WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ZAIRE: SHABA COMES BACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 5, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Zaire: Shaba Comes Back
CIA
UOCUMEf1T S'RVS 111
FL E COPY
Did N
UMESHO'hughyt
Secret
N2 657
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5 January 1973
No. 0351/73A
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Special Report
5 January 1973
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Less than two weeks after independence, the
new Republic of the Congo was faced with a
cluster of serious problems-its army had mu-
tinied, its European functionaries were leaving,
.;nd its richest province was on the brink of seces-
sion. On 11 July 1960, three days before the
central government broke diplomatic relations
with Brussels, the leader of that province-then
called Katanga-proclaimed its independence and
called for "close economic community" with Bel-
gium. Under Moise Tshombe's direction the seces-
sion lasted 30 months, until UN military opera-
tions forced the breakaway regime to surrender.
Now, almost ten years after the end of that
secession, the province (renamed Shaba, the
Swahili word for copper, in January 1971) has
lived down its past and is well on the way to
being fully integrated into the Republic of Zaire.
The authority of the central government is un?
challenged-although sometimes resented-and is
slowly making itself felt in even the remotest
areas of the region. Domestic and foreign invest-
ment in Shaba's important mining industry has
been rising steadily since 1969. The economic
boom has been lessened somewhat, '- 'wever, by a
slump in world prices for copper, w'dch provides
the vast bulk of Shaba's (and Zaire's) exports.
Republic of the Congo . . Republic of Zaire
Leopoldville . . . . . . . . . . Kinshasa
Katanga . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shaba
Elizabethville . . . . . . . Lubumbashi
Albertville . . . . . . . . . . . Kalemie
These economic improvements are felt
largely in the mining belt of southern Shaba. The
rest of the province is still suffering from the
disruptions brought on by the secession. Agricul-
tural production is expanding only slowly, trans-
portation and communications facilities continue
to rust away, and social services are virtually
non-e>-;-,tent. Survivors of the Simba revolt in
1964 have turned to petty banditry and prey on
Special Report
the local populations along Lake Tanganyika,
often in competition with the army troops sent to
weed them out.
This independence is total. May God protect independent
Katanga.
The territory known as Shaba has always
been a special case. Its vast mineral wealth earned
it the status of a semi-autonomous enclave within
the Belgian Congo.' Through a complex system of
holding companies and affiliates, private Belgian
economic interests managed for years to keen
administrative and political control of the area
from falling into the hands of either Brussels or
the colonial government at Leopoldville. In 1933,
however, administrative control passed from the
special provincial vice governor to the bureauc-
racy in I- .opolclville. The move provoked a vio-
lent reaction from the area's Europeans who
regarded Leopoldville as the symbol of admin-
istrative "megalomania" and financial irre-
sponsibility.
Belgian and Congolese officials assumed
that, after independence, the new Congolese Gov-
ernment would take control of the Katanaa
mining industry, cruc'.31 to the Congo's economic
survival. Moise Tshombe and his powerful
Katanga Confederation Party had close ties with
the Belgian economic community and resisted
such a take-over. Katangans-both native and
European-distrusted Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba and his government and saw ample
evidence of its inability to mLintairi order. Taking
advantage of the mutiny of the Congo Army, the
breakdown of central authority, and the outbreak
of Iccal disorders, Tshombe on 11 July 1960
raised the flag of secessicn. Belgium quickly sent
in troops, ostensibly to protect European lives,
but primarily to restore order and ensure the
continuation of economic and administrative ac-
tivities. The Congolese Government, in turn,
requested military assistance from the United
Nations to counter Belgium's "aggression." Al-
though Belgium quickly withdrew its troops upon
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the arrival of a UN peace-keeping force, it con-
tinued to give political and material support to
the Tshombe regime.
With support from the United Kingdom and
the Republic of South Africa as well, the
Tshombe government was able to maintain politi-
cal control and, above all, continue mining opera-
tions. Although the provincial government was
"Africanized," Belgian technical assistance re-
mained at a high level. Belgian personnel in
Katanga remained at their posts, in sharp contrast
to the mass exodus that took place throughout
the rest of the Congo. With mineral production
and sources of revenue thus intact, the Tshombe
government was able to support extensive tech-
nical and administrative staffs plus a large army
led by foreign mercenaries and Belgian advisers.
While things were fairly settled in the mining
belt, unrest flared elsewhere in Katanga. For
example, the Tshombe regime was unable to sup-
press a large-scale revolt by the Baluba in North
Katanga. In response, mercenary-led Katangan
gendarmes carried out a reign of terror from
which the area has not fully recovered. In the
South, Tshombe carried out a ruthless and sys-
tematic purge of all political opp2sition.
...to Integration
We are ready to proclaim before the world that the
Katanga secession is ended.
Moise Tshombe, 14 January 1963
The Tshombe government finally collapsed
in January 1963, following a series of highly
successful military operations by the central gov-
ernment and the UN. Faced with an imminent
march on Elizabethville, the provincial capital,
Tshombe struck his colors and shortly thereafter
went into temporary exile in Spain. A smooth
reintegration of the province into the republic
was held back by mutual suspicion and bitterness
between Leopoldville and Katanga. The central
government, under the leadership of Prime Min-
ister Cyrille Adoula, feared that Tshombe would
be able to rally his supporters and make a new bid
for power.
Special Report
Even tvn return of Tshombe in the summer
of 1964 for a brief sojourn as prime minister at
President Kasavubu's request did little to lift the
pressure against Katanga. Tshombe, realizing that
his presence in Leopoldville provoked fears of a
"Katangan take-over" among old-line Congolese
politicians, bent over backwards not to show any
favoritism toward his home province. He called
or national unity and stated repeatedly that
secession was a thing of the past. Tshombe not-
withstinding, Congolese officials, bureaucrats,
and thy: army were more intent on revenge than
rehabilitation. With the exception of the southern
mining i,elt, the provinc' was virtually ignored.
Katangans were treated as pariahs; local politi-
cians were jailed or kept under preventive deten-
tion. Central government officials and military
personnel assigned to Katanga were given free rein
to run the province, and the government closed
its eyes to their excesses.
President Mobutu's seizure of power in No-
vember 1965 did little at first to change the
situation. Then a gradual shift in the central gov-
ernment's attitude toward Katanga began. The
turning point came in 1967 when Mobutu com-
Dleted his nationalization of the Belgian copper
mines, and Katangans refused, to the evident sur-
prise and delight of the central government, to
support an abortive invasion by foreign mer-
cenaries from Angola.
Moreover, in 1967 President Mobutu estab-
lished a countrywide official political party, the
Popular Movement of the Revolution. This act
brought to an end his two-year moratorium on
political activity which he regarded as having been
at the heart of the Congo's instability. The party,
besides being designed to bolster Mobutu's
authority, served also to absorb former political
leaders, including those from Katanga, who were
considered to be ready for rehabilitation. Katanga
got its fai, share of appoirtments to the party's
political bureau and regional organizations.
The national election campaign in late 1970
gave the central government, through the party,
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Republic of Zaire
Peoples Republic
of the
Congo
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its first major opportunity to reach rural Congo-
lese, many of whom had only minimal contact
with the government since the collapse of the
Belgian administrative system in 1960. In
Katanga, as well as other regions of the country,
party officials stumped the countryside seeking to
instill a degree of political consciousness in a
heretofore largely apathetic population. Although
Mobutu and the party-approved regional slate for
the national legislature ran unopposed, a heavy
voter turnout pointed to a new-found party
ability to mobilize people, if nothing else.
Since then, the party has concentrated on
swallowing up the village and tribal structures
that provided governmental services during the
secession and its aftermath, and on transferring
regional and tribal alliances to the central govern-
ment. Success has been uneven, because tribal
loyalties are strong and the central government is
viewed with deep suspicion. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment has enjoyed a measure of success in
enlisting the support of tribal chiefs, even those
who once supported the secession. The govern-
ment has even managed to line up the brothers of
Moise Tshombe and well-known associates like
Godefroid Munongo, minister of interior and
security chief of the secessionist regime. The
latter was appointed to a government job by
Mobutu in 1971.
The tendency toward regionalism, a major
problem throughout the country's history, has
been weakened now that all important govern-
mental posts throughout the country, and par-
ticularly in the province, are Mobutu appointees.
They are not natives of the region in which they
serve and owe their primary loyalty to Mobutu
and the central government. The capital keeps a
watch for signs of corruption and mismanage-
ment, though the watch is not always kept with
even-handed dedication. The heavy influx of
of accusations and counter-accusations and even-
tually resulted in the dismissal of the mayor on
grounds of mismanagement and corruption.
Despite the charges, the real reason was that the
mayor came out second best in a personality clash
with the governor.
The governor's victory was not very long
lived. Shortly after the mayor's dismissal, the
governor himself, regarded by Zairian and foreign
observers alike as one of the country's best ad-
ministrators, was recalled to Kinshasa for "grave
failures" in the performance of his duties. In
September 1972 he was sentenced to a one-year
prison term for "anti-revolutionary acts," specifi-
cally for spreading "malicious rumors" about
Guinean President Sekou Toure at a time when
Mobutu was trying to improve Zairian-Guinean
relations. The new governor, taking his cue from
the fate of his predecessor, is keeping his head
down.
As a result of this sequence of events, many
provincial leaders have been left with the uneasy
feeling that the central government, dependent
upon a president who often seems capricious and
intemperate, may not be as stable as it appears. It
certainly makes the central government more dif-
ficult to deal with. Local politicians, for example,
were dumbfounded when Mobutu decided to
change the name of the region in order to "Afri-
canize" it, even though the old name, Katanga, is
as African as the new one. Then, Mobutu's at-
tacks early this year on the Catholic Church,
which inter alia provides the bulk of the prov-
ince's social services outside the mining belt, and
party propaganda that attempts virtually to deify
him add to the uneasiness of local officials. The
feeling is general, but so far has evoked little more
than res;y-;ied shrugs; it is not at this time likely to
be translated into active opposition.
civilian and military personnel from the central Another source of uncertainty is +he convic-
government, while useful for Mobutu, has also tion around that Kinshasa does not keep as tight a
increased the chances for political clashes. In rein on the local army as it does on civilian
early 1972, for example, a three-way political officials. This is particularly true along Lake
feud developed among the provincial governor, Tanganyika where survivors of the late 1964
the mayor of the capital city, and the area army Simba revolt carry on a low scale but irritating
commander. The feud gave rise to a tangled snarl insurgency that is little more than banditry. The
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unrest fostered by these dissident groups has been
increased rather than abated by the abuses of
ill-disciplined Zairian troops sent in to suppress
the bandit rebels. In November 1972, army com-
mander General Bumba recalled the sector's army
commander and his staff and the commander of
the lake guard to answer charges of exceeding
their authority and mistreating civilians in the
area of Kalemie. The sector commander's prede-
cessor had been relieved of duty on similar
charges five months earlier. Lack of discipline and
a general contempt for civilians have long char-
acterized the ranks of the army, however, and will
not be eradicated by isolated disciplinary actions
like this.
Economic Progress
The economic heart of Shaba is the mining
belt. The belt provides about 80 percent of
Zaire's exports and generates 45 percent of the
Copper Mine
Special Report
central government's revenues, primarily from
copper. At the time of independence, mining in
the belt accounted for 75 percent of Zaire's entire
mineral production. An cxt ;;sire and we!!-de-
veloped rail and road network supported the
mining operations, which employed one third of
the province's 1.6 million people. Shaba also had
the largest population of European technicians
and administrators of any province, around
30,000. The industry was valued at $236 million.
Since 1967 President Mobutu has sought to
internationalize and diversify mining operations,
not only as a- means of finding additional capital
but also to offset the pervasive Belgian presence
throughout the industry. The government hopes
ghat by 1976 domestic and foreign investment in
mining and related activities will reach $1 billion.
The state-owned Gecamines (La Generale
des Carrieres et des Mines du Zaire), established in
1967 to replace the Belgian-owned Union
Miniere, is in the midst of a five-year development
program designed to increase copper production,
which reached 406,000 tons in 1971, by at least
five percent a year. The program calls for an
investment of $100 million to be jointly financed
by Gecamines, the Export-Import Bank, and the
European Investment Bank.
The largest single foreign source of new in-
vestment has been and is Japan. In 1967 President
Mobutu awarded a copper concession to a Japa-
nese consortium led by the Nippon Mining Com-
pany. Operating through its Zairian affiliate,
Sodimiza (Societe de Developpement Industriel et
Minier du Zaire) the consortium hopes to produce
about 50,000 tons of copper per year from two
sites and is expected to begin work at a third site
in the near future. Total Japanese investment is
likely to reach $200 million by 1975. At present,
Sodimiza employs about 300 Japanese tech-
nicians and administrators, although this number
is expected to decrease gradually as African tech-
nicians are trained.
An international consortium, led by Stand-
ard Oil of Indiana and including British, French,
and Japanese interests, was awarded a concession
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by Gecamines in 1970 and hopes to be producing
at least 150,000 tons of copper a year by 1976.
By that time its total investment is expected to
approach $300 million.
Thus, the once-dominant Belgian presence
has been drastically reduced. Brussels no longer
participates directly in copper mining operations.
Through a highly complex system of interlocking
directorates and subsidiaries, Brussels does op-
erate a number of small affiliates, such as a
manganese mining operation near the Angolan
border. Apart from these affiliates, Belgium no
longer invests in the mining industry, although it
continues to handle the international transporta-
tion and refining of ore from Gecamines. The
30,000 Belgian technicians and administrators
who once made Shaba their private preserve have
been cut to about 1,600.
Development of the mining industry has
spurred development in related areas. Top pri-
ority is being given to the Inga-Shaba power
project designed to meet the increasing power
needs of Shaba's industrial growth. The govern-
ment is studying bids for construction of a
1,000-mile-long transmission line between the
Inga Dam near the mouth of the Congo River and
the Shaba copperbelt. The line is expected to be
completed by 1976 at a cost of $300 million.
General Electric, Westinghouse, and an Anglo-
Belgian firm have expressed interest in the
project. In addition, the government plans to
spend about $100 million expanding and mod-
ernizing the rail system that serves the mining
areas. Japan has proposed construction of a rail
line from Port Francqui to Kinshasa at an esti-
mated cost of $400 million. Completion of the
project would provide a direct rail link between
Shaba and the port of Matadi on the Congo River.
Not surprisingly, the rest of Shaba has been
virtually orphaned by the central government.
Kinshasa prefers to allocate the province's share
of national resources to the mining belt. Agricul-
tural production is rising very slowly. The wide-
spread agricultural network that existed in north-
ern Shaba was largely destroyed during the dis-
orders of the secession and has not been restored.
Special Report
Most of the area remains tied to self-supporting
agriculture and barter economies. Transportation
and communications facilities are slipping down-
hill since the rate of repair does not keep pace
with the rate of decay. At present, the only bright
spots outside the mining belt are a number of
sizable cotton plantations in northern Shaba, and
cattle ranching, which has been growing con-
tinuously since 1967.
In the longer term, Shaba is likely to be
caught between over-development of its mining
industry and under-development of its other re-
sources. Although copper production was ex-
pected to be up slightly last year, revenues were
down sharply because of a decline in copper
prices. Prospects for a resurgence in the world
market do not appear good at the present time
and this colors the economic outlook in Zaire.
Zaire supplies only about six percent of the
world's copper and will face stiff competition as
it tries to increase that percentage.
Already, the government is finding it dif-
ficult to attract foreign investors to set up indus-
trial plants that will draw on the Inga-Shaba
project. Since there is a world surplus in those
minerals like aluminum that Zaire would like to
exploit and since prices for these minerals are
low, potential investors have been reluctant to set
up shop in Shaba. The mining industry is steadily
becoming less and less profitable, but the govern-
ment is doing little to develop alternate sources of
income like agriculture and fishing.
Although the banditry and related arms
smuggling in the Lake Tanganyika area, combined
with the government's failure to maintain military
discipline, has fostered instability in that area, it
is more of a fragmented nuisance than a cohesive
threat, and is not likely to spread beyond its
present limits.
In spite of all these difficulties, there is a
sense of confidence in the future of the mining
belt, both in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Kin-
shasa's past indifference to Shaba's needs,
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motivated by a belief that the province had to be
punished for its secessionist transgressions, has
been replaced by a desire to send capable and
reasonable officials and civil servants into the
province. The picture is marred by the occasional
capriciousness of Mobutu or by intra-regional
rivalries, and by a lack of attention to areas in
Shaba outside the copper belt. In this part of
Shaba, most of the services normally provided by
governmental agencies have to be supplied by
religious missions, and development, left to local
initiatives and resources, lags badly. Kinshasa is
doing little in the way of building needed schools,
clinics, and development projects. As a con-
sequence, much of Shaba is left in the position of
being in Zaire but not of it.
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