen. Sec 54
CEAUSESCU, N.
7.65
x^~'
48
DALEA, M. 41
ANDREI, S.
4.72
52
DRAGHICI, A. 46
BANC, I.
4-72
49
MANESCU, M. 60
MANESCU, M.
7-65
51
MOGHIOROS, A. 41
BURTICA, C.
2-72
42
NICULESCU-MIZIL, P. 50
DINCA, 1.
4-72
40
PATILINET. V. 52
GERE, M.
6-66
w-r
55
RAUTU, L. 43
PANA, G.
8-69
F-r
39
TROFIN, V. 44
POPESCU,D.
12.68
Executive Committee (Established July 1965)
Full members
47
CEAUSESCU, N. 54 CEAUSESCU, N. 7-65
52
APOSTOL, G. 54 BERGHIANU, M. 6-66
59
BORILA, P. 68 BODNARAS, E. 7-65
~^+
61
BODNARAS, E. 47 CIOARA, G. 4-72
tTr?
52
DRAGHICI, A. 55 DANALACHE, F. 12-67
~-y
43
DRAGAN, C. 50 DRAGAN,C. 7-65
~*+
54
BIRLADEANU, A. 54 DRAGANESCU, E. 8.69
sue`
51
MOGHIOROS, A. 46 FAZE KAS, J. 12-67
50
SALAJAN, L. 50 LUPU, P. 12-68
t+o-e
63
MAURER, I.G. 56 MANESCU, M. 12.68
42
NICULESCU-MIZIL, P. 70 MAURER, I.G. 7.65
55
RADULESCU, G. 49 NICULESCU-MIZIL, P. 7.65
yam'
a5
RAUTU, L. 43 PANA, G. 8.69
~-
57
STOICA, C. 44 POPESCU, D. 8.69
65
VOITEC, S. 58 RADULESCU, G. 7.65
62 RAUTU, L. 7-65
~,.
72 STOICA, G. 12-68
46 TROFIN, V. 4-68
51 VERDET, 1. 6.66
n..r
~+y
62 VILCU, V. 10.66
72 VOITEC, S. 7-65
39
48' BABALAU, C. 2-71
BANC, 1. 46 BANC, I. 7-65
n++
42
58
BLAJOVICI, P. 50 BLAJOVICI, P. 7-65 41 BURTICA, C. 4.72
COLIU, D.
yam'
43
aERGHIANU, M. 55 CONSTANTINESCU, M. 3-70
>a r
44
GERE, M. 52 GERE, M. 7-65
a r
50
DANALACHE, F. 55 DALEA, M. 3-70
-0-.~
39
FAZEKAS, J. 48' DOBRESCU, M. 8-69
43
49
LUPU, P.
DUCA, A.
8.69
40
VERDET, 1. 42
ILLIESCU, I.
8.69
m-
55
VIL' U, V. 48
IONITA, 1.
8.69
z~.r
46
PATAN, I.
4-72
47
PATILINET, V.
8-69
43
STANESCU, 1.
8.69
52' TELESCU, M. 2-71
CO- UGLAR, I. 2-71
45' WINTER, R. 2-71
vs-
Special Report
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with not only the excessive centralism of the
planning system but also the old pat, rns of
industrial organization and investment as well as
price and wage formation. Specifically, they
called for some decentralization and a carefully
spelled out fusion of some party and state mana-
gerial functions.
The directives have not worked well because
of three fundamental dichotomies they intro-
duced into Romania's economic development:
? a. Central authorities and decentralized
decision-making.
? b. Central economic planning and the
use of open-market forces in price formation.
? c. Emphasis on heavy industry and in-
sistence on consumer goods.
These dichotomies are compounded by
Ceausescu's style of leadership. He is reluctant to
delegate responsibility. He intervenes directly
with the lower levels of the administration. He
operates without having set up channels for the
flow of accurate information. Above all, he insists
on primacy of the party. All of this has com-
plicated the execution of a coherent policy of
decentralization.
Nonetheless, the party conference in August
1972 decided to keep trying. The "perfection"
program is to be kept going until 1973. The
extension followed Ceausescu's strong complaint
about excessive centralization in the work of the
economic ministries. But he also spoke of "the
ever more powerful affirmation of the leading
role cJ the party" in "perfecting the management
and planning of the whole society."
In important respects, Ceausescu's problem
is fundamental to all Eastern European regimes:
How can economic power be redistributed with-
out weakening the party's monopoly of control?
For all its merits, decentralization has meant
tremendous headaches for the Yugoslav leaders,
yet Ceausescu is also mindful that too much
stultifying centralism, as in Gomulka's Poland, is
as bad or worse.
Reform of the power structure is one of the
most delicate and dangerous moves for a Com-
munist leadership to undertake. The object of the
"reform" exercise in Eastern Europe is to try and
establish who is responsible for what, and then
give them sufficient power to carry out decisions.
Hungary and Yugoslavia have tried to do this by
separating the party from the government and
limiting the party's interference in the economy.
Ceausescu has tried to clarify lines of responsibil-
ity by combining party and state jobs. Neither
effort has been wholly successful.
Against this background, two other eco-
nomic policy issues are likely to cause differing
opinions within the leadership: Should efforts to
accelerate the development of heavy industry be
continued by seeking increased Western technol-
ogy and credits? Should Bucharest cooperate
more closely with CEMA? Ceausescu himself
clearly favors the development of heavy industry,
with a small increase in consumer goods, and, of
necessity, small increases in trade and cooperation
with CEMA members, particularly the USSR.
These stands reflect a maxim central to
Ceausescu's over-all policy, namely, that maneu-
verability in foreign and domestic affairs hinges
heavily on reduced economic dependence on the
Soviet Union. Because of growing hard-currency
indebtedness, however, Ceausescu may sometimes
find it difficult to maintain his maneuverabilitj at
home and abroad. For example, Bucharest's rela-
tive inability to put its trade with the West on a
firmer footing probably increases the pressure to
cooperate more closely with CEMA and to re-
direct more of Romania's trade back to CEM.'
(read the USSR).
Still, his is the pre-eminent voice, and the
more positive tone he has struck in conversations
with high-level Western visitors confirms this. The
more positive tone may also reflect a belief that
as long as the Western countries are competing to
promote trade with Eastern Europe, they will
continue to grant larger credits-and probably
some refinancing-to Romania. To the extent that
the West pursues this line, Ceausescu gains time
for further economic development. He can disarm
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his critics by selective increases in trade with
CEMA and "all socialist countries," often a Ro-
manian euphemism for China.
The acquisition of needed Western expertise
and equipment is made more difficult by the size
of the debt he has already run up in the West.
Ceausescu's references to achieving financial
equilibrium by 1974 suggest that he recognizes he
needs time to resolve Romania's economic prob-
lems and disarm his critics at home and abroad. In
making personnel shifts and in calling for new
legislation, he seems intent on broadening his
popular support by rooting out corruption on one
hand and by stressing accountability on the other.
In setting out a new "Law on Social and Eco-
nomic Development," "unanimously" approved
at the party conference, he is underscoring Ro-
mania's inalienable right to work out its own
national plans and its opposition to "supra-
national economic integration" within CEMA. Be-
cause the law established a Supreme Council for
Economic and Social Development with
Ceausescu as its chairman, it also accentuates the
"presidential" character of the regime and the
personality cult around Ceausescu.
Foreign Policy
For nearly a decade, Romania's major for-
eign policy objective has been to assert and to
demonstrate that it is an independent sovereign
state with the right to conduct its domestic and
foreign affairs free of outside interference. Be-
cause Romania has an 830-mile-long border with
the USSR and is a member in the Soviet alliance
system, Bucharest has had to tailor its independ-
ence course to levels of Soviet tolerance as it has
perceived them.
Although this has involved taking risks that
could have affected the unity of the leadership,
the Romanians appear to have passed such tests
with a minimum of trouble. There is no evidence
that any of his principal colleagues oppose Ceau-
sescu on foreign policy, including China. His most
conciliatory stance toward Moscow since the first
of the year suggests Ceausescu's belief that his
trip to Peking had come dangerously close to
provoking an irrational reaction from Moscow.
Special Report
On the other hand, in his long foreign policy
report to the party conference, as well as other
recent actions, he upheld all the major tenets of
the Romanian course.
Ceausescu appears more interested than ever
in pursuing that course. In recent months he has
put on a greater show of responsiveness to the
Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. This has included
permission for a small convoy of Soviet non-
combatant vehicles to cross Romania in March
and somewhat closer relations with CEMA. Ceau-
sescu evidently reasons that by making controlled
concessions on the least thorny issues, he can
undercut any potential domestic or Soviet pres-
sure for increased give on more important mili-
tary, political, or economic questions.
Bucharest's closer cooperation with the bloc
institutions, Ceausescu's participation in this
year's Crimean summit, and his later private talks
with Soviet party chief Brezhnev point to a meas-
ured improvement in Romanian-Soviet relations.
These also convey at least a qualified endorse-
ment of the Romanian leader's policies by the
Kremlin. Such actions may. therefore, have the
added effect of buttressing Ceausescu's position
against domestic critics.
Although Bucharest's interest in the Euro-
pean Communities and the International Mone-
tary Fund does not please Moscow, the Roma-
nians apparently continue to believe that these
many-sided foreign policy initiatives best serve
their interests. Indeed, their preoccupation with
the establishment of a permanent secretariat
during the early phases of a Conference on Euro-
pean Security reflects their search both for insti-
tutional security and legitimacy. There is, how-
ever, a real and immediate reason for the Roma-
nian opening to the West. They need Western
knowledge and Western money. Indeed, in recent
months the Romanians have sometimes seemed
almost feverish in their search for more Western
credits. Although they are quite capable of crying
wolf, they have displayed increasingly serious and
genuine concern about the need for expanded
Western credits.
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Length of Romania's Frontiers
Frontiers (approx. miles)
-Total ?. land. Rive'r Std.
All' 1,970 670 1,150 150,
USSR 830 170 ,.: 660..:
Hungary 275 255 20
Yugoslavia 340 155 185
Bulgaria 370