WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT MOSCOW AND THE GEORGIANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500040043-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: December 15, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
SP ecial Report
Morcow and the Georgians
Secret
N2 657
15 December 1972
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 Special Report
scow and
the Georgians
A major crackdown appears under way in
Soviet Georgia following the rt.tirement of long-
time republic party boss Vasily Mzhavanadze and
the exposure of economic mismanagement and
corruption of major proportions. Mzhavanadze,
like Shelest in the Ukraine, was one of the few
regional leaders who seemed to resist Brezhn:v's
emergence as the dominant man in the Kremlin;
both went into political decline after Brezhnev
consolidated his position at the 24th Party Con-
gress. Although Mzhavanadze has not thus far
been personally impticated in the charges of cor-
ruption in Georgia, there are rumors that his wife
was involved, and it is clear that he is being held
responsible for the situation there. He will prob-
ably be relieved of his candidate membership on
the politburo at the next central committee
plenum.
The scandal that engulfed Mzhavanadze
involved the revelation of a vast network of
individuals, in and out of official positions, who
had amassed personal fortunes by misappro-
priating state funds, materials and land and by
manufacturing and selling consumer goods, all
quite illegally. Bribery, influence peddling, and
kickbacks ensured the cooperation of those in the
party and government whose job it was to prevent
such activity. While corruption of this sort is not
unusual in other parts of the Soviet Union, it wz s
especially flagrant in Georgia, where a free-
wheeling life style has combined with fierce na-
tional pride I- breed indifference-if not outright
disdain-for the finer points of communist ethics.
The character of Mzhavanadze's successor is
good evidence that Moscow is serious in its intent
to root out corruption in Stalin's homeland. The
new party boss, Eduard Shevardnadze, earned his
reputation as a tough crime-buster during his
many years as head of the republic militia. His
appointment to head the party is reminiscent of
the choice in 1969 of Azerbaydzhan KGB chief
Aliyev to take over and clean out the party after
the exposure of widespread corruption in that
republic. Shevardnadze's performance since he
took over in September suggests that similar
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house-cleaning in Georgia is getting started. Given
the aggressively independent nature of the Geor-
gians, however, it is unlikely that he will be able
to do more than eliminate the most glaringex-
cesses unless he resorts to really harsh measures.
The Georgian Scene
The swashbuckling, colorful Georgians are
immensely proud of their rich and ancient Chris-
tian heritage. Although their homeland was re-
peatedly overrun by foreign invaders-Byzantines,
Persians, Arabs and Turks-their culture and
language have been preserved intact. The Geor-
gian language, for example, has changed so little
11th Century Church in Mtskheta
Special Report
that school children toc'ay can easily read 12th
century Georgian poetry.
Thanks to Stalin, the republic has always
occupied a unique position in the Soviet Union.
Although Stalin quelled all Georgian strivings for
any real measure of independence from Moscow,
the republic enjoyed a privileged economic status
during his time, and the people are stubbornly-if
somewhat perversely-loyal to his memory. For
them, Stalin is still a national hero and a symbol
of Georgian greatness. Khrushchev's secret speech
in 1956 denouncing Stalin touched off riots in
Tbilisi that still stand as the worst civil disturb-
ances in recent Soviet hi;`; ?y. Since the riots,
Moscow has made an exception of the Georgians
and has permitted them to continue to honor the
memory of their native son. Two years ago, for
instance, the esplanade in Tbilisi was renamed
after Stalin and his portraits ri w appear on city
buses.
Furthermore, the Georgians were never
Russified to the same extent as other Soviet
minorities, and the republic's leaders are almost
entirely native Georgians. There are only sever
Slavs among the .123 full members of the Geor-
gian central committee. Georgia is also unique in
that it is the only republic where the number of
Russian inhabitants has declined in the last ten
years. The exodus was undoubtedly prompted by
the strong anti-Russian sentiment among the
Georgians, who have become increasingly out-
spoken ir, their practice of disparaging Russians
and things Russian. There is, however, more
sound than real fury in this attitude.
Life in Tbilisi has an air of vitality, gaiety,
and permissiveness, both in the style of living and
in the style of business. Georgia has the strictest
anti-narcotics laws in the USSR and probably has
a greater narcot cs problem than any other area.
Mzhavanaaze is, the only regional leader of con-
sequence who has ever publicly mentioned the
problem. Judging from the frequent complaints in
the press, there are probably more illegal firearms
in Georgia than anywhere else.
But most of all, it is the air of conspicuous
consumption that marks Georgian life. There are
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reportedly more private cars per capita there than
in any other republic. Collective farmers make a
good living peddling produce from their private
plots throughout the Soviet Union and the Geor-
gians, particularly the residents of Tbilisi, seem to
have money to lavish on good food and wine. The
fact that Georgian affluence is often the result of
shady business dealings is an open secret, and the
citizens take p;easure in insisting that there are
still millionaires in Georgia.
For the first few years after Khruch_nt i's
ouster, Moscow's control over the provir..es -as
relatively lax and assertiveness grew noticeably
not only among the Georgians but amorg the
other nationalities as well. The diffusion of au-
thority within the collective leadership and thn
co;rsequent difficulty in reaching agreement on
any question kept the Kremlin from taking strong
action against errant officials in the hinterlands.
Regional leaders were able to find high-level
patrons in Moscow and to play one leader off
against a:iother to protect themselves and their
own regions.
Mzhavanadze was one of the more inde-
pendent republic leaders and there was certainly
little interference from Moscow in his handling of
Georgian affairs.
Mzhavanadze[ I built
himself luxurious privat~in Tbilisi and in
various resort areas in Georgia. He lived in high
style. While he allegedly did not engage in corrupt
practices himself, he did not prevent others from
enriching themselves, with the result that under-
ground business blossomed.
n pu is is attitude was re-
flected in pride ul remarks about the Georgian
people; e.g., at the 24th Party Congress in 1971,
most regional leaders echoed Brezhnev in extrava-
gant praise of the Great Russians, but Mzhavan-
adze blithely took the opposite tack, pointing out
that the recent Moscow celebration of the 800th
anniversarv of Georgia's greatest poet, Shota
Rustaveli, had shown "enormous respect" for the
"ancient and original Georgian culture."
Georgian Night Life
While there is no good evidence as to who
Mzhavanadze's allies were on the politburo, his
frequent references to close ties between the
Georgians and the Ukrainians suggest a special
relationship to Shelest. Mzhavanadze and
Shelest-along with Kebin of Estonia-were the
regional leaders who took a dim view of Brezh-
nev's efforts to enhance his own authority. Their
opposition was reflected in the rather perfunctory
references to Brezhnev in their speeches, in con-
trast to the lavish praise heaped on the general
secretary by his supporters. While there were
other reasons, a key factor may well have been
the recognition by these regional bosses that any
weakening of collective leadership would mean
the emergence of a strong leader in the Kremlin
who would in turn restrict their freedt,m to
maneuver. Their fears were well founded; Mzhava-
nadze and Shelest found themselves isolated at
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111 . .
Statue in Moscow of 12th Century
Georgian Poet Shota Rustaveli
the 24th Party Congress. Their positions were
further weakened when Brezhnev emerged with
his authority significantly enhanced.
The first sign of serious trouble for Mzhavan-
adze came with the publication in Pravda on 6
March of a Central Committee decree criticizing
the Tbilisi party organization for a wide range of
shortcomings, including corruption, improper
personnel policies and ideological and nationalist an ess talk. he ax began to tall. In May, city
deviations. The appearance of the decree on the party secretary Nikolay Tskhakaya was removed
day after the anniversary of Stalin's death lent a for "errors" in his work. Tskhakaya was secretary
particularly ominous note to the criticism. for industry and was probably held responsible
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for much of the corruption uncovered in Tbilisi.
Toward the end of July, Lolashvili was demoted
and finally, at the end of September and two
weeks after his 70th birthday, Mzhavanadze him-
self stepped down. Although TASS reported that
he resigned at his own request because of age, he
clearly left under a clouc:. The praise accorded
him on the occasion of his birthday was con-
siderably cooler than he had received at the time
of his 60th birthday, and the choice of Georgia's
MVD chi%f rather than one of Mzhavanadze's own
political cronies to succeed him spoke loudly of
Moscow's lack of confidence in his leadership.
Since his retirement, Mzhavanadze's reputation
has been further damaged by additional disclo-
sures of the economic corruption that existed
during his tenure. The exclusion of his name from
a list of Politburo members who signed an
obituary in Pravda on 19 October suggests that,
for all practical purposes, he is no longer con-
25X1 sidered a member of the top party body. He will
almost certainly be formally removed at the next
central committee plenuri.
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